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"And ye sail weill trow all and ken 
That we are command of gentilmen, 
The sempillest now oure ost within 
Has gert gentillis in his kyn" 
"And you shall all truly know 
That we are descended from gentlemen, 
The humblest man in our army 
Has great nobles in his ancestry." 
Trans. C. Brown. 
Chron. Wyntoun, vol. v, p.338. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political, social and, in particular, military conditions that influenced the 
allegiance of the men and women of the political community of Lothian, that is to say those people with 
personal landholding, legal and military obligations whose services were crucial to the efficient 
administration of the sheriffdom and whose support was courted by kings and magnates alike. 
The key issue is the high degree of survival among these minor landed families. The upper strata of 
Scottish political society undervvent considerable changes in the early to middle fourteenth century 
through the fortunes of war, in particular through the disinheritance of the Comyn family and their allies 
early in the reign of Robert I. Some families lost their Scottish properties, such as the Balliols and the 
Comyns. Others grew in stature; notably the Douglases and, in Lothian specifically, the Setons and the 
Lauders. Most landholders would probably have been content to retain their inheritances, and indeed, 
virtually all of the Lothian landed families of the late thirteenth century would seem to have managed to 
do just that. 
A high rate of success is not necessarily evidence that something is easily achieved; the retention of 
family properties was a complex business in wartime. In the period 1296-1314 the political community 
had to discharge their fmancial, legal and military burdens to the party currently in charge, but \vithout 
permanently compromising themselves \vith the opposition, who might, after all, be in a position to exert 
lordship themselves at some point in the future. The military burdens are central to this thesis. Army 
service was a very obvious indication of allegiance. Given the nature of the normal practice of war in 
thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe, it is inevitable that this study examines the nature and incidence 
of armoured cavalry service in Lothian. The overvvhehning majority of that service was performed by 
minor landholders. Records of their service in garrisons or their forfeiture as rebels provide us with a 
guide to the rate and incidence of defections from one party to another and therefore some guide to the 
degree to which a particular party was able to impose their lordship. 
The thesis explores the various challenges that faced the lesser landholders and more prosperous 
tenants and burgesses who lived through the Wars of Independence from the campaign of 1296 which 
ended the reign of King John and imposed the rule of Edward I, until 1341 when Edinburgh castle was 
recovered by the Scots from the forces of Edward III. It also questions the extent to which Edward III was 
able to impose his lordship in Lothian, considers the nature of the forces ranged against him and 
challenges the perception that only the outbreak of the Hundred Years War prevented the operational 
defeat of the Bruce party. 
The siege of Edinburgh castle in 1341 marked the end of the last attempt by an English medieval 
king to provide Lothian with a government. Naturally this would not have been abundantly apparent at 
the time; however subsequent English invasions, though they might attack Edinburgh, were not designed 
to bring about the conquest of Lothian. The political environment of Lothian landholders therefore 
differed substantially in 1296-41 compared to the century either side of the Wars of Independence in that 
the minor nobility faced difficult decisions which had to be made on assessments of the likely eventual 
success of the Balliol, Plantagenet and Bruce parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It could be argued that no other period 'made' Scotland the way it IS so much as the Wars of 
Independence. Many other countries experienced wars of similar or greater duration that were equally 
devastating' but the political consciousness of many Scots is still shaped or influenced by their 
perceptions of the conflict, particularly in the period l296-13l4? The legacy is as much a matter of 
romance as record; the frequent near-extinction of the 'patriotic' party, the adversities and triumphs of 
William Wallace and Robert I, the fickle nature of the Scottish nobility and the eventual success of the 
'nationalist' cause at Bannockburn in 1314. Despite the conflation, exaggeration and, doubtless, pure 
invention of chroniclers and poets in relation to the gestes of Wallace and Bruce, there can be no doubt 
that both men were genuinely heroic figures to a large body of opinion within their ovvn lifetimes, as well, 
of course, as being genuinely wicked terrorists to a great deal of the rest of the population. The 
perception that the wars were 'won' by Bruce at Bannockburn can be dismissed by even the most cursory 
study of Scotland in the ensuing decade, let alone in the 1330s to 1350s. 
What of the 'fickle' nature of the nobility? The regularity with which the great lords of Scotland, 
Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick, for example, deserted one party for another gives some substance to the 
argument that the Scots nobility were less than consistent in their support of the 'patriotic' cause. For a 
variety of reasons discussed elsewhere in this thesis, it \vould have been extremely difficult for 
1 Devastation was, in itself, an important military activity. Rogers, Wars, pp. 271-283, has pointed to the 
economic consequences of: disruption of the enemy's economy and therefore his ability to wage war. He also 
considers the use of destruction to coerce the enemy into offering or accepting battle in unfavourable 
circumstances. Pursuing political objectives through devastation operations - whether undermining the 
credibility of the opposing government or directly enforcing obedience from his subjects - was also an 
important factor. See also E. Fryde Peasants and Landlords in Medieval England (Stroud, 1986) pp. 221-
233; CIPA1, i, no. 1795 for damage sustained to the manor of Manilawes in Northumberland; CDS, iii, pp. 
327-41 for many examples of devastation in Lothian in 1335-6. See also Allmand, C., 'War and Non-
Combatants' in Keen, M.,Medieval Wmfare, a HistOlY (Oxford, 2000) pp. 259-61. 
2 This is not to suggest that there was no sense of a national identity in Scotland before the Wars of 
Independence, rather, as Dr. Webster suggests inlvledieval Scotland. The Making of an Identity, (Basingstoke, 
1997) p.77 that it was present but not yet 'extensively articulated in a situation where the Scots had a very 
difficult problem to solve'. 
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fourteenth- century Scots to defIne an ethically 'proper' standpoint on the thorny question of allegiance. 
The immediate import of such a question was, as might be expected, severely compromised by the 
economic, legal, social and political realities of life. The value of being ideologically 'correct' may not 
have seemed high if it brought the threat of disinheritance, poverty, imprisonment or even death, either on 
the battlefIeld or on the gallows. 
Historians have worked on the war period in different genres: general political histories, biographies, 
family and military histories. Inevitably these categories overlap in any period but the history of Scotland 
in the fIrst half of the fourteenth century is positively saturated with war to the degree that it dominates 
virtually every aspect of society. In his outstanding work Scotland:T71e Later Middle Ages3 Ranald 
Nicholson devoted over 100 pages to the Wars of Independence, a period of sixty years or less, but less 
than fIfty pages to the agriculture, commerce, culture and society of Scotland from the close of the 
thirteenth century until the middle of the fifteenth. Similarly, Alexander Grant devotes more than fifty 
pages of his Independence and Nationhood 4to Scotland's fourteenth-century "vars, but only twenty-seven 
to her economy and society over a rather longer period. War is a central theme of the history of Scotland 
in the later middle ages simply because there \vas so much of it. The pressures of war affected the 
economy through war damage, militarised the political community in the sense that service was rather 
more 'active' than it had been before 1296, politicised the clerical community and bred a tradition of 
Anglo-Scottish antipathy that coloured the relations between the two cOIDltries for centuries. 5 
There have been several political studies of the Wars of Independence; E. M. Barron's Scottish War 
of Independence,6 Colm MacNamee's T71e Wars of the Bruce/ Michael Penman's Scottish Civil War, 
8Michael Bro\vn's Wars of Scotlancf and several excellent articles and essays including Barrow's 
3 Nicholson, Middle Ages. 
J A. Grant, Independence and Nationhood (London, 1979). 
5 The very titles of several ,vorks are indicative of this; F. Watson's Under the Hammer and N. MacDougall's 
An Antidote to the English (Edinburgh, 2002). 
6 E. M. Barron, Scottish War. This volume continues to be influential tll0ugh much of Barron's analysis is of 
questionable value at best. 
7 C. MacNamee, The Wars of the Bruce. (East Linton, 1997). 
8 M. Penman, The Scottish Civil War (Stroud, 2002). 
9 M. Brown, TV ars of Scotland (Edinburgh, 2004). 
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'Lothian in the War of Independence' 10 and 'Mtennath of War,ll and Duncan's 'War of the Scots'.12 
Barron, Penman, MacNamee and Duncan naturally deal with the war from a 'national' perspective. They 
are concerned with 'national' issues and 'national' outcomes, rather than the course of the war as it 
affected particular localities. Neither MacNamee nor Brown nor Penman addresses the issues of Lothian 
to any great extent. MacNamee concentrated on the recovery of the Bruce cause after 1307, the attacks on 
northern England and the invasion of Ireland, as did Penman. Each region of Scotland will have had a 
different experience of the war years. In Lothian there was very little in the way of fighting between the 
Strathord agreement in 1304 and the battle of Bannockburn in 1314 or, despite Edward II's invasions, 
between 1314 and 1335, but a great deal between 1335 and 1341. In the north-east there was a great deal 
of action between 1307 and 1309, but little, if any, betw·een 1309 and 1334 and, despite the operations of 
Edward III, virtually none after the defeat of Sir David Strathbogie at Culblean. 
The single military event that has attracted most attention from students of medieval Scotland and 
the one that is most prominent in the consciousness of the general public is of course the battle of 
Bannockburn. 13 Although illlquestionably of great significance, the relevance of Bannockburn to the 
general military experience of medieval Scots has surely been greatly exaggerated. Large open-field 
engagements ,vere sufficiently rare as to be almost an anomaly. Even when a large anny was raised 
specifically to seek out battle - Edward I in 1301-2 and 1306, Edward II in 1310 and 1319 and Edward III 
repeatedlyl4 - it more often than not disbanded without making any major contact with the enemy. 
Despite the wide extent of military service among the political community particularly, it would 
seem that very few men participated in more than one or two major battles save for a very small group of 
professional soldiers - men who made a career out of soldiering as opposed to men who discharged their 
10 G.W.S Barrow, 'Lothian in the First War of Independence' SHR LV (1976). 
11 G.W.S. Barrow, 'The Aftermath of War' TRHS (1978). 
12 AAM. Duncan, 'The War of the Scots, 1306-23', TRHS (1992) 
13 Several books have been published on the battle ofBarmockbum, including W. M. McKenzie's Battle of 
Bannockburn (Glasgow, 1913) A Nusbacher's Bannockburn 1314 (Stroud, 2000) and W.W. Scott's 
Bannockburn Revealed (private, 2000). Curiously, there has been no modern, full-length academic study of 
this battle. 
14 S. Waugh points out that after Halidon Hill, 'The Scots rallied and Edward brought armies northward again 
and again for the next four years to no avail'. England "1 the Reign of Edward III (Cambridge, 1991), p. 14. 
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service obligations. The outcome of battle might have significant effects, but the structures and practices 
of field armies and the tactical application of the constituent elements of such forces are not a good guide 
to the nature of the war at a more mundane level. It is clear from both record and chronicle accounts that 
the general practice of active campaigning in fourteenth-century Scotland ,vas almost exclusively 
conducted by parties of men-at-arms, seldom, if ever, greater than a fevv hundred strong. 15 Though small, 
these forces ,vere obviously of great significance. The success or otherwise of royal administrations 
depended on their support and the careers of successful war leaders were built on their ability to draw 
such men to their service. The lives of those men and women form the subject of this study. Like their 
counterparts elsewhere, they were subject to the course of events at a national level, but they were also 
bound by local ties and political considerations. This was no less the case in Lothian than anywhere else. 
As the location of the most significant to\\'ll in the land (certainly after the destruction of Berwick in 
1296) and a relatively high concentration of urban development and castles, the three constabularies of 
Lothian, Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow constitute one of the most intensively recorded areas of 
medieval Scotland. Bounded by the Firth of Forth to the North, the River Avon to the West and the 
Dunglass burn to the East, Lothian was (and continues to be) an administrative unit. 16 It was (and is) also 
an area of high agricultural productivity and therefore desirable, but vulnerable to attack since there were 
no significant geographical barriers to be considered. The combination of the political and military 
significance of Lothian, the relatively ,vide range of material relating to the military service of the 
political community of the sheriffdom and the considerable disparity between the perception of Lothian as 
a war-zone and the reality of military conditions as revealed by record sources make Lothian a good 
choice for the focus of an investigation into the operational and political lives of the men ,vho served. 
15 Knight and man-at-anns service was a vital component in the Scottish Wars ofIndependence to judge by 
the regularity with which it is recorded. Professor Howard's assertion that armoured cavalry service \vas an 
'elegant anachronism' in the later middle ages is of questionable value in relation to general engagements and 
does not bear examination at all in relation to the usual practice of war throughout the fourteenth century. M. 
Howard, vVar in European History (Oxford, 1976), p. 16. 
16 The current division into independent Local Authority establishments - West Lothian, Midlothian, East 
Lothian and City of Edinburgh - does not compromise the validity of Lothian as a tenn. Many of the 
institutions oflocal government continue to be 'combined operations', notably the Police and Fire services. 
Perhaps more importantly, Scottish people continue to speak of 'Lothian' or even 'The Lothians' confident 
that what they mean is what the listener hears. 
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The minor gentry who conducted the lion's share of the day-on-day operational burdens in these 
wars were not simply soldiers. They were landholders with estates to run, they had judicial obligations to 
discharge and they had family responsibilities and political relationships with the crO\OVTI, with magnates 
and \vith one another. These are considered in Chapter 2, "Rights and Responsibilities" and Chapter 3, 
"Landholding in Fourteenth-Century Lothian". Naturally, for most Lothian men the war had a Lothian 
focus, and the most obvious aspect of the war would have been the local garrisons. Several Lothian men 
served in Plantagenet garrisons both in 1296-1314 and 1333-41 as paid soldiers, chiefly as men-at-arms. 
Many more would have given the customary military service attached to their landholdings to avoid 
forfeiture. 
As sources of employment, centres of administration or as a visible enemy, garrisons were a feature 
in the life of the community and are examined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5, "Service and Allegiance" 
considers the extent and the practicalities of military obligations on Lothian landholders. The 
proposographical appendix that accompanies this thesis is intended to show the members of the political 
community in their familial and military contexts. It comprises a series of profiles of Lothian families of 
some status. The free tenants, king's and bishop's tenants, knights and barons who, collectively, illustrate 
the experience of the political community of the sheriffdom. These family profiles were assembled from a 
variety of sources. At least one member of each of the Lothian families listed appears on the Ragman 
Roll, a collection of affirmations of acceptance of the rule of Edward I gathered in August 1296. Most of 
those individuals appear elsewhere (though only once in many cases) in published compilations of 
medieval record material including Bain's Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland,Regesta Regum 
Scottorum, Rotuli Scotia, Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scotorum, The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland 
and, Stevenson's Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland,17 the published collections of 
17 RMS lists the various instruments of Scottish kings issued under the Great Seal, RRS volumes detail the 
acta of those kings and ER records their surviving fmancial records. Rot. Scot. is a collection of material 
gathered by English governments in connection with Scottish affairs. Stevenson's Documents and Bain's 
CDS (and the supplementary volume by G. Simpson and 1. Galbraith) are general compilations of material 
from a variety of sources. In the century and more since their publication many faults have been identified in 
both Bain and Stevenson's work, particularly in relation to the editorial choices made by the compilers, 
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religious houses, and of Scottish historical societies, the calendars of Chancery, Post Mortem and 
Miscellaneous Inquisitions, Close Rolls and of course in contemporary narrative accounts such as the 
Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey and Bow'er's Scotichronicon. 
In an attempt to augment the selections chosen by the editors and writers of these collections and 
chronicles extensive use was made of the 'search' functions of the catalogues of the National Archives at 
Kew and the Archives of Scotland at East Register House. The names of all of the individuals listed in the 
profiles and the names of all of the properties, estates, tovms and baronies of Lothian that had been 
collected from published collections were entered as 'search' questions and the documents cited in the 
response - if any - were compared to the existing body of information. Although this exercise produced 
many references, few of the results were within the period 1280-1360 and there were very few indeed that 
have not appeared in print. The period is somewhat longer than that covered by this study, but it seemed 
desirable to examine any information about these families which might be material to understanding their 
status and political inclinations before the Wars of Independence and also the extent to which they had 
declined/survived/prospered during the last years of the conflict. The exercise may not have been a 
resounding success in the sense of generating a great deal of new information, but it helped considerably 
in revealing the shortcomings in the indexing of various volumes, resolving some questions of identity 
between men bearing the same name and drawing attention to translators' choices of vocabulary. 18 
The careers of several of the major figures of the early fourteenth century have been appraised in 
some detail, notably in Geoffrey Barrow's Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm of 
Scotland, 19 which is of course rather more than a royal biography, Michael Prestwich's Edward 1 20 and 
Michael Penman's David II.21 As the definitive source of authority in medieval societies, the study of 
however it is worth bearing in mind the sheer scale of the undertakings. Bain calendared approximately 
10,000 documents. Despite their faults Bain and Stevenson's works have proved to be extremely useful tools 
for this thesis. 
18 For example Stevenson's choice of 'men-at-arms' tor hommes de pie (footmen) in INA C47122/21l8, 
Stevenson Documents, ii, p.180, 
19 Barro,,,', Bnlce. 
20 M. Prestwich, Edward I (London 1980). 
21 M. Penman, David II. 
12 
kingship is crucial to any understanding of the nature of the society and the functioning of government. 
To achieve effective government, it was necessary for kings to devolve po,ver to earls and other great 
lords with traditional support, thus providing a source of authority that was both locally credible and 
sympathetic to the crown. Temporal magnate status need not have been inherited, though generally of 
course it was. It could be achieved through successful service to the crovm. In The Black Douglases]2 
Michael Brovm has made a detailed study of the rapid rise of the Douglas family from minor barons to 
magnate status through the military abilities of the 'good' Sir James and his descendants. As the Douglas 
estates grew they naturally acquired existing tenants, thus increasing their military resources, but 
successful leadership in war could attract the support of men other than their military tenants and other 
men over whom they had rights of lordship. The men and women who appear in this thesis are very much 
the sort of people whose support was actively sought by Sir James and other ambitious lords; the people 
who could provide them with military and political support in exchange for protection, patronage and 
political leadership. Alan Young's TIle Comyns, Robert the Bruce's Rivals,23 examines the rise of a 
magnate family through the more traditional route of consistent crovvn service over several generations. 
The power and influence of families like the Douglases and the Comy'l1s was both exerted through, and 
underpinned by, the lesser nobility, the rank of men and ,vomen who were registered on the Ragman 
Rolf4 of 1296 as being 'of the county of.. .. ' Fife or Lanark or Edinburgh, rather than as individually 
named lords or clerics, or as the representatives of burghs. 
In Lothian there was no recent tradition of an intermediate source of authority between the king and 
the 'county' homagers (the term 'homagers' was used by Bain, and here, to denote those whose status 
demanded a personal declaration of loyalty to the crown) who formed the local political and military 
community. This does not mean that there was no magnate influence in Lothian, but it does mean that the 
majority of the political community were more likely to be led by local considerations and the trends of 
local opinion than might be the case in an area dominated by a magnate ,vith wider responsibilities. The 
22 M. BroViJ.l, The Black Douglases (East Linton, 1998). 
2; A. Young, The Comyns. Robert the Bruce's Rivals (East Linton, 1997). 
2.+ CDS, ii, no. 823. 
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existence of a magnate class tends to obscure the lives of their immediate subtenants. Not only are the 
magnates themselves better recorded as individuals due to their relative social and political prominence, 
but they directed, at least in theory, the activities of their tenants to the extent that often such people did 
not always need to be named in official documents of restoration or homage and fealty. The allegiance of 
the superior could be deemed to have included his or her tenants and other dependants. The majority of 
Lothian landholders were the possessors of relatively small estates and did not have the sort of 
relationship with great lords that has generally been seen as a vital element in the pyramidal structure that 
is traditionally, if erroneously, associated with medieval societies. The most significant source of 
authority in their lives was the king, or at least his appointed officer, the sherifes 
The origins of the high incidence of 'in capite' tenancies in Lothian cannot be defmitively 
demonstrated, though it would seem likely that the large number of relatively small properties and 
baronies throughout the sheriffdom were conversions from ministeriallandholdings26 in the early twelfth 
century (if not before) as part of a royal policy aimed at providing the crovm with a 'modem' heavy 
cavalry element of knights and men-at-arms.27 The status of 'king's tenants', as they are described in the 
Ragman Roll, is less clear, though they were obviously men (and unlike the 'county' homagers they were 
all men) of some standing in the community. They may not have enjoyed quite the same status as the 
'county' homagers, but the members of both groups had a direct and personal relationship with the crown. 
Their obligations, military, judicial or financial (and generally, if not invariably, a combination of all 
three) were those of individuals, not of a class. This may have been the product of the scale of 
landholding. The relatively small size of Lothian estates meant that there were few' men with the 
obligation to serve with a retinue of men-at-arms, though such service was extensively owed, and 
discharged, by the political community. There is, therefore, a high incidence of named individuals in 
25 This was a two-way process; Professor. MacQueen has observed that the decentralised nature of Scottish 
government effectively required the king's law officers - the sheriffs and the justiciars - to co-operate with 
local men. MacQueen, Common Law p. 253. 
:6 Ministerial landholdings - tenures that were not heritable. 
27 Duncan, Scotland .pp. 370-1,377. 
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garrison muster rolls and horse valuations. Only a very tiny proportion of the men on station appear as 
unnamed 'scutifers' or 'socii' in the company of a more prominent individual. 
The minor nobility of Scotland comprised some thousands offamily groups, several hundred of which 
were primarily based in Lothian, though naturally many of them had interests elsewhere in Scotland or in 
England. Few of its members appear more than once or twice in record and many of those who do appear 
more frequently do so mostly through documentation of service or forfeiture. Although the information 
relating to each individual is slight, the sum of their experiences as a group is very extensive. This does 
not mean that a synthetic 'typical' model of the Lothian free tenant in the fourteenth century can be 
constructed. The most consistent factor in the lives of the political community could reasonably be said to 
be inconsistency. As Alexander Grant writes in Independence and Nationhood, ' ... their actions could 
only be determined by personal considerations and were bound to be inconsistent. ,28 
Inconsistent or otherwise, the sound administration of Lothian \;vas heavily dependent on the 
cooperation of the political community. The willingness of the community to accept a particular source of 
lordship was obviously dependent on what that lordship could do for the community. In the early 
fourteenth century the party most able to exclude war from Lothian would surely have enjoyed more 
popular support than its rival. Edward I ,vas able to make his rule in Lothian reasonably secure having 
won it through battle in 1296. Edward II lost Lothian through battle in 1314, though his influence there 
must have already been on the wane follo\;ving the loss of Linlithgow peel and Edinburgh castle. Both, but 
obviously Edinburgh particularly, were important indicators of the power of the administration. Edward 
III won Lothian through battle in 1333 but could not provide the good lordship necessary to secure the 
allegiance of the community. Robert I gained Lothian through battle as well, though ability to coerce the 
community into paying for truces indicates that his influence, though not the acceptance of his kingship, 
\vas increasingly significant before Bannockburn. Robert I does seem to have been able to make his 
lordship acceptable to a large portion of the political community of Lothian between 1314 and 1329 given 
the extensive support there for the Bruce party during Edward Ill's administration of the sheriffdom. Most 
28 A. Grant,Independence and Nationhood (London, 1984), p.2S. 
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of the activity against Edward III's Lothian administration would come from Lothian itself. There is little 
doubt that Scottish troops from other areas saw senTice in Lothian during that period, but the daily 
practice of the war was the work of local men under local leaders, in particular Sir Alexander Ramsay and 
Sir William Douglas of Lothian29 (see Appendix). Neither of these men was born into magnate status. 
They derived their power through developing reputations for consistent success in the field at the head of 
small forces drm\'TI from minor lairds, burgesses and free tenants, men with specific personal 
responsibilities in local judicial and military administration. 
Throughout the rest of southern and eastern Scotland the range and burden of obligations on the 
minor gentry would probably have been much the same as in Lothian, but this does not mean that Lothian 
was absolutely 'typical' of Scottish, or even 'Lowland' sheriffdoms. It would be reasonable to assume 
that for practical purposes the legal and military responsibilities of landholders in Dumfriesshire or 
Aberdeenshire were not radically different to those of their Lothian equivalents, but it should not be 
assumed that they were identical. Also, for a variety of reasons, the war would not have had an identical 
impact in each locality.30 Distance from major concentrations of Plantagenet, Balliol or Bruce sympathy, 
the influence of local magnates, the ease or otherwise with which the differing factions could exert 
military or political pressure in a given area and, naturally, the course of the war as a \vhole at a particular 
juncture, would all affect the political complexion of each area in different ways.31 
In 1934 E.M. Barron made the case that not only had Gaelic Scotland borne the brunt of King John's 
and King Robert's wars between 1296 and 1314, it was, he claimed, a struggle in which Lothian had 
'played no part.,32 Professor Barrow's piece 'Lothian during the First War of Independence,33 made a 
29 Despite the conditions of the 'Perpetual Peace' of 1328, Douglas may have been involved in raids in 
England late in 1330 CDS, iii, no. 1029. If so, it did not prevent him from receiving crown pan-onage in 
March 133l. RRS, vi, p.57. 
30 Between 1307 and 1309 there was a great deal of conflict in the northeast and very little in the southeast, a 
situation reversed in 1337-4l. 
31 M. Jones has commented on the diversity of experience of war in France during the Hundred Years War. 
'France in the Fourteenth Century' in Rogers Wars, pp. 343-8. Differences in geography and traditional 
loyalties across Scotland and in particular the ability - or otherwise - of English armies to consistently 
dominate the North and West led to a similar diversity in Scotland. 
32 Barron, Scottish War, p. 8. 
33 Barrow,Neighbours, p.156. 
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very convincing rebuttal of Barron's view, but concentrated on the relatively small numbers of men who 
turned out for the Bruce cause in 1306. None of these men were lords of the first order, though within the 
Lothian community they were all quite significant individuals. 
Barron hoped to redress what he saw' as the marginalisation of the contribution of 'Gaelic' Scotland 
to the struggle for independence. His conflation of several geographical, cultural and linguistic terms 
which are themselves misleading (Celtic! Highland! Gaelic! northern versus Anglian! Lowland! Teutonic! 
southern) compromised the general validity of his position. Victorian scholarship had indeed tended to 
concentrate on events, and therefore individuals, in the central and southern parts of the country. To a 
considerable extent this was inevitable; most military activity throughout most of the period did take 
place south of the Tay. Barron's argument was essentially based more on undermining the contribution of 
southern Scots than on highlighting the efforts of their northern compatriots. His study was limited to the 
period 1296-1314. In King Robert's early operations in the west and north-east the importance of recruits 
from the Isles and west Highlands is unquestioned and Highland men continued to serve in Bruce armies, 
but clearly Robert's later campaigns \vere conducted by forces which included a significant quantity of 
men-at-arms and these could not be raised in large numbers from Highland areas. In King David's reign 
the pattern of the war was very different. Throughout that period the bulk of day-on-day military activity 
was conducted by men-at-arms raised, chiefly, from lowland communities. 
It is not the function of this thesis to rehearse, rebut or support the contentions of either Barron or 
BarrO\v, but to examine the survival of the minor noble families of Lothian through the Wars of 
Independence and therefore the conditions that influenced their acceptance or rejection of Balliol, 
Plantagenet or Bruce lordship. It is, however, abundantly clear that Barrow's case is more easily sustained 
than Barron's. This is not to say that what Barron saw as Highland!Celtic Scotland was any less patriotic 
than he claimed, or that the efforts of Highland people were anything less than crucial to the Bruce party; 
only that the commitment of southern Scots was also vital to the eventual defeat of the English. 
It is apparent from chronicle sources that men-at-arms, the overwhelming majority of w'hom were 
supplied by the lesser nobility, performed the bulk of the fighting other than at sieges and in the very rare 
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general engagements. These men appear in record as esquires, valets, scutifers and 'homines ad arm a , 
(men-at-arms) with no apparent distinction. Several of them were knights, but most were not. They do not 
seem to have had the same formalised burdens of responsibilities of English 'knights of the shire', but, like 
them, were probably indispensable to the administration of govermnent. As sheriff court jurors, and in 
some cases as barons with jurisdictional responsibilities of their ovm, and as men with defined military 
obligations, they were crucial to the administration of civil and criminal justice and to the general conduct 
of war. In England the activity of the political community of the county can, to a limited extent, be 
observed in elections for the Commons and in the records of sheriff court proceedings.34 In Scotland the 
only political activity that is extensively recorded in surviving documents over lengthy periods is military 
service, and a great deal of that material relates to service in English garrisons and field armies. Even in 
that sphere the material hardly constitutes a systematic body of information, but the volume and nature of 
such record as has survived clearly indicates the significance of the barons, minor lairds and the more 
prominent burgesses of Lothian to the stability of government in the sheriffdom in the administration as 
jurors and soldiers. 
A very large proportion of these people (or their immediate forbears) appended their seals to the 
Ragman Roll in the late summer of 1296, acknowledging the kingship of Ed,vard 1. Though probably 
incomplete, the Roll lists the Lothian men and women who were considered, by Edward I's 
administration, to comprise the political community. The criteria for inclusion are by no means certain, 
but there can be no doubt that the Ragman Roll lists the people whose acceptance of the new government 
in 1296 was considered vvorth acquiring. Their support was sought, and sometimes extorted, by both 
English and Scottish kings, because it was desirable - sufficiently so that defectors would seem to have 
been welcomed quite easily when they moved from one party to another. To accept a former enemy into 
the king's peace rather than forfeit them and grant their property to someone else was preferable for a 
number of reasons. The recipient of a new grant would very likely have to spend some time there to 
34 There is no doubt that Scottish administrative material was recorded before 1296. Edward I's receiver for 
Scotland accepted delivery of the accounts of the sheriffs and crown estates ofnorthern Scotland 'de tempore· 
the Kings of Scots. Palgrave, Docs. Hist Scot., p. 277. 
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make his lordship a reality, thus temporarily depriving the king of that person's serVIces. Someone 
accepted into the king's peace would be more likely to have established his authority on his estates 
already and be ready to render the due services immediately. They would also be likely to have some 
useful experience of local affairs and customs and would, hopefully, be a presence in the community that 
w'as favourable to the crown. 
From the perspective of kings, the minor landholding class was what made the Lothian community 
'tick' as an administrative and military entity. In order to understand the pressures that formed their 
allegiance, it is useful to examine the demands made upon these people, the effect of the war on their 
lives, their relationship with government, the services demanded and performed and the results of failing 
to give those services. 
There were of course personal factors that cannot be identified at this distance. When landholders 
were forfeited they obviously had to make some provision for their families. No doubt many found shelter 
with friends or relations, but that would be no substitute for home, and in the wave of forfeitures made by 
Edward III in 1335-37 it would not be impossible that all of a person's friends and relatives had been 
forfeited as well, or that those who had not been forfeited either would not or could not take in more 
mouths to feed. Equally, in the mid to late 1330s, Lothian men who might have been willing or eager to 
accept Plantagenet lordship lived in a community where a very large proportion of their neighbours were 
strongly enough in favour of Bruce lordship to have been forfeited. With the Scots increasingly in the 
ascendant militarily after the battle of Culblean,35 Edward apparently less interested in the retention of 
Lothian after the abandonment of the siege of Dunbar in June 1338, tlle granting of a truce until 133936 
and the defeats of English forces at the Crags of Craigie, Blaksollings and Crichtondene,37 there was little 
to discourage Lothian men from defection to the Bruce party as long as they could reach an 
accommodation that would preserve their heritage and their status in the community. 
35 Chron. Fordun. i, p. 361. 
:6 Rot.Scot. i, p. 540. 
37 Scotichronicon, vii, p.139. 
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Those who would not or could not make their peace with the Bruce party faced a rather bleak future 
by the later 1330s. Clearly the Edwardian administration was under increasing pressure from the Scots 
after 1335 if not before. If Scots in the Plantagenet party were obliged to evacuate their families, even if 
they could be confident of secure financial support from the English crovm, they might well come under 
family pressure to defect to the Bruce party in order to recover the family home. Financial support from 
English kings might not, in any case, be a very dependable source of income. In the event of a financial 
crisis38 or of a settlement between the Plantagenets and the Bruces, Scots in English peace might easily 
find themselves abandoned in the interests of a general peace. Domestic issues such as family pressures 
on men like Alexander Seton (see Appendix), who defected to Edward II sometime after 1308, or the 
dismal insecurity of an existence on a crown pension for the more fortunate Plantagenet supporters after 
the 1330s 39 cmmot be measured, but are likely to have been uppermost in most people's minds. This is 
something to be borne in mind amid consideration of the more accessible issues of service, leadership and 
allegiance. The retention of the family property was of the utmost importance and that was dependent on 
accepting the lordship of whoever had practical control of the area. In 1296-1314, despite Wallace's 
march on Haddington, the Balliol party victory at Roslin in 1303 and Robert 1's ability to force the 
community to pay for truces in the three or four years preceding Bannockburn, control lay with the 
Plantagenets. Between 1314 and 1333, despite Edward II's invasion of 1322 and Edward Balliol's short-
lived kingship after Dupplin Muir, it would be the Bruces. 
The Lothian administration of Edward III from 1333 to 1341 may not have enjoyed the same apparent 
degree of acceptance as had that of his father and grandfather. Initially he installed tiny garrisons that may 
have been of a similar order to traditional 'peacetime' levels of complement; and made no immediate 
effort to repair Edinburgh castle, slighted by Robert I in 1314. By 1335 he had been forced to commence 
38 The fmancial challenges of maintaining war in Scotland affected all of the subjects of the Plantagenets, not 
just those in England, Ireland and Wales. Edward II \vas obliged to demand support from Gascony in 1315-
17. Gascon Rolls, 1307-17, nos. 1507-9, 1607-11, 1723-27,1730. 
39 TNA, C47/22/6/18 Alexander de Cragy was gifted a consignment of wine in November 1338 by Edward III 
to compensate him for his losses. 
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restoration at Edinburgh and to install a substantial garrison,40 but when the castle came under siege in 
1338, according to John of Fordun41 and Walter Bower,42 the community of Lothian accepted the 
authority of the newly-appointed Bruce party sheriff, Laurence of Preston although the castle had not yet 
fallen. From the mid - 1330s, unlike the period between 1296 and 1314, Lothian was consistently a 
theatre of operations, and the extent to which Plantagenet government was accepted or effective is very 
questionable. Not only had there been a great many forfeitures made by 1335-6, itself a sign that the 
administration had only limited acceptance, but many properties made returns to the sheriff of little or 
nothing, either because they were 'destroyed' or just 'on account of the war'. The latter term is possibly a 
tacit admission that that property was no longer under the control of the administration.43 
The activity of the burghal communities of Lothian is less well recorded than that of the rural minor 
gentry. Most of their personal records would have been commercial and of only very transitory 
significance. The bulk of such burghal record as has survived tends to focus on property rights and, by the 
later fourteenth century, court cases. The burghal community may have accepted changes in kingship 
relatively easily. In a sense, they were much more vulnerable than landholders. Lands forfeited could be 
restored, farms, manors and castles could be repaired, but it would be extremely difficult to restore a 
business if the capital and stock were lost. It might be a challenge for a restored landholder to re-establish 
himself after a long absence, but farm produce is almost always saleable and agricultural land can almost 
always be rented out. The situation for a burgess returning to business after forfeiture and restoration 
would have been more difficult. The customers on whom he or she relied in the past would have 
established relations with other trades people or merchants, and the suppliers on whom they relied for 
stock in the past would have found new clients and might not be in a position to service a new demand. 
40 CDS. iii, no. 1186. The garrison included eight knights and fifty-two other men-at-arms and sixty archers 
trom Yorkshire. The castle was in need of repair before it could serve as a useful establishment. Its 
established use as an administrative centre is indicated by the description of one of the buildings as the 
'counting house'. TNA, E 101119/21 
41 Chron. Fordun, i, p. 354. 
42 Scotichronicon, vii, p. 127. 
43 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. 
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In Edinburgh and Linlithgow under Ed\vard I and II, and at Edinburgh after 1335 under Ed\vard III 
there \vould also be the garrison to consider. Obviously, a force of men-at-arms housed in a strong castle 
or peel gave the sheriff the power to enforce his rule in the town, but the garrison also became a part of 
the economy of the town in that it provided opportunities for paid military service and it provided 
customers. The burghs, of course, were bound to the crovvn by their charters. 44 Since the burghal 
communities had a long tradition of relating to crovvn officers,45 it is not surprising that, in the light of all 
these factors, the inhabitants of Lothian tOvvns seem to have accepted Plantagenet lordship without much 
apparent rancour. 
It was perhaps more difficult for women of the political commmlity, whether burghal or rural, to 
retain their positions. They may not have been called on to fight or, so far as we know, give court service 
in person, but they were still obliged to give fealty and homage.46 They were still obliged to keep on the 
right side of the de facto government or face forfeiture and therefore obliged to make political decisions. 
That they did so is clear from the number of women forfeited or described as being 'rebels' and the 
numbers seeking reconciliation and restoration.47 Presumably the refusal to perfonn military service, or 
performing service for the enemy would be adequate grounds for forfeiture among men, but what form 
the 'rebellion' of \vomen took is never made clear. 
There is no sign that Plantagenet governments ever attempted to call on 'common army' service in 
Lothian. In part this must be due to the availability of troops from England for large offensives, but the 
administration may have had doubts about the wisdom of arming large numbers of Scots. In England 
there were mechanisms in place to ensure that counties and tOvvns bore the expense of arming, and to 
some extent, provisioning, the men selected for duty, and for paying their wages for the jomney from the 
44 RRS, v, p.627. Donaldson, Documents, p.63, gives a translation of Robert 1's charter to the Burgh of 
Edinburgh, given in May 1329. Similar charters exist for Aberdeen (1319) and Bef\vick (1320). 
45 Most significantly the Chamberlain, who accepted their ferms, and the sheriff, whose criminal jurisdiction 
was rather greater than the burgh's own court - MacQueen Common Law p.57 - and who may have collected 
the revenues for fonvarding to the Chamberlain, see. Duncan, Scotland, p. 159. 
46 TNA, E39/3 147. This collection of 59 homages, some illegible, contains the declarations of at least forty-
one women. Although most of the documents are very brief and virtually identical, some are very lengthy-
especially no. 4 at four pages. The documents are dated 15/0311306 x 25/0311306 and are perhaps a reaction 
to Robert 1's claim to kingship. 
47 TNA, C47/22/2/ll. Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 92-97. 
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counties to the muster points. It may have been considered that making such provisions in Scotland would 
not generate enough men to make the exercise worthwhile. More importantly perhaps, the demand for 
such service would have been very limited: common army service would not provide the men-at-arms 
that provided the striking arm element of the garrisons. The failure to demand 'common army' could of 
course be seen as an indication that the administration did not feel confident that the call would be obeyed 
in respectable quantity, and that that in itself would undermine the prestige and credibility of the 
government. 
Most of the members of the Lothian political community were simply not sufficiently significant on 
the national stage to merit much attention in the narrative and chronicle accounts, and this, more than 
questions about the reliability or bias of the wTiters, is the most important factor in limiting the usefulness 
of these sources for a local study. This is not to say that Lothian landholders were not influenced by the 
wider picture. The growing success and confidence of the Bruce party in the years before Bannockburn 
and after Culblean must have had an influence on them, as must the surrender of the Balliol party at 
Strathord in 1304, or the defeats of the Bruce party at Dupplin Muir in 1332 or Halidon Hill in 1333. Nor 
is it the case that Lothian landholders ,vere free from magnate influence simply because there \vas no 
Lothian based magnate. The Earls of March and Fife both had interests there, and their choices of 
allegiance would inevitably have carried some weight among the Lothian gentry, if only because they 
might be perceived as having better access to information on which to base their actions; however neither 
of them was as commanding a figure in terms of Lothian politics as Sir Alexander Seton or Sir William 
Douglas of Lothian. Seton and Douglas were barons, and therefore persons of some significance, but 
there were at least thirty other barons and some hundreds of in capite, king's or bishop's tenant and 
burghallandholders so the influence of the two Earls may not have been terribly significant in Lothian. 
In practice, whether they accepted or welcomed the lordship of Balliol, Bruce or Plantagenet kings, 
the landholders of Lothian must have been chiefly motivated by personal and commercial concerns. 
Whose head the crown rested on may have been a matter of some significance, but the quality of the 
lordship offered was of prime importance. Was it better to have the lordship of Edward II, arguably the 
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rightful superior of Scotland, 'who could not provide protection or to accept the lordship of Robert I -
turncoat, sacrilegious murderer and, in the eyes of some, usurper - who could? However attractive a 
certain political choice might be, personal and family security must surely have been uppermost in most 
men's minds, most of the time. 
THE SOURCES. 
The Regesta volumes covering the reigns of Robert I and David II, the Register of the Great Seal of 
Scotland, the Exchequer and Chamberlain's rolls constitute the entirety of Scottish government records 
surviving from the period. Naturally, only a very small portion of the information in these volumes 
applies directly to Lothian, and that which does is of limited value. The sheriff's returns to the crown 
represent the outcome of his duties, not the performance of them. They tell us only balance due to the 
CroVill, not the income and expenditure that produced that balance. Further, we cannot assume that, for 
example, a practice followed in Dundee or Aberdeen was necessarily identical to that follow'ed in 
Edinburgh. The actual practice of both military and legal obligation might well be affected by local 
practice, economy and geography. We should not, for instance, be surprised that Lothian was a better 
source of cavalry service than Kintyre or that birlinns48 were more readily available in Argyle than in 
Lanark. In addition to the records of central government there is an extensive body of material from 
baronial and ecclesiastical sources. These include T77e Morton Registntm,49 T77e Laing Charters,50 Liber 
Cartontm Prioratus Sancti Andree,5! The Chartulary of Coldstream,52 The ChartuiaJY of Neubotle53 and 
48 Birlinns - galleys. Neil Campbell of Lochawe was obliged to provide a galley of fortv oars whenever 
required for the operations of Robert I in exchange for 'the whole land of Lochawe and the land of 
Ardscodyrthe' in 13 l5,Donaldson, Documents, p.51. 
~9 T. Thomson, A. MacDonald, C. Innes (edd.), Registrum Honoris de Morton (Edinburgh, 1853). 
50 Rev. J. Anderson (ed), The Laing Charters (Edinburgh, 1899). 
51 G. Tyndall Bruce (ed.), Liber Cartanlm Prioratus Sancti Andree (Edinburgh, 1841). 
52 Rev. C. Rogers, (ed.), Chartula!}, of the Cistercian Prio!}' ofColdstream (London, 1879). 
53 C. Innes (ed.) , Registnlm Sancte Marie de Neubotle (Edinburgh, 1849). 
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The Charters ofHoZvrood/4 though a very large proportion of the information contained in these volumes 
relates to periods and topics outwith this study. 
English records for Lothian between 1296 and 1314 and again between 1333 and 1341 afford much 
more information about the political community with references to military service, juror service, 
homage, forfeitures and restorations. Significant collections of this material are to be found in 
Stevenson's Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland, 55 T71e Chamberlain Rolls,56The Exchequer 
Rolls of Scotland,s7 Bain's Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotlan~8 and McPherson's Rotuli 
Scotiae. 59 Little relating specifically to Lothian during the war years appears in other collections such as 
the Calendar of the Close Rolls,60 or the Calendar of Post Mortem Inquisitions. 61 
The narrative sources tend to be concerned with the fate of the nation, and, inevitably, with the affairs 
of king and great lords. The focus of the narrative might move to Lothian due to a given event, but soon 
moves to developments elsewhere. From an operational viewpoint, the most significant chronicle account 
for the purposes of this thesis is the Scalacronica62 of Sir Thomas Grey. Unlike the Scottish chroniclers, 
Fordun, Wyntoun, Barbour and Bower, Grey had no particular agenda within the Scottish political sphere. 
Beyond his support for Edward Balliol, rather than David Bruce, as king of Scotland, he had no interest in 
inflating the reputation of one person at the expense of another. More importantly, he had personal 
experience of the war he describes. Unlike the Lanercost compiler, he was socially and professionally 
familiar with the Scots, and considerably less antagonistic toward them. Most importantly, other 
chroniclers 'wrote of the men-at-arms of the period, but Sir Thomas served as one. 
54 Lord Francis Egerton (ed.) Liber Cartarum Sancte Crucis (Edinburgh, 1840). 
'5 1. Stevenson, Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1870), hereafter Stevenson, 
Documents. 
56 The Accounts of the Great Chmnberlains of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1836). Hereafter The Chmnberlain Rolls. 
571. Stuart and G. Burnett (edd), The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland hereafter ER. 
581. Bain, Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland (London, 1881-8), hereafter CDS. 
59 J. MacPherson, Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londiniensi in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi Asservati, 
hereafter Rot. Scot. 
60 Calendar of the Close Rolls. Only eleven of the citations in the Appendix are drawn from this source 
compared to some hundreds of citations from CDS and RRS. 
61 Calendar of Inquisitions Post Afortem, hereafter CIP]II!. 
62 Scalacronica. The Reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III (Trans) H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1907), 
hereafter Scalacronica (Maxwell). 
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Most of the families that feature in this thesis were of fairly minor significance even within the 
confines of the Lothian political community and have left no charter chest collection, just a trail of 
references in official documents - as charter witnesses for example. Unfortunately for the purposes of this 
thesis, witness lists have proved to be a much less revealing source of evidence than one might have 
hoped.63 Few documents have a complete list of named vvitnesses,64 other than cro",n charters vvhich 
name only a handful of very prominent men.6S Many documents, regal, ecclesiastical and lay, make no 
reference whatsoever to witnesses,66 have only a very small number of witnesses67 or name only a 
selection.68 These are generally the most prominent persons present and perhaps a family member, the rest 
of the witnesses appearing merely as 'et aliis', 'et multis aliis' or 'ac multis aliis,.69 It seems likely that 
these 'aliis' would have comprised the friends, neighbours and relatives of the parties to the document. 70 
It is quite possible that some of the witnesses - named or not - had no formal or legal obligation to take 
part in the process, but were simply men of substance from the neighbourhood whose acknowledgement 
of a document was considered desirable. Broadly speaking the unnamed witnesses were the sort of people 
who held land, formed local juries and owed military sen7ice; exactly the sort of people on whom this 
study is focussed. Were these people named individually it would perhaps give us some valuable insight 
63 The validity even of crown charter witness lists is open to question, see B. Webster, Scotland fi-om the 
Eleventh Century to 1603 (Cambridge, 1975) p.73-4. 
64 Laing Chrs., nos. 19,21, 27. 
65 NAS,GD 122/1/140 ( charter of Christina de Preston), RRS, v, pp 316,322,324, Arbroath Liber, i, no. 287 
and many others are witnessed only by magnates close to the King, typically his brother Edward, Sir Thomas 
Randolph, Sir Robert Keith and one or more bishops and, increasingly after the death of Edward Bruce, Sir 
James Douglas. The attestation of 'many others' was not unknown in royal charters - David 1's charter 
announcing the establishment of a house for the religious at Jedburgh (1147 x 1151) was witnessed by his 
son, Henry, four bishops, three abbots, various named laymen 'et multi alii' G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters of 
David 1 (Woodbridge, 1999) p.l39. 
66NAS, GD 4011/23, GD8211,Liber Holyroodp.75;Arbroath Liber, pp. 7, 9. 
67 John de Ma1eville' s charter to Newbattle abbey was witnessed by the bishops of S1. Andrews, Glasgow and 
Brechin, Newbattle Registnllll, pp. 161-3. 
68 NAS, GD 40/1141; RH 6198; GD84/116. 
69NAS, RH 6,67,68,70,98,100, 104,112,118, 119, 120; GD86/1n.Morton Registrum, Bannatyne Club 
(Edinburgh 1853) no. 5 bears the less common 'et pluribus aliis'. 
70 This seems to apply widely to ecclesiastical documents, Liber St. Andrews p. 376-7,383,390,393 and 
many others complete the witness list with variants of 'multis aliis', similarly the Newbattle Registrum, p.95, 
98,100,157,165, Cold. Cart., p.41;Liber Holyroodpp. 65,70,74,77,93. There are charters that do have what 
appears to be a complete list ofnamed witnesses, such as NAS, GD 86/1/4. 
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into the patterns of local leadership, but the presence of a specific individual is not proof positive that that 
person was an adherent of the granter or the grantee. 
The same applies to sigillography. A considerable proportion of sealed documents have lost their 
seals, but of those that have not, very few bear more than the seal of the granter and the grantee and 
several would seem never to have had either slits or tongues for the application of seals in the fIrst place. 71 
Additionally, the presence of a particular seal does not necessarily prove the presence of the seal's owner. 
When William Blair resigned the chaplaincy of Heriot in November 1309 he used the seal of the abbot of 
Dunfermline because 'his [own] seal was unknown to the majority.,n It should not be taken for granted 
that witnesses to a land charter necessarily had any particular personal concern with the subject. George 
Abernethy witnessed a charter of David de Penicuik in 1373.73 He may have had local interests; he may 
simply have been a friend of David who happened to be present. 
The political and military history of Scotland in the early fourteenth century has, understandably 
been the focus of much attention by historians. Like the chroniclers, they too have mostly concentrated on 
the fate of the country as a whole. The men, and occasionally women, who figure in political histories are 
almost inevitably people of substance and, perhaps more importantly, status. Because Lothian was not 
generally an active theatre of war other than between 1334-5 and 1341, and because the great lords and 
earls hailed from other areas relatively little has been written about local conditions. 
The Wars of Independence were not a series of conflicts all with the same basic format. The war of 
King Robert against the MacDougalls would not have been very similar in nature to the war w'aged by 
Ramsay and Douglas in Lothian in the 1330s. Leadership - and coercion - by forces from outwith the 
sheriffdom formed an important part of the political situation in Lothian. This was the case in the years 
before Bannockburn and again during the mid 1330s due to the activities of the Plantagenet garrison and 
71 NAS. GD40/1124. undated buteo 1290-98. 
n NAS: GD401l129. Bruce MacAndrew has identified a number of Ragman RoB seals that were used by 
more than one person. 'The Sigillography of the Ragman Rol1.' Proe.SoeAntiq.Scot. 129,1999, p.670. 
73 NAS, GD18/1. The other witnesses were the Bishop of st. Andrews, Sir Walter and Sir Alexander de 
Haliburton, Alexander Cockburn and Robert de Raynton. It is not clear whether David de Penicuik was any 
relation to Hugh, Nigel and Margaret de Penicuik (see Appendix) or whether he took his title from the name 
of the estate. 
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Bruce raiding parties. These forces were not necessarily particularly 'alien' to the local community, Bruce 
party combatants were often men of neighbouring counties - people that they would have knovvn by 
reputation at least, and not infrequently related to them. The deployment of troops from one part of the 
country to another was a normal event in the sense that it occurred on a number of occasions, but to a 
great extent the general conduct of the conflicts could be summarised as 'local wars for local people'. The 
military and political activities of those 'local people' form the subject of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MILIT AR Y ACTIVITY IN LOTHIAN 
PART 1, 1296-1304 
In 1296 Edward I conquered and deposed his vassal John Balliol in a matter of five months. The fall of 
Berwick in March and the apparently brief cavalry action at Dunbar in April l and the subsequent, almost 
immediate, surrender of Dunbar castle seems, superficially, to be small reason for the military and 
political collapse of the Scottish effort against Edward I in the spring and summer of 1296. Although 
King John did not surrender and abdicate until July it would seem that he made no effort to continue the 
fight after March 1296 himself and that nobody else had the capacity or inclination to continue the fight 
on his behalf. John's withdrawal and Edward's pursuit may not, of course, be the whole story. Thirteenth-
century records can hardly be described as all-encompassing, but we can be confident that Edward's 
armies were not seriously opposed in any of the areas they traversed, or at least not sufficiently so to 
delay seriously, let alone prevent, their intended operations.2 
The fall of Dunbar and then Edinburgh castles in 1296 and the ease with which Edward I was able to 
install an administration might be construed as evidence to support the contention that Lothian, and the 
other comIties of the south-east, were particularly amenable to annexation by the Plantagenets.3 Other 
evidence could be construed in a similar light. We know that Lothian men served as jurors under Edward 
I's administration as early as August 12964 and that men from Lothian, and from the south-east generally, 
1 Despite the Lanercost Chronicler's assertion (Chron. Lanercost., p.175) that more than ten thousand Scots 
were killed for the loss of only one rash (incauto) Englishman, there is no recorded description of a general 
engagement, only of a Scottish cavalry charge which was easily overcome by the Earl of Surrey's cavalry 
division. Only one noteworthy Scottish fatality, Patrick Graham (Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.26) is recorded 
- an unlikely outcome had there been an 'all arms' battle. Neither the scale of a battle, nor even of the 
'butcher's bill' are infallible guides to the political significance of an engagement. 
2 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 25-32. 
3Barron, Sco ttish War, p. 413. 
4 INA, C4 7 12211 0/45. 
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were performing military service in his armies and garrisons.s Lothian men sought justice in Edward's 
courts6 and the ovenvhelming majority (so far as we can tell) of the political community became 
Edward's homagers,7 all within the first year of the Plantagenet administration. 
There are strengths to the 'Anglophile Lothian' point of view adopted by E.M.Barron,8 but, as 
Professor Barrmv has demonstrated,9 there are also major weaknesses. The battle of Dunbar and the fall 
of the castle would not seem to have resulted in heavy casualties. 10 The proposition that one formation of 
King Edward's cavalry, alone and unaided, killed Scots in their thousands, simply beggars belief 
Nonetheless, the political and moral aspects were enormous. Armies are oflittle value without leaders and 
cohesion. Both were lost at Dunbar. 
A considerable number of men were held as prisoners of 'var, including at least thirty who hailed from, 
or had extensive interests in Lothian, such as Herbert de Morham, David Graham and Edmund de 
Ramsay, each of whom would defect to and from the Plantagenet cause on a number of occasions (see 
Appendix for profIles of the Morham, Graham and Ramsay families). Superficially it would seem 
unlikely that the absence of so small a number from a political community that consisted of at least 300 
men and women II would severely restrict the potential for that community to offer armed resistance to an 
invader, however, there are a number of factors to be considered. The Lothian men who served in the 
1296 campaign may not have represented the whole strength of the community in arms, but they must 
surely be assumed to include a substantial proportion of men w·ith military experience or ambition and 
also the men with the most extensive military responsibilities, the sheriffs and those with baronial status 
who had the 'leadership' of men in a given vicinity. The men captured at Dunbar might only be a very 
small portion of the political community of Lothian, but their absence would have been much more 
5 CDS, ii, no. 1132. 
6 Ibid., p.191. Lothian was not alone in accepting Edward's rule. Isabella Beaumont sought possession of the 
barony of Crail in Fife, Stevenson, Documents, ii, p. 122. INA C4712212/l4 and Adam Ie Arrnourer and his 
wife Gunnora petitioned for peaceful enjoyment of their tenement at Berwick INA C47122/2/16; Stevenson, 
Documents, ii, p.156. 
7 CDS, ii, pp. 193-214. 
8 Barron, Scottish War, p. 413. 
~arrow, Bruce, pp. 188-9,325-8. 
10 See note 1, above. 
11 Ihe sum of Ragman Roll homagers for Lothian and the prisoners of war from Dunbar. 
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significant in terms of military capacity and organisation than their numbers would suggest. Even if, as a 
group, the prisoners of war did not represent a disproportionate share of the militarily obliged part of the 
community, the very fact that they had been in the field inevitably means that they were among the more 
fit and able members of that group. Some members of the group must, at any time, have been sufficiently 
youthful, elderly or physically unsuited to war to have been ineligible for service. Some of them \vould 
ahnost certainly have been female or clerics, though these persons presumably provided substitutes or 
perhaps paid cash in lieu of service. 12 
We can be reasonably confident, then, that the prisoners were men of the right age and capacity -
competence is a different matter - to discharge military service. Their absence would have been a 
hindrance to continuation of the fight, in terms both of personal service as men-at-arms and of local 
leadership. The number of prisoners held after Dunbar was quite small and \ve cannot be sure that 
absolutely all of the 200 or so Scottish prisoners mentioned in record were in fact prisoners of \var at all, 
let alone men captured either in the battle or the subsequent surrender of Dunbar castle. Nor can we be 
sure that all those taken at either location are identified in surviving record. Given that over 100 men-at-
arms were stationed in Dunbar castle at the time of the battle l3 and that we can safely assume that the 
armigerous cavalry arm of the Scottish army \vas rather larger than the balance of 100 men taken during 
or after the battle, it is clear that the majority of the Scottish men-at-arms serving in King John's army did 
not fall captive in 1296. They either escaped from the battle and returned home or they were captured or 
surrendered, had their parole accepted, and were allowed to depart. If this were the case then the number 
of men who might be expected to give service to the Balliol cause after Dunbar would be further reduced. 
Regardless of the political rights or wrongs of the situation generally, men who had given their parole 
could hardly be expected to break it. 
12 This was certainly the case in England. In May 1314 the abbot of Abingdon offered to pay a fme of 60 
marks in lieu of the service due from three knights' fees held by the abbey. TNA, C4 7/22/10/12. In 1327 the 
abbot of Abingdon was ordered to pay £60, the abbot of Ramsey £80, the abbess ofWylton £20 and the 
abbot ofSt. Edmund's £120 in fmes for anny service in Scotland, as were many other religious houses. 
j'yfemorandaRolls 1326-1327, no. 1939. 
13 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.16. 
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Defeat in one battle was not the only factor to weaken the position of King John. From the outbreak of 
the war he had not enjoyed the support of all the important sources of leadership and manpower in his 
kingdom. A number of important figures in the political community of Scotland chose to serve in Edward 
I's army. The Earl of Carrick chose to support Edward, possibly in the hope of being chosen as the 
successor to King John. His choice of alignment would probably have had little direct effect on the 
military/political community of Lothian since he had little or nothing in the way of estates there, but the 
Annandale and Carrick tenants who held property from the Bruce family must surely have been 
influenced by the Earl's decision, thus reducing the number of men-at-arms available to turn out in the 
Balliol cause. More significantly Patrick Earl of Dunbar served in the Plantagenet army despite the fact 
that his countess, Mrujorie Comyn 14 (daughter of the late Alexander, Earl of Buchan) held his chief castle, 
Dunbar, in the Balliol interest. It would be unreasonable to assume that all of the Earl's tenants sided 
against him in the campaign of 1296. Some proportion of the men-at-arms who served under the countess 
were certainly Lothian men such as Alexander Sinclair (see AppendL-x), John Currie, Malcolm de 
Haddington, Brice Ie Tailleur, Herbert de Morham (see AppendL-x) and Thomas Byset (see Appendix), 
who all appear in a document dated 16 May 1296 as prisoners of warIS among more than 100 other 
Scottish knights and esquires (and one clerk) taken at Dunbar castle. 
It is open to question whether there was any strong support in Lothian for continuing the fight at alL 
The king of Scotland had been defeated by the king of England. It may have been some time since this 
had last occurred, but it had happened before. The centre of Lothian administration, Edinburgh castle, had 
been occupied by an English garrison on numerous occasions in the past, all of which had proved to be of 
limited duration. The political community of Lothian may have assumed that Edward's administration 
14 The active involvement of women in military command or leadership positions can be identified on several 
occasions during the Wars ofIndependence, notably the two countesses of Dunbar who resisted the forces of 
Edward I and Edward III, and the countess of Atholl who defended Kildrummy against the forces of David II. 
This Viras vlell 'Within the cultural traditions of the late middle ages, see J.A Truax 'Anglo-Norman Women at 
War: Valiant Soldiers, Prudent Strategists or Charismatic Leaders?' in (edd,) D. Kagay and L.JA Villalon, 
The Circle of War in the Middle Ages. (Woodbridge, 1999) p.lli. 
15 The prisoners \vere listed by name and \vrits issued to pay them appropriate allowances. CDS, ii, no. 742. 
TNA, C47/22/4/2. 
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would be a temporary institution pending the making of a new king of Scots. No doubt the new king 
would be very much under the sway of Edward I, but it is difficult to assess whether or not that would 
have been a real issue to the minor landholders who comprised the bulk of the political community. They 
did not, after all, have much say in matters of kingship. When Margaret of Norway was acknowledged as 
heir to Alexander m16 or when John Balliol was acknowledged as King of Scots 17 the opinion of the 
freeholders and burgesses of local political communities ,vould not have been a matter of great concern to 
the spiritual and temporal magnates who formed what we might regard as the 'national' political 
community. When Edward I took custody of Scottish royal castles in 1291-9218 it is a virtual certainty 
that the minor nobles of Lothian were not consulted and that there was no noticeable degree of resistance 
to Edward's officials. In 1296 not only was there an absence of active resistance in the field, but 
Edinburgh castle, a major strength, surrendered after a brief siege. Edward deployed three 'engines' to 
cast stones into the castle 'day and night' and the garrison sought terms after five days, but the shooting 
apparently continued for another three days thereafter, though Edward himself had moved on to 
Linlithgow. 19 Perhaps the garrison had asked better terms than Edward was prepared to concede, but the 
possibility that Edw'ard was prepared to offer no terms other than unconditional surrender cannot be 
discounted. 
There may have been a shortage of men-at-arms to man the walls of Edinburgh castle due to the 
demands of the army beaten at Dunbar, but in fact there would have been little point in holding out 
against King Edward. Obliging him to mount a long siege would not be likely to impede his operations 
sufficiently to allow the Balliol party to raise an army capable of restoring the situation through combat, 
and a close siege, if maintained competently, must eventually be successful unless the garrison can be 
relieved by an external force. It would hardly have been unreasonable if the men who were responsible 
16 APS, i, p.424. 
1, Rot. Scot., i, p. II. 
18 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 204-209. 
19 W. Croft Dickinson, G.D. Donaldson, I. Milne (edd) A Source Book of Scottish HistOlY, ~ (Edinburgh, 
1958), p. 8. 
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for the safe-keeping of the castle - and there must surely have been someone - had concluded that no such 
force was likely to be raised quickly enough to justify the risks of offering resistance. 
ill addition to the shock of defeat and the absence of the prisoners of war, the lack of a generally-
acknowledged source of lordship to co-ordinate resistance in the immediate aftermath of Dunbar and 
Edward's march to Elgin, would have made overt activity in Lothian worthless militarily and dangerous 
personally. ill addition to the obvious risks of combat a man who took up arms against the Edwardian 
government could be forfeited of his lands. If opposition to Edward were eventually to prove successful 
he would expect to have his property restored, but what if it failed? He might be restored as part of a 
general political settlement if the Scots were sufficiently successful in their war with the English to force 
Edward to negotiate rather than conquer. If Edward was completely successful, and that must have looked 
like a very real possibility by the winter of 1296, he might never regain his property. 
In addition to national political issues, there was a local problem. Although John had been king of 
Scotland he did not have the benefit of strong personal traditional leadership bonds in Lothian. The 
Balliol family, though extensive landholders elsewhere in the country, had little, if anything, in the way of 
Lothian interests and several men who did have local interests were either prisoners of war, like Herbert 
de Morham, William Curry, Edmund de Ramsay, William and Henry de Sinclair or were aligned with the 
Plantagenet cause, like the Earl of March. Also, a great many Lothian men had accepted Edward's 
kingship by appending their seals to the Ragman Roll. The lack of a major active local political presence 
with a strong commitment to the Balliol cause, then, may have made it easier for Edward's administration 
to take up the reins of power in Lothian in 1296. This may have been a lesson learned for those \vho 
would gain, or attempt to gain, Lothian over the next fifty years. As we shall see, there is evidence to 
suggest that Edward II (if not Edward 1), Robert I, Ed\vard III and David II would all elevate men they 
felt they could rely on to positions of local prominence, presumably in an effort to establish a local habit 
or tradition of allegiance to the party in question. That traditional local sympathies could be a significant 
factor in European medieval political life cannot be seriously questioned and we should not expect 
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Scotland to have been radically out of step. Almost forty years after the deposition of his father Ed"mrd 
Balliol was still able to calIon traditional loyalty to his family in the southwest.2U 
Mounting resistance to a powerful regime is, under any circumstances, a difficult and dangerous 
course of action. Even in situations where there is a clearly-popular 'national' cause, with an active 
political force fighting for that cause with the help of sympathetic agencies and even where the 
occupation's general policies are very brutal, it can take years before resistance becomes a serious issue 
for the occupying power, let alone start to threaten its stability. 21 In 1296 the defeat of the king's army, 
the fall of Dunbar and other castles, the passage of Edward I's troops, the fall of Edinburgh castle, the 
absence of Lothian military men as prisoners of war or perhaps as fugitives would all have been factors in 
reducing further the likelihood of local resistance. Furthermore, if it was the case that men who 
surrendered or were captured gave their parole we should not assume that they all returned home with 
charger, arms and armour. The surrender of an army might well include safeguards for personal 
equipment, but by tradition both mount and armament of a man killed or captured were the prizes of his 
vanquisher and would have a significant cash value.22 Even if the individual was free to fight, they might 
not have the means of doing so, or at least not as a man-at-arms. 
Despite the disruption of traditional authority and the installation of new officials there \vas some 
level of resistance in Lothian within a short time of Edward's conquest. On 23 July 1297 Edward I's 
treasurer for Scotland, Hugh de Cressingham, wrote to his king that the Scots had appointed baillies and 
officials in some counties and that no county was properly held ' ... save for Berwick and Roxburgh, and 
they only lately. ,23 If anyone \vas in a position to judge the effective extent of Edward's Scottish 
20 Nicholson, Edward III, p. 92. 
2i J Sumption, The Hundred Years War. Trial by Battle (London, 1990), pp. 539,557-6(,. 
22 Even fairly basic equipment for a man-at-arms could easily cost £ 1 0 ill the late thirteenth century. A horse 
valued at 10 marks (CDS, ii, pp. 413-32 gives several examples) a chammail hauberk for 20 shillillgs (SHS 
misc.ix 1990 p. Ill) and a sword for four shillillgs (ibid, p. 65) would cost a total of £7 17s 4d. 
23 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 206-7. The summer of 1297 saw \videspread challenges to Ed\vard's 
government. In addition to the actions of Andrew Murray and William Wallace; there was the 'Noble Revolt' 
of Bruce and the Stewart ill the southwest, TNA C/4722/2123, Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 200-202. The 
campaign of Andrew Murray ill the northeast was preventing communication between Edward I and 
Plantagenet adherents like Sir Regmald Cheyne, TNA, C47/22/2/30; Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.232 and 
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government it would have been Cressingham, so it would appear either that Lothian had yet to be secured 
for Plantagenet rule a year and more after Edward's initial conquest, or that counties which had been 
effectively secured in 1296 had been recovered by the Scots, or at least lost to the English, by the summer 
of 1297. Naturally, the defeat of a major English field army at Stirling Bridge in September 1297 did 
nothing to improve the situation of Edward's administration. In the autumn Wallace was able to lead a 
force to Haddington, where, on 11 October, he issued an invitation to the merchants of Cologne and 
Hamburg to resume their Scottish trading operations.24 His ability to lead a force into the heart of Lothian 
is perhaps less indicative of the military situation than his ability to extract that force without recorded 
interference by the garrison forces in the sheriffdom. Additionally, three castles, including the major 
stronghold of Dirleton, must have been gained by the Scots at some juncture since Edward was obliged to 
detach a force under Bishop Bek to recapture them.25 Some consideration must be given to Wallace's 
motives for mounting his expedition. Militarily and politically, marching a force through Lothian \vas a 
matter of some significance. To the Plantagenet administration it was a declaration Balliol supporters 
",·ere intent on ensuring that even if John's writ did not run in Lothian, Edward's could not be guaranteed. 
If Wallace could seize Haddington, even if only for a day or two, Edward's government could hardly be 
said to have control of the land. If Haddington was within Wallace's reach, then so was virtually any other 
place in Lowland Scotland that did not boast a castle or at least lay within range of a large and active 
gamson. 
In addition to these military and political issues, we should bear in mind that a very large part of the 
community would have had quite enough disruption and instability in their lives. The tensions between 
the Bruce and Balliol parties before 1292, the Dunbar campaign and the subsequent occupation would 
undoubtedly have persuaded some at least that the risks involved in carrying on the war ",·ere not 
warranted by any gain likely to be made even if the aims of the war - and it would be difficult to be clear 
there was also tension with Alexander of the Isles in the West. INA C47122/2/20, Stevenson, Documents, ii, 
p.187. 
24 Nicholson, Afiddle Ages, p.55. 
25 Watson, Hammer, p.65. 
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about what exactly such war aims would be - were completely achieved, a condition that would have 
seemed unlikely at the time. 
Men and ,'vamen with responsibilities - nobles, free tenant landholders, burgesses - seem to have 
had nothing to fear from the Edwardian administration so long as they fulfilled their obligations and 
accepted his rule. As long as that administration ",·as visibly in power they could be reasonably secure in 
their positions. Although the Balliol administration could not prevent acceptance of Plantagenet lordship 
by direct military action, they could hardly afford to allow that acceptance to grow into a tradition of 
allegiance, and therefore of service, unopposed. Wallace may have gone to Haddington to undermine the 
Plantagenet administration, but he was surely making a point to the local political community as well. 
Those ,vho were active on behalf of the English administration or considering activity (joining a garrison 
for example) could not fail to have been concerned at the arrival of a pro-Balliol force deep in 
Plantagenet-held territory. No doubt Wallace was waving the flag as well as rattling a sabre, but from the 
point of view of the political community of Lothian the whole exercise may have looked rather more like 
threatening behaviour than patriotic encouragement. Men like Matthew de Ha-wthornden and William de 
Fenton, restored to their properties in the autumn of 1296,26 had obviously entered the peace of Edward 1. 
In the event of a Balliol restoration they might well find it difficult to justify their actions. Similarly, men 
who took part in the 'normal' business of the sheriff court, such as the inquisitions in several sheriffdoms 
into the estate of Elena de la Zouche,27 could hardly avoid accusations of collaboration with the enemy. 
The [mdings of those inquisitions have survived and the jurors who reported to the sheriff of Edinburgh, 
Hugh Louther, were very clearly Lothian men: Henry de Ormiston, Nicholas de Preston, William son of 
Geoffrey de Bolton, Henry Ferrur of Tranent, Waldone de North Berwick, David de Pencaitland (see 
Appendix ), Gilbert de Drem, Thomas de Straiton and Jordan de Aldhamston all bore names derived from 
Lothian landholdings. The others, William de Sydeserf and John Scot, were both Ragman Roll homagers 
26 CDS. ii, no. 853. 
:7 Ibid., no. 824; CIPM, iii, p. 363. 
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for Lothian. There can be no doubt that these men were discharging their normal judicial obligations, but 
under the authority of Edward I rather than of King John. 
Although there \vas not a complete absence of armed resistance to the Edwardian government in 
Lothian in the period between Falkirk in 1297 and the fight at Roslin in 1303 there certainly was not a 
general state of war throughout the county?8 Equally we cannot be sure that there was not widespread 
sporadic violence, only that there was not sufficient activity for it to be regularly cited in Edwardian 
administration records as an argument for increasing the military establishment. Fluctuation in the size of 
garrisons is, in any case, a very poor guide to the tactical situation. The enlargement or reduction of any 
particular garrison or group of garrisons could occur for any number of reasons not immediately related to 
the progress of the war generally. The availability of men, money and materials, the greater political 
significance of some locations compared to others, the preference of men to serve in particular areas and 
their unwillingness to serve in others, would all be issues which, although of some importance to the 
military administrators of the day, cannot be clearly identified now. Further, having the people, the money 
and the munitions to provide a garrison does not guarantee the capacity to put that garrison in place, let 
alone provide for its needs once established. Perhaps most importantly, the level of resource applied to 
solving any military problem, in this case judging the military force required to achieve local dominance 
and perhaps additional objectives of which we are unaware, is not simply a product of the availability of 
the means, but of the subject's estimate of the situation; in this instance the perceived threat constituted by 
the Scots at a given moment. 
That there was a military administration in place by October 1296 is apparent from the appointment of 
Sir Walter Huntercombe29 as its commander and various documents30 relating to the supply of the 
garrison at Edinburgh. Unfortunately there seems to be no indication of the number of men under 
command there until 1298. On 25 November Sir John de Kingestone was appointed to relieve 
28 In addition to the irregular ebb and flow of the military situation there were periods of truce, see Treaty 
Rolls, i, pp. 149-151 for the text of the 1302 truce. 
29 CDS, ii, p.225. 
30Ibid., ii,nos. 1039,1040. 
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Huntercombe as commander in Lothian.31 On the same day King Edvv'ard issued an instruction to Sir 
Simon Fraser to support Sir John with twenty men-at-arms on barbed (armoured, or at least protected) 
horses as required due to the fact that the 'constable ... has not sufficient force of his 0\Vn.,32 Evidently 
there was a military presence at Edinburgh, and one that contained a heavy cavalry element, albeit one 
considered inadequate for offensive operations without additional support. The presence of Sir Simon's 
men may have been more a matter of political significance; a means of ensuring Scottish participation for 
propaganda purposes. The scale of an operation calling for 200 men-at-arms ordered from Berwick at this 
time33 suggests that twenty men-at-arms, though hardly insignificant, was not a vital contribution the 
force. Sir Walter Huntercombe, now in command at Berwick, was ordered to make a 'foray' against the 
Scots in the company of Sir Simon 'and others' with 200 men-at-arms. It is quite possible that the phrase 
'and others' refers to Scots, perhaps specifically those men from Berwickshire who were in the peace of 
Edward I. Part of the 'price' of being in Edward's peace and of enjoying one's heritage must surely have 
been the acceptance of the usual range of responsibilities owed by landlords to their superior or sovereign, 
including military service obligations. 
It would appear that Sir Simon's contribution was of some material significance since he would be 
providing ten per cent of the manpower. The intended target for the 'foray' of November 1298 is not 
mentioned in the sources, either as a security measure or because the intended target was so obvious that 
it did not need to be stated. It would seem most likely that the intention was to conduct operations in the 
south-east of Scotland. This is a strong indication that the administration had not established complete 
control of that part of the country that was most accessible to intervention, but also that the administration 
could successfully call upon the military service obligations of some proportion of the political 
community. 
31 CDS, ii, no. 1033. 
321bid., ii, no. 1034, TNA,C47J22J6JlO 
33 TNA,C47/2216112 
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The fIrst full description of Sir John de Kingestone's garrison dates from 28 May 130034 though, as 
Dr. Fiona Watson has demonstrated/5 there were arrangements in place for the logistical support of what 
was effectively 'a small standing army' from 1298, part of which was stationed at Edinburgh.36 Although 
there was a total of sixty-seven men-at-arms in the complement a shortage of chargers reduced the 
number available for operations to sixty, but Sir John would have been taking a considerable risk if he 
committed them all to action away from Edinburgh castle. There is no doubt that there was a garrison 
before this date. On 9 August 129837 Sir John had informed King Edward that the Scots under the Earl of 
Buchan and the Bishop of St. Andrews had crossed the Forth and marched on Glasgow, from where they 
intended to move to the borders with the intention of joining forces with Balliol supporters in the forest of 
Selkirk. Sir John had received intelligence that Sir Simon Fraser had already met with the leaders of the 
Scots and that he was intending to defect, if he had not in fact already done so. It would seem that the 
Scots had already been active in the Edinburgh area since Sir John referred to a day when they 'came 
suddenly before our castle, and on which Sir Thomas D' Arderne was taken,.38 
The same letter informs the king of difficulties with the local populace as well as the major initiatives 
of the Scots. Margaret de Penicuik (see Appendix) was reported as having received her son, Hugh, and his 
men (presumably Sir John assumed that these were men from the Penicuik estate) despite the fact that 
Hugh was a rebel. Sir John felt obliged to take action and made a descent on the 'ville' of Penicuik and 
impounded all the cattle there.39 Some local men then demanded the return of their cattle, claiming that 
they were at peace with the Edwardian administration, and had taken no part in the raid. Sir John returned 
the cattle to the 'poor people to whom they belonged' and retained the rest, presumably on the assumption 
that they were the property of Margaret or Hugh de Penicuik or of the 'other ill-doers' that he had reported 
34 CDS, ii, no. 1132. 
35 Watson, Hammer, pp. 69-70. 
36 On 22 November 1298 the garrison included fifty men-at-arms and eight knights. TNA, ElOl117129. 
37 Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.303. TNA C47/22/2/41. 
38 Ibid. It is possible that sir Thomas' capture might not have occurred at Edinburgh, but it would seem an odd 
piece of information to include if it were not immediately relevant. Interestingly Sir Thomas' family had a 
co=ection with Lothian pre-dating the Wars of Independence. In 1270 Thomas d' Arderne (perhaps the 
father) held a knight's fee in East Lothian from Henry de Pinkney, who in in turn held from Sir Roger de 
Quincy. CDS, i, no. 2582. 
39 Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.303. 
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as being 'harboured and received by them'. This episode reveals a real operational difficulty for Sir John 
and his various successors as local commanders in Edward 1's Scottish government. How could one 
adequately and reliably identify the enemy? The 'poor people' of Penicuik might be entirely honest in 
their claim to be 'at peace'; if so, the confiscation of their cattle would not help them to see the Edwardian 
government as a source of 'good lordship'. 
The sheriff had felt obliged to report the activity of Hugh de Penicuik and take action against him, 40 
but that would seem to have been a relatively rare instance of active service for the Edinburgh garrison; 
indeed, the fact that Hugh de Penicuik was able to approach Edinburgh at all could be construed as 
evidence that at that particular juncture, the garrison was not fit to carry out its duties properly. Although 
he had obviously been a problem to the administration, Hugh, like the overwhelming majority of Scots 
seeking to defect, was accepted into Edward's peace without apparent difficulty. Although there is no 
official instrument recording the restoration of Hugh's property in Scotland, there is a document 
instructing the sheriff of Northumberland to restore to him various properties there. 41 It may have been a 
standard practice of the time that Scots forfeited of property in England had to have individual writs in 
order to be restored to that property once they were no longer in a state of rebellion, whereas their 
Scottish properties could be restored as part of a general settlement. 
The Scots may not have been able to make noticeable progress 'within Lothian after the battle of 
Falkirk, but they were active in its vicinity, notably sending a force under Sir John Comyn of Badenoch 
and Sir Simon Fraser from Biggar to Roslin in February 1303.42 The battle that ensued was not 
particularly large, but it was of considerable importance. The ability of the Scots to intercept, engage and 
defeat a force less than a day's ride from Edinburgh was hardly a sign that the Plantagenet cause was 
winning the war, or even that it was capable of protecting the inhabitants of Lothian from raiding parties. 
On the other hand, if Sir Thomas Grey is correct in his assertion that Comyn and Fraser had lifted their 
40 Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.303. 
~l CDS, ii,nos. 1481,1594. 
42 Scotichronicon, vi, pp. 293-4. 
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siege of LinlithgO\v,43 presumably to move against the English force under Manton, Dunbar and Segrave, 
that may be an indication that the Scots did not have the necessary strength to prevent the siege being 
lifted by an English expeditionary force on even a relatively modest scale, though it would also suggest 
that the English garrisons were unable to prevent a siege being imposed in the first place, hence the 
necessity for a relief column. 
According to Thomas Grey the Scottish force had been in action at the new peel at Linlithgow, 
over thirty miles away, until 20 February when they lifted their investment and moved south.44 Given the 
difficulties of communication Segrave may have been under the impression that the Scots were still 
engaged there, and felt that he could raise the siege and perhaps bring the Scots to battle. Certainly 
Reimund Walrund and Robert Seueldedy were paid the substantial sum of thirty shillings for making a 
night recolUlaissance to Linlithgow in search of the Scottish army.45 Alternatively, the Scots may have 
had wind of his intention to move on Linlithgow and decided to intercept him once they were sure of his 
line of approach. Either way, it is clear that both the Scots and the English were prepared to offer or 
accept battle. 
The initial attack occurred at the village of Roslin, where Sir John Segrave and Patrick, Earl of 
Dunbar, currently in Plantagenet allegiance,46 had halted for the night. Superficially it might seem that tlle 
Plantagenet commanders were not expecting an attack at all, let alone a night attack, since they chose not 
to 'close up' their formation, but left the advance guard at 'a league distant at a hamlet' or even divided 
into three formations 'two leagues apart.,47 There are a number of possible explanations for the division of 
the English force. Since the action took place in February we can be confident that the weather conditions 
would be far too cold for men and horses to be lying out through the night. Unless the force \'vas very 
small indeed it would almost inevitably be too large to be accommodated in a modest Lothian village and 
43 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 23. 
44 Ibid., p. 24. 
45 CDS, v, no. 472. 
46 He at least managed to avoid capture; Hugh de Flotterston, holder of a house in Berwick, but presumably 
with some connection to Flotterston, Midlothian, was taken later and released for ransom. TNA,SC8/9/432. 
47 Scotichronicon, vi, pp. 293-4. 
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a further billeting area would be required whether an attack was expected or not, so division of force \vas 
probably forced on Sir John and the Earl, regardless of tactical preference. 
The failure of the English command to perceive, and take steps to neutralise, the threat posed by 
Comyn's force is clearly demonstrated by the resulting engagement; however Comyn's force was not 
necessarily a reflection of an extensive sympathy ''lith the Balliol cause among Lothian landholders 
merely because the fight took place in their neighbourhood. The location of a battle is the product of a 
wide range of factors; if the English force had chosen a different route there might have been no 
engagement at all, and since the engagement was very much a function of war at what we might 
reasonably see as a 'national' level, it would not be inevitable, or even particularly significant, that any 
Lothian men were involved. Sir John Comyn's force was, in all probability, an 'ad hoc' formation, 
assembled from immediately available manpower to respond to a threat or take advantage of an 
opportunity. Unquestionably there were Lothian men in the Balliol camp generally, but their presence at, 
or absence from, any particular action should not be seen as a determining factor in the location of that 
action since they might already be committed elsewhere. Similarly, that neither of the leaders of the Scots 
were Lothian men and that the Earl of Dunbar was in the Plantagenet force is not indicative of the 
political leanings of the Lothian community. With the exception of Wallace, the leadership of the Balliol 
cause was generally vested in senior nobles. The nearest thing to a Lothian magnate would have been earl 
Patrick, who, with English garrisons surrounding his Earldom, could hardly be expected to do anything 
other than accept Plantagenet government throughout the period 1296-1314. 
Although a battlefield success, Roslin illustrates the weakness of the Balliol cause. A battle could be 
forced in Plantagenet-held territory, and a successful outcome gained, but the Balliol party was not in a 
position to exert lordship in Lothian any more than Wallace had been in 1297. The restoration of King 
John may have seemed like a realistic possibility once he had been released into the custody of the Pope48 
and then to that of Philip IV,49 but the peace agreed between Philip and Edward in 1303,50 endorsed in 
48 Stevenson, Documents, i, dlxxv. 
49 Nicholson, ~Hjddle Ages, p. 63. 
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advance by John, destroyed any likelihood of that and in February 1304 the Balliol party came to 
Edward's peace, mostly under quite generous conditions.51 The light nature of the penalties imposed on 
the Balliol party activists can be interpreted in two ways. Ed,vard may have sought to bring Scots to his 
allegiance through demonstrating a degree of magnanimity in the hope that these men would become his 
agents in the future administration of Scotland, a possibility supported by the fact that a number of these 
men served the Plantagenet govermnent for years to come; men like Sir William Oliphaunt who held 
Stirling castle against Edward I in 1304, was a prisoner of war in England until 1308, but was an officer 
in Edward II's govermnent, commanding the Perth garrison until it fell to Robert I in January 1313, at 
which point (or shortly thereafter) he joined the Bruce party. Alternatively he may have decided that the 
war could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion through force of arms. Edward must have been 
aware that he was unlikely to live for very much longer. The generosity of his terms perhaps indicates a 
degree of desperation to achieve a political settlement. 
Several factors discouraged Lothian men from supporting the Balliol party in 1296-1304. Obviously the 
power of the Plantagenet administration was a major consideration, as was the inability of the Guardians 
to counter that power. Wallace's seizure of Haddington probably made some impression on the local 
political community, but not enough to bring large numbers of recruits to the Balliol cause. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the community of Lothian was hostile to the Balliol party, but equally there is 
nothing to suggest that they were very well-disposed to it either. The absence of significant local leaders 
with a strong commitment to King John was therefore a significant issue in itself. Men whose position in 
society relied on the patronage of King John might be expected to take up arms on his behalf since they 
might be compromised by his deposition, but the political community of Lothian in 1296-1304 were, in 
the main, men whose local prominence pre-dated John's reign. The Balliol party really had very little to 
offer as an incentive for Lothian men to resist the Plantagenet govermnent other than the prospect of 
50 A.P.S.. i, p. 454. 
'1 Barrow, Bruce, p. 129. Edward was not convinced that hostilities were completely over; Wallace was still 
at large and in March 1305 Edward was encouraging his son to reinforce Sir Alexander Abernethy at the 
Fords of Drip in the pursuit of the rump of the BaHiol party. Stevenson, Documents, ii, p. 472. 
44 
political independence from England. Many of them had, in any case, given their allegiance to Edward I 
in 1296. They may not have had much choice and medieval jurists certainly understood the nature of 
duress, but in practical terms, opposing Edward I's government was unlikely to result in anything better 
than forfeiture and possibly death. 
Despite the victory at Roslin, the Balliol party had run its course by early 1304. The French had 
abandoned the cause of King John (as had John himself) and made peace with England. The country was 
exhausted by the effort of fighting, the magnates had accepted Edw·ard's rule through the Strathord 
agreement and by August 1305 the sole active representative of the BaIliol cause was Sir William 
Wallace. Wallace was no longer the figure he had been in 1297. His defeat at Falkirk in 1298 had 
undermined his authority completely. He still enjoyed some sympathy, but he was unable to revitalise the 
Balliol cause as a serious proposition for ejecting the English. Indeed, by 1305 he may have been seen as 
something of an embarrassment, an obstacle to a politicaI settlement and therefore more part of the 
prob lem than the solution. At the close of hostilities in 13 04 there was no longer any effective 'patriotic' 
leadership. The BaIliol cause had been identified with the 'patriotic' cause for obvious reasons, but with 
John himself rejecting any prospect of restoration, what would the Scots have been fighting for? 
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PART 2, 1304-1314. 
It is unlikely that the Strathord annistice, or Robert the Bruce's seizure of the crown, really had much 
immediate impact on the lives of Lothian people generally. War broke out again in 1306, but then there 
had been war ahnost continually for the better part of a decade, largely conducted well away from 
Lothian. The resumption of hostilities undoubtedly forced Edward I to maintain a rather greater level of 
military commitment in Scotland than he would have liked, though there would seem to be no evidence of 
extraordinary garrison expenditure in Lothian in the first few years of the Bruce war. 
The Bruce cause did enjoy some measure of support among the Lothian gentry; a number of men 
were forfeited by Edward52 for their adherence to Robert I in 1306. A handful more, some of whom had 
in fact been active in the Bruce cause for two or three years, were forfeited by Edward II in 1312.53 The 
majority of the Lothian political community remained in Edwardian allegiance until 1314. As mentioned 
above, and more fully explored in Chapter 5, the Bruces had no established 'constituency' of support in 
Lothian, but even if they had, the presence of an extensive network of Plantagenet garrisons would have 
limited their activity. Had such sympathy existed and had it expressed itself in anned activity throughout 
Lothian (the latter would not have been an inevitable result of the former) the defeat of King Robert at 
Methven would surely have brought it to an end, at least temporarily. 
Several men, (though hardly a major, or even particularly significant segment of the political 
community as a whole) with extensive interests in Lothian did support Robert I. Michael Wemyss, 
William de Somerville, Alexander Fraser and Alexander de Lindsay turned out for Robert at the time of, 
or immediately after, his enthronement as did the tenants of Sir Henry de Pinkney, an English knight who 
had inherited land at Ballencrieff and at Luffness castle near Aberlady.54 Wemyss, Somerville, Fraser and 
52 Barrow. Bruce. pp. 325-8. 
'3 CDS, iii, no. 245. 
54 CDS, ii, no. 857, INA, C47/22/l0/45. He may have regretted his inheritance later. At some point between 
1300 and 1307 the castle, apparently having been gifted to Henry by the king, was back in Edward's hands. 
Henry petitioned for an allowance 'in consideration' of the heavy expense he had incurred in repairing the 
castle. INA, SC/8/43n14l. See NAS, RH5 230 for a less detailed inquisition relating to Henry Brade. 
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Lindsay were all men of some standing, probably quite prominent among the political community of 
Lothian, but with extensive interests elsewhere - Lindsay and Somerville in Lanark and Wemyss in Fife. 
They were hardly magnates, but they were fairly prominent people. Ballencreiff was a property of some 
significance which was held 'in capite' from the king for the service of one knight. In 1296 the most 
significant tenants of the estate had been Alexander Lindsay (presumably the same Alexander Lindsay 
forfeited in 1306 for supporting Robert I, see Appendix) John de Bickerton (see Appendix), Thomas de 
Colville and Henry Pinkney, the brother and heir of the late Robert. It is reasonable to assume that Henry 
sought the forfeiture of Lindsay, Bickerton and Colville rather than the unnamed and unnumbered cottars 
mentioned in the Post Mortem Inquisition'S which had confIrmed Henry as the legitimate heir. 
For the first eight years of King Robert's reign, the bulk of recorded military service performed by 
Lothian men was in Edwardian garrisons, either for payor to fulfil land tenure obligations. The paid men 
can be traced through muster rolls and horse valuations. Tenure service would not seem to have been 
recorded on a named basis, but was presumably administered by an official of the sheriff. The 
significance of the contribution that Lothian men made to the support of Edward II's government cannot 
be adequately defmed in either an administrative or operational context, but it is fair to assume that the 
political significance to Edward of retaining that support (and preferably extending it) was considerable if 
he was to maintain his rule. It is not clear that these garrisons were challenged to any significant degree 
until the autumn of 1310. This can be partially attributed to the fact that King Robert was preoccupied 
with fighting the Comyn and MacDougal interests in the north and west, and, perhaps to a limited degree, 
the nature of the forces available to him. The bulk of his troops would seem to have been recruited in the 
south-,vest, the west Highlands and the Isles, areas from which he could not expect to raise much in the 
",·ay of the mounted men-at-arms that he would need to conduct extensive operations in the south and 
east. By 1310 he must have been able to extend his rule into areas where he could call on the service of 
men-at-arms. Not enough perhaps to confront Edward II's expedition of 1310, but enough to harass his 
retreat and then make a descent on Lothian. A series of truces from November 1309 to the summer of 
55 CDS, ii, no. 857. 
47 
1310 had allowed Robert to pursue his enemies in the ,vest of Scotland while preventing any expansion 
by the Plantagenet administration. The end of the truces and the withdrawal of Edward's army gave 
Robert the opportunity to descend on Lothian in sufficient strength to prevent serious intervention by the 
garrisons at Edinburgh and Linlithgow, but not, apparently, enough strength seriously to threaten the 
security of the towns or castles. The Lanercost chronicler tells us ' ... Robert and his people invaded 
Lothian and inflicted much damage on those who were in the king's peace',56 an indication that not 
everyone resident in Lothian could be considered to be 'in the peace' of King Edward. By November 
1312 Edward II was obliged to instruct the commanders of his garrisons in Lothian, Roxburghshire and 
Berwickshire to prevent their men from infringing truces that the communities of those counties had been 
obliged to purchase from King Robert.57 The size of a medieval army is always open to question, but it 
would seem that Edward's army was not strong enough to pursue Robert I into the north, though strong 
enough to deter him from offering battle.58 
The absence of reports of actions between the English garrisons and King Robert's troops could be 
seen as evidence that the garrisons largely had the upper hand. The Scots were unable to force the 
surrender of castles or, so far as we can tell, deny territory to the administration until some time after 20 
August 1313 when the last recorded requisition of stores for Linlithgow from Berwick was authorised. 59 
The fall of Linlithgow must surely have had a disheartening affect on Edward's supporters in Lothian, but 
there were problems within the administration itself. By 1313 the commanders of the garrisons at 
Edinburgh and Berwick had either lost control of their men or connived at their activities as robbers and 
kidnappers. The failure to prosecute the guilty parties brought the administration into disrepute, and 
complaints from the Earl of Dunbar and Sir Adam Gordon failed to move Edward II to take effective 
56 Chron. Lanercost. p. 214. 
'7 Rot. Scot., i, p. Ill, Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous, ii, no. 452 and CDS, iii, no. 858 relating to 
hostages for the ransom of Ripon. 
58 Edward faced difficulties with recruitment, not only for the army itself but for the ships and sailors required 
to maintain an adequate level of supply. The towns of Sidmouth and Seton were not alone in failing to 
provide shipping (two well-armed vessels) demanded of them for June 1311. TNA, C4 7/22/10/9. 
59 CDS, iii, no. 330. 
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action.60 Edward was not una,vare of the difficulties facing his Scottish supporters generally, not just in 
Lothian. As King Robert extended and consolidated his rule it must have become increasingly clear to the 
men in Edward's peace that the situation was unlikely to improve without a major intervention by an 
English army. Edward did make an attempt to mount an offensive in 1310 but could not bring the Scots to 
battle and failed to make any impression on the situation.61 Neither troops nor provisions, though 
demanded in considerable quantities, were forthcoming in adequate quantity and in July 1310, having 
spent the better part of a year in the north of England and southern Scotland for no discernible gain, he 
left Berwick for London, giving the Scots a tremendous propaganda victory since they could claim to 
have repelled the invader without coming to blows. Even so, the fact that the Edwardian administration in 
Lothian, and throughout the south-east generally, survived at all over the following three years is a 
testament to its general effectiveness and the extent of its acceptance in the community. 
By the close of 1312 Robert I had shown that he could mount operations virtually anywhere in 
Scotland by making a surprise attack on Berwick which apparently was compromised by a dog barking at 
the approach of tlle Scots. 62 The town was held, but the commanders (and complements) of garrisons 
must have become more aware of their vulnerability. By November 1313 Edward was thanking Lothian 
landholders for their steadfast support and promising them positive action in the form of a major 
expedition.63 His letter lists only seven men as recipients of such letters: Adam de Gordon, Edward de 
Letham, Robert de Coleville, John Laundells, Alexander Stewart, William de Soulis and Thomas de 
Somerville. Whilst accepting that these men may have been identified as leaders of their local 
communities, or even perhaps that they were men who had been entrusted with leadership roles in the 
Plantagenet administration, their small number needs some consideration. They were not all primarily 
Lothian men, and probably all had interests in other parts of the country, thus they can hardly be 
considered a sample of the Lothian political community specifically just because they were all southern 
60 Ibid., no. 337, INA, C47/22110111. 
61 Rot. Scot., i, p.82. 
62 Chron. Lanercost, p. 200. 
63 Rot. Scot., i, p. 114. 
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nobles. The long-term reliability of even this small group of men must have been open to question. 
Thomas Somerville had been one of the men who had joined the Bruce party in 130664 and John 
Laundells - described as 'dominus' (lord) - managed to make his peace with King Robert sometime before 
1316, .vhen he was a witness to a royal confirmation.65 
Presumably Edward's declared intention of seeking out the Scots in difficult terrain was not far from 
the truth; Edward can hardly have expected that Robert would even accept or offer battle, let alone force 
it. Whatever Edward's general campaign policy in 1314 - if he really had one - his goals were surely more 
ambitious than the recovery and retention of Lothian. The appearance of a major field force would be an 
encouragement to the community and discourage defection to the Scots. On the basis of past experience it 
would be reasonable for Lothian men to assume that King Robert would refuse combat and withdraw 
across the Forth, allowing Edward to reinstate his administration in areas recently lost, regaining 
strongholds like the peel at Linlithgow and its satellite establishment at Livingston. More importantly, if 
Stirling castle was relieved and the Scots refused battle and retired, Edinburgh castle, which had fallen to 
Randolph in March through a coup-de-main operation,66 would probably be regained as well. The fall of 
Edinburgh castle undoubtedly destabilised the Lothian administration, but it also shows one of the 
military weaknesses of the Scots. Randolph either did not possess, or could not effectively deploy, the 
concentration of equipment necessary to bombard so powerful a fortress into submission, and, though 
there was a formal siege in progress, the garrison must have been sufficiently well-supplied to make 
starving them into submission an unfeasibly lengthy proposition. 
An English expeditionary force would be more or less certain to recover Edinburgh castle because it 
would be against Robert I's general policy to garrison it, and even if he did, the garrison would be 
unlikely to make a protracted defence since there would be little or no chance of an army coming to their 
relief If Lothian men thought that Edward's expedition of 1314 was likely to restore his administration 
they would have been very rash indeed to have declared for Bruce in time to serve in his army at 
64 Barro,:v, Bnlce, p. 326. 
65 RRS, v, p. 386. 
66 Barbour, The Bruce, pp. 381-97. 
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Bannockburn, though at least one, Sir Alexander Seton (see Appendix), whose interests lay primarily in 
Lothian and Berwickshire, appears to have seen which way the wind was blowing and defected on the eve 
of the main battle.67 
As we have seen, there was some degree of support in Lothian from the very start of Robert 1's reign. It 
was not sufficient to bring Lothian under his control. Naturally, the presence of Plantagenet garrisons, 
though perhaps resented as occupations tend to be, was a considerable barrier to the efforts of the Bruce 
party to penetrate Lothian and bring it under Robert 1's control. Additionally, as had been the case for 
King John, there was no strong tradition of local support for the Bruce family. None of the major figures 
within the Lothian community were men who owed their status to Bruce patronage. Although Robert had 
enjoyed remarkable military and political success in the preceding years, it may not have appeared to 
Lothian men that he was capable of ejecting the English, or that even if he could, he would be able to 
maintain a government strong enough to exclude them permanently. Unless Robert was able to force an 
acceptable political settlement there was every chance that the war might be renewed by the English at 
any time. Whether or not the Plantagenets could conquer the whole of Scotland was not the issue, only 
whether or not they could recover Lothian. On the other hand, Robert's military successes could not be 
ignored. It must have been self-evident by early 1314 that the Plantagenet administration was failing. The 
community of Lothian had been obliged to buy truces from Robert, the remaining English garrisons were 
less than totally secure, the administration was losing control over the garrison complements and Edward 
II was beset by domestic problems which might well prevent him from pursuing his agenda in Scotland. 
67 Barbour, The Bruce, p. 456. 
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PART 3, 1314-1329. 
The attitude of the Lothian political community to both Bruce and Plantagenet governments seems to 
have been broadly similar; whichever party could provide the better quality of 'lordship' could reasonably 
expect to enjoy extensive acceptance and a considerable level of material support. Edward had been able 
to recruit men-at-arms in significant numbers for paid service;68 presumably his administrators had been 
able to collect military service or there would surely be evidence of fmes, if not forfeitures for defect of 
service. Equally, the lack of recorded opposition to Robert I after 1314 and the incidence of Lothian men 
serving in his armies until the peace of 1328 and at Halidon Hill indicate an acceptance of the Bruce party 
as the de facto government. This is not to say that the Bruce party enjoyed the wholehearted support of 
the minor lords of Lothian, only that they apparently fulfilled their obligations to the crown, at least 
sufficiently not to lose their properties for defect of service. In some measure, the ease ,vith which 
Lothian free tenants seem to have changed allegiance (and we should bear in mind that that 'ease' may not 
have been very apparent to the men and women in question) may have been the product of their 
traditional relationship with the crown. The absence of a magnate whose interests lay primarily in Lothian 
meant that the primary source of lordship and patronage in the sheriffdom was the king' s government. 
Robert I may not have been able to impose his rule in Lothian before June 1314, but he was certainly 
able to impose it thereafter, and, to a great extent, was able to keep the war out of the sheriffdom, largely 
by mounting operations in Ireland and the North of England.69 In 1322 Edward II made a serious attempt 
to restore his administration through force of arms. Although he could raise an army and take it into 
Lothian/o he could not force the Scots to accept battle. King Robert stripped Lothian of provisions and 
68 CDS, ii, pp. 408-12. 
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retired across the Forth, keeping his army at CuIross until the failure of Edward's fleet to deliver 
provisions forced him to withdraw. 71 The Scots pursued the English into Yorkshire, winning a striking 
victory at Byland, from which Edward himself was fortunate to escape. 
Robert's ability to carry out a scorched earth policy is clear evidence that he could enforce his will in 
Lothian.72 It might be expected that the damage inflicted on his subjects there might cause resentment, but 
if the community identified the destruction of their property with the aggression of Edward II rather than 
the policies of Robert I, the popularity of the Bruce cause might actually be enhanced, particularly if 
Robert made arrangements for the sustenance of those who suffered losses. Additionally, his willingness 
to destroy the sheriffdom would have been an indication to the English that he was prepared to ruin it to 
deny it to them, and to the men of Lothian he would not tolerate resistance to his rule or acquiescence to 
the enemy. Army service for Lothian men after 1314 was not simply a matter of serving the Bruce cause 
w'ithin the confines of the sheriffdom. King Robert's devastating incursions into the north of England 
became something of a regular fixture, culminating in the Weardale campaign of 1327 which forced 
recognition of his kingship from Edward III - or at least from his mother, Isabella, and her partner, Roger 
Mortimer. 73 The participation of Lothian men in the campaigns of King Robert after 1314 is not of itself a 
sure indication of the political preferences of the community as a whole, only of the ability of the Bruce 
party to successfully demand service from that community. It would not be unreasonable to assume that a 
considerable proportion of the men and women with military obligations would have been happy to avoid 
making any overt political commitment at all, let alone take up arms in support of Robert I. Nonetheless it 
would seem that the greater part of the political community of Lothian were prepared to accept his 
kingship and that they were prepared to discharge the various obligations attached to landholding. Had 
there been widespread refusal to accept Bruce lordship - and the military commitments that would be 
71 Barbour The Bmce, p. 678. 
72 Whether he spent much time there reinforcing his power in person is difficult to assess. Dr Webster has 
pointed out that there is a strong likelihood that routine crown documents could be dated at Edinburgh 
regardless of where the King was. B. Webster, Scotlandfrom the Eleventh Centwy to 1603 (Cambridge, 
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required - there ,vould surely have been a spate of forfeitures. It could be argued that the instruments of 
such forfeitures might not have survived since there would have been no great value in preserving them, 
but the expectation would have been that the king would have granted such properties to his adherents. 
Robert I certainly did grant lands and privileges to Lothian men but there is little to indicate that the fall 
of the English administration in Lothian gave him extensive assets in the sheriffdom with which he could 
reward supporters. Interestingly, the man who benefited most from the king's patronage was probably Sir 
Alexander Seton, who, though he declared for Robert I in 1306, returned to Plantagenet allegiance shortly 
thereafter and remained in that allegiance until the battle of Bannockburn in 1314. Robert was doubtless 
pleased to accept Sir Alexander's homage and fealty, but his rewards were probably more a product of his 
role in the Bruce administration after 1314 and the need to build a structure of Bruce supporters in the 
south and east than of his timely defection on the battlefield. 
PART 4,1328-1341. 
If the Bruce party achieved acceptance in Lothian74 after Bannockburn without serious opposition due to 
the propensity of the political community to accept the 'government of the day', was that situation, or 
rather the reverse of it, prevalent in the periods following Dupplin Muir and Halidon Hill? There seems to 
be no evidence to suggest that Edward Balliol was able to establish his authority effectively in Lothian in 
the autumn of 1332 and there seems to be no record of a concerted resistance to Edward III in Lothian 
sufficient to have merited any discussion in surviving record of 1334-5. This might be construed as 
evidence that the political community of Lothian was, initially at least, prepared to accept a change of 
kingship. The cession to Edward III of the southern counties by Edward Balliol may have been accepted 
in 1334-35, though there is little evidence to support or refute that acceptance. Certainly by 1335 -36 about 
one hundred Lothian men and women had been forfeited. 75 Some of these - Godfrey Broun and William 
de Fresselay (see Appendix) -had certainly been in the Bruce party before 1314, and others had benefited 
74 Robert I of course put a great deal of effort into securing acceptance of his authority throughout Scotland, 
see M. Penman's Ph.D. Thesis, 'The Kingship of David II' (St. Andrews 1999), pp. 1-45. 
75 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. TNAE101119/24. 
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from Bruce patronage at the expense of Plantagenet supporters - for example Walter de Bickerton (see 
Appendix) who had apparently become the owner of the Luffness property that had once belonged to the 
de Pinkney family- but it would surely be unlikely that all of the hundred or more people forfeited during 
(or perhaps 'by') 1335-6 had been active Bruce supporters or that they had benefited from Bruce 
patronage if they were not active in his cause. Perhaps \ve should regard these persons as people who 
were not so much in the Bruce party as opposed to the Plantagenets. The absence of a document 
comparable to the Ragman Roll exercise of 1296 does not mean that the new administration did not seek 
the homage of these individuals. Given the absence of English, let alone Scottish shrieval registers for 
Lothian in 1334-5 this is hardly a surprise. The freeholders forfeited in 1335-6 would not have constituted 
anything like a majority of the political community, but they would have been a significant portion of the 
whole. There is no readily apparent pattern to their rejection of Plantagenet government. There was a 
greater incidence of forfeiture in the constabulary of Linlithgow than in Haddington, but not enormously 
so, and the lower incidence of forfeiture in 1334-35 may have been a product of the Earl of Dunbar's 
allegiance to Edward III. In 1335-36, when the Earl had defected to the Bruce party the incidence of 
forfeiture rose noticeably in Haddington, but only by a very small margin in Linlithgow. Curiously, 
Edward does not seem to have considered the reconstruction of Linlithgow to be a worthwhile project, 
assuming perhaps that it was redundant as long as he held Stirling, nor did he seek to restore Edinburgh 
castle until his administration had been in place for some time. 
That as many as 100 freeholders and significant tenants should feel sufficiently confident of an 
eventual Bruce victory to risk life and property suggests that the position of Edward III was less than 
secure and/or that all of these individuals had made themselves unacceptable to the Plantagenet 
government through military activity. It is unlikely that they were forfeited simply for accepting Bruce 
lordship after 1314 or the incidence of forfeiture would be very much greater since presumably all of the 
free tenants of Lothian had accepted that lordship. Only about one in five was prosecuted. 
It is possible that the high number of forfeitures that had been made by 1335-36 was a product of the 
battle at Culblean in October 1335, where, it would seem, several hundred men from south of the Forth 
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served. However the compotus of 1335-36 may be a reflection of the number of men who were not 
willing to accept Edward's lordship in 1334-35. The capture of Gilbert Talbot and other English knights 
near Linlithgow, the first recorded opposition to the PlantagenetlBalliol administration in Lothian,76 
certainly indicates that the occupation was not entirely secure, but the defection of the Earl of Dunbar was 
almost bound to influence local opinion. Presumably his submission to Edward III after Halidon Hill had 
encouraged some at least to accept Edward III as their king in 1333. However if March was prepared to 
declare for the Bruce party at a time when there were English garrisons all around his chief property 
(Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh once it had been refortified and possibly Dirleton and Yester77 as well) 
he must have decided that the risks of rejecting Bruce lordship were greater than the risks of rejecting that 
of Edward III. Naturally the Earl of Dunbar would have had to have taken a rather wider view of events 
than the average Lothian free tenant, but he would also have to take the views of his tenants and the local 
political community in general into account. He may have come to the conclusion that the conquest, or 
rather the retention, of even the south-east of Scotland was beyond the po\ver of the Plantagenet 
administration, a conclusion perhaps reinforced in December 1334 by the fact that Edward III failed to lift 
the siege of Dundarg, leading to the surrender of Henry Beaumont,78 a crucial supporter of the Balliol 
cause in the north-east. 79 Equally he, and indeed men like Sir William Douglas of Lothian and Sir 
Alexander Ramsay, may have felt that the weight of local opinion favoured the Bruce cause (or at least 
rej ected the Plantagenet one) and that if they wanted to have credibility and influence in the region they 
had best adopt a 'patriotic' position in politics. 
If the Bruce party could secure northern Scotland in the 1330s as they had two decades before, there 
was every chance that they could regain Lowland Scotland thereafter; not perhaps through a general 
76 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 164. 
-7 Henry de Greenford was the constable of Yester in November 1296, collecting over £40 from the issues of 
Yester and the sale of the horse and goods of John Keu, 'a felon'. Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 345 dates 
this document to November 1295, however, apart from the fact that war had yet to break out, the document 
clearly states that the compotus started from the 24th year of Edward's reign - 1296. 
7~icholson, Edward III, p. 168. 
79 He may also have been influenced by the international interest in Scotland as a threat to England. It is 
possible that knights from France and Flanders were in Scotland in 1334 to study the prospects for the Scots. 
M. Penman, David II, p. 62. 
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engagement like at Bannockburn, but by a steady campaign of regaining territories through local 
superiority. The high incidence of forfeitures, even if they were the product of political activity - which 
by the nature of the situation must surely have meant military activity for the majority of those forfeited -
need not be seen as evidence of outright Bruce support so much as of a rejection of Plantagenet lordship. 
The garrisons of Edward I and Edward II maintained control of Lothian quite effectively for nearly two 
decades but they were not necessarily popular. The acceptance of Bruce lordship during the siege of 1338 
should not be taken as proof of a general antipathy, but a foreign garrison is seldom popular anywhere. 
Further, if the tovmspeople saw the fall of the castle and of the Edwardian administration as inevitable -
not an unreasonable conclusion in early 1314 or by the summer of 1338- they might have been well 
advised to nail their colours to the Bruce mast as quickly as they could. Lothian men who saw an eventual 
Bruce triumph or at least a Plantagenet defeat as being inevitable might adhere to the Bruce party for the 
same reasons. Some may have genuinely believed that in the long term the Bruces could offer better 
lordship, but we should not discount patriotic or nationalist motivation as a possibility. In the early 1300s 
and again in the 1330s some men described themselves primarily as Scots rather than Bruce, Balliol or 
Plantagenet partisans by declaring that their allegiance was to 'the lion', the heraldic device of the king of 
Scotland.80 Fourteenth-century men and women certainly knew their nationality;81 there are far too many 
examples of a clear division in the minds of contemporary writers to think othenvise and there may have 
been a substantial element in the political community that did not so much favour the Bruce cause as 
reject the PlantagenetlBalliol alternative. 
The extensive war damage recorded in the English accounts for Lothian (and the picture is much the 
same for other southern and eastern counties) demonstrates that the administration of Edward III could 
not exert the same level of control or provide the same level of protection that had been afforded to the 
80 Rot. Scot., i, p. 401. 
81 See R. J. Smoll 'Off quhat nacioun art thou?' in R.A. MacDonald (ed.) History, Literature and .~dllsic in 
Scotland, 700 -1560 (Toronto, 2002). Identification by nationality could be a hazardous experiences-
Geoffrey de Everwyk, a monk of Dunfermline, sought sustenance from Edward I in 1307 since he had been 
expelled from his house because he was English and for 'uncovering certain Scottish plots against the King' 
INA,SC8!46!22!55. Edmund Hastings, as commander of the garrison of Perth asked that no Scotsman should 
have jurisdiction over the garrison in wartime. INA C47/22/lOn. 
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community under either the first Edwardian government or under that of Robert I. There would seem to 
be no particular pattern to the damage, in fact it is not clear to what extent the damage in anyone example 
was the product of Scots or English activity. The Scots had an interest in compelling allegiance: raiding 
the lands of those who would not accept Bruce lordship as a warning to others would have been a very 
conventional approach. Equally, burning out the property of defectors as an object lesson to waverers 
would probably have seemed a useful policy to the English. In all likelihood troops on both sides were 
less than concerned about whose property was attacked than they were about exerting control over 
communities and denying resources to the enemy. King Robert was able to make communities buy local 
truces on terms that were very advantageous. If he had not built a reputation for being able to restrain his 
men to a worthwhile extent his truces would not have been worth buying. Of course as long as the 
community was willing to pay for truces King Robert had no need to take his men into Lothian other than 
to pass through into Roxburghshire. Robert's men had little opportunity to cause damage, whereas the 
garrison troops were a continual presence which, as we have already seen, was a source of local friction 
through failure of discipline.S} 
The striking arm of Edwardian garrisons in Lothian invariably comprised bodies of men-at-arms (see 
Chapter 4). The advantage of a highly mobile, heavily armed and experienced force is obvious; what is 
significant is that forces of that nature were clearly unable to achieve local dominance in 1313 -14. In 
order to counter such a force at all, King Robert must have had a force of men-at-arms large enough to be 
able to neutralise the garrison forces. In 1303 Sir John Comy'11 had been able to assemble a force large 
enough to defeat a body of men-at-arms on a particular day and under particular circumstances; he was 
not in a position regularly to confront the garrison forces, let alone contain them. By 1313 King Robert's 
men-at-arms would seem to have been able to counter their opponents on a daily basis if required to do 
so. By entering a truce with the community of Lothian he ensured that they did not have to, and therefore 
they could be deployed to another front, whereas the Edwardian administration in Lothian would have 
needed to maintain the strength of their garrisons for fear of the Scots breaking the truce and taking 
82 CDS, iii, no. 337; INA, C47/221l01l1. 
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castles by surprise and also for the sake of their presence in the community as visible tokens of lordship. 
As long as King Robert was able to impose good observation of the truce by his troops, the disorderly 
conduct of the garrisons may have helped eventual acceptance of his 'peace' among Lothian men and 
women after the summer of 1314, since he would have demonstrated that he could offer, if not 'good 
lordship', certainly better lordship and more consistent protection than that offered by the Plantagenets. 
It would be misleading to say that Robert I encountered no opposition from Lothian landholders 
throughout the rest of his reign: he did, but not on account of Lothian issues. Sir Peter Lubaud (see 
Appendix), was forfeited of Cowden some time before 1316,83 possibly for compromising a planned 
attempt on Berwi.ck. 84 Sir Alexander Moubray (see AppendLx) and others entered the peace of Edward II 
in 1320-21 on account of the De Soulis conspiracy,85 but these men were moved by 'national' political 
considerations; the location of their properties was not a factor. Although the De Soulis conspiracy ,vas a 
failure, it was evidence that Robert I was less than secure in his kingship and may have encouraged 
Edward II to mount his 1322 campaign. If Barbour is to be taken at face value, De Soulis had a force of 
over 300 men in 'livery' ,86 not an expression nonnally associated with the early fourteenth century, but 
perhaps in this context indicating men-at-anns bearing a device of their 0'\\-'11 as opposed to bearing the 
device of their leader, in which case De Soulis had mobilised a powerful force. The fact that he was taken 
at Berwick perhaps suggests that a considerable portion of his force might have been recruited from 
exiled Scots, the men who would later be kno'\\-'11 as the 'disinherited' and not, therefore, an indication of 
widespread opposition to the Bruce party among the existing political communities of Scotland. The very 
fact that this incident is kno'\\-'11 as the 'De Soulis' conspiracy is evidence of the success of Bruce 
83 RRS, v, p.367. 
84 The garrison at Berwick faced more problems than the likelihood of a Scottish attack In March 1316 the 
constable of Berwick, Sir Ivo de Aldeburgh, was due arrears for himsel( his garrison and for horses lost in 
the reign of Edward L TNA, C47/22110/25. 
3~icholson,A1iddle Ages, p.102. Nicholson states that the aim of the De Soulis conspiracy was to replace 
Robert I with Sir William De Soulis, however any claim that De Soulis might have made would have been 
tenuous in the extreme. The only plausible candidate would have been Edward Balliol, son of King Jolm. See 
also .Barrow, Bntce, pp. 309-310. Dr. Penman suggests that Bruce propaganda ascribed the conspiracy to De 
Sociis to undennine the credibility of the Balliol cause and that the kingship of Robert I was 'undeniably 
strengthened' by his decisive response, 'A fell Coniuracioun agayn King Robert the Doughty King: the De 
Sociis Conspiracy of 1318-20' Innes Review, 50, (1999). 
86 Barbour, The Bnlce, p. 700. 
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propaganda.87 The real rival for Scottish kingship was Edward Balliol, son of King John. His success at 
Dupplin Muir88 enabled him to have himself made king at Scone and to hold a parliament at Perth, but the 
extent of his rule is open to question; he does not seem to have spent much time in Lothian during his 
brief kingship between Dupplin Muir in August 1332 and his flight from Annan at Christmas. In 1336 
Robert de Byncestre claimed that he had been granted the lands of Sir Alexander Seton by Edward Balliol 
after his first battle and that he had enjoyed seisin of those lands until the cession of 2000 librates of 
southern Scotland to Edward III by Edward Balliol, \vho had since granted them to Sir William 
Eynesford. 89 Since Seton had joined the Plantagenet peace by December 1333 (though he had been 
forfeited again by 1335-6) when he served as one of the jurors making an extent of Benvickshire90 and 
attended Edward Balliol's parliament at Holyrood in February 133491 there must be some question as to 
when exactly Sir Robert had enjoyed possession of the properties. Presumably he had not had them for 
very long given the short period between the forfeiture of Sir Alexander by Edward Balliol and his 
subsequent acceptance into Balliol peace in 1334 or his forfeiture by 1335-6 by Edward Plantagenet. 
The extent to which Plantagenet government was established after Halidon Hill is impossible to 
ascertain. Since there was resistance to it, in the shape of William Douglas of Lothian among others, it 
evidently existed. In August or September 1334 the Guardian, the Earl of Moray, led his troops into 
Lothian to meet Douglas, recently released from prison, who had raised a body of troops and commenced 
operations against the English. Bower tells us that the exploits of Douglas would make a 'large and 
attractive book', and were evidently sufficiently impressive to make Douglas the chief focus of Bruce, or 
87 See N. Reid 'Crown and Community Under Robert l' in Grant & Stringer (edd), Medieval Scotland. 
Crown, Lordship and Community (Edinburgh, 1993), pp. 215-6. 
88 Lt. CoL Rogers (pers comm.) has suggested that the defeat at Dupplin Muir would have been seen as a 
mark of God's favourable attitude to the Balliol cause and that the Bruce cause would have been 
compromised accordingly in the eyes of the Scots, however it would be reasonable to assume that a similar 
attitude would have developed in English society after the battles of Bannockbum, Myton and Culblean. 
89 CDS, iii, no. 1223. 
90 Rot. Scot., i, p.260. 
91Nicholson, Edward III, p.l52. Edward Balliol's parliament was attended by some Lothian men, though not, 
apparently, in great numbers despite the recent Bruce defeats at Dupplin Muir and Halidon HilL Among tlle 
' ... bishops, prelates, earls, barons and nobles' of the realm there were Patrick Graham (see Appendix), 
Michael Wemyss, Patrick Curry, Geoffrey Moubray, Robert de Pinkney and the Earl of Dunbar. INA, 
E39115Jl. 
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at least anti-PlantagenetlBalliol, sympathy in the sheriffdom. As such he was a natural ally of Moray in 
the sense that they shared an enemy. Moray could hardly avoid endorsing Douglas' rise to prominence so 
long as Douglas was harrying the enemy. Their co-operation was brought to an end by Moray's capture 
while escorting the count of Namur from the fight at Edinburgh. By the time Moray was liberated in the 
autumn of 1340 the English administration in Lothian was close to defeat and Douglas had established 
himself as a prominent war-leader among the Scots as a whole, not only in Lothian. 
The large number of forfeitures made by Edward III in 1335-36 may be an indication of the success 
of the Bruce party in making themselves acceptable as a source of lordship. The promotion by Robert I of 
men like Alexander Seton or of John de Stirling92 by Edward III (see Appendix) to positions of some 
prominence as Lothian landholders no doubt provided, or was intended to provide, a source of leadership 
loyal to the crown. It is possible that since so many Lothian tenants held their property directly from the 
King, the introduction of such a figure would not necessarily be popular. The rights, responsibilities and 
privileges of free tenants may not have been very clearly defined, but it would not be surprising if the 
lairds of Lothian felt they might be compromised in some way by the rise of a great lord in their midst. It 
would not be surprising either, if a similar condition applied to the relationship between the Lothian 
gentry and the English crown. Under Scottish kingship Lothian free holders might or might not approve 
of the king, but they could hope to get access to him should the need arise. Gaining the royal ear under 
English kingship might be rather more difficult. One attraction of Robert's kingship in 1314 was 
obviously military success. Lothian landholders - and the rest of the people of the county of course - had a 
vested interest in peace, however if they had to have war, much better that the focus of that war be 
southern Scotland or northern England or Ireland; in fact, anywhere but Lothian. As long as the Bruce 
party was in the ascendant militarily there were attractions for the martially inclined in Bruce adherence, 
and in the period of Bruce administration from 1314 to 1333 they had sho'wn that while they could not 
always keep war out of Lothian, they could prevent continual warfare there if they could keep the focus 
of the conflict to the border areas. When circumstances allowed King Robert was prepared to offer, even 
92 For John de Stirling (Strivelin)'s grants at Ratho and Bathgate see TNA, C47122110!53. 
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force battle, but he was seldom in a position to confront large-scale invasions, preferring to adopt a 
'scorched earth' policy. This can hardly have been popular with the people whose crops were destroyed, 
but it was certainly effective militarily. Politically any damage done to King Robert's standing would 
have to be compared to how much the populace came to perceive Edwardian ambitions as the real source 
of their troub les. 
Initially the position of Edward Ill's administration was similar in many respects to their predecessors 
under Edward II in the sense that for a while the presence of men-at-arms in garrisons at Stirling, 
Bothwell and Edinburgh by the winter of 1335 was sufficient to deter the Scots from mounting operations 
in Lothian, and in the sense that the ability of the administration to protect the community was eventually 
compromised by the inability to deploy enough man-at-arms to counter the Scots. Apart from the obvious 
consideration that only a strong force of cavalry can consistently impose its will on another body of 
cavalry it is worth noting that virtually all of the recorded actions (with the exception of a handful of 
general engagements and the capture of castles) ·which took place in Lothian throughout the Wars of 
Independence were, so far as we can tell, fought by men-at-arms. There is no doubt that there were 
archers and other infantry in the garrisons of the Plantagenet administration and we must assume that they 
took an active part in the defence of their establishments, but the task of an occupation garrison is 
primarily to exert control far beyond the perimeter of a castle or camp; not to man the walls but to exclude 
the enemy from the vicinity. Unlike the administrations of Edward I and Edward II, the garrisons of 
Edward III were apparently unable to fulfil that objective sufficiently well to exclude Bruce party forces 
from operating throughout Lothian after 1335 at the latest. 
In the 1330s Sir John de Strivelin felt secure enough to leave his post, taking a large portion of the 
men-at-arms of the garrison with him, on an expedition to Fife to lift the Scottish siege of Cupar in May 
1336,93 but he was unable to prevent the guardian, Andrew Murray, from imposing a siege of Edinburgh 
castle in June 1338.94 The guardian appointed a sheriff of Lothian, and while the siege was in progress, 
93 CDS, iii, p.354. 
94 Scotichronicon, vii, p.131. 
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what Bower calls the 'community of Lothian' accepted his authority. It would seem, then, that the heavy 
cavalry element of the garrison was unable to confront their Scottish equivalents sufficiently to prevent 
the Scots leading a major force into Lothian. The Scots, on the other hand, do not seem to have felt 
confident of their ability to withstand intervention from another force. The approach of a relief column 
seems to have caused the Scots to lift the siege and move to Clerkington in order to meet the relief 
column, which they met and defeated at Crichtondene.95 This was a tactical victory for the Scots, but their 
inability to restore the siege suggests that they had doubts about their ability to maintain a close 
investment in the face of English reinforcements, or, possibly, that they had expected the relief column to 
be stronger than it was, dispersed the infantry and detached a cavalry force to observe andlor disrupt the 
relief column. Finding that it was smaller than expected, the Scots offered battle successfully, but were 
not in a position to restore the siege. Although the garrison had obviously lost the ability to dominate the 
tactical situation in Lothian, they were not sufficiently intimidated to surrender, even in the wake of a 
battlefield defeat, which suggests that although Crichtondene was certainly a victory for the Scots, it did 
not materially alter the balance of power in Lothian. The acceptance of Laurence de Preston as sheriff 
should be seen in that context. The Bruce party, it would seem, could depend on the support of the 
Lothian community, or at least a significant proportion of it, if they could demonstrate military control. 
Once the siege of Edinburgh had been lifted the Plantagenet administration presumably re-asserted its 
position to some degree. 
How effectively is open to question, we might assume that the lack of sheriff court accounts in 
Lothian for 1337-38 (most of the records from 1338-41 relate to the administration of the garrison, not the 
sheriffdom) and thereafter is an indication that the Lothian administration had become an outpost of a 
fonvard policy of defence and obstruction rather than a serious attempt to retain Lothian as part of 
Edward Ill's domain. The outbreak of war between England and France in 133796 was obviously going to 
be a huge burden on Edward's resources and would almost inevitably reduce the effort that he could 
95 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.102. 
96 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War. Trial by Battle (London, 1990), pp. 143-51. 
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devote to his Scottish campaigns, but retention of castles in Scotland, particularly Edinburgh and Stirling, 
would help to keep the Scots occupied and reduce their ability to intervene effectively in support of the 
French and perhaps help to deny the Scots full lordship in Lothian and keep them from making further 
progress in Roxburghshire and Bervvickshire. 
The fighting in Lothian was not limited to operations connected with sieges. Sir Alexander Ramsay 
(see Appendix) was able to conduct operations from Hawthornden,97 the caves there providing what 
Bower calls an underground fortress. That Ramsay could base himself and his 'ioli' (gallant/daring) 
company of men-at-arms98 right in the middle of Lothian is a strong indication that the Edinburgh garrison 
was unable to carry the fight to the Scots effectively. The security of Hawthornden may have been a 
product of the nature of the force available to the Plantagenet administration, largely men-at-arms. 
Without adequate infantry protection, the men-at-arms of the garrison would be unable to close with 
Hawthornden without risking several excellent ambush positions whichever approach they chose, and the 
garrison did not have any close combat infantry at all so far as record reveals. The problem would seem to 
have been overcome by November 1338, when supplies were authorised for Sir Laurence Abernethy to 
garrison and provision 'the castle of Havvihornden', 99 apparently recently captured from the Scots, though 
since that is the only reference to a Plantagenet force there it seems likely that the stronghold was 
recovered by the Scots shortly thereafter. The small complement of infantry allotted to the Lothian 
garrison suggests that the general tactical policy of the administration was to rely on the mobility of the 
man-at-arms element of the sheriff's force. Evidently that force was not sufficient to contain their 
counterparts in the Scottish army. In late 1337 Sir William Douglas (see Appendix) of Lothian offered 
battle to Sir John Strivelin (see Appendix) at the Crags of Craigie (unlocated, but ahnost certainly in West 
Lothian, and probably in the vicinity of Torphichen) and was able to win the day, though Bower's claim 
that he did so with fifty men against 500 must be taken with a pinch of salt. 100 Sir Jolm's garrison seems 
97 Seo tiehronieon, vii, p .147. 
98 Chron. FVyntoun, vi, p. 83. 
99 CDS, iii, no. 1291. 
100 Seotiehronieon, vii, p.129. 
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never to have amounted to as many as 500 men-at-arms, and even if it did, he would be most unlikely to 
lead the entirety of his force on a foray. He may have been able to call upon the customary military 
obligations of those Lothian landholders who were still in the peace of Edward III as well as those in paid 
garrison service so the limited number of men on garrison muster rolls should not be seen as the whole 
extent of his offensive capacity. Even so, the Plantagenet administration was clearly unable to maintain 
operational superiority over the Scots in mobile combat. Bower10l patriotically records only one success 
(a fight at Blackburn from which Sir William Douglas was lucky to escape) for the Plantagenets against 
the success of the Scots in actions at the Crags of Craigie, Blacksollings, BurghmuirlEdinburgh castle, 
Crichtondene (where, according to Wyntoun, Douglas led a company of one hundred knights and men-at-
arms in a successful attack against a wing of the English army), an unlocated action against Sir Laurence 
Abernethy which involved six different clashes, the defence of Dunbar castle and the eventual capture, 
after a second siege, of Edinburgh castle in March 1341. 
Of all the field engagements Bower refers to, only one, the fight at Blacksollings, was a dismounted 
action. The very fact that Bower thought it necessary to point out that Douglas was with a company of 
footmen indicates the rarity of dismounted combat in the Lothian theatre. It is quite clear that Blaksollings 
was far from typical of medieval war and indeed pre-mechanised warfare in general; incidences of 
cavalry being ambushed by infantry were not common in any age. 
Command of forces was by formal appointment in the Plantagenet party, but was, to a greater extent 
anY'vay, assumed by members of the Bruce party. Sir John de Strivelin's leadership role was a part of his 
general responsibility as an officer of Edward III, but that of Alexander Ramsay would have been the 
product of a number of factors. Obviously as a Lothian baron, Alexander enjoyed some formal power 
over the men of his barony and of course a degree of influence over neighbours through his local 
prominence and familial relationships, but he was also, effectively, a local focus for Bruce sympathisers, 
for those whose properties had been, or might be, forfeited in order to restore members of the 
'disinherited', for those who just resented the English and those in search of adventure. The same is true 
101 Scotichronicon, vii, p.129. 
65 
of Sir William Douglas of Lothian (see AppendLx), whose martial abilities allowed him to extend his 
influence beyond his tenants and relatives. By the time Edinburgh Castle fell to Douglas in 1341 he had 
established himself as one of the two most powerful men in Lothian (the other being Sir Alexander 
Ramsay), though in 1333 he had been only one of a dozen or more barons in the constabulary of 
Linlithgow. 
The capture of Edinburgh Castle marked the end of Edwardian administration in Lothian, but not of 
military activity. Edward's interest in acquiring territory in Scotland would seem to have waned by the 
time he visited the Earls of Salisbury and Arundel at the siege of Dunbar in 1337,102 so to what end did he 
maintain expensive garrisons there for the next four years? In fact, Edward had little choice. The only 
way he could have relinquished Edinburgh without a fight or an ignominious withdrawal would have 
been as part of a general settlement with the Scots, who, in the military climate of the late 1330s, would 
hardly have been likely to accept any settlement that would have appealed to Edward. Perhaps more 
significantly he must have questioned the effectiveness of his administration in southern Scotland 
generally. The Earl of Dunbar had defected to the Scots more than three years previously, but his castle at 
Dunbar, surrounded by English-held castles, was still held against Edward III. Indeed, the fact that the 
Earl had chosen to defect at all was a strong sign that the administration was not gaining the acceptance of 
the community, but was losing its credibility as an alternative to Bruce lordship. The failure of Edward 
Ill's officers at Dunbar is something of a curiosity. Evidently the administration was able to undertake a 
major siege without fear of serious intervention by the Scots, though they were unable to prevent a force 
of men-at-arms under Sir Alexander Ramsay of Dalhousie from entering the castle, mounting a sally 
against the siege force and departing again. 103 It is possible that Edward hoped to draw the Scots into 
offering battle to raise the siege, but the castle does not seem to have been in grave danger at any point. 104 
This has implications for the confidence of the defenders. It was unlikely that the Scots would offer battle 
102 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.168. 
103 Scotichronicon, vii, p.129. 
104 The failure of the siege had implications for the reputations of the commanders; ' ... after spending a long 
time there, they raised the siege and withdrew, to their no small discredit.' G. Martin, (ed.) Knighton's 
Chronicle, 1337-1396 (Oxford, 1995), p. 5. 
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under such circumstances given their defeat at Halidon only four years previously. With no reasonable 
expectation of a relief force the defenders must have been confident that they could hold out beyond the 
ability of the administration to maintain the siege. This in tum throws a light on the state of the 
Edwardian government. If Lothian, Roxburghshire and Berwickshire were secure in Edward's rule it 
seems very odd that the garrison of Dunbar castle should undergo a siege of twenty-two weeks confident 
that the administration would be unable to force their surrender. 
Regardless of exactly why the siege was abandoned, the fact that it was must have been both an 
encouragement to Bruce supporters and a blow to the Plantagenet party in Lothian. Edwardian 
administration could hardly be considered secure if there was a strong castle held by the enemy 
immediately to the southeast of the county. Lifting the siege was effectively an admission that Edward's 
government was no longer consistently able to direct the course of the war. 
During the first period of Bruce administration in Lothian (1314-33) Ed\vard II continued to 
authorise officials to accept Scots into his peace105 and even to grant benefices in Scotland to 
petitioners. lo6 The latter perhaps helped men seeking other appointments; they could hope for a 
sympathetic hearing if they could claim to have been ejected or prevented from taking up their 
appointments by the Scots. To some extent Edward's acceptance of Scots into his peace would have been 
a means of fostering opposition to Robert I; the implication being that men who crossed King Robert 
were very likely to find favour with Edward II. Edwardian restoration in Lothian in particular and 
southern Scotland generally must have seemed a far-fetched proposition in 1314, but by adopting a policy 
of offering his peace to Robert's opponents Edward perhaps helped to nurture support among minor 
gentry for the party that would become known as the 'disinherited'. 107 Without Edward's protection and, in 
105 Rot. Scot .. i, p. 139. 
106 CDS, ii, no. 653. Ihe clerics ofChemay petitioned for the grant of various Scottish churches in July 1319. 
INA, SC35/31. Edward was prepared to make such grants - he gave the prebend of Kilbride to William de 
Cliffe on 19 July 1319 - since they were unlikely to cost him anything so long as Scotland was outviith his 
control. 
107 Ihe issue of the 'disinherited' had not been resolved by the time of Robert 1's death, but the suitors did not 
simply reach for their arms, they had been in negotiations for years before the Dupplin Muir campaign. INA, 
C47/22110/48. 
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some cases, financial support, a policy continued by Edward III until 1333, there might have been a rather 
smaller body of men to accompany Edward Balliol to Dupplin Muir, though it is worth bearing in mind 
that a large proportion of Balliot's 1332 army was provided by English lords. lOS If such a 'constituency' of 
support had developed it would seem not to have been important enough to have made much impression 
on the situation after 1341. Even after the dramatic victory at Neville's Cross in 1346, Edward made no 
move to re-occupy Lothian. 
Edward Ill's initial approach to the distribution of garrisons may be an indication of how much effort 
he had originally been prepared to devote to the task. When Edward took control of Lothian and the other 
ceded territories he does not seem to have intended to build a network of strongholds across Scotland, but 
to have concentrated his efforts on a relatively small number of centres. In Edward II's reign there had 
been two major garrisons in Lothian, Edinburgh and Linlithgow, and a number of smaller establishments, 
including a peel at Livingston, the Hospitaller Preceptory at Torphichen, baronial castles such as Dirleton 
and Yester109 and whatever constituted the administrative presence at Haddington. With the benefit of 
Bothwell, Stirling, Roxburgh and Dunbar in the surrounding area, the lack of a Plantagenet-held 
stronghold in Lothian may not have been considered an issue if the political community could be 
persuaded to support Edward Ill's rule; after all, Robert I had managed to keep Lothian securely in his 
power for nearly twenty years without a castle or, so far as we are aware, maintaining a force there. 
Edward's decision to re-fortify Edinburgh was not part of his original scheme of administration, but a 
reaction to events, primarily the defeat and capture of the count of Gueldres there in 1335 which 
demonstrated the vulnerability of troop movements through areas without secure refuges and possibly to 
the capture of Sir Richard Talbot (who apparently had to find a ransom of £2000), Sir John de Strivelin 
108 As ever with medieval battles, the strength of the armies is hard to ascertain. Penman gives the Balliol 
torce 2,000-3,000 participants David II, p.47, broadly inline with contemporary figures. The Scottish army is 
estimated at 30,000 (Chron. Fordun, i, p.355), but this should be seen as a literary convention indicating a 
'vast' force, not as a literal statement. It would be remarkable if the combined Scottish forces amounted to as 
many as 15,000. 
109 Two men-at-arms from the retinue of Sir Adam de Welle were available for the operations of Sir John de 
Kingstone in late 1302 (CDS, v, no. 305). This was not a unique, nor even perhaps an unusual arrangement. 
Twenty men-at-arms of the 'gentz' of Galloway were to be paid wages for service should they be called upon 
to pursue the enemy' (palgrave Docs. Hist. Scot., p. 297). 
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and Sir John FeltonllO near Linlithgow. There may have been other pressures, not strictly military, which 
encouraged him to take on the expense of rebuilding a castle and providing it with a garrison. Edinburgh 
was probably already seen as the most significant town in Scotland, with the possible exception of Perth, 
which, in 1335, was ostensibly the centre of Edward Balliol's Scotland and a forward position of Edward 
Ill's military establishment. Without a strong castle and garrison Edinburgh would have been vulnerable 
to sudden attacks by the Scots; if Edward could not defend Edinburgh he would hardly hope to become 
master of southern Scotland. The absence of Linlithgow from his plans seems to indicate a different 
approach to both strategic and tactical considerations compared to that of Edward I and Edward II. They 
had developed a chain of fortresses that could rely on one another for support; Edward III seems to have 
adopted a similar policy for northern Scotland, installing royal officials or supporting the installation of 
those of sympathetic barons like Sir Henry Beaumont and Sir David Strathbogie, but in southern Scotland 
he made use of a much smaller range of locations. Perhaps in the hope that Edward Balliol would 
successfully assert his kingship and secure the transfer of the ceded counties to Edward III without 
meaningful resistance, he seems to have pinned his hopes on a more aggressive policy with a greater 
tendency to combat than the containment that seems to have been the objective of the garrisons in 1310-
14. Edward's willingness to take large armies to Scotland can be seen as evidence that he still intended to 
achieve the cession of the southern counties, though he seems to have achieved little by the exercise. We 
can be confident that had he been offered battle under circumstances that he felt suited him, he would 
have been quick to accept, but we should question whether he would have been likely to expect such an 
eventuality. The Scots had not developed a 'large army' tactical format that could counter the combination 
of the longbow archer and the man-at-arms, nor could they maintain a large enough body of men-at-arms 
to force a purely 'chivalric' engagement on a large scale. The Scots would seem to have been able to raise 
a force of men-at-arms large enough to contain the man-at-arms element of a major garrison; they had 
been able to mount sieges of Edinburgh castle in 1314, 1338 and in 1341. They could find enough cavalry 
to overcome even relatively substantial forces of men-at-arms at Roslin and Crichtondene, but could 
110 Chron. rVyntoun, p.83. 
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hardly hope to defeat the cavalry element of a major English campaign force. If the Scots were not likely 
to offer battle, they were still less likely to accept it and forcing battle on the Scots had proved to be more 
than just a challenge for Edward I and Edward II. 
If it is hard to see any material military value in the massive expenditure involved, the political value 
is perfectly clear. By moving large bodies of men through Scotland Edward demonstrated his military 
power and expressed confidence in Edward Balliol. The former may have been counter-productive given 
the behaviour of medieval armies, but 'without the latter Balliol would surely have lost his position more 
quickly than he did. The more time it took for the Scots to decide between Balliol and Bruce, the longer 
they would be too preoccupied with internal strife to pose a threat to northern England. Maintaining even 
a small field army under Edward Balliol would have been far too much of a financial burden to be 
adopted as a medium or long term policy and in any case, would have been a risk)' venture. Should that 
army be defeated the prestige of Edward III as a martial prince, and of English arms generally, would be 
severely diminished abroad, and the willingness of his English subjects to serve in and pay for a lengthy 
war of occupation and conquest might be seriously impaired. On the other hand the relatively small 
expense of maintaining a body of men-at-arms at Stirling that could intervene should Edward Balliol need 
immediate support would be money well spent if it helped to keep the Scots in Scotland. 
In opting, so far as we can tell, not to have any garrisons at all in Lothian between 1333 and 1335, 
Edward may have been making a political gesture, or rather two. By not stationing troops in the area he 
could be seen as having confidence in Edward Balliol's kingship and at the same time he could be seen as 
deliberately avoiding a potential source of contention with the community. There may even have been a 
policy motive in the composition ofthe garrison of Edinburgh; the 1335-36 muster roll is divided into two 
groups, Scottish and English men-at-arms, though at least two Scots served in the 'English' sub-unit, 
conveniently described as 'Anglici ad arma'. j]] The 'Scottish' component, almost all of whom would still 
be serving in the garrison in 1336-37 and a few in 1340, included several surnames to be found in the 
muster rolls of Edward I and Edward II's garrisons of twenty and thirty years before. It would not be rash 
111 CDS, iii, pp. 360-61. 
70 
to assume that some portion of these men were minor members of the 'disinherited' and other Scots who 
had either remained with, or joined, the Plantagenet cause after 1314. 
The benefits of employing these men in garrisons would have been considerable. The garrison forces 
as a whole might not seem such an intrusion to the community if a large proportion of the establishment 
were Scots, the people who had remained in Plantagenet faith needed to be rewarded for their constancy 
and the garrisons needed men who would have to be paid. By employing Scots opposed to the Bruce 
party as men-at-arms Edward could be reasonably sure of loyalty from a garrison that had some 
understanding of the community in which they were stationed. The disadvantages were at least as 
considerable. The fact that such men were embedded in the communit)T meant that they could negotiate 
defection to the Bruce party through their network of relatives and associates. William Fairley, was 
pardoned, along with several other men who had served, or would serve in the Edinburgh garrison; 
(Alexander de Craigie Senior, Alexander de Craigie Junior. and William Dahnahoy,112 see Appendix) for 
defecting to the Scots in 1335.113 He was serving in the Edinburgh garrison as one of the 'Scoti ad arma' 
in 1335_6,114 but was no longer serving there by the summer of 1340,115 and was involved in the capture 
of the castle in 1341 116 having defected to the Scots for a second time. 
Installing a garrison and rebuilding the castle at Edinburgh undoubtedly strengthened Edward's 
position in eastern Scotland. Although the castle garrison was evidently unable to prevent Bruce forces 
from raiding in Lothian it would be unreasonable to think that their presence, let alone their activity, was 
not a factor for which the Scots had to make allowance. In a sense the Edinburgh garrison can be seen as a 
genuine 'subtracted reserve', that is to say, a portion of the force which has been retained to exploit 
opportunities or meet unexpected contingencies as opposed to a portion of a force that has not yet been 
112 The cash for wages was not always easily achieved. Dalmahoy was paid in wool on at least one occasion 
(see Appendi'i:). This was not an innovation. In 1305-6 Edward I gave Sir Alexander Abernethy (as 'keeper' 
of Scotland betvveen the Scottish Sea and the mOlmtains) a license to export wool TNA, SC/32/67 and in 
November 1338 Edward III gave Sir Alexander Craigie three 'tonels' of wine in recognition of his losses in 
Scotland. TNA C4 7 /22/6/18. 
113 CDS, iii, no. 1184. 
114 Ibid., pp. 360-3. 
115 Ibid., no. 1323. 
116 M. Brown, The Black Douglases, p. 169. 
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deployed. The only clear example of the garrison in that role is Sir John de Strivelin's foray across the 
Forth to raise the siege of Cupar castle.l17 The Cupar operation was a success in immediate tactical terms; 
the siege was raised and Sir Alexander had performed a notable feat of arms, both factors that would have 
encouraged the PlantagenetlBalliol party and discouraged Bruce supporters. 
It would be rash to conclude that Edward never set much store by the cession of the southern counties 
by Edward BallioL The cause of the disinherited gave him an opportunity to achieve the effective 
subjection of the Scots if he was fortunate or temporarily cripple them if he was not. Without the 
resources of most of Scotland south of the Forth and Clyde, and dependent on the ability of men who had 
been absent from Scotland for as much as twenty years to make good claims to extensive lordships in the 
face of Bruce opposition, Edward Balliol's chances of establishing himself as king were not good. If 
Balliol were unsuccessful, but could keep up a struggle, the garrisons at Edinburgh, Berwick, Stirling and 
elsewhere would keep the Scots occupied for some years to come while Edward pursued a campaign in 
France, from which the potential gains were much greater than anything he could hope to achieve in 
Scotland. Edward's Scottish operations may have initially been aimed at conquest, but by 1337 at the 
latest they had become a means of preventing the Scots from significant intervention in what would 
become the Hundred Years War. 
The effectiveness of Edward's occupation policy is revealed by the apparently large body of men-at-
arms from south of the Forth who fought for the Bruce party at Culblean, exempted perhaps from the 
truce then in force 118 by the fact that they were going north to intervene in a contravention of that truce 
and by the fact that the Plantagenet administration was confident of success should the Scots adopt a 
combat policy. It is not necessarily the case that the forfeitures of 1335-36 were in any way connected 
with that battle, though if they were not that could be construed as evidence for a rather stronger Bruce 
sympathy than the forfeitures themselves suggest. Any men forfeited for reasons unconnected with 
Culblean would represent potential Bruce support additional to the men who had served there. It is of 
117 CDS, iii, pp. 352-3. 
l1S Rot. Scot., i, pp. 384-5. 
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course possible that the situation should be read the other way round; that participation by Lothian men at 
Culblean was the product offorfeiture by Edward III, but that would still be an indication of a strong level 
of resistance to the Plantagenet administration before November 1335, which, admittedly, is not quite the 
same thing as proof of strong sympathy for the Bruces. 
The fall of Edinburgh castle marked the end of Plantagenet rule m Lothian itself but the war 
continued to impinge on the community; Edward's 'burnt Candlemas' campaign in 1356 being the most 
significant example. The military aim of the campaign would seem to have been no more constructive 
than an attempt to disrupt the Scottish administration in the south-east and perhaps re-establish control of 
territory in Berwickshire and Roxburghshire; Roxburgh was regained by the English in 1346 and 
remained a symbol of English power in Scotland until 1460.119 The campaign surely had a dramatic 
impact on the community of Lothian; it is called the burnt Candlemas campaign after all, but there would 
not seem to have been any real plan to achieve a strategic goal other than to disrupt the allies of his other 
enemy, France. At what point Edward decided to abandon the conquest of Lothian is unclear, though 
presumably his war in France made it necessary that he should do so. Bower at least was of the opinion 
that Edward's French war saved the day for the Scots, but by the time the French ,var started the 
P1antagenet administration was already well on the way to defeat. Edward Balliol's administration had 
virtually ceased to exist, the Plantagenet garrisons were at risk, the siege of a single Scottish castle 
(Dunbar) in the very centre of Edward Ill's Scotland was abandoned and the Bruce party retained the 
military initiative despite the concerted efforts of a larger and more prosperous kingdom. Given Edward's 
enormous financial commitments and difficulties in recruiting men for service in Scotland this suggests 
that the entire project was beyond his means or at least that the candle was worth considerably more than 
the game. A battlefield victory on a grand scale might be enough utterly to disrupt the Scots for a brief 
period, but not to persuade them to accept a Ba1lio11P1antagenet division of the country. Then, as now, the 
ability to destroy the army of the enemy was no guarantee that an occupation government could be 
l1~icholson, Middle Ages, p. 396. 
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imposed successfully.120 Success in battle, even when dramatic, was evidently not sufficient to CO"" 
enough Scots enough of the time into acceptance of the kingship of either Edward Balliol or Edward III. 
It would seem that the Bruce party - including perhaps an element of Scottish political society that saw 
the Bruces as no more than the lesser of two (arguably three if we include the Balliol party) - evils were 
not convinced that the struggle was at an end merely on the strength of defeat in battle. As Clausewitz 
would have it, '(a defeated state) .... often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil' that can be 
overcome in future operations. 121 The Scots had 'lost' their war against Edward I in 1296, renewed the 
conflict in 1297, come to terms in 1304, renewed the fight again in 1306 and triumphed in 1314. There 
was no particularly good reason for them to assume that they could not do so again in the wake of the 
campaigns of 1332 and 1333. There were however reasons to believe that they could achieve such a 
victory. Edward Ill's failure to bring even Lothian under his control, the outbreak of the Hundred Years 
War, the knowledge that deploying large armies in Scotland had not, after al~ brought Edward success, 
the failure of English arms to contain, let alone defeat, the Bruce party, were matched by political 
considerations. Prior to 1314 there had been no established tradition of Bruce lordship in Lothian, but in 
1314-1332 Bruce sympathy would seem to have been on the increase. By 1333-5 there were two Lothian 
leaders (William Douglas and Alexander Ramsay) who identified with the Bruce party. To what extent 
they adopted the Bruce cause from personal political motives and to what extent they did so in order to 
further their influence as local potentates is impossible to say. If there had been no Bruce sympathy to tap 
neither Douglas nor Ramsay would have had much of a future as 10ca1leaders.122 They may have been as 
much led by the local community as leaders of that community. Also, due to the efforts of the 'Good Sir 
James', the Douglas family had grown to magnate status. That status was derived from Bruce patronage, 
120 The current situation in Iraq is a case in point. The Coalition forces were able to inflict a massive defeat on 
the army of Iraq, but have not been able to impose a settled political or military environment. 
121 Dr. Webster's suggestion that' ..... at no point were Edward Balliol and Edward III allowed to dominate 
without opposition.' perhaps overstates the case slightly. B. Webster 'Scotland without a King', Grant and 
Stringer (edd) , Medieval Scotland. Crown, Lordship and Community (Edinburgh 1993) p. 227. 
122 The same rationale would apply to the Earl of Dunbar, with the added complication that the rise of men 
like Douglas and Ramsay might well diminish the influence of the earl in Lothian and therefore throughout 
the country. 
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and would be unlikely to survive should the BalliollPlantagenet cause prosper. In William Douglas the 
Bruce party had a figure of political influence and proven military ability from the political community of 
Lothian. The best Edward III could achieve was Sir John Strivelin, a man imposed on that community by 
an outside agency whose landholdings had been acquired through the forfeiture of local men and women. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 
THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY OF LOTHIAN IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
By the close of the thirteenth century the descendants of the French, English and Flemish 
adventurers who came to Scotland in the reign of David I or William the Lion had long been 
assimilated into the nation of Scots.! Not all of the men and women who constituted the political 
community bore English or French names, and not all those who bore English or French names 
were members of it. The full range of factors which brought an individual into the political 
community, or kept them out of it, is not clear, but land tenure and military and court service 
obligations were part, and probably the most significant part, of the equation. 
Very broadly we might assume that all barons and knights and a large proportion of 
landholders would be members of that community, though we might question whether extent of 
landholding was as important as traditions of political influence attached to particular properties. 
We cannot be sure that mere possession of land would necessarily bring acceptance into the 
political community, or even that the lack of it absolutely prevented membership. We can be 
confident that belonging to the political community was seen as a desirable condition and that 
landholding, particularly heritable landholding, was an element in obtaining or retaining 
membership. The privileges and potential for advancement pertaining to the nobility were 
considerable, but there were political, cultural, judicial and military burdens and obligations to be 
discharged as well the various duties involved in estate management. In varying degrees these 
issues affected all of the men and women who formed the political community: the secular 
landholders, clerics and burgesses whose allegiance was sought, cajoled and extorted by English 
and Scottish kings in the decades after the deposition of King John in 1296. This chapter 
1 G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots (London, 1973), pp. 251-6;. Duncan, Scotland, p. 141. 
77 
examines in tum the relationship between the crown and the political community, the position of 
the lesser nobility, magnate influence and the extent to which the lot of the clerics and burgesses 
differed from that of their noble neighbours. 
CROWN INFLUENCE. 
Royal recognition of the importance of locally prominent figures can be glimpsed among the \vitnesses to 
an 1136 charter of David I to Holyrood Abbey which was confirmed by Robert I between 1318 and 1327. 
The witnesses to the original charter include several men of national significance; the Bishops of St. 
Andrews and Glasgow, the chancellor and the chamberlain, but also William de Graham and Thurstan de 
Crichton, two Lothian landholders. 2 The ",itnesses to the confirmation, given behveen 1318 and 1327, 
include the Bishops of St. Andrews and Dunkeld and the Earl of Moray, but also Sir Alexander Seton and 
Sir Robert Keith (see Appendix), both Lothian landholders and both close to the king. Keith, admittedly, 
was the Marshal of Scotland and therefore had 'national' responsibilities, but Seton was first and foremost 
a Lothian man. The unnamed witnesses (those covered by 'et aliis multis') would very probably have 
been Lothian men. Similarly, in 1136, David I had felt it was appropriate to have a charter of local 
significance witnessed by men of his court, but also by a number of men of Tweeddale and Lothian to 
indicate approval of the king's actions (in this case a grant to Holyrood abbey) among the local political 
community. 
Those who were members of that community enjoyed access to the king's court when they sought 
justice, access to his authority when they sought preferment and access to the king himself when he \vas 
in the vicinity, the latter confrrming or enhancing the individual's prestige. Since the crown was the most 
important source of patronage, access to the king at court, in councils and parliaments or in the field was 
highly desirable to those who sought to improve their position. For the most powerful men and women 
this access to patronage was generally direct and personal to the king himself. For the less exalted it was 
still personal, achieved either through direct service to the crown or through the agency of a lord to whom 
2 RRS, VI, pp. 652-4. 
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they were attached in some way, whether through landholding, marriage, family tradition or by adoption. 
Because of the absence of a great Lothian lord the significance of the crown as a source of lordship and 
patronage can hardly be exaggerated. Lothian may not have had a magnate in the thirteenth century, but 
the king' s favour was highly desirable and could lead to positions of influence and specific families might 
manage to acquire particular offices in more than one generation. Geoffrey de Mowbray held all three 
sheriffdoms of Lothian until 1263 when he was replaced by another Lothian man, Sir William Sinclair; a 
generation later they were in the hands of Roger de Mowbray. 3 
Absence of a Lothian magnate does not imply that no magnates were Lothian landholders, nor that 
less important Lothian landholders permanently, or even habitually aligned themselves with important 
men outside Lothian or with the men that Edward I, Edward II, Robert I and Edward III would promote to 
positions of authority there. Duncan Earl of Fife and Patrick Earl of Dunbar were both significant 
landholders in Lothian4 and lesser men and women held land from them, but it is not possible to 
demonstrate that either had an extensive customary 'constituency' of supporters within Lothian beyond 
their own tenants. Witness lists are less informative than one might expect; very few charters name more 
than a selection of witnesses - generally, it would seem, the more prominent persons present. It is not 
clear either that witnesses, named or unnamed, were necessarily tenants of, or closely associated with, the 
granter or the grantee. The witnesses described as 'et multis aliis's may be no more than significant 
neighbours, men with an interest in the area rather than those with a direct relationship with the families 
or property concerned. Even the power of the lord over his tenant is questionable given that Edward III 
empowered the Earl of Dunbar to take possession of the property of any of his tenants forfeited for 
supporting the Bruce cause in the 1330s,6 suggesting that the Earl could not rely on all of his tenants to 
.' Duncan, Scotland, pp. 588,597. 
4 Edward I had evidently been convinced of the value of the earl's support, issuing: a letter to Sir John dt' 
StJolm in 1301-2 ordering him not to interfere with the earl's decisions concerning those oflus tenants 
whose lands had been forfeited to the king, but again this surely suggests that the earl could not completely 
controL the political inclinations of his tenants, INA C47/22/3/24. 
5 See Chapter 1, p. 26. 
6 CDS, iii, no. 1121. 
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follow his lead even in the period immediately after the two significant defeats at Dupplin Muir and 
Halidon Hill. We should not look for a simple relationship of instruction and obedience however. Even 
men who were heavily dependent on their lord were also influenced by a wide range of concentric and 
conflicting loyalties and responsibilities. Loyalty to crown, friends or family might override the 
relationship of landholder to superior in the same way that loyalty to the king might easily be overridden 
by the practicalities of the situation. Men who were undoubtedly loyal to King John, or at least 
sufficiently so to turn out for him in the campaign of 1296, can be found accepting Edward I's lordship, 
being restored to their properties, performing suit of court and military service throughout the Plantagenet 
administration of Lothian from 1296 to 1314. Similarly, men who served in Edwardian garrisons 
throughout the period 1296-1314 can be seen to have entered the peace of Ro bert I immediately after the 
battle of Bannockburn, remaining in his peace until the erection of a new Plantagenet administration after 
the battle of Halidon Hill, joining Edward III's peace and still being able to return to the Bruce party when 
they regained the military ascendancy in the mid 1330s.7 In short, kings had to accept that their subjects 
could not withstand the pressure exerted by the success of the other side. Lothian landholders, like the 
Morhams or the Setons, who wished to retain their position through changes of government naturally had 
to be prepared to support the de facto government of the day or be prepared to desert their property in 
order to give their overt support to the opposition. Some were prepared to do so. In the period between 
the campaign of 1296 and the Stmthord armistice of l304 a number of Lothian landholders8 served 
against Edward I and in 1306 several were prepared to throw in their lot with Robert 19 despite the 
apparent strength of the Plantagenet administration, and several more had joined the Bruce cause by 
1312.10 Equally, many of their neighbours gave military service for wages in Edwardian garrisons, and 
probably a very large proportion of them discharged military obligations attached to landholding. If there 
7 Sir Alexander Seton and Patrick Earl of Dunbar for example. 
S William Byset CDS, ii, no. 1471. William Frere, Archdeacon of Lothian CDS, ii, no. 1455, INA, E/3912121 
did not formally submit until October 1305, possibly prompted by the capture and execution of Wallace in 
August that year. 
9 Michael Wemyss, William Somerville, Alexander Fraser, James Lindsay. Barrow, Bruce, p. 326. 
10 CDS, ii, no. 245. 
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was a system for the commutation of such service for money payments no trace of it has survived, and it 
is reasonable to assume that the bulk of the service was performed (whether in person or by a substitute) 
since the overwhelming majority of landholders managed to keep their status despite changes of monarch. 
If they had not discharged their military obligations they would presumably have been forfeited for defect 
of service. 
THE LESSER NOBILITY 
Not all of the members of the political community were heritable landholders, though clearly a great 
many were. At a more humble level, the men who are described as 'king's tenants ,I I or bishop's tenants I2 
on the Ragman Roll do, in some cases, appear as 'County' or 'Burgess' homagers as \vell, but the 
majority of them appear only in the former categories. Evidently their status was sufficient to admit them 
to the lower echelons of the political community, the 'worthy men' of Lothian, but it was not the same as 
the status of the 'county' homagers or there would have been no need to defme their position. There may 
conceivably have been a distinction that extended to, or was even dependent on, military obligation. Of 
all the Lothian, Peeblesshire and Roxburghshire king's tenants and bishop's tenants who appear on the 
Ragman Roll, only one, Thomas Lillok of Roxburghshire, can be identified as serving as a man-at-arms. 
However Thomas was a county homager as well as a king's tenant so his military status may have been 
on account of his 'county' landholding. Thomas appears as a 'socius' or 'scutifer' of Sir Simon Fraser or 
of Sir Simon de Horsbrugh, a Peeblesshire landholder who was serving Edward I as a paid soldier. 13 
Thomas' introduction to army service may have not have been connected to landholding at all, but to 
1J Men like Thomas de Caribre. king's tenant Edinburgh and Richard de Erthe (.Allih?), king's tenant, 
Peebles, CDS, ii, no. 823. 
12 Such as Robert de Brunhus, tenant of the Bishop of St, Andrews, CDS, ii, no. 823. 
13 Professor Barrow 'Lothian in the First War of Independence' SHR LV (1976) p. 159, citing CDS, ii, no. 
1011, states that Thomas was a 'valettus' of Sir Simon Fraser. Neither the original document, NAS, ElOln /5, 
nor Bain's translation clearly support this. Lillok is described as 'Sir Simon's valettus' and is the entry 
subsequent to that of Horsburgh, who is described as 'Sir Simon's Knight'. Horsburgh's record is 
immediately subsequent to that of Sir Simon Fraser. It is not absolutely clear to which of the 'Sir Simons' 
Lillok was connected. 
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being a member of a family with sufficient wealth and status to support him in a career opportunity 
afforded him by a neighbour. Regardless of his career history, the fact that a man as obscure as Thomas 
Lillok could equip himself adequately as a man-at-arms is a pointer to the level of landholding that could 
carry, if not the legal obligation of man-at-arms service, the economic and social status to support it. 14 
In most cases men of Thomas' social and political stature seldom feature regularly in records. In part 
this is a reflection of the survival of documents, but it is also, perhaps more importantly, an indication of 
the ability of most people to be able to arrange their affairs in such a way as to avoid the dangers of not 
being on the right side at the right time. That most members of the political/landholding community were 
able to achieve this would seem to be borne out by the sample profiles in AppendLx I, but it should be 
borne in mind that the available data is unlikely to include all of the relevant instructions of forfeiture or 
restoration. It is however reasonable to assume that a warrant from the king of England authorising the 
restoration of property to a particular individual who had come to the king's peace must have been 
preceded at some point by a warrant ordering that person's forfeiture. Thus any order of forfeiture or 
restoration is very likely to represent a change of allegiance on the part of the subject of that order. To 
ease identification of these events, incidences of pardon or forfeiture are noted in the Appendix by 
italicising and underlining the entry thus -torfdted or pardoned or restored. 
It is apparent from the family profiles in appendix I that a great many such changes of allegiance 
were accepted even at a second or third defection. Even men whose position would seem to have been 
heavily, or even utterly dependent on Bruce patronage such as Sir Robert Bruce (Robert 1's natural son), 
Sir Robert Lauder and Alexander Seton were all able to make their peace, though in some cases only very 
briefly, with Edward Balliol or Edward III. Alexander Seton is an extreme example (see Appendix) but 
virtually every prominent family in Lothian was in the peace of the Plantagenets at some point between 
1296 and 1341. The majority of individuals either managed to avoid having to make a formal declaration 
of their allegiance (other than the Ragman Roll exercise of 1296) or crown records of their forfeiture or 
14 Thomas was a member of the Stirling garrison which surrendered to Edward I in 1304. He was still a 
prisoner of war in l307, when Nicholas Ferinbaud, late constable of Bristol castle. claimed £14 2s 6d for 
Thomas' allowance of3d/day for 3 years and 38 days. CDS, iii, no. 16. 
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restoration have not survived. Even so, changes of political allegiance may have been a less regular 
occurrence than we might expect given the regularity with which historians have discussed the 
inconstancy of the Scottish medieval nobility in general Is and the lowland nobility in particular. 16 It is by 
no means sure that Edward III was ever really able to exert full lordship in Lothian or that he ever enjoyed 
the allegiance of the Lothian political community as a whole. The forfeitures recorded for 1335-36 may 
reveal the body of Bruce supporters in Lothian that had refused to acknowledge Edward 's lordship and 
had in fact been forfeited in 1333 or 1334. 
From the sample profiles in the Appendix we can see that there were over sixty changes of allegiance 
in this selection of less than three hundred people, but there are a number of factors to be bome in mind. 
Simplistically, one could argue that one fifth of the sample defected during the period under 
consideration, however that is a period of more than half a century, so one could argue that the rate of 
defection was a little higher than one per year, though whether either of these figures could be described 
as high or low is difficult to say: what exactly constitutes 'high'? More importantly, the raw figure of 
sixty defections is very misleading . At least thirteen of those forfeitures were made by Edward III in 
1336-7 and might be more an indicator of a refusal to defectfi'om the Bruce party than of defection to it. 
Of course it is possible that the given sample is highly unrepresentative in this particular regard and that a 
similar sample would have yielded very different rates of defection. However the sample is very large 
indeed in relation to the political community of Lothian and it is thus extremely unlikely that any 
comparable sample would provide a radically different outcome. 
Defectors, members of garrisons and prominent members of society figure regularly in documentary 
record, but what of those, the majority of the political community, who, like William Bachelor, do not? 
William (see Appendi,x), a Haddington burgess sufficiently prominent to be one of the burgh' s 
L' Oman. H istOf') ' of Ellg /olld (London 1910 ) pp. 167-8. Despite the efforts of more recent scholars such as Sean 
McGIYllll. 'The M:-1hs of Medieyal Warbre' Histoll' Todcn'. 44 (1 994 ) and 
I..h.~' ,'L, I I~' Uc~' rile Ie. ~,~ 1 I] Olll~Ul continues to exert considerable intluence: see A. 
Nusbacher Thl' Bott/I' o f BollllocklJllril 131-1 (Stroud. 20(0) , particularly in relation to llis perception of Scottish 
armies and llis assumptions ~lbout the nature of the engagement. 
,,; Barron. Scottish fro/'. pp. 9-10 . 
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representatives in August 1296, was typical of Ragman Roll homagers in that he would seem not to 
appear in any other record. The reasons for this 'normal' incidence might be quite varied- death, decline 
into economic obscurity or forfeiture could all bring about this absence from documentary material, but 
the most likely explanation is that the individual (or family group for that matter) simply never did 
anything much that needed to be recorded. Even a relatively prominent member of society might tum up 
in record only as a witness to the documents of others but their rank and status would of course be more 
likely to bring them into record in some form. Less prominent men and women who managed to be 
consistently on the 'right' (i.e. currently more successful) side during the conflicts of the fourteenth 
century might never find themselves forfeited and would therefore never need restored. If they 
consistently paid their taxes and discharged their other burdens conscientiously they need never find 
themselves in court for failure to give service. 
The manner in which families such as the Bachelors managed to transfer their allegiance is not made 
clear in documentary record, but self-evidently many, presumably the vast majority in fact, did so without 
incurring any serious damage to their status or wealth. Obviously the ability to change allegiance was 
desirable from the point of view of the individuals concerned, but it was also usually advantageous to the 
competing sources of authority. Whichever party was in the ascendant had nothing to gain from social or 
economic dislocation. Kings whether English or Scottish were primarily interested in furthering their 
own interests and therefore sought to achieve stability and good order, objectives that were more likely to 
be realisable with the support of the existing structures of local power and influence 
It would be a gross over-simplification directly to equate forfeiture and defection. Men who declared 
for Robert I in 1306 were forfeited immediately it is true, and the series of forfeitures ordered by Edward 
II in 131217 was certainly aimed at men who had joined the Bruce party in the intervening period, but it is 
difficult to see a rationale for the delay between defection and pronouncing forfeiture that is explicitly 
stated in the document. Both of these exercises were undoubtedly intended to 'encourage' continuing 
loyalty in the political community but the much more extensive series ordered by Edward II in 1335-36 
17 CDS, ii, no. 254. 
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and 1336-37 would seem to have been more a question of disinheriting those landholders who were not 
prepared to defect from the Bruce cause to the PlantagenetlBalliol cause and to indicate to the community 
a determination on the part of Edward III that he would take a far harder line than his father on 
recalcitrant landholders. Edward II's government very probably disinherited rather more than the seven 
men (three of whom, Aymer de Rauden, Peter de Pontekin and Geoffrey de Fressingleye, appear in the 
Appendix) whose properties were the subject of an inquisition in 1312,12 but it would not seem likely that 
Edward II's forfeitures in Lothian were anything like so extensive as those of Edward III in 1335-36, 
when over one hundred men and women (thirteen of whom appear in the sample), representing over one 
hundred properties, were the subject of forfeitures. Naturally several of those forfeited held lands in other 
counties and their political actions must be seen in the light of their more 'national' role. Northern 
landholders with minor properties in Lothian might be more influenced by the fact that their main 
properties lay in areas under Bruce control than the fact that a solitary manor or annual was lost to them 
for the duration of English administration in Lothian. The loss of such property was obviously an 
incentive for such men to carry the war to the enemy; if Edward III was successful in bringing Lothian 
under his lordship their properties there might be lost permanently. 
One of the most striking features of the Appendix is the high incidence of actual performed military 
activity. Of less than three hundred people, of whom twenty-eight were women, at least one hundred can 
be positively identified as serving as men-at-arnls. 18 Many can be identified from garrison muster rolls 
and horse evaluations, but some from the evidence of their service, that is reports of their conduct in the 
field -such as being captured or killed in action - or by the fact that they appear as prisoners of war 
receiving subsistence allowances or being pardoned in exchange for service in the king's army. In all 
likeliliood the figure of one hundred out of three hundred is, if anything, rather conservative. It would be 
18 This is not really a particularly large figure. Matthew Paris believed that Alexander II's arn!.v in 1244 
included 'a thousand armed men, upon horses sufficiently good' Anderson, A, Scottish Annals from English 
Sources (Stamford, 1991), p. 354. A century later Thomas Sampson estimated that the army David II led to 
Neville's Cross included around 2000 'bannerets, knights and men-at-arms', quoted in Rollason and 
Prestwich, The Battle of Neville 's Cross 1346.(1998) p. 134. In each case it is unlikely that every man liable 
for man-at-arms service actually took part. 
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likely, to say the least, that some portion of the men forfeited in 1306 or 1312 or 1335 were actually under 
arms with the Bruce party and virtually none of these men would have served as common infantrymen. 
They have not been included in the figure of one hundred men-at-arms because their service in that 
capacity has not been demonstrated beyond question, though there is no doubt that some of them at least 
must have done so at some point in their career. Similarly, men who appear in the profiles as the leaders 
of unnamed retinues have been counted as one man only as we have no way of knowing the origins of the 
members of the retinue. Only Lothian men serving in Edwardian armies and garrisons have been counted 
in the man-at-arms total of one hundred. This is a matter of some significance to our perception of the 
operational conditions prevalent in fourteenth-century Lothian. 
Our traditional picture of Scottish medieval armies - a preponderance of spearmen with a small, almost 
token, element of men-at-arms and perhaps a few archers 19 - may not be even vaguely adequate when 
applied to particular theatres or periods of the war. Arguably, we might even find some support here for 
the vievv that part of Edward 1's agenda in acquiring Scotland was to enlarge his recruiting grounds. 20 
From his administrative relationship with Scotland in 1291-92 Edward would have had a far clearer 
appreciation of the economic and military potential of medieval Scotland than we can hope to achieve at a 
distance of over 700 years and ·without the benefit of the advice and experience of both English and 
Scottish administrators and nobles, not to mention access to records and registers. If more than one in 
three of the sample given in the Appendix can be shown to have performed military service in the period 
1297-1341 we can be fairly safe in accepting that of the 300 -plus men that we can associate with Lothian 
19 G. W. S. Barrow, 'The Army of Alexander III' in Reid, Alexander III., Duncan, Scotland, pp. 380-1. S. 
Wood The Sea ttish Soldier (London, 1980), p .8-12. Wood merely repeats the general perception of Scottish 
armies of the middle ages, though it is clear that the composition of forces varied according to necessity and 
availability. Major armies were a rare occurrence throughout the wars of the 13th and 14th centuries. However 
it is clear that the Scots army in France in the early 15th century consisted of men-at-arms and archers. It 
would be unrealistic to assume that the forces generally committed by either side for minor operations were 
smaller versions of the large armies raised for specific tasks. 
20 The surrender terms proposed by the leaders of the Noble Revolt in July 1297 mention a fear that Edward 
' ... would have seized all the middle people of Scotland' to serve in his army. Stevenson, Documents, ii, 
p.l98. Stevenson states that Edward intended to send these men 'beyond the Scottish sea', though the French 
text he presented just says 'beyond the sea'. Prestwich, The Three Edwards (London 1980), pA8, describes 
the fear of such conscription as 'widespread, and not wholly unjustified' . 
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in 1296 something like one hundred would have been socially and economically capable of serving as 
men-at-arms. 
If anything this would be a conservative estimate. The Lothian forfeitures of 1335-36 involved at least 
a hundred landholders.2! Not all were primarily Lothian men, though most were, and not all were 
necessarily forfeited because of their political alignment and activity, but it is clear that the majority must 
have been. Not all of the men forfeited would have been personally involved in the fighting, but, again, it 
seems likely that very many of them were and that that they served as men-at-arms in the Bruce interest in 
that year. During the same period at least twenty-seven men associated primarily with Lothian, such as 
William de Fairley, Alexander de Dalmahoy (see Appendix), and Alexander de Craigie, served for wages 
in the Edinburgh garrison, and very likely more who served for land without pay if the Plantagenet 
government was capable of extracting customary military services from the local political community. 
Between the forfeited landholders, the men in Edinburgh garrison, men who were in the peace of Edward 
III and no doubt some men who managed to avoid involvement vvith, or forfeiture by, either side but were 
equipped to serve if they chose, it is almost unimaginable that there could be any fewer than one hundred 
men able to give man-at-arms service for land tenure in Lothian. 
There were probably Lothian landholders who did not appear on the Roll in the Lothian categories 
and perhaps others who did not appear at all, and by the standards of medieval Scotland Lothian had a 
large urban population. Not only the towns of Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Haddington, but many 
nucleated villages, one at least (Seton) substantial enough to be held in 'free burgh' from the king and to 
support a weekly licensed markee2 despite the liberties of the Burghs. Certainly men from Edinburgh and 
Haddington served in garrisons as archers and hobelars for wages; to what extent and by what rationale 
they served as men-at-arms is not so clear since it is often impossible to be certain of the nationality of 
men named in payTolls and horse valuations. However John Wyggemore23 (see Appendix), burgess of 
Edinburgh, was serving as a man-at-arms in the garrison in 1336-37 alongside at least forty-three other 
2! CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. INA, E10l/19/24. 
22 RRS, v, p. 515. 
23 CDS, ii, p.343; TNA, E 101119/24. 
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Scots, presumably men of a similar station to himself in terms of the capacity to eqmp themselves 
appropriately. John may have been an exceptional case but it would seem unlikely that men of substance 
would be excused the burden of army service just because they lived in a to"vn. 24 We cannot be certain 
that people with surnames occurring in both garrison rolls and on the Ragman Roll were necessarily 
related to one another, but we can be confident that some proportion of them were. The N apiers (N apers) 
who appear on Lothian garrison muster rolls in 131225 and 133826 were, more likely than not, related to 
the Napiers \\Tho appear on the Ragman Roll, likewise the various Harpers and Butlers who appear in 
those, and other, documents. 27 These three family groups appear most often in record in connection with 
Edinburgh properties and affairs. We might reasonably see them as burg hal rather than rural people and 
we might take this as a further indication that man-at-arms service was not the preserve of prominent 
freeholders owing knight service but a burden on a rather wider segment of society?8 It is of course 
possible that the presence of burgh men in garrisons indicates a general enlarging of the class of men 
liable for (or expected to be capable of) man-at-arms service, possibly in order to ease the recruitment 
difficulties of the Edwardian government or possibly to spread the burden of service more widely in a 
period when casualties (in the \videst possible sense, including prisoners of war and those avoiding 
service as well as those injured or killed) among the man-at-arms were probably high in relation to the 
amount of service required and the number of men able to perform it. 
Man-at-arms service was definitely a very common experience for the nobility, and possibly for other 
members of the community, so should we consider service of that order of magnitude to be a product of 
more than traditional knight-service obligations? Of the 1000 or so entries in the AppendLx only four are 
concerned with knight service and one of those, constituting almost half of the actual service requirements 
referred to, applies to a barony (Muscamp) in Northumberland. Certainly several of the men in the 
24 John de Wyggemore also served Edward III as collector of customs for Edinburgh, gathering £12 2s 6d in 
l337-8. INA E101/331/23. 
25 CDS, iii, pp. 408-10. 
:6 CDS, iii, pp. 361-2. 
27 Such as John Naper and Sir John Butler of Cramond, INA, C47 122/6/18 and Matthew Naper INA, 
EI102/19. 
28 Laing ChI'S., no. 18 for a cavalry obligation without any mention of knight service. 
88 
profiles were knights, but the overwhehning majority of those serving as men-at-arms were definitely not. 
It has been pointed out elsewhere that the army service requirements for land tenure, even for very great 
estates, were not heavy in Scotland. Robert I gave the newly-created Earldom of Moray to Sir Thomas 
Randolph for the service of only eight knights.29 Indeed, where knight-service is stipulated at all it is often 
fractional - the service of half, quarter or even one twentieth of a knight. 30 How fractional service was 
practically expressed is not kno'A'TI, but it is clear that formal knight-service obligations were not 
sufficient to furnish Scottish kings with a large force of knights. All the same, one sheriffdom, admittedly 
a large and wealthy one, would seem to have been easily capable of furnishing at least one hundred men-
at-arms. 
Obviously land tenure obligations were not the only factor encouraging people to give army service; 
there was also the question of 'career development'. Some men, such as Pierre Lubaud or Sir John de 
Strivelin or Scalacronica author Sir Thomas Grey served in the hope of improving their fortunes through 
promotion for good service and were undoubtedly attracted to military service in the Edwardian 
administrations by the prospect of wages. The 12d per day paid to a man-at-arms would need to be 
accumulated for a long time before it would cover the outlay required for arms, armour and horse. The 
man vyhose status and background would enable him to serve as a man-at-arms for payor for land would 
be likely to already OVyTI the necessary kit for the job. It might be more appropriate to view garrison 
service, for some at least, as a means of defraying the cost of an investment in horseflesh and armament 
that could not, in any case, be avoided if the man in question was going to be able to fulfil his traditional 
military service obligations. Howeyer attractive conditions or prospects might be, the overwhelming 
majority of the people in a position to give man-at-arms service were those with land tenure of some sort. 
29 RRS, v, pp. 633-5. 
30 Duncan, Scotland, p. 383; Fractional knight service was not always a product of division of an existing 
fief. David I granted land in East Lothian for the service of half a knight. G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters oj 
David I, (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 148-9. Miniscule knight service obligations were not a purely Scottish 
phenomenon. In 1304 16 acres of meadow and pasture and a wood around Wappenham, Northamptonshire 
were held by Henry de Pinkney of Geoffrey de Lucy for 1I24th of a 'moiety' (half) of a knight's fee, CIPM, 
iv, No 218. A charter of James the Stewart dated 9 January 1295 stipulated forinsec service of one archer for 
one day a year at the Stewart's castle of Renfrew 'if reasonably forewarned' , hardly a severe burden and of 
very limited practical value. R. Gram (ed.), The Reign of Alexander II (Brill, 2005), p. 191. 
89 
Tenure might not be the reason for their service at a given point in time, but unless they came from the 
sort of family that did enjoy tenure of relatively high status they would be unlikely to have the skills or 
equipment required, though the likely presence of men from the burghal community in garrisons as men-
at-arms would suggest that the commercial wealth of a family could perhaps confer, for military purpose 
anyway, the economic and social status which we associate with man-at-arms service. 
The overwhelming majority of those Lothian people - almost all of them men - who appear m 
medieval records at all, do so only once or hvice, but even such a slender presence is probably not typical 
of members of what Edward I called the 'middling' part of the society.31 Only a fraction of those 295 
people appear in record other than on the Ragman Roll, an indication that to appear at all in 'national' or 
'cro\vn' records was a rare thing, even in the lives of the prosperous. This should not be construed as 
evidence of a lack of administration - no doubt fourteenth-century Scots, like their counterparts 
elsewhere, felt that they were quite sufficiently 'intensively' governed - but perhaps more an indication of 
some of the functions of government in the remit of the sheriff. If Edward I was prepared to authorise his 
sheriffs and other officers to accept 'middling men' into his peace at their discretion we might reasonably 
assume that Robert I or David II might empower their sheriffs to do the same thing. Certainly there is no 
extant Scottish instrument equating to the Ragman Roll recording the fealties of people previously in the 
peace of the Edwards, but it would be rash to assume that the local! administrative structure of Scottish 
kings did not maintain registers of those due services to the cro\vn. During Edward's administration of 
Scotland in 1291-2 he appointed commissioners specifically to examine the Scottish crown charters and 
rolls and mentions William of Dumfries, chancellor to Alexander III and custodian of his records.32 
Although there are no extant examples from the fourteenth century, the existence of shrieval records 
and registers is not in doubt; there are several references to them in English cro\\<u documents. 33 Just what 
range of functions was covered by those registers is open to debate, but in the absence of other data we 
might reasonably conclude that the range included suit of court, military service, castleguard and such 
31 CDS, ii, no. 1755. 
32 CDS, ii, p. 472. 
33 Rot. Scot., i, p. 3. 
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aids and taxation as might be imposed from time to time. Administrative effectiveness in any of these 
areas would be severely compromised if the sheriff was not able to make himself aware of who was or 
was not in the king's peace and of course \vhat was the extent oftheir liability for service and when it was 
due to be performed. 
Given that most of the men and women who appear in the Appendix do not appear in documentary 
record either frequently or regularly we might reasonably conclude that their relationship with central 
authority was adequately administered by the sheriff and other authorities (barons or ecclesiastical 
institutions) and that this was the experience of most landholders. We might ask then, 'what sort of 
activity brought the landholder to the attention of the cwwn?' Primarily questions of allegiance and 
service it would seem, insofar as a large proportion of the data consists of either forfeitures! restorations 
or references to prisoners of war; the latter usually relating to the payment of daily subsistence 
allowances. Virtually all entries referred to in the family profiles can be seen as belonging to one of three 
rather broad categories; items relating to default of service, items relating to the discharge of service and 
items relating to legal procedures. The first category ranged from sentence of forfeiture to the payment of 
prisoner of war allowances, though one does not seem to have been contingent on the other; a man might 
spend years aligned with the opposition or as a prisoner of war without suffering forfeiture. The second 
group comprises pay roll or horse valuation entries, letters of protection and of thanks for service past or 
anticipated. The remaining category relates to matters like the acquisition of charters of land, office or 
pensions, appearing as a witness to crown charters and the discharge of suit of court obligations such as 
Post Mortem Inquisitions, Perambulations and criminal trials. 
We should not conclude that these areas were automatically, or, particularly in the case of 
inquisitions, even normally, outwith the competence of the sheriff merely because particular examples 
happen to appear in what we night term 'crown' documents, but rather that for some reason, obscure to 
us, these particular cases required the sanction of higher authority and are thus (or at least likely to be) in 
some sense exceptional. This may not be the case with the 1312 forfeitures by the P1antagenet 
administration in Lothian. Since warrandice of title for lands held of the cro\vn was obviously derived 
91 
from the regal authority it might be the case that fonnal invalidation of that warrandice would be 
enhanced by the authority of the king in person. Should this be the case, we might conclude that the 
extensive series of forfeitures of 1312 was something of a 'tidying-up' exercise on the part of Edward II's 
government The subjects of the forfeitures were people who had been active in the Bruce interest, in 
some cases for years, and were fonnally deprived of their estates in one administrative session though 
their properties had been taken into the king's hands to all practical intents and purposes at the time of 
their defection. 34 
There was no exercise by the Scottish crown comparable to the Ragman Roll. This may be a matter of 
the survival of documentation, but to have undertaken a similar exercise could have been seen as a tacit 
acknowledgement that the Plantagenets had had a case or that the Ragman Roll had some legal validity. 
No other document records such a large body of Lothian people as the Ragman Roll, but we can compile 
a fairly extensive sample of Lothian men and women four decades later from a variety of sources. Unlike 
the Ragman Roll this material gives us some infonnation about political choice and activity. Edward Ill's 
administration of Lothian, as we might expect, kept records of garrison service, of retours to the crown 
and of forfeitures. By excellent good fortune there is an extensive body of infonnation on all three areas 
for the years 1335-36 and 1336-37.35 A compilation of the list of names of known Lothian men in English 
garrisons and of the names of the men forfeited in 1335-37 is not so extensive as the relevant portions of 
the Ragman Roll, but then it is probably a reflection of a smaller group - no mention is made ofking's or 
bishop's tenants. 
Most, though not all, of the Ragman Roll homagers for Lothian were Lothian people first and 
foremost. Many of them were homagers for other counties or more than once for Lothian; sometimes in 
more than one capacity - 'county' and 'king's tenant' or 'king's tenant and Burgess'. The weight of 
evidence connecting them primarily with Lothian through property or service strongly indicates that in the 
Lothian sections of the Roll we see at least the Plantagenet administration's understanding of what 
34 CDS. ii.no. 245. 
35 Rot. Scot., i, pp. 397-496; CDS, iii, pp. 327-41;376-91; TNAE101/331/23. 
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constituted the political community of the county and, assuming that existing records were used to 
compile the roll, very probably that of the Scottish CrovVll before 1296. The forfeitures and muster rolls of 
1335-37 afford us a glimpse of that community after nearly four decades of intermittent war and the 
\videspread famine that occurred across Europe in the early part of the fourteenth century. The material 
that can be extracted from those sources is of course a very partial picture; it comprises people known to 
be actively opposed to the Plantagenet administration, including several women, and people active in the 
service of that administration - all of them men and ahnost all of them men-at-arms in receipt of ",·ages. 
Naturally those who avoided active participation on either side do not figure to any great degree. The 
administration had no call to forfeit them and if they performed military service for land the 
administration would not have paid them, therefore they would not appear on wages records or horse 
valuations. 
Comparison of the two groups suggests that the political community managed to remain remarkably 
intact between 1296 and 1337 if we are to judge by the number of family names that are common to both 
groups. Precision over names is not always possible due to the vagaries of medieval spelling, but of 
approximately 260 surnames found as Ragman Roll homagers for Lothian and Lothian men who were 
prisoners of war or serving in Edward I's army in the summer of 1296, over eighty appear either as 
having been forfeited or serving as men-at-arms in 1335-37. Clearly at least one third of the families of 
Lothian were either giving military service for wages or had been declared forfeit on account of their 
political position. The remaining two thirds presumably discharged their various obligations to the 
Plantagenet govermnent. A brief study of the comparable documents relating to Roxburghshire and 
Berwickshire would seem to suggest that the proportion of family names occurring in lists of forfeitures 
and of men-at-arms in relation to the Roxburghshire Ragman Roll names is not dissimilar. What is 
striking is the ratio of forfeited men to men who served in Plantagenet garrisons, virtually all of whom 
served as men-at-arms. 
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At least thirty-nine men who served in the garrison of Edinburgh 1335_3736 bore names we can safely 
associate \vith Lothian, Roxburgh or Peebles in 1296 compared to at least fifty three Lothian men and 
women who suffered forfeiture in the same period. Should we take this as evidence that the Plantagenet 
cause enjoyed a considerable level of support in Lothian in the period after the battle of Halidon Hill? 
Only in the same sense that we could say the Ragman Roll indicates a consensus of opinion among the 
nobility of south-east Scotland in favour of accepting Edward I as king. The forfeited landholders of 
1335-37 cannot confidently be seen as the sum of Bruce support in Lothian, rather they represent that part 
of the political community willing to risk life, limb and property for the Bruce cause at a time when, it 
would seem to us, the Plantagenet government was securely in place. Superficially this would seem to 
have been the case. Edward III does not seem to have made any effort to restore Linlithgow as a base of 
operations. Indeed, he did not feel it was necessary to refortify Edinburgh until after the fight there in 
which the count ofNamur was captured.3! He may have felt that the victory at Halidon Hill had made the 
counties ceded by Edward Balliol (a grant confirmed by Balliol's parliament at Holyrood) secure. 
Alternatively he may have felt that he had to be seen to have confidence in Balliol's kingship and the 
establishment of a chain of castles would undoubtedly be intrusive from the point of view of his new 
subjects. 
To what extent Edward III ever achieved acceptance of his authority is difficult to say. Certainly the 
apparatus of shrieval government was in place, but its effectiveness is questionable. The retours of 1335-
37 do not merely list forfeited Lothian gentry. They contain a mine of information relating to the 
peacetime values of properties, but they also record the actual returns made. A good many were made in 
full, but the number of rents that could not be collected 'because of the war', 'because they are laid waste' 
or because they 'could not be raised for this compotus,38 suggests that Edward's government could not 
provide 'good lordship' to the community even if the community was willing to accept it. The choice of 
36 CDS. iii. pp. 360-3. 
'7 Scotichronicon, viii, 113. 
38 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. 
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phrases used to account for shortfalls in rentals may have some significance in itself. Lands 'laid waste,39 
were obviously just that; not an unusual occurrence in a war zone. Failure to collect the proper rent 'on 
account of the war' or the simple declaration that they 'could not be raised' is only stated, not explained. 
Presumably these properties had not been destroyed. Whether either comment implies that the area in 
question was beyond the control of the administration through the activities of the Scots, the resistance of 
the tenants or the garrisons could not spare manpow'er from operations for rent collection is open to 
question. 
As far as we know neither Edward I nor Edward II made such a large number of forfeitures as those 
of 1335-37, perhaps indicating a change of policy toward the lesser nobility under Edward III. There must 
be a question mark over how people regarded forfeiture in practice. Theoretically it was an unmitigated 
disaster in a society that valued land ownership and inheritance rights so highly, so it seems odd that so 
many people were willing to risk the loss of their birthright to support causes (John and Edward Balliol in 
1297 and 1332, Robert and David Bruce in 1306 and 1334) whose chance of success often looks very 
slender from a nventieth-century perspective. The men who were forfeited by Edward I in 1306 for their 
support of Robert I must have known that they risked forfeiture and they must have been aware of the 
considerably greater military resources of England, the nature of Edward I and, surely most significantly, 
the fact that a very large part of the Scottish political community did not support Robert's kingship. 
Lothian men in particular must have been aware of the military power of Edward's government; 
Edinburgh and Linlithgow castles were certainly garrisoned by his troops and it is inconceivable that he 
had not ensured that all the baronial castles were in the hands of sympathetic men. The Lothian 
landholders forfeited in 1306 must either have been awfully optimistic men or men with a very clear 
picture of weaknesses in Edward's rule that would allow the Bruce party to triumph despite their struggle 
w'ith tlle Comyns and MacDougalls. 
They possibly felt confident that even if they were defeated they would have a good chance of 
redeeming themselves and having their heritage restored. Prior experience may have encouraged such a 
39 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. 
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belief. A number of the men who had fought Edward at Dunbar were freed and restored for service, or the 
promise of service overseas; the men who surrendered at Irvine in 1297 and at Strathord in 1304 suffered 
relatively lightly for their opposition. The 1335-37 forfeitures may indicate a different policy toward 
forfeiture itself as well as its distribution. Forfeiture by Edward I or Edward II tended to be of fairly 
significant figures in the community - not barons necessarily, but substantial landholders - though it is 
possible that other forfeiture records have not survived. Under Edward III the number of recorded 
forfeitures was very much larger, embracing some relatively trivial properties - even half carucates or a 
field of seven acres were not below the interest of the escheator. 40 
MAGNATE INFLUENCE 
Exerting administrative power would not seem to have been an issue for the Scottish crown in peacetime, 
but the advent of Edward 1's administration inevitably led to a competition for authority as soon as the 
Balliol party started appointing their own officials.4! In Fife or Strathearn the local magnate could be a 
force in supporting or undermining the authority of the govermnent of the day, but the lack of a local 
magnate whose priorities lay primarily in Lothian may have accorded an unusually prominent political 
role to barons. Dirleton castle in East Lothian and Bothwell castle in Lanarkshire represent an enormous 
investment on the part of the owners - both barons - which cannot be ascribed simply to defence. 42 Both 
castles ""ere built in the thirteenth century before there was any likelihood of a protracted Anglo-Scottish 
war and the incidence of baronial war in Scotland seems to have been insignificant. The construction of a 
great castle did, however, impart prestige to the o"vner. It gave him an imposing venue for his courts and 
40 CDS. iii, pp. 339-40. For an examination ofland measurement in medieval Scotland see G.W.S. Barrow, 
Kingship and Unity (Edinburgh, 2003), p.197. 
41 Stevenson, Doc~tments, ii, pp. 206-7. 
42 Dr. Watson has suggested that the prestige of the castle-builder was often the primary concern, that the 
castle was' an expression of power, in the fIrst instance, not the means of it.' 'The expression of power in a 
medieval kingdom: thirteenth-century Scottish Castles.' in (edd) S. Foster, A .MacInnes, R. MacInnes. 
Scottish Power Centres from the Early MIddle Ages to the Twentieth CentulY (Glasgow, 1998). See also G. 
Steil, 'The Scottish Medieval Castle: Form, Function and Evolution' in Stringer, Nobility Essays. 
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for receiving his gnests and perhaps lent an air of credibility to his military position as well being a 
conspicuous demonstration of personal success - castle-building was an expensive enterprise. 
It is possible that Edward I, Edward II and Robert I all tried to improve their position by building local 
leadership groups through granting extensive lands and rights to men on whose loyalty they could 
depend, such as Sir Robert Hastang, Sir Pierre Lubaud and Sir Alexander Seton. Edward III may have 
continued this policy with Alexander de Strivelin. All four kings may have intended to install a magnate 
in Lothian, but Edward III may also have been attempting to replace local opponents with men that he 
could depend on not to defect. 
The first of these men, Robert Hastang, sheriff of Roxburgh for Edward I until 1305, was the recipient 
of various lands forfeited by Bruce supporters in 130643 which were restored to their owners when they 
returned to Plantagenet allegiance. In recompense Sir Robert was granted the properties of another group 
of Bruce partisans: Robert Keith, Thomas de la Haye, Peter Pontek-yn, Godfrey Brun and Aymer de 
Hauden (the Appendix for Hauden, Keith, Haye and Pontekin). 
The sum of Sir Robert's holdings in Byres, Heriot, Ratho, Ladyset and Garvok in western and central 
Lothian, Easter Felton and Philipston 'in the barony of Musselburgh', Broxmouth, the barony of Cumbre 
Culstone and Cockpen (sometimes described as lying in 'upper Lothian') and Wester Duddingston near 
Edinburgh, made him a man of some substance among Lothian landholders in terms of acreage, but his 
properties were spread right through the sheriffdom, possibly giving him greater influence simply because 
he had a 'presence' in several areas.44 The distribution of his estates may of course have been simply the 
range of property available to Edward, but the concentration of grants in Lothian might have been a 
policy decision. As a major figure in any area of Lothian Sir Robert was bound to have some degree of 
influence beyond his immediate tenants and could get rid of his own tenants who failed to discharge their 
obligations. If Edward was consciously endeavouring to achieve security in Lothian by the introduction 
43 CDS. iii, nos. 230,258. 
"4 The grants were not of great duration due to the military success of the Scots. Sir Robert ,vas recompensed 
for his losses in Scotland with a grant of Kingston-upon Hull sometime between 1311 and 1316. INA, 
SC8/5112504. 
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of a new layer of leadership by putting several baronies and properties into the hands of one man the 
effectiveness of the policy must be questioned. An indication of the strength of the Plantagenet 
administration and of its acceptance in the community is the force of men-at-anns from Lothian who 
served at B31illockbunl. Even if the 'gret menye' described by Barbour45 actually only amounted to a few 
dozen or score men-at-anns the fact that they were there at all is test3lllent to their belief that the war 
could be won, their continuing acceptance of Plantagenet lordship and their confidence that they would 
continue to live under that lordship after the coming battle (though many on both sides probably doubted 
that a major action would take place at all). The fall of Edinburgh castle in March 1314 must have 
compromised the effectiveness of the administration, but it could still call upon and receive due anny 
service three months later. 46 However there seems to have been no extensive resistance to King Robert 
after June 1314. The political community of Lothian may have accepted Bruce kingship vvith reluctance, 
resignation, equanimity or delight according to inclination, but it would seem they did accept it, as no 
doubt they or their predecessors had accepted the rule of Edward I for the better part of two decades. 
One man who evidently saw things differently was Sir Alexander Seton. Although he had served as a 
juror on the inquisition that had dealt v"ith the forfeiture of Lothian Bruce supporters in February 1312,47 
he managed to effect a transfer of allegiance without d3lllaging his career, defecting to Robert I on the eve 
of the main engagement at Bannockburn and, according to Sir Thomas Grey, encouraging the king to 
attack48 The extensive lands and superiorities gr311ted him by Robert I in 1321 (at Gogar, Winchburgh 
and Pentland), with the properties he already held may not have been enough to make him a magnate on a 
national scale, but they would surely have made him a man of power and influence in Lothian. The other 
staunch Bruce supporter to benefit from the generosity of King Robert was Sir Robert Lauder who was 
granted Cowden in 1316 after the forfeiture of Pierre Lubaud in 131649 and Pencaitland and Nisbet 
45 Barbour, The Bruce, pp. 409-10. 
46 Alexander Seton was not the only defector on 23/24 June 1314. Sir Laurence AbemeLl}y and his COmilivQ 
arrived late for the battle and promptly joined the Bruce cause Barbour, The Bnlce, p.508 
47 CDS, iii, no. 245. 
48 Scaiacronica, (Ma'(well), p.55. 
49 RJ'vIS, i, no. 62. 
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forfeited by Sir Thomas Pencaitland.50 Again, the availability of disposable land must have been a 
significant factor in the location of awards, but the concentration of several properties in the hands of two 
men may have been seen as a contribution toward binding the political community of Lothian to the 
Bruce cause. At a distance of seven centuries it is impossible to be sure that the advancement of these tv,co 
men was a conscious policy, or if it was, to \vhat extent it was successful. When a new· Edwardian 
administration was erected in Lothian in 1334-35 it may, for all we know, have enjoyed widespread 
support, but the high incidence of war damage and forfeitures recorded in 1335-36 is a clear indication 
that a very large proportion of the landholders in the county were prepared to risk their lives opposing that 
government \vhile a rather smaller portion were prepared to serve in its garrisons as paid men-at-arms. 
Obviously since the majority of the political community figure in neither garrison pay rolls or lists of 
escheats, we must conclude that they were willing to accept a change of government, or at least not 
sufficiently moved to take up arms against it, presumably discharging their customary judicial and/or 
military obligations. 
The new administration appointed Sir John de Strivelin of East Swinneburn, a Northumberland 
landowner, as sheriff of Edinburgh, but on 12 July 1336 Edward also favoured him with a grant of 300 
merks of land there, with the promise of 200 merks of land in England or 200 merks annually at the 
exchequer should the Scots regain Lothian? Sir John then, had the resources, not only of the sherif:f s 
garrison, but, if he could enforce his lordship, of two significant baronies, Ratho and Bathgate - like Sir 
Robert Hastang before him - and a cash income from the mills of Dean on the Ahnond near Edinburgh. 
By 1337 Sir John's Lothian property included the 'lands' of Balnacreiff, Inch, Blackburn, Drumcross and 
half of the 'vilIs' of Cousland and Riccarton in addition to lands, breweries and mills at Bathgate. In sum, 
an extensive landholding concentrated in, but not limited to, the Linlithgow area. Although this choice of 
properties may have been a considered response to the operational situation, it may just as easily have 
been brought about by a relatively high concentration of Bruce supporters in that area whose lands could 
50 RMS, i, no. 68. 
51 INA, C47/221l0/53. 
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be forfeited. Edward may have believed that the combination of lands and office would make Sir John a 
major figure in the community, that his prestige - and of course his ability to remove tenants - would be 
instrumental in making practical possession of Lothian, formally ceded by Edward Balliol, King of 
Scotland, with the consent of his parliament, a reality. Edward was to be disappointed, and in due course 
Sir John was recompensed for his services with 200 merks of land around Newcastle and HartiepooL 52 
The bulk of the political community of Lothian, as noted above, seem to have accepted the Edwardian 
administration in 1335-37, confident perhaps that they would not be severely penalised for discharging 
their obligations to barony and shrieval authority during the occupation; they would seem to have 
accepted the re-imposition of Bruce lordship similarly. The Edinburgh garrison continued in existence 
until March 1341/3 and Lothian men continued to serve in it,54 but there seems to have been no resistance 
to David II after the fall of the castle, and Lothian men were present in strength at Neville's Cross. 55 Sir 
Robert Hastang would seem to have been granted extensive property in Lothian so that he could be a prop 
for the sheriff, but Sir John de Strivelin was both sheriff and landholder; possibly Edward felt that the 
office of sheriff would be more easily or more conscientiously performed by a man with a large stake in 
the community, possibly that a landholder with the authority of sheriff would be in a better position to 
make good his grants. 
However much of an advantage it was to the Plantagenets to have the Earl of Dunbar in their peace, 
his loss must have been a great disadvantage to the Scots, whose ability to conduct operations in 
Roxburghshire and East Lothian must inevitably have been compromised by his opposition. By 
November 1335 Patrick had returned to the Bruce cause, demonstrating his change of faith by leading his 
52 CDS, iii, no. 1319. 
53 CDS, iii, nos. 1323, 1383. 
54 At least thirty-one Scots served in the Edinburgh garrison as men-at-arms in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, pp. 360-1), 
at least forty-two in 1336-37 (CDS, iii, pp. 362-3) but perhaps as few as fourteen in 1340-41 (INA, 
E10112311). These figures should be regarded as absolute minimums since it is reasonable to suppose that 
some, probably most and very possibly all of the u=amed 'scutifers' attached to Scottish knights in the 
garrison muster rolls would also have been Scots. 
55 Edward Keith, Robert Keith, Edmund Keith, William Hay, William Moubray, William Ramsay, John 
More, William More, William Livingstone, John Preston (see Appendix) and William de Vaus, John Sinclair, 
James Sandilands and Henry Douglas, all men with strong Lothian co=ections all served at Neville's' Cross. 
See M Penma~ The Kingship of David II unpublished Ph.D. thesis (St. Andrews, 1998) p. #210. 
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tenants to Culblean. Although the list of Lothian forfeitures recorded in 1335-36 comprises mainly free 
tenants, and some, perhaps many, may pre-date Earl Patrick's defection it is quite possible that the 
balance are indicative of local leadership of a sort. Local landholders may have been encouraged by his 
defection because it gave a local focus for Bruce, or at least anti-PlantagenetlEnglish feeling, because it 
gave them confidence that the war could be won (or else the Earl would not have changed sides) or that 
the war was already being won (in September 1334 Sir Richard Talbot was captured by the Scots near 
Linlithgow and in 133556 the count of Namur was captured at Edinburgh) and that the Earl's defection 
was a good indication that the autumn of 1335 would be a good time to change sides, lest the incoming 
government of King David took a less conciliatory position with Lothian landholders than that of his 
father. Equally, the high incidence of forfeiture in Lothian between 1335 and 1337 may be a sign that the 
Bruce party enjoyed enough support among the minor landholders that the Earl felt obliged to follow the 
political inclinations of his tenants and neighbours. The defections of both Earls are indicative of the 
strength of their position; they might not have been so easily reconciled with Bruce or Plantagenet 
lordship if they had not been seen as desirable allies. The loss of the Earl of Dunbar seriously weakened 
the hand of whichever side had lost him. The defection to Edward I of Earl Patrick senior in 1296 would 
have strengthened Edward's position, a major castle, garrisoned and provisioned at Earl Patrick's expense 
against tlle Scots would have been highly desirable, but Patrick's absence was probably more of a 
problem to the Balliol party than his presence was an advantage to Edward. As the most significant 
temporal landholder in the south-east Patrick must have been a major influence in the political 
communities of Roxburghshire and Berwickshire and as long as he remained in the peace of the Edwards 
he would exert some pressure in the rest of the community. It would seem that after Patrick's return to 
Scottish allegiance in 1314 King Robert faced no real opposition in the south-east, which surely cannot be 
wholly ascribed to his success in battle, even in conjunction with a failure on the part of Edward II 
56 This action is generally assumed to have occurred on 30 July, (Nicholson, Edward III, p.2l3) however Dr. 
Watt has pointed out that that was the date ofNamur's entry into Scotland, therefore the action must have 
occurred on a later date, which can hardly have been earlier than 1 or 2 August. Scotichronicon, viii, p.222. 
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actively to support his ershvhile Scottish subjects.57 Resistance to the Plantagenets had survived a massive 
defeat at Falkirk and smaller reverses both military and political too numerous to mention, resistance to 
the Bruce party cannot have utterly evaporated in June 1314, and we should perhaps see the example of 
Patrick as an indicator to the political communities of Roxburghshire and Berwickshire that the time had 
come to abandon the Plantagenets. Patrick's defection to Edward III after Halidon Hill weakened the 
Bruces and aided the Plantagenet party, though there must be some doubt about the wholeheartedness of 
his defection, since, as we have seen, he was back in the Bruce party before the end of November 1335. 
Had he remained in Plantagenet peace and therefore been actively opposed to Douglas and Moray they 
would have taken a great risk in leading their southern tenants to Aberdeenshire leaving Patrick virtually 
unopposed in the south-east. Further, without the participation of the Earl, they would have had fewer 
men to lead there and might have been defeated at a time when the Bruce cause was in poor shape. 
March's defection and the victory at Culblean seem, from a modern perspective, a pivotal juncture, 
though March's adherence to the Scots will have certainly come about only through his conviction that 
the Scots were going to win the war and a desire not to fmd himself an isolated Scottish magnate in 
English peace. In 1334-35 he had enjoyed Edward's confidence enough that he was allowed to upgrade 
his castle at Dunbar'S or at least to be allowed to retain castleguard payments normally due to Berwick, 
but in the event of Edward having an opportunity to make peace with the Scots on good terms and thus 
free men and resources for campaigning in France, he might well have been prepared to abandon Earl 
Patrick to the Bruce party in the interests of achieving a secure northern frontier. 
The extensive war damage recorded in 1335-36 may give an indication of a factor that could have 
pushed Earl Patrick to join the Bruces. If the Plantagenet administration was unable to provide stability 
and security for Lothian men his authority among his tenants would be diminished. If the administration 
was unable to prevent the incursions of the Scots his own and his tenants properties would become 
57 AJ. MacDonald 'Kings of the Wild Frontier'? The Earls of Dunbar or March, C 1070-1435' in S. Boardman 
,md A. Ross (edd.), The Exercise of Power in Medieval Scotland (Du.blin, 2003), p. 154. 
58 CDS, iii, no. 1115. The sums were rather greater than identitled by Bain. In 1334 the earl gave a receipt for 
£100 ofa grant of£600 from Edv{ard III. TNA. E42/269. 
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worthless so even men opposed to the Bruce party would be likely to prefer Bruce lordship to no lordship 
at all. Depressed rentals in 1335-37 obviously reflect damage but they might also be construed as 
evidence of acts of compulsion against the landholders of Lothian as much as acts of war against the 
Plantagenet administration. No doubt many properties were 'laid waste' by the Scots as an exercise in 
enforcing Bruce lordship. 
Despite the signal successes of Edward Balliol and Edward III against the Scots on the battlefield at 
Dupplin Muir, Halidon Hill and Neville's Cross, the cession by treaty of the southern counties and the 
detailed administrative structure erected for them, one has to question how serious Edward III was about 
his Scottish acquisitions, or at least how long he remained committed permanently to retaining Scottish 
territory. The Lothian garrisons in his father's day had been stronger and there had been more 
establishments; Linlithgow and Livingston peels do not seem to have been brought back into use by 
Edward Ill's administration. However confident Edward II or Edward III may have been about eventual 
success it is worth noting that at least two of the men that they appointed to the task of securing Lothian 
(Sir Robert Hastang and Sir John Strivelin) were both promised alternative rewards should Lothian fall to 
the Scots. Presumably this was a question of 'insurance' or warrandice59 should the worst come to pass, 
though it might be construed as the 'real' promise of rew'ard - particularly in the case of Sir John, who, 
unlike Sir Robert, knew that a Plantagenet administration of Lothian had already failed once - based on an 
assumption that the Scots would eventually displace the English administration. 
By the time of Neville's Cross the general focus of the war lay in the south-west and in 
Roxburghshire and Benvickshire, but it did not cease to be a major factor in the lives of Lothian people. 
Edward made no effort to restore his administration there after 1347, but his troops made a destructive 
descent on the county after the battle of Neville's Cross and again in 1355 for the 'Burnt Candlemas' 
campaign. Apart from reacting to English operations Lothian men would have had to serve in the army of 
David II to reduce the English garrisons at Roxburgh, Berwick and Lochmaben as part of their general 
59 If Edward III were successfully to establish his rule in Lothian he might frod it expedient to restore Lothian 
men to the properties granted to Sir John, in which case Sir John would have to be compensated accordingly. 
Robert I had faced by a similar situation twenty years earlier, see H.L. MacQueen, Common Law 106-7. 
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military obligation if they were to retain their property. Only a handful of those Scots who had served in 
the Edinburgh garrison between 1335 and 1340 appear in English records thereafter as recipients of 
allowances to compensate them for the loss of their lands in Scotland. Some, no doubt, had been killed in 
action and it is quite possible that some sought their fortune elsewhere, but it would seem quite possible, 
even probable, that the remainder found their way into the peace of David II in much the same way as 
Scots who had changed their allegiance from Balliol to Plantagenet to Bruce and back to Plantagenet 
kings over the preceding half century. 
CLERICS AND BURGESSES. 
If we accept that the conflict in Lothian in the periods 1297-1304, 1306-14 and 1334-41 was one that 
generally involved very small numbers of people and bear in mind the high incidence of man-at-arms 
service we would be justified in accepting that operational activity was, largely at least, the province of 
the landed classes, somewhat in the traditional division of medieval society into 'men who labour, men 
who fight and men who pray'. In fact, we should be aware that these groups were not so clearly 
delineated as all that. There are numerous instances of clerics being involved in combat or being declared 
forfeit for rebellion and Edward I found Scottish parish clergy enough of a problem that he attempted to 
resolve it by trying to reserve all benefices that fell vacant to Englishmen. 6o Martial activity among the 
clergy should not surprise us; the majority of benefices were probably held by men of the landholding 
class and several were landholders in their own right. They might be excused service for their charge, 61 
60 CDS, ii, 1023; TNA, E101/47/22/10/48. 
61 There is no evidence to suggest that Scottish bishoprics or abbeys were obliged to provide knight service, 
though common army service was required from their tenants. G.W.S. Barrow, Kingship and Unity (London, 
1981) p. 47. This was not the case in England. The abbots of Tavistock and St Augustine's, Canterbury 
would seem to have been on active duty in 1305-6, each of them having 'had his service "With the king'. 
Calendar of Chancery Rolls, Various, 1277-1326, p. 378. The abbot of Reading had ten men-at-arms on 
covered horses serving Edward I in England and Scotland in May 1296, CDS, v, no. 151. The Abbey had 
cause to take part in the Scottish war since they were looking for the restoration of the priory of May, from 
which they had been ejected by the bishop of St. Andrews when he was guardian of Scotland. CDS, v, no. 
177. Scottish religious foundations were not entirely exempt from military obligations beyond common 
army; see belowp. 166. 
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but they would undoubtedly have to discharge it for any property held temporally. Holy orders did not 
save Richard, rector of Ratho, from forfeiture by Edward III.62 
A possible indication that a cleric was involved in military activity may lie in the use of the term 
'knight' with ecclesiastical titles. 63 The fIrst incidence of this relevant to this study 64 is that of William de 
Balliol, rector of Kirkpatrick, the only cleric described as a knight on the Ragman RolL He may have 
been accorded the style of knight as a courtesy, though that must be considered unlikely given that none 
of the other senior clerics benefIted from it. Another example from the same period include Sir Thomas 
de Bridderhale 65 and a canon of Jedburgh, Sir Adam de Langchestre, who carried a letter to Edward I for 
William, his abbot.66 The armigerous status of these men may have pre-dated their ordination of course. It 
is quite possible that Sir Adam was a man of knightly rank who had retired to a more spiritual life. Not all 
of the clerics involved in the war were knights; among the surrendered garrison of Dunbar there was one 
John Somerville, clerk, presumably a member of the Lanarkshire Somerville family. He may of course 
have been concerned with the spiritual welfare of the garrison or chaplain or secretary to a member of the 
company. That he appears as a prisoner of war surely suggests that he had been on active service, though 
that need not have precluded other duties. The chaplain of the Earl of Lennox was, apparently, another 
clerical knight. In the autumn of 1301 he had apparently been 'out' for the Balliol cause but made his 
peace with Edward, who \\-Tote to the Abbot of Paisley asking him to induct 'Sir Robert' to the vicarage of 
Kirkpatrick. 67 The Abbot responded that an appointment had already been made a fortnight before 
because Sir Robert had not yet entered Edward's peace. The vicar of Peebles and the rector of Skirling 
62 WatL Fasti, p.198. 
63 Translation of the term 'dominus' as 'Sir' rather than 'Lord' certainly accounts for some apparent 
incidences of clerical knights, however in addition to senior ecclesiastics ,vho pursued military careers, such 
as Antony Bek. Bishop of Durham, there are instances (see p.106) of clerics fulfilling the role of a knight 
among the men-at-arms of garrisons. 
64 There are earlier examples. In 1206 the Melrose Chronicler accorded the title of' Sir' to Richard de Cave, 
but not to his successor, Hemy, the prior of the house. The entry for 1208 refers to the late abbot of Dry burgh 
as Geoffrey, but his successor is referred to as Sir William, an indication that this was not simply a courtesy 
to senior clerics. Anderson, A., Early sources of Scottish Hist07Y (Stamford, 1990), pp. 368, 371. 
65 When Stirling castle surrendered to the Scots at the end of 1299 the complement included one 'Sir Thomas 
de Bridderhale, chaplain' in the small list of knights. CDS, ii, no. 1119. 
66 CDS, ii, no. 969. 
67 Ibid, no. 1238. 
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"vere both forfeited for rebellion68 and William, Archdeacon of Lothian69 confessed to his rebellion when 
he joined Edward's peace on 28 October l3 05, more than a year after the surrender of the Balliol cause in 
February l304. When war broke out again in l306 Edward was sufficiently convinced of the dangers 
presented by senior churchmen that he ordered the Bishops of Glasgow and St. Andrews to be kept in 
irons 70 partly no doubt as punishment for their defection, but presumably also to prevent their escape. 
The Archdeacon had left Plantagenet peace by Aprill308, when he \vas receiving 3d/day as a prisoner of 
war. 71 Since the archdeacon was an officer of the bishopric of St. Andrews it is conceivable that his 
resistance to Edward I and Edward II was encouraged by the attitude of the Bishop. The examples of 
clerical forfeiture and/or imprisonment and attempts by Edward I and Edward II to install Englishmen or 
sympathetic Scots to parish vacancies are indicative of a level of opposition among those members of the 
secular clergy whose life in the community had a political dimension - for example those who were 
temporal landholders, and had obligations of social and military services. Despite the apparent failure of 
other attempts to provide Englishmen to Scottish vacancies, Edward II persevered, even after the loss of 
Lothian, in making such appointments. He provided Richard Makaud to Yetham parish in the diocese of 
Glasgo"v in September l31671 and others to no less than ten Lothian parishes in July 1317.73 What either 
Edward or the newly-appointed incumbents hoped to gain is obscure to say the least unless there was a 
body of opinion (shared presumably by the appointees) that the Scottish war was not yet irretrievably lost 
and that the appointments would be made good in due course when the Scots had been defeated. 
Another clerical 'knight' was Sir William Bullock, chamberlain to Edward Balliol and constable of 
Cupar castle. 74 He joined the Bruce cause in l339, eventually filling the office of chamberlain for David 
II. Unlike other clerics who were accorded the title 'knight' there is perhaps a practical explanation for Sir 
68 CDS. ii, p.425. 
69 Watt, Fasti, p.401. 
70 CDS, ii, no. 1813. 
71 Ibid., no. 188. 
n CDS, iii, no. 505 
73 Ibid., no. 653. 
74 Scotichronicon, vii, p.126 'the priest (presbyteri), Sir Wilham Bullock'; CDS, ii~ no. 1321. Interestingly, 
Sir William does not appear in Watt, Fasti, possibly an indication that he never held a Scottish benefice. 
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William's accolade. As the constable of a castle he might have found some difficulty in asserting his 
authority over knights in the garrison. Conceivably Sir William's knighthood was a means of lending 
authority to his position as Edward Balliol's chamberlain, though knighthood would not generally seem to 
have been a concomitant of senior office under the crown. A final example of a clerical knight, Sir 
Robert Fraser, seems to be unusually clear-cut. Sir Robert was parson of Pencaitland,7s but in l336-37 he 
was serving in Edinburgh castle garrison as a knight with a retinue of two men-at-arms (scutifers). We 
might assume that his service was a temporal tenure obligation; however, he ,vas evidently serving for 
wages since he appears on a muster roll. Again, we might consider that Sir Robert's knighthood was given 
to enhance his authority among the men-at-arms of the garrison. As one of only six men serving with a 
retinue in a garrison of over eighty men-at-arms and one of only SLX knights it is very likely that he had a 
leadership role. The two groups are not identical, which would cast doubt on the possibility that any man 
serving with two companions was termed 'knight' as a courtesy. 
The incidence of military service of any kind on the part of ordained clergymen might suggest a 
limited acquaintance with the relevant commandment, but it is not clear that that simplistic view would 
have been considered valid in the fourteenth century. The concept of a 'just war' was perfectly acceptable 
to mainstream medieval Catholicism on a number of levels. To fight 'God's foes' in the Holy Land was 
obviously highly acceptable, and at least one senior Scottish cleric, Thomas of Dundee, Bishop of Ross, 
preached that fighting against the English was just as acceptable.76 Two others, William Lamberton, 
Bishop of St. Andrews and Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow were sufficiently active in the Bruce 
cause to be held as prisoners of war at Winchester and Portchester castles respectively in l307.77 Clerics 
with temporal landholdings w'ould be likely to have military service obligations no different to any other 
landholder. Ifthose obligations were not discharged, whether in person, by a substitute or by payment, the 
clerical landholder was just as likely to lose his property for defect of service as his layman neighbour. 
75 CDS. iii, p. 363. 
-6 G.W.S.Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots (London, 1973), p. 324. 
77 CDS, iii, no. 24. Each of them had, however, asked Edward to allow them to continue to enjoy the income 
from their benefices, INA SC 813011494. 
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Burgess families were not divorced from the rest of the political community either. The position of 
individual burgesses was, arguably, more vulnerable than that of the landlords. Wealth based on 
commerce could be disrupted completely by damage incurred in one day. The destruction or confiscation 
of a warehouse, workshop or ship might well be enough to put a burghal family out of business 
permanently and thereby force them out of the political community. As long as a landholder could 
maintain or recover possession of an estate they would have a chance of restoring their fortunes even if 
the crops, livestock and installations had been destroyed or driven off. It is traditionally much easier to 
borrO\v money against the certain ownership of land than against the possibility of commercial success. 
That burgesses could be liable for military service is not in question. Clearly several members of burghal 
families served as men-at-arms. Not all ofthe Napiers, Botelers, Wyggemores and Harpers who appear in 
muster rolls were necessarily drawn from Scottish urban roots, but some, like John Wyggemore 78 
certainly were. Presumably there was a qualification of sorts - perhaps membership of the burgess guild-
which defined liability for service and clearly there was an expectation that townsmen could provide 
themselves with the necessary equipment: Robert I would seem to have expected that a burgh could 
supply 'armed' (meaning armoured) men to lead the to"'"11'S contingent in time of war,79 foreign 
merchants in Berwick were required to have arms and horses for the defence of the to"'"1180 and Sir 
William Douglas was able to recruit from Edinburgh after the fall of the castle in 134l81but there is no 
defmition of responsibility for arms and armour other than Robert I's '1318 legislation. 82 In the absence 
of clear evidence to the contrary, and in the knowledge that Scottish men-at-arms could serve in or against 
the Plantagenet cause it would be reasonable to assume that the arms, armour, training and ethos attached 
to heavy cavalry service did not differ radically, if at all, between the two countries. Further, it would 
78 An Edinburgh merchant and alderman of the city in 1335, John served as collector of customs for Edward 
III and as a man-at-arms in the castle garrison in 1337, CDS, iii, no. 1186, pp. 346,363. Various Botelers, 
Harpers and Napers appear on the Ragman Roll, CDS, ii, pp. 194-214 and in the garrison pay rolls of 
Edinburgh, Perth and Stirling castles under Edward I, II and IlL 
79 RRS, v, p. 261. Professor Duncan makes a strong case that the text of this part ofF onnu1ary E - no. 59 -
refers to Ayr, and that it originated in the spring of 1296. 
80 G.W.S. Barrow 'The Army of Alexander Ill's Scotland' in Reid A lexander III. 
81 Chron. Wyntoun, vi, p.195. 
82 RRS, v, p.414. 
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seem that the sources of such service - the nobility, the burgess community and appropriately-motivated 
members of the clergy, were at least broadly similar. This does not mean that these sections of society 
were the sole sources of men-at-arms, but they were surely the most significant ones. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LANDHOLDING IN FOURTEENTH - CENTURY LOTHIAN 
Evidently Lothian men were prepared (or could be coerced into) serving as men-at-arms in the armies 
of Balliol, Plantagenet and Bruce kings, but, while it is clear that there was a 'national' political 
dimension, it is important to consider the driving force behind acceptance or rejection of particular 
lordship at particular times; specifically the retention, recovery or acquisition of land. The social and 
cultural pressure to keep property, especially heritable property, in hand is widely recognised, but it is 
valuable to examine the nature of the properties if we are to appreciate the condition of the landed 
classes that formed the bulk of the political community. This was not simply a matter of acreage and 
agricultural exploitation. Legal and military duties were all parts of the obligation of landholders, 
whether to another noble or to the king. The practical realities of landholding and the relationship 
between landholding and military service have obvious implications for this thesis, particularly in 
regard to the incidence of man-at-arms service that Lothian could contribute to the conflict. 
LANDHOLDING AND ADMINISTRATION 
Acceptance of Plantagenet, or for that matter Bruce government, was not simply a matter of rents and 
army service. Participation in the administration and the courts was one of the factors that divided the 
political community from the mass of the populace. The sheriff court provided the executive arm of the 
king in local affairs, chiefly the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the king's rights in 
the county. The men of the political community served as jurors in a variety of applications, including 
'Post Mortem Inquisitions' or inquiries into the estate of someone recently deceased to define the extent 
of their estate, the burdens on that estate, the rights of the crown in relation to it and the identification of 
the correct heir. The Post Mortem Inquisition held for the estate of Robert de Pinkney in late 1296 is the 
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earliest detailed inquisition surviving from the Scottish administration of Edward I and the only one that 
pertains to Lothian. i Why exactly it should have been recorded securely enough to have survived is 
open to question. Robert de Pinkney's estate was valuable, but hardly of great significance within 
Lothian, let alone in Scotland as a whole. Three distinct possibilities are worth considering. The 'new' 
administration may have considered it desirable to impose the same system as pertained in England and 
recorded the inquisition carefully to provide an example of how Scottish inquisitions were to be 
conducted in the future or, given Edward's apparent preference for retaining the established practices of 
Scotland, it may have provided an example of Scottish practice for the benefit of English 
administrators. The third possibility is that English and Scottish practices were not significantly 
different and that the report of the inquisition has been preserved simply through good fortune. 2 In the 
absence of a similar process recorded in such detail at much the same time it seems reasonable to 
assume that this document was acceptable to the jurors at least, and is probably reasonably indicative of 
Lothian practice at the close of the thirteenth century.3 Even if the inquisition itself was an innovation, 
the judgement is still valuable as an indication of the realities of landholding in the region. 
On 26 October 1296 King Edward issued a writ instructing the Earl of Surrey to take the estate of 
Robert de Pinkney into his custody pending an inquiry as to the correct heir. A month later the Earl 
instructed the king's escheator for Scotland south of the Forth to hold an inquisition which convened 
shortly thereafter, presumably at Haddington, the caput of East Lothian given that the property in 
1 A great many English inquisitions have survived from this period, obviously manv are to be found in the 
CIPA1 volumes, but many more very similar processes appear in other collections such as the Calendar of 
Fine Rolls, iii, pp. 227 -8,229-230,283,413. The process carried out by the de Pinkney jurors does not 
seem to have differed significantly from those recorded in England. Bain's Calendar lists only the Scottish 
properties of Sir Robert, he also held several properties in Buckingham, Essex and Northamptonshire. 
CIPM, iii, p.366. 
2 Barrow, Neighbours, p. 219. 
2 H. MacQueen, Common Law pp. 1-3, Professor MacQueen clearly demonstrates that Scotland had an 
extensive body of law long before the Wars of Independence which must surely have taken account of the 
necessity for a process for deciding heirs and assessing the value of and burdens on property. Given that the 
writs of Novel Dissasine (pp. 137-143) and Mortancestor (pp.168-70) were already well-established 
processes by this time, it would seem impossible that there could have been no means of deciding the 
possession and extent of property. The process in hand might in fact give title to the jury as a visnet, 
recognition or, most significantly an inquest. (p.SO). 
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question lay in the vicinity of Aberlady and that the bulk of the jurors (if not all of them) were drawn 
from that area.4 
The majority of the jurors had subscribed the Ragman Roll by the end of August 1296, the exceptions 
being John Purde and Adam de Congilton. Neither of these men seems to make any appearance in 
vvritten record other than as jurors to this inquisition. Adam may well have been the son of Mabille 
(Mabel) de Congilton and Walter de Congilton, both of whom were Ragman Roll homagers5 so 
possibly Adam could be included as a juror on the grounds that if he was not yet a Lothian landholder it 
was reasonable to assume that he would become one in due course. The inclusion of John Purde is less 
easily explained, unless we assume that the political community extended beyond the ranks of the 
Ragman Roll homagers. This is very likely considering the range and extent of judicial and military 
obligation on the political community. The few hundred men who appear on the roll for the Edinburgh 
counties were obliged to serve as jurors for three of the king's courts, Edinburgh, Linlithgow and 
Haddington. With twelve people sitting on each jury, the three suits a year which seems to have been a 
fairly ordinary level of obligation would surely soon be exhausted by the demands of three busy courts, 
particularly when we bear in mind the extensive range of business that might come before those courts. 
Alternatively of course Adam Purde may have failed to register on the Ragman Roll for a variety 
of reasons. He could have been out of the country, simply overlooked or a prisoner of war (a common 
experience apparently: at least twenty-one of the men who appear in the Appendix spent time as 
prisoners) or in service in Edward's army. Sir Simon de Horsburgh,6 a Peebles shire landholder, does not 
appear on the Roll, though Peeblesshire was one of the most intensively recorded counties and despite 
the fact that as a knight Sir Simon would surely have been a member of the political community of that 
county, suggesting the possibility that men serving in the field were not required to give their homage in 
a civil setting, or at least not in the rather unusual circumstances of August 1296. 
4 CDS. ii, no. 854. 
'CDS, ii, no. 823. 
6 His horse was valued in 1296, INA, E 10115/23. His property was restored in 1297, suggesting perhaps a 
brief defection to the Balliol cause. CDS, ii, no. 954. 
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The De Pinkney inquisition gives a report of the various lands and rights held by Sir Robert at the 
time of his death and the various burdens outstanding on the estate. These burdens show the 
fragmentation of the estate into several sub-tenancies or lettings of varying type. Robert and his 
ancestors had shown considerable generosity to the hospital of St. Cuthbert; a total of nine bovates, nine 
acres and twenty shillings a year from the two mills of the estate. The inquisition also mentions a group 
of cottar holdings with a fixed annual rental value of 112s 6d. These cottars, probably descended from 
men of servile status, presumably represented the main source of seasonal waged labour for the estate. 
Their rents represent a trivial percentage of the gross income of the estate so it is reasonable to assume 
that the acreage occupied by the cottars was minimal, probably not really enough to keep them fed and 
clad, hence the need for alternative sources of income, of which labour on the land of others would, in 
most cases anyway, be the only option. The cottars were undoubtedly 'thirled' to (that is to say they 
were obliged to use) the mills that provided £8 a year for the lord (including the twenty shillings paid to 
the hospital of St. Cuthbert) and to the breweries. These were worth 29s 4d per annum as fixed rents, 
but 13s 4d (or one merk) was paid to Alicia de Graham (see Appendix) as 'terce' from her late husband, 
Roger LeIman. How Roger Leiman came to have rights in the breweries of Robert de Pinkney's estate 
is not recorded, but it does serve to illustrate the potential complexity of medieval landholding. 
A further six bovates were held by Henry de Pinkney, brother of the deceased. 7 Although that part 
of the estate was valued at £4, Henry's charter granted him the land for a mere 1d per annum, neatly 
demonstrating the means by which younger sons could be provided with a living. Henry's favourable 
rental is explained by the fact that the principal landholder was his brother, but the other major tenant 
seems to have fared even better, though he does not appear to have been a relative. John de Bickerton 
held the castle of Luffnoc (Luffness) along with three carucates and the demesnes of the castle as well 
as a further twenty marks of land at Bynyn in the constabulary of Linlithgow. The castle and the land 
attached to it was valued at £26 13s 4d, superficially a carefully derived figure, but in fact simply an 
alternative expression of forty merks. For these extensive properties John paid the paltry sum of 6d per 
7 Henry was also a landholder in Northamptonshire, TNA, C143/27110, C143/28110. 
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annum. The most likely explanation of this generosity is that John had in fact provided a considerable 
lump sum in exchange for the permanent use of the land, but that Robert had been unwilling or unable 
formally to alienate the property permanently, the annual payment of 6d remaining as a token of the 
owner's rights. Since the castle, demesnes and the three carucates were held of Robert 'in capite', should 
John die without issue the property would escheat to Robert. 
The two other significant tenants on Robert's property were Alexander de Lindsay, who held one 
carucate (though in two different parts of an area of the estate called 'Ie cotis') valued at £4 but paying 
only 1d, and Thomas de Coleville. Thomas's holding would seem to have been scattered through the 
estate; the value of his property being 'estimated' by the jurors at £10, though Thomas paid no money, 
instead performing the 'foreign service' (forinsec) of a quarter of a knight in the king's army. For all the 
property at Luffness and Bynyn Robert owed a total of one and three-quarter knight's service, but what 
he seems to have retained himself was the chief house at Ballencreiff with a garden and pigeon house 
within the enclosure with 10 carucates in demesne and fIfty-four acres of arable with meadow and 
grazing and each valued at 21 d, altogether some £95 14s 2d. The conclusion of the inquisition was that 
the issues of Robert's properties came to £112 lOs, a sum that does not accurately accord with the 
amounts described in the document, but gives us a picture of the fiscal realities of landholding in 
Lothian. More significantly perhaps it demonstrates the fragmentation of estates among neighbours. 
Some of that fragmentation can be readily identified, such as the 'terce' holding, the gifts by Robert and 
his predecessors to the church and the provision made for his younger brother. Whatever the origin of 
the dispersal of the other portions of the estate it is clear that even a relatively small estate, though 
nominally a contiguous landholding belonging to, or rather held by, one individual might in fact be 
effectively held by several different people who might or might not be related to one another, but were 
bound to one another by what were essentially commercial considerations. 
The de Pinkney post mortem inquisition provides a glimpse of the political community at work in a 
normal peacetime activity, but it is only one document among a collection of unrelated and fragmentary 
material. With little in the way of continuous record relating to specific subjects it is impossible to state 
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categorically that any particular piece of material represents 'standard practice'. It is unlikely that all of 
the documentary evidence is the product of recording unusual or anomalous situations; therefore we 
might consider that a wide range of material might give us a generally valid body of evidence from 
which to draw generally valid conclusions. 
In general there is very little evidence indeed relating to Lothian land prices in the early fourteenth 
century, and much of what there is tells us little about the actual value of the property. The return due to 
the crown might be stated, but not the extent, productivity or profitability of the estate in question. 8 
Exceptionally, records of the Lothian administration of Edward III for 1335-6 and 1336-7 provide a 
remarkable snapshot of the various properties, estates and baronies that comprised the sheriffdom, 
detailing not only the sums due from landholders, but the actual returns received by the sheriff. 
Although we should bear in mind that land prices were not constant in fourteenth-century Scotland - if 
only because there had been intermittent war for nearly forty years before Edward Ill's acquisition of 
Lothian after the battle of Halidon Hill - virtually all of the properties of Lothian would seem to have 
been held for customary, rather than genuinely economic rentals. These rents were not necessarily token 
payments in the strictest sense; no doubt many of them had been economic at the time of their 
agreement, but had dwindled relative to economic development generally. There are several examples 
of rents of £5 or more, considerable sums of money, but not necessarily - and probably only rarely, if 
ever - anything like a commercially rational return on the property. 
In those instances where \ve can see what is, or at least appears to be, a genuinely economic rental 
we should remember that the rent paid by the tenant is not the same thing as the annual value of the 
land as a production asset. The holding would have no value to the tenant if there was no profit to be 
8 The barony of Kings-Cavil (West Lothian) and Calder-Clere (Mid-Calder, Midlothian) cost James 
Douglas of Lothian £ 12 5s. 1 Od and the service of half a knight, but the charter makes no mention of the 
income that James might expect to receive from it (RRS, v, p. 341). Westhall of Ratho (Midlothian) was 
held by 'Patrick called Noble' for 'accustomed service' in October 1316, but there is no defmition of what 
that service might be or of the actual value of the property, a common condition in charter evidence. Patrick 
received the land as the heir of his grandfather, a Ragman Roll homager in 1296 RRS, v, p. 382. 
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made from sub-letting or direct exploitation, and in tum the sub-tenants or labourers would need to 
profit also. 
LANDHOLDING AND ARMY SERVICE. 
Military obligation was often associated with land tenure in a way that is easy to identify- estates 
d .c k' 1 9 h 10 ( . 11' £ 11 , d ,p) . M'l' grante 1.0r 'lllg 1t or arc er very occaSlOna y m antry or anne man - servIce. I ltary tenures, 
seldom involving the service of more than one knight and very often just fractions of the service of one 
knight,13 can hardly have provided Scottish kings with an army, but as we have already seen, experience 
of army service as a man-at-arms was very widespread among the lesser nobility of Lothian. Dr. 
Preshvich has observed that the fmancial rewards of a man-at-arms were more in the way of a 'return 
on an investment' than wages. 14 The rate of pay was not sufficient to justify the investment in horse and 
arms. However if the purchase of horse and arms was an unavoidable duty anyway, there was 
something to be said for enlisting to partially offset the cost. Since we can identify over 100 men from a 
relatively small sample of Lothian landholders serving as men-at-arms we must surely conclude that 
heavy cavalry service of some kind extended well beyond provisions of knight service. I5 G.W.S. 
Barrow and A.A.M. Duncan have alluded to drengage landholding in Northumberland and Cumberland 
as a precursor of knight-service I6 tenure and have suggested that a similar service may have been a 
condition of landholding in Lothian. If so it would seem to have left no readily identifiable trace by the 
fourteenth century, but it would be rash to assume that it was not part and parcel of many, perhaps most, 
of the properties that were big enough to encompass more than one farm merely because we have no 
record of it. If it was normal practice only exemptions would need to be recorded. Alternatively such 
9 RRS, v, pp. 342,374,450,568; RRS, vi, pp. 86,339,358,462. 
10 RRS, v, pp. 352,455, 609;RRS, vi, pp. 527-8. RlvfS, ~ app. i, no. 45. 
11 RRS, v, p. 615. 
12 RRS, vi, pp. 627-8. 
13 RRS, p. 341. 
14 M. Prestwich War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I (London, 1972) p.50 
15 Laing Chrs., no. 18. In a charter of 1286x1300 William Gurlay granted land at Stonehouse for twelve 
pennies and 'bodily service in the army on horseback at the cost of the lord of the fee'. The recipient was 
surely obliged to serve as a man-at-arms, but the term 'knight service' is not used. 
16 Duncan, Scotland, p. 161; G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scotsp. 23. 
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duties may have been recorded in rather greater detail by the sheriffs and lords to whom such service 
was due, but the shrieval, magnate and baronial registers have not survived. If a military obligation on 
the tenant was part of the package of arrangements ranging from cash, produce and suit of court to 
hunting and military services that might constitute a rental agreement, that obligation obviously had an 
economic aspect or at least had at the time the agreement was made. If the tenant had to equip himself 
to a given standard, and take the time to learn and practice the skills of war, or devote some of his time 
to court duties, that might have been a factor in the rental that was likely to reduce the cash element. 
A possible indication of the practical extent of cavalry service that might be expected from a 
particular area can be seen in a charter from the reign of William the Lion. l7 The king gave his sister 
Margaret one hundred librates of land at Ratho infeft with twenty knights; five pounds worth of rent per 
annum per knight. Of course the figure of £5 is indicative of the return to the lando'wner, Margaret. It 
was not of the value of the land to the knight, and the value of money had changed somewhat by the 
time of the Wars of Independence An estate of £5 would hardly seem enough to sustain a man in 
'knighthood' as we understand fourteenth-century usage; also, twenty knights is a very large number 
indeed when compared to the ten knights required of the Bruces for the whole of Annandale. However, 
if we think not in terms of knights, but rather of modest landholders - the parish gentry to use a phrase 
generally applied to a slightly later period - with an obligation to give service in the capacity of "vhat in 
English record is called a valet, scutifer, or man-at-arms, and bear in mind that military obligations of 
this type were probably as little susceptible to change as any other aspect of land tenure packages, the 
number of 'knights' infeft at Ratho was probably not extraordinary when compared to Lothian 
generally. It would be premature to suggest that a £5 landholding was a 'threshold' figure for man-at-
arms service in Lothian generally on the strength of one document from a hundred years before the 
Wars of Independence, but the incidence of that service among the parish gentry is sufficiently high to 
suggest that a large proportion of such landholders performed military service at that level. Military 
service of any kind was not of course strictly and inevitably a product of land tenure in any sense at all. 
17RRS. ii, p.476. 
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There were several men in English service with no particular association with Lothian other than army 
service, professional soldiers like the Gascon Pierre Lubaud. His career in Scotland is described more 
extensively in the Appendix, but he served in Lothian as a man-at-arms from August 1298, when his 
horse (a 'rough liard' hackney) was valued at £20. He was constable of Linlithgow peel by September 
l305,18 and received a grant of lands at Bathgate and Ratho from Edward II in December l311, by 
which time he had been promoted to sheriff of Edinburgh. 19 He defected to the Bmce party before the 
fall of Edinburgh castle in March 131420 and was granted land at Cockpen, Lothian by Robert f1 which 
he held for about two years before being convicted of treason. We might reasonably expect to see men 
on either side whose ambition was to achieve heritable landholder status as a reward for service but 
whose CUlTent service was not based on tenure. 
MONEY RENTS. 
Perhaps the most significant factor in setting the rent of any property lay in the relationship between the 
principal and the tenant. Provisions of land for younger sons, friends or associates would not always be 
made at a commercial rate. If the tenure was heritab Ie it would be difficult, if not impossible to alter the 
return. Money rents fixed in the early twelfth century would have lost a great deal of their value by the 
close of the thirteenth. 22 Perhaps more significantly the increase in the money supply and increasing 
velocity of exchange of that supply throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had considerably 
improved the purchasing power of most, if not all members of the society other than those dependent on 
fLxed rent incomes. Nominal rents are often fairly obvious - men holding land for a pair of spurs or 
gloves or for a penny were not exactly heavily burdened - but tenants who paid more substantial sums 
were not necessarily, or even normally, having to fmd anything like the commercial rent value of the 
1S TNA E101/69/1/2. CDS, ii, nos. 1007, 1691; CDS, iii, no. 42. 
9 CDS, ii.230 
20 LUbaud was ordered to hand over his command to Sir Ebulo de Montibus on 22 February 1314, Calendar 
afFine Rolls, ii, p. 189. 
21 RRS, v, p.367 
22 H.L. MacQueen Common Law, pp. 20-1 
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property. Generally we have no clear picture of the physical extent of particular landholdings, only the 
return due. From this information we can deduce that there were a great many properties throughout 
Lothian \vith a rental of ten pounds, ten merks or fractions or multiples thereof/3 but we cannot tell if 
properties of identical values in different parts of Lothian were of similar value to the tenant. Tenant 
profits were obviously a function of productivity and demand for produce so we might reasonably 
assume that properties with a higher proportion of better land would be more desirable than others. 
Ho\vever in peacetime proximity to the market might well make a less productive estate more profitable 
than a superior property vvith poor access to the market. In wartime the very properties whose relative 
isolation reduced their profitability in peacetime might be more likely to avoid the worst effects of the 
conflict. Thus the war, though not permanently affecting the customary rentals of the properties, may 
have affected their desirability. 
A barrier to understanding the relationship of 'normal' rent values of properties compared to the 
actual returns is the propensity of medieval accountants to convert merk prices to Sterling prices and 
vice versa. Superficially, the reductions for war damage to individual properties accepted by the 
administration of Edward III in 1335-37 seem to be quite arbitrary. Once the sums are converted to a 
particular account format there does seem to be a tendency for the return to be a 'round sum', one 
presumably agreed between the responsible officer of the crown (the sheriff, or at least his bailies) and 
the landholder. This is obscured somewhat by the use of the two terms for money of account. The 
seemingly arbitrary rentals can often be rationalised by conversion to the alternative method of 
accounting. If, for example the 'normal' return from a property was £26 13s 4d we might conclude that 
the odd nature of the sum is in some way a scientifically calculated value of property, and if the actual 
return from the same property in wartime was £6 13s 4d we might conclude that that too, since it is 
such a very specific sum of money, represents a rational calculation of some precision. If on the other 
hand the two sums are ex-pressed in merks we fmd that the normal return was 40 merks, and the actual 
sum paid was 10 merks. This suggests that the initial sum is a customary and perhaps quite arbitrary 
23 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41 
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rental, probably of considerable antiquity, such as we might expect for any 'feudal' property, and that 
the actual return, being one quarter of the usual 'peacetime' return, may be arbitrary or represent an 
agreed composition, that the landholder and the bailie had agreed- or that the bailie had decided - that 
war damage and commercial dislocation had reduced the value of the property by 75%. The barony of 
Keith,24 valued at 100 merks in peacetime was assessed at £40 (60 merks) in February 1312. In 1335-6 
a property at Garmilton, normally worth £5 per annum to the crovvn made a return of only Yz merk (3 s 
4d) in 1335_36.25 It would seem, then, that each of these properties made a return that was almost a 
token. On the other hand the barony of Glencorse, forfeited by Sir William Abernethy and normally 
valued at £13 6s 8d (20 merks) made a returu of only £2 18s 6d in 1335-6?6 The latter sum cannot be 
expressed conveniently in merks or as an obvious rational fraction of the normal return. It might 
therefore be reasonable to assume that the bailie acting for the Plantagenet administration had 
investigated the condition of the property and had made a realistic assessment of its current value; a 
'fair rent' in effect. However in 1336-7 the return from the same property was £3, suggesting a rather 
more arbitrary approach?7 Glencorse, situated along the eastern foot of the Pentlands would, 
presumably, have been particularly vulnerable to Scottish forces passing into Lothian, and might well 
have sustained a great deal of damage thereby. 
The evidence does not support a conclusion that the returns demanded were all necessarily of this 
pattern. A property normally returning 13s 4d (one merk) but returning only l2d does not make any 
immediate sense as a simple extrapolation for comparative value. The l2d is, obviously, one shilling, a 
unit of account rather than of specie, but there is no direct relationship between merks and shillings that 
can be expressed as a fractional function. A merk is two -thirds of a pOUlld and a shilling one twentieth 
of a pound: the arithmetical difficulties of the multiplication, division and rationalisation of complex 
fractions would have been more than just a challenge to people who did not have the benefit of Arabic 
24 CDS. iii, pp. 327-41. 
:5 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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numerals. Certainly the shilling was a generally acceptable unit of account - there was no shilling coin, 
nor merk or pound coin for that matter,28 but it was not a simple fraction of a merk such as a quarter or 
a tenth. In the absence of any evidence of a specific calculation it may well be the case that a return of a 
shilling was agreed with, or imposed by, the mechanism of the state in the shape of the bailies of the 
sheriffdom as much as a formal recognition of responsibility as anything else - a token of the 
continuing landlord-tenant relationship. 
It is not universally the case that the returns demanded for different properties can be readily 
expressed as round figures in either pounds or merks, and some at least of these demands may well 
represent economic rentals based on the real productivity of the estate in question. Many, perhaps the 
majority, seem to be based, or to have been based in the past, on ideas of the value of a property 
sufficient to maintain a person of a particular social status in the economic condition deemed 
appropriate to their station and to enable them to provide the services demanded of such a person. This 
is often seen as a function of the military aspects of medieval landholding, and there is a good deal of 
merit in this. However, the social duties oflandholders extended well beyond any question of the ability 
of the landholder to provide themselves with the necessary equipment - armour, weapons, horses, staff-
to follow the king to war. The full extent of suit of court obligation is quite impossible to judge given 
the loss of sheriff court records other than a mere handful of inquisitions, but they were probably seen 
as a considerable burden to those who had to discharge them. Court duties often required the subject to 
travel distances that seem trivial to us but would have been a considerable burden seven centuries ago. 
In poor weather conditions, or in short winter days it might well have taken a whole day for William 
Abernethy (from his barony of Glencorse) or Hugh de Penicuik (from his property at Penicuik) to travel 
to Edinburgh to discharge their obligations as jurors, and, having done their duty, another whole day to 
return home. One day in court, therefore, might well take up three days of their time. For a man with 
property and judicial duties in two or more sheriffdoms the burden might be increased by longer 
journey times amounting to twenty or thirty days a year. 
28 Nicholson, Middle Ages, p.180 
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In the absence of a clear indication as to a rationale that might explain the variety it is probably 
reasonable to assume that a rent set at a round sum such as ten merks or thirty pounds or fifty shillings, 
is likely to be a sum set on the basis of the relationship between the landholder and the superior as 
indicated above, but this can be misleading. A rental of 33s 4d might seem to be a carefully calculated 
sum reflecting the real value of the property. It is also the sum of h\'o 'simple' units of account (one 
pound and one merk) and therefore might just as easily represent the rent of two different properties 
combined or simply an alternative expression of two and a half merks. Such a rental might be the 
product of the division of a property at some time in the past (for example a quarter share of what had 
originally been a 10 merk property), and some of the more curious-seeming sums may well be the result 
of division and subdivision and amalgamation of estates over generations resulting in what might seem 
like curious, random rentals that are in fact a half of a third or a ftfth of a half of an earlier rental 
agreement brought about by the requirement to provide for younger sons, or to fund terces and dowries 
or by the partition of estates between daughters. Division of property to provide income for dependants 
was commonplace, but not permanent. Land allowed as terce, dower or dowry from heritable estates 
returned, generally at least, to the estate on the death of the holder. Life tenures of this sort do not seem 
to have been automatically affected by the forfeiture of the principal landholder. The forfeiture of 
William Douglas 29 did not prevent his widowed mother, Joanna, from retaining her terce holding in 
1335 -36; on the other hand her gender did not prevent her from being forfeited in 1336-37,30 
presumably for her political convictions if not activity. 
BARONIES. 
The application of the term 'barony' is not entirely clear in any way, other than the fact that baronies 
were in some sense, though not necessarily in an aspect common to them all, different from other 
landholdings. That the barony was not a single block of territory owned outright by a baron is clear 
from the number of properties described as being 'in the barony of...'. That description is surely 
29 CDS, iii, p.333 
3(, CDS, iii, p. 341. 
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indicative of more than geographical location. Barony would seem to have formed a level of local 
administration in various spheres most significantly judicial and military responsibilities. It would seem 
that those responsibilities were not necessarily tied permanently to the land and that administrative 
functions, and no doubt privileges, could be negotiable items in their own right; hence we see 
Alexander Seton acquiring the 'superiority' of Dundas and Wester Craigie in Lothian. 31 One of these 
properties may have already belonged to him since the Craigie family would seem to have been among 
the disinherited. Sir Alexander Craigie and his son both served in the Plantagenet garrison of Edinburgh 
from l335-40,32 so evidently the superiority was worth having in addition to, or separately from, actual 
tenure. A strong possibility must be that superiority conferred judicial authority; that the residents of the 
property became subject to the court of Alexander Seton and presumably were removed from the 
jurisdiction of a different baron. The profits of justice in the barony court accrued, un surprisingly , to the 
baron, making 'ownership' of such a court an attractive proposition. 
At least thirty baronies existed in Lothian in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. 33 
What administrative relationship, if any, they bore to the constabularies in which they lay is unclear, 
though it would be likely that both military and judicial responsibilities were involved. In turn it is not 
clear that there was a specific relationship between baronies and properties. A particular location might 
be described as lying in a particular barony and the barony may have been a unit of court jurisdiction, 
but we cannot be sure that all properties lay in the sway of one or other barony. King's tenants for 
example might, for all we know, fall within the scope of the sheriff for all purposes from taxation to 
military service and not be in any legal sense attached to a barony at all. 
31 RRS, v, p.453. 
32 CDS, iii, nos. 1186, 1383. 
33 These included Bolton, Drem, Dirleton, Duncanlaw, Elphinston, Glencorse, Keith, Neuton, Morham, 
Tranent, Ratho and Pentland, which may have formed one barony with Cousland and Roslin (however 
Cousland and Roslin may have been baronies in their own right, but customarily held by the same 
individual) all ofwhich lay in Haddington constabulary. In Linlithgow constabulary there \vere Abercorn, 
Auldcathie, Barnbougle, Carriden, Kingscavill and Calder-Clere, Livingston, Loghorward, Ratho and 
Musselburgh. Edinburgh constabulary included the baronies of Byres, Colinton, Curry, Dalhousie, 
Dalkeith, Gorton, Neuton, Norton ofRatho and possibly Redhall of Ratho. 
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Beyond judicial and army services it is difficult to identify a feature that is common to fourteenth-
century baronies and separates them from properties without baronial status. This a topic that has 
received very little attention from historians apart from Professor Duncan's concise description,34 but it 
would not seem that barony was either land tenure, judicial rights or military leadership, but that 
elements of all three were constituent parts, though not always universally. The scope of judicial power 
varied from one barony to another 35 and there is no reason to assume that military leadership could not 
be a variable. In 1321 Sir Alexander Seton was granted the superiority of Elphinstone though he already 
held the barony itself.36 If that superiority included rights of leadership in war we must assume that 
some figure other than the baron of Elphinstone had had the responsibility of leading the Elphinstone 
men when required before 1321 and that 'superiority' was a thing desirable in itself or Robert I would 
not have granted it or Sir Alexander would not have gone to the bother of acquiring it. It may be that 
'superiority' was a vital component of 'barony' holding; that other rights, powers, privileges and 
property might form part of the 'barony' package, but that superiority conferred the actual status of 
barony and thus had to be specifically stated to erect (or perhaps restore) a property to barony status. 
As a general rule we can safely assume that the rights implied by a grant 'in barony' were clearly 
understood by the donor, the recipient and the existing tenants of the barony and that grants of 
superiority separate from the baronial property were something of a rarity. Accepting that most royal 
documents were issued at the behest of the recipient we might consider what issues night have 
motivated Sir Alexander and King Robert to arrange specific grants of barony and superiority at Gogar 
and Elphinstone. One possibility is that the superiority was a form of warrandice to Sir Alexander from 
the king of the baronial franchise, though why that should have seemed necessary is unclear. 
Alternatively the document might be useful for Sir Alexander as a means of assuring his tenants and 
perhaps the persons from whom superiority had been transferred, that his baronial status had royal 
34 RRS. v, pp. 41-5. Professor Mac Queen's work on baronies relates mostly to the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. 
35 RRS, V, pp. 41-44. 
36 RRS, v,pp. 221-3. 
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sanction. The latter would seem to be the more likely possibility, which brings into question the security 
of Sir Alexander's lordship. Ifhis tenants needed a written instrument to bring about their acceptance of 
his lordship there must have been some question about it. When these grants were made Bruce rule in 
Lothian was still a relatively recent development. Lothian had largely been under Plantagenet rule for 
most of the preceding two decades and King Robert had recently been the target of an attempted coup, 
the de Soulis conspiracy. The parish gentry of Lothian might not have been especially keen to accept 
changes in their local practices from a government that might not be able to provide them with long-
term security. The Plantagenets had not been able to prevent the Bruce acquisition of Lothian in 1314, 
but the Bruces might not be able to prevent the re-imposition of an English administration in the future, 
an administration that might need assurances that the Lothian gentry had accepted the government of 
Robert I because they had had no choice. 
The military service burden attached to the barony was not the same thing as leadership of the men of 
the barony in war. Each property within the barony would have a military obligation, as did the 'baron' 
for his property within the barony. Jurisdiction and military leadership might lie elsewhere, but 
generally the 'baron' would hold these powers and his tenants would provide him with the manpower to 
discharge his obligations to the king. The leadership rights of a favoured individual might be extended 
to exclude the customary rights of others. This might well be the case in the granting of the 'superiority' 
of a property separately from the actual landholding, such as in the case of Sir Alexander Seton, whose 
grant of the superiority of various properties throughout Lothian is examined in chapter five. It was 
certainly the case for Sir James Douglas, who, in l369 received letters from David II which gave him 
the leadership of all of the men who lived on all his lands 'throughout our kingdom,.37 The clear 
implication is that men who lived on estates belonging to James, who in the past had been subject to the 
military command of sheriffs or of other lords, would now come under his direct authority. 
The nature of service demanded was not constant. Knight service predominates, but there are 
examples of grants made for archer service. The instances of relatively heavy demand from baronies, 
37 RRS vi, p. 480 
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such as ten archers for half of Manor, Peeblesshire/8 or thirty archers and an anned man from Bowden, 
Roxburghshire,39 should remind us that our perception of archers as an element in Scottish annies - that 
they fonned only a very small proportion of the force - could easily be compromised by the discovery 
of just a couple of similar grants since the demand for knight service is so low. Similarly, although there 
is a popular perception that Scottish archers hailed from Ettrick Forest, the relatively high incidence of 
archer service from Roxburgh and Peeblesshire in military service tenure grants may be a matter of 
document survival and the numbers involved are not large. A couple of archer service charters from 
other areas would, superficially at least, invalidate the perception that the Forest was the chief source of 
archers for Scottish annies. 
Although military tenure grants are a significant proportion of the surviving charters of Ro bert I, the 
number of knights involved is not large. As we have already seen in Chapter 2, it would seem that in 
Scottish armies, like their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the number of men-at-arms available in 
Lothian was considerable for a government that could effectively impose its lordship. Even a very 
superficial survey of the incidence of paid man-at-anns service recorded in muster ro11s40 and horse 
valuations41 and of forfeitures in 1335-6 and 1336_742 among the landed families of other southem 
sheriffdoms would strongly suggest that Lothian was not exceptional. It therefore seems reasonable to 
conclude that there were extensive cavalry service obligations attendant on land tenure well below the 
social status of knights. That service may not have been part of the leadership obligations of barons, but 
it was certainly discharged at some level. As an example of what might be expected in the way of such 
service from a particular property we might look to David II's grant of a charter of entail for the estate 
(not even a barony) ofPettynain in March 1352 for the service of four 'anned men' and four archers.43. 
Unarmed men would not be at a premium obviously, and in general 'armed' in a medieval document 
3S RRS, v, p.294 
39 Duncan, Scotland, p.389; Kelso Liber, no. 471. 
40 CDS, iii,pp. 383-412. 
41 Ibid.,pp. 412-32. 
42 Ibid, iii, pp. 317-26. 
43 RRS, vi, pp. 527-8. 
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should be understood as 'armoured'. Men who could provide themselves with armour were unlikely to 
be men who would serve without horses; even though they might actually fight on foot should the 
tactical situation require it. The service of eight men trained to arms (as Professor Duncan has pointed 
out,44 there was clearly a considerable difference between an archer and a man anned with a bow) 
would seem to be a considerable burden, but it is quite possible that the light military obligations 
attached to the majority of properties and baronies for which we have evidence are exceptional, hence 
the need for their burdens to be defmed, and that the eight soldiers from Pettinain or the thirty archers 
from Bowden or the ten archers from Manor are actually more indicative of normal levels of obligation 
attached to landholding. That does not mean that the military service of all of the parish gentry in 
Lothian took the form of cavalry soldiering, though clearly a considerable portion of it did. The archers 
from Bowden and Manor might fall into the same sort of category in social and economic terms as the 
man-at-arms from Lothian but serve, perhaps by tradition, in a specialist capacity. Dr. Morgan has 
shown that men from Cheshire,45 whose social status would make them likely to serve as men-at-arms if 
they came from a different county, served as archers in the reign of Edward III if not earlier. The same 
may hold true of the Manor men and, possibly, of some Lothian men. Certainly on the occasions when 
the Scots raised large armies the bulk of the men served on foot, but this was true of all medieval 
European countries and to give battle on foot might be a decision prompted by the terrain or by military 
fashion. A man on foot in battle need not be primarily an infantryman. The reverse holds true to some 
extent of course: a soldier on a horse is not necessarily a cavalryman; the mounted archers of Edward 
Ill's armies and garrisons did not shoot from the saddle; they dismounted to engage and were thus 
strictly mounted infantry. 46 
The size of force available from a particular area does not seem to have been a factor in conferring 
baronial status. The four 'armed men' from Pettynain and the thirty archers (with an 'armed man' to 
44 RRS. v, p. 54. 
45 P. Morgan War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403 (Manchester, 1977), p. 58; Ayton, Knights, 
p.16. 
46 M. PrestwichA17nies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (New Haven, 1996) pp. 
135-6. 
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lead them) of Bowden may represent unusually heavy burdens or the ten archers required of Kilsyth or 
for half of Manor unusually light burdens, but whether or not they bear any relationship to the physical 
size of the barony - in gross acreage or perhaps arable acreage -or its fmancial value or whether it was 
derived from traditional burdens is impossible to say. Assuming that the barons were responsible to the 
sheriff we must also assume that the sheriff held some form of register to ensure that the correct level of 
service was being demanded and discharged. 
Beyond the duty to provide men as required, the army function of the baron is open to question. In 
battle we could expect that the majority of men-at-arms of all ranks would serve with the cavalry if a 
mounted force was being deployed at all, which would preclude them from fulfilling a 'junior leader' 
role among those of their tenants called to arms, but combat is only a very tiny facet of the life of an 
army and the administration of sentry, ration and work parties might have been provided through 
baronial leadership under his superior sheriff or magnate. If so, the disparity in size and nature of the 
commands of the individual barons must have made the assignment of tasks and responsibilities and of 
provisioning something of a challenge for senior officers, but maintaining the prestige of the baron 
among his tenants might demand that his civil status be reflected in his military status. We might 
wonder whether the existing social and judicial hierarchy of landholders, barons and sheriffs would 
provide a viable structure for the tactical and administrative articulation47 of Scottish medieval armies. 
Self-evidently a large army must have articulated leadership in some form and the advantages of 
leadership figures already familiar to the rank and file are obvious - those being led might not like their 
landlord or baron, but at least they would know who he was and that he held the relevant authority. 
47 The articulation of an army is essentially the ability of discrete portions of the force to operate 
independently or as a group of formations subtracted from the main body of the army, both in the course of 
general operations and in the conduct of battlefield manoeuvres. Without some degree of articulation the 
army deployed for battle cannot initiate movement other than as a single formation nor can it respond to a 
change in the tactical situation in subdivisions or adequately combine portions of the army to carry out 
operations away from the battlefield. The daily existence of an army demands articulation for distribution 
of rations and ammunition, rotation of sentry duties throughout the force and the detailing of training and 
work parties. 
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The extent of military obligation and of judicial power was peculiar to each barony. The latter is 
more surprising than the former since each barony will have had a different value and population, but 
there would seem to have been considerable variation in the nature of the jurisdiction of barony courts. 
Obviously their physical jurisdiction in terms of area varied one to the next, but they did not all have the 
same range of powers in relation to which crimes they might try and who they might try and what 
sentences the court could pass. Professor Duncan48 has demonstrated that the absence or presence of 
infangandthef and outgangenthef or of capital powers did not unite baronies as a class of landholding, 
nor does value of the property seem to have been a crucial factor; the peacetime valuations of Lothian 
baronies varied between £140 for Dirleton49 and £13 lIs 4d for Norton of Ratho,50 but a property of just 
4 V:z carucates in Ratho was valued at £1251 in the same year (1335-36). 
Barony, then, did not convey either judicial or military rights of itself, but those rights were among 
the range of easements that might be, and mostly were, attached to a barony. The range of easements, 
like the range of administrative power, was by no means universal, but broadly we might expect that 
they might include fishing, fowling and hunting rights, advowsons and the rather elusive 'free tenant 
services' and 'usual services', which were sometimes specifically included or excluded but usually not 
mentioned at all. 
Mostly the return to the king from the baron is not detailed but described as the 'due and customary 
services' of the barony. If the crown was going to be able to exploit the services of baronies there must 
have been a mechanism for recording the liabilities of each barony. There were over 30 baronies in 
Lothian alone in the early fourteenth century, so it would seem unlikely that their services were 
administered by an officer of the king's court. The quantity of documents involved would have been 
enormous and it seems unlikely that no trace of such a body of material has survived. It would in any 
case be much more likely that such records would be one of the many duties of the sheriff. As the 
48 RRS. v, pp. 41-43. 
19 CDS, iii, p. 336. 
50 CDS, iii, p. 378. 
51 CDS, iii, p. 329. 
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king's chief officer in the area, he would have responsibility for ensuring discharge of suit of court and 
military duties by the barons and free tenants of the sheriffdom, an impossible task vvithout registers of 
the services due. 
Barony tenures may have varied in detail one to the next, but one of the factors they shared was 
obviously tenants, men who held their property from the barony. The free tenants, largely rentiers, 
owed the baron service of varying natures and extents depending on their individual relationship but 
generally a package of obligations and responsibilities that included military service, suit of court, 
money and produce. To varying degrees this held true for all the tenants, but the degree of security of 
tenure and the nature of obligation depended on status. The free tenants of one barony need not have 
automatically enjoyed exactly the same rights and privileges as their counterparts in the neighbouring 
barony, but, like those holding in barony, elements of that status were likely to be broadly similar. 
EST ATES AND FARMS 
The 'land' or 'lands' in this barony and in that sheriffdom and held by this man from that did not farm 
themselves. The rents that the free tenant and the baron drew from the land were the product of 
labouring men, but they, like the barons and the free tenants, were not all equal in status or in the nature 
of their landholding. The smallest level of landholding of which we are aware is that of the cottars. It is 
not impossible that the status of the cottars varied, and not only according to the extent of their holding. 
A two acre cott was obviously less valuable than a six acre cott of similar quality, but the status of the 
person from whom the cott was held may have had a significance. A cottar holding directly from the 
king was, if only in a very technical sense, a tenant 'in capite', and though the holding was not officially 
heritable (as far as we know) one would wonder what motive the king would ever have for the removal 
of a tenant and it would not be surprising if such holdings effectively were inherited as long as there 
was a male heir to take up the lease. The cottar must have been in a more comfortable economic 
condition than the landless labourers, and it is surely more than likely that virtually all of them will 
have been included in Robert I's army legislation of 1318 as being men with goods in excess of the 
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value of a co,v, and thus liable to serve with bow or spear at need52. How regularly this liability was 
called upon is hard to judge, but probably only very infrequently since the majority of day-on-day 
military service seems to have been performed by men-at-arms. 
The incidence of cottar holdings may have been quite high in order to support the considerable 
numbers of people needed for regular day-labour on larger farms and estates and to supplement the 
efforts of landless day-labourers. Many of these cottar properties may have had their origin in villein 
holdings providing the upkeep for the labour on the lord's fields, but the apparent disappearance of 
servile status in Scotland by the middle of the fourteenth century suggests that it was economically 
advantageous for both lord and tenant to convert their relationship to a more commercial format. 
Evidently the cottars were an important part of the economy, otherwise they would have ceased to exist 
for the same reasons that drove the agricultural revolution of tlle eighteenth century. Small holdings 
tend toward lower productivity - though not necessarily lower production - than large fields. A far 
greater proportion of agricultural land was occupied by larger farms, many, probably the majority, with 
multiple tenants sharing arable and pasture. The practices of Scottish medieval agriculture cannot be 
examined in detail here, but we should assume diversity rather than uniformity perhaps even more in 
Lothian than other areas. 
One of the factors that distinguished the free tenants from the others lay in their relationship to the 
barony court. Both free tenant and sub-tenant might serve on the barony court; the free tenant was 
probably less subject to it but either could take their cases to the king's court if they felt that they had 
been denied justice. 53 The most important distinction however was that a free tenant held his or her 
property heritably, in 'fee and heritage'. As long as the 'fee' side of the equation was fulfilled properly 
the 'heritage' side was guaranteed. The fmancial burden on the tenant might or might not be substantial, 
but the services due to the superior could be extensive. Attendance at the barony court, military service 
and the obligation to help with the hunt would demand a lot of the tenant's time and if he held more 
52 RRS 41Ll 
.. ,v,p. .. 
), Nicholson, Middle Ages, p. 18. 
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than one property the demands could be very heavy indeed. A man with three such properties might 
have to discharge nine days court service, 120 days army service and a quantity of hunting days that 
cannot be ascertained, though presumably there were customary limits. If the properties were extensive 
the tenant could reduce his personal obligation through sub infeud ation, but if the properties were 
modest that might not be financially realistic and the alienation of property generally and of heritage 
property in particular save in the utmost necessity was contrary to the mores of the time. 
The bulk of property held by free tenants, barons and religious houses in Lothian was set to rent in 
the form of farms, burgages, tofts, orchards, gardens and cottar holdings. A burgage was more than 
simply a house in a burgh. The property could be extensive enough to include a garden which could 
grow enough to make a real contribution to the family economy and possession brought a share in such 
fields and grazing as belonged to the town. The term garden would seem to imply a different sort of 
property, possibly more akin to what we would think of as a market garden. Orchards we can 
reasonably assume to have been made for growing fruit, potentially in some quantity since we can see 
the monks of Coldingham seeking compensation for damage to their orchard which had previously 
generated 100 shillings a year in addition to the needs of the community. 54 What is less clear is the 
significance of tenure terms with a financial rationale, lib rates and marcates. Each term obviously 
derives from a relationship between time and money, that is to say a librate would be land that was 
worth £1 per annum and a marcate land worth 1 merk per annum, but at what point was the value 
assessed? Land for which the king received £1 a year could potentially be very extensive given the 
number of valuable properties held for 1d or 6d per annum. Land that generated £1 per annum in rent 
from the farmer to landlord would inevitably be considerably smaller than that. If the librate represented 
the amount of land adequate to generate £1 worth of produce per annum it would be smaller yet. 
54 CDS, ii. no. 733. 
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Discrete farms were generally held in multiple tenancies from the free tenant or baron on a 
notionally annual basis,55 though continuity of tenure was very probably more the rule than the 
exception since landlords anywhere are traditionally inclined toward stability. Perhaps more 
significantly there was very possibly56 already a decline in the population of West em Europe generally 
and there is no reason to assume that Scotland was not similarly affected; even before the sharp 
reduction occasioned by the Black Death in the late 1340s tenants may not have been too easy to come 
As we have seen in the case of the orchard of Coldingham priory, the properties of the religious 
houses were not insulated from the war. Although the centres of the foundations may have escaped the 
worst effects of passing armies, and though they might be able to get compensation for damage, the 
heads of the houses could hardly avoid acceptance of the more powerful party of the day. This must 
have been apparent to both English and Scottish kings, since ecclesiastical institutions seem never to 
have suffered for their acknowledgement of either party when a new administration took over. Both 
English and Scottish governments were happy to make use of the administrative capacities of religious 
foundations to achieve military aims. The abbot and convent of Jedburgh offered to match Ed.vard 1's 
investment of up to 500 marks per annum for five years to repair Jedburgh castle and provide a 
'sufficient bachelor' to command it.58 Local religious foundations were required by Edward III to fund 
improvements to the fortifications at Perth in the 1330s and the Priory of St Andrews was relieved of 
responsibility for collecting money to support the Scottish army during the siege of Loch Leven 
castle. 59 With a few very prominent exceptions; Bishops Lamberton, Wishart and Sinclair under Robert 
I and Sir William Bullock under Edward Balliol and then under the government of David II, few senior 
churchmen seem to have been very actively involved in warfare. This does not mean that the actions of 
55 For a reasoned appraisal of Scottish agricultural practice in the later middle ages see P. Dixon Puir 
Labourers and Busy Husbandmen (Edinburgh, 2003 j. 
56. Duncan, Scotland, p. 309. 
57 K. Jillings Scotland's Black Death (Stroud, 2002) p.46. 
58 This offer was, however, part of negotiations aimed at acquiring custody of the Forest of Jedburgh for the 
Abbev. TNA C47/22/2/36; C47/22/2/37. 
59 RRS, vi, p.63. 
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the heads of religious houses were without political significance. Like any other great landowner they 
would inevitably affect local opinion as well as reflect it. An approach to the new government, perhaps 
for a particular favour or the confirmation of charters, would be an act of recognition and acceptance of 
his lordship. That recognition would have an impact on the tenants of the house; if they wished to retain 
their tenancy they would be obliged, pro tern, to accept the validity of the new government since their 
tenure was dependent on that of their landlords. 
There is a great deal that we should like to know about fourteenth century landholdings in Lothian, 
not least some definition of various terms and their practical significance. King's tenants, bishop's 
tenants and sergeanties are all classes of land tenure that occur sufficiently often or prominently to 
indicate that they had specific meanings; presumably clearly understood by the holders of the tenancies 
and their landlord, whether crown or prelate. It would be very desirable to have a better understanding 
of the practice of agriculture, particularly the proportion of arable land devoted to wheat, barley, oats, 
rye and maslin,oo but also the incidence of other crops. There would seem to be no incidence at all in 
record of either legumes, brassica or root vegetables as field crops in the thirteenth or fourteenth 
century, but that should hardly be taken as evidence of their absence from the diets of the wealthy at 
least. We are aware that the priory of Coldingham had at least one orchard and that Adam de Melville 
forfeited his shares in a property called Orchardland.61 In all probability any orchards in Lothian would 
have been limited to the varieties of soft fruit that we would expect to find in Scotland today: apples, 
cherries, plums, brambles, raspberries and strawberries. The only surviving description of the produce 
of particular Lothian farms is from the group of estates in the Cramond area whose output is recorded in 
the returns of Edward III's administration in 1335-6 and 1336_7.62 Although they may well have been 
absolutely typical of Lothian farms it is by no means certain that they were. Apart from the obvious 
60 Maslin; a mixture of grains - wheat, oats, rye, barley - SO\;\ffi, reaped and milled together. A quantity of 
maslin (meslin) figured in an extent of King John's manor of Kemeston, Buckinghamshire in October 1298 
CDS, ii, 1024. The advantage of this practice is unclear, though it may have been a means of making use of 
old seed corn in the hope that some of it would ripen properly. Maslin was still being milled in the early 
19th century, see E.Gauldie The Scottish Country Miller (Edinburgh, 1999) p.31. 
61 CDS, iii, no. 337; INA, C47/22110/ll. 
62 CDS, iii, pp. 331,378 
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difficulty of assessing what exactly constituted a 'typical' farm, it seems very possible that the farms in 
question provided very carefully specified quantities of particular produce, wheat, barley, oats and hay, 
to fulfil a particular need in the crown income of the Lothian sheriffdom, such as the requirements of 
the garrison of the sheriff, and thus may have differed substantially in their output from neighbouring 
properties. What is clear is that in general Lothian property was profitable and therefore desirable. If 
we accept that agriculture in Lothian was probably not radically different from agriculture in Yorkshire, 
though perhaps (and even this is by no means certain) with a smaller proportion of the arable devoted to 
wheat, we should consider the opinion of Jean Ie Bel, who, resident in York for over a month in 1327, 
commented on the great 'abundance' of produce.63 There has perhaps been too great a tendency on the 
part of historians to concentrate on reports of famine, but then this may well be due to the chronicle 
accounts from which so much of our information is gleaned. Years of outstanding productivity might 
draw comment, but years of great shortages would probably loom larger in the minds of compilers.64 
Years of 'ordinary' productivity would hardly be worthy of comment at all.65 
For the majority of the political community the only significant source of income was agriculture. 
Farm tenants provided the rents that enabled landlords to equip themselves for war in order to fulfil 
military obligations, whether to the crown or to a feudal superior. The fierce protection of existing 
property rights -and the desire to acquire new ones- was not simply a matter of maintaining and 
increasing the personal wealth of the individual, but of preserving and/or improving the standing of the 
family unit. Without the resources that could only be reliably provided in the long term by agriculture, 
and without the social status conferred by lordship, a place in the political community would be very 
difficult to maintain. 
63 Chronique de Jean Le Bel, i, p.43. 
64 The general northern European famine of 1313-1317 was compounded for communities of northern 
England by the operations of Robert 1's armies. C. MacNamee, The Wars of the Bnlces, pp. 123-157 
examines these operations in great detail.. 
65 A. GrantIndependence and Nationhood, pp. 75-6. Conflict and the passage of armies looting and 
wilfully devastating was also a factor, as in Robert 1's 'herschip' of Buchan, Barbour, The Bruce, pp. 332-
5. Bower's assertion that 'the whole lands of Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns was reduced to almost 
irreparable devastation (Scotichronicon, vii, p.125) and the widespread destruction of southern and eastern 
Scotland in the l330s illustrated in the 'compoti' ofPlantagenet sheriffs in 1335-7 (CDS, iii, pp. 327-41) 
undoubtedly caused a shortage of produce and dearth ifnot famine. 
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CONCLUSIONS. 
The relationship between landholding, income, status and military obligation was, self-evidently, 
idiosyncratic. The size of an estate might not, indeed generally did not, have any relation to the extent 
of service and/or money due from landholder to superior. On the other hand, the nature of the service 
and of the tenure would, in general, have implications for the status of the landholder. Tenure with 
military obligations was more 'honourable' than tenure based simply on money rents. Military service, 
even as a man-at-arms, need not have been strictly dependent on landholding. Although we cannot be 
absolutely positive that the Napiers66 and others who appear in garrison payrolls and horse valuations 
were in fact members of burghal families it seems very much more likely than not. However men like 
the Napiers and Botelers67 were serving for wages and we cannot be certain that their status would have 
obliged them to give such service in normal 'peacetime' circumstances. Sir William Douglas of Lothian 
added recruits68 from the burgesses of Edinburgh to his following in 1341 when he captured the castle 
and appointed his half-brother, also William, as sheriff. Unless the burgesses could serve as men-at-
arms Sir William would not have had too much use for them given the nature of the fighting. 
Similarly we cannot be absolutely positive that all landholders had a military obligation attached to 
their tenure, though again, it seems probable that in practice they did. Certainly there is good cause to 
believe that the overwhehning majority of landholders did perform military service and mostly, if not 
universally, as men-at-arms. 
The enormous variation in the financial details of their tenure does not seem to have been a 
significant factor in their obligation compared to their social status and their ability to carry the burden. 
It would seem certain that the bulk of unpaid service as men-at-arms was provided by the rural political 
community, partly a matter of customary obligation, partly of financial capacity, partly perhaps of 
maintaining social status, but for the majority of men-at-arms these three conditions would have been a 
function of their position as landholders. This is not to say that these men were in some way separated 
66 CDS, iii, p. 361, no. 1323. 
6, Ibid, nos. 1412, 1390. 
6S Chron. Wyntoul1, v~ 195. 
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from those for whom military service was attractive as a means of increasing their income, furthering 
their ambitions or simply because they liked soldiering. There was no clear distinction between those 
discharging service because they had to and those serving in the hope of gaining property or ransoms 69 
or making a chivalrous reputation. The latter, with very few exceptions, were dravvn from the ranks of 
the former. Almost all of the operational activity of the Wars of Independence south of the Tay was 
conducted by men-at-arms discharging obligations attached directly to their landholding or to social 
status which was at least largely dependent on landholding. It is important to have some picture of the 
land they held, since that was what they were fighting to retain, either directly, in the sense of 
recovering their property from occupation, or indirectly in that failure to discharge service would be 
likely to result in forfeiture. 
The loss of land through forfeiture obviously deprived the landholder of his income. Those incomes 
were primarily derived from the rents of tenants. Since there was no consistent relationship between 
return owed to the crown and the actual rental income of the property to the landholder it is impossible 
to make any general statement about the wealth of landholders even where their return to the crown can 
be identified. Bernard de Rauden owed the service of one knight and 20s castleguard for his property in 
1316/177°, but his income from rentals was estimated at 853 shillings (£42 13sil at his defection to the 
Scots in 1356. A selection of Robert Lauder's forfeited properties was valued at £86 by an extent in 
1335_672 and the barony of Dirleton at £140 in the same year,73 but these are the existing nominal cash 
rents of tenants and take no account of produce or casualties or, in the case of the barony, profits of 
justice in the barony court. Knowledge of income is not of itself knowledge of wealth. The material 
may not exist to construct an adequate picture of the value of money in fourteenth century Lothian, and 
69 Capture and ransom was an occupational hazard. For an interesting record of how two English squires of 
the early fifteenth century viewed the prospect of falling prisoner see C.T. Allmand, Society and War 
(Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 32-4. 
70 RJo.JS, i, app i, 54, 55. 
71 M. Brown, ' The Development of Scottish Border Lordship', Historical research. LXXX. Febmary 
1997. 
72 CDS, iii, p.336. 
73 TNA, EIOl!331123 
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certainly not to give even a dim impression of the fmancialliabilities of landholders, but it would seem 
that Lothian properties were considered desirable enough that people took great risks to acquire, 
recover or retain them. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EDWARDIAN GARRISONS IN LOTHIAN, 1296-1341. 
An examination of the nature, incidence and effectiveness of men-at-arms serving in the cause of John 
Balliol, Robert I and David II must, for practical reasons, include an examination of the practices of the 
forces committed by Edward I, II and III to their Scottish projects. The operational policies of the Scots 
were, naturally enough, a product of the nature of the resources available and the prevailing military 
traditions. They were also - inevitably - conditioned by the response of the English. Had Edward I and 
Edward II adopted a policy that was essentially ethnocentric I they might well have dispensed with 
garrisons and concentrated on controlling the means by which the structures of Scottish society were 
supported. The deployment of an infantry-based army with a remit to starve the population into 
submission through confiscating or killing livestock, trampling crops in the field and burning produce 
in barns,2 would have required the Scots to adopt a very different approach. It should not be assumed 
that the policies of Edward II and Edward III were identical to those of Edward I, though initially at 
least the desired outcomes were broadly similar. Edward I and Edward II hoped to bring Scotland under 
their direct rule on a permanent basis. Edward III hoped to acquire permanent possession of the 
southern counties - including Lothian - and he was certainly prepared to accept Edward Balliol as a 
sub-king, but by the later 1330s he may have seen his Scottish campaigns as a means of preventing the 
Scots from becoming a more serious impediment to the conquest of France. Edward III's failure to even 
attempt to prevent the fall of major fortresses in Scotland - Edinburgh in 1341, Roxburgh and Stirling 
1 In the sense of replacing the existing Scottish political community with Englishmen. David de Strathbogie 
appears to have adopted such a policy, removing free tenants who resisted the Balliol cause. 
Scotichronicon, viii, p.l 07. 
: Robert 1's 'herschip' of Buchan is an example of just such a policy. 
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in 1342 -strongly suggests that he was not completely committed to maintaining an administration north 
of the River Tweed. 
This chapter is divided into two sections to reflect the rather different conditions of 1296-1314 and 
those of 1332-134l. During the period 1314 -1332 the only operationally significant military event was 
Edward II's march into Lothian in 1322 and the scorched earth policy that was applied against it. 
Robert I did not maintain garrisons in the sheriffdom and the major campaigns of the period were 
conducted in the north of England. Obviously some of Robert's troops were raised in Lothian, and some 
proportion of his armies passed through the sheriffdom on the march into England, but there is no 
indication to suggest that extensive operations were conducted between the Dunglas burn and the River 
Avon. 
PART 1, KING JOHN TO ROBERT 1. 
The function of garrisons would not be achieved adequately simply by stationing men in centres of 
power in the fourteenth century any more than at any other point in history. In order to retain secure 
possession the new administration must demonstrate not only the ability to retain control of specific 
locations within the territory but the ability to prevent incursions and insurrections on the part of any 
resisting power that remains after conquest. This was not simply a military consideration for Edward 1's 
government in 1296. If the new administration were to make itself generally acceptable to the 
population it would have to be able to impose or maintain the wider functions of government 
throughout the territory as a whole. In addition to suppressing armed opposition to the government the 
normal conditions for stable administration need to function adequately and consistently if the 
occupation is to be successful in the long term. There can be little doubt that both Edward I and Edward 
II had every intention of adding the entirety of Scotland to their realms on a permanent basis, and to that 
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end the provision of garrisons, initially on a fairly modest scale,3 ,vas part of their general war policy 
throughout the period 1296-1314. 
The military function of the garrisons is fairly self-evident. The force committed was responsible 
for preventing armed opposition from gaining momentum throughout the region, in this case Lothian, 
and in particular to prevent such opposition from gaining control of the tov.TIS and castles of the 
sheriffdom. This was not simply a matter of ensuring that the castles had a complement of troops 
adequate to defend the castles and tov.ns themselves but to maintain a visible presence of armed 
strength throughout the sheriffdom sufficient to deter resistance. In this, the garrisons were rather more 
successful than might seem, superficially, to be the case given that all of the towns and strongpoints did 
fall to Robert I by the summer of 1314. It is worth bearing in mind that the major centres of power (at 
least) were taken through the intervention of elements from outwith the area or fell to the Scots after the 
battle of Bannockburn when it became obvious that Edward II was not in a position to enforce his rule 
through military effort. This is not to say that the garrisons were completely successful at all times in 
preventing the Scots, whether under the Guardians or under King Robert, from conducting operations in 
or around Lothian, but they were successful in preventing consistent Scottish military activity. Nor is it 
the case that the garrisons could always be considered secure as installations. According to Walter of 
Guisborough, in 1298 Edward I was obliged to commit a force4 under Anthony Bek, Bishop of Durham 
to capture castles in East Lothian, Dirleton and two others, possibly Yester and Hailes. 
It would seem very unlikely that any of these castles had remained in Scottish hands in the period 
after the battle of Dunb ar in 1296. Yester had been put under the command of Peter de Dunwych and its 
provisioning and 'arming' had been the responsibility of Henry de Greneford in 1296.5 It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that they had fallen to the Scots at some point in the intervening period, though 
whether they had been taken by the Scots, been abandoned or been turned over to the Scots through the 
defection of the ov.ners is not clear. That the Scots were able to enter Lothian is demonstrated by the 
3 CDS, ii, 1323 
4 Watson, Hammer, p.63 
5 Rot Scot., i, p.31 
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fact that Wallace was able to issue documents from Haddington,6 but it would seem that he could not 
maintain a sufficient presence to form an alternative administration, or at least he does not seem to have 
appointed a sheriff of Lothian in competition with the Edwardian government. As far as we are aware 
Wallace was unable to threaten either Edinburgh or Linlithgow. The former was protected by a major 
castle. If Wallace were to lay siege to it and not succeed his prestige as a military leader would be 
compromised and his political power rested primarily on his martial reputation, but Linlithgow had not 
yet been developed into a major stronghold. Since it was obviously more exposed to Scottish threats we 
might wonder why Wallace chose to make an incursion so deep into the territory under occupation as 
Haddington. Although we know that Edward I made a considerable investment at Linlithgow we cannot 
be sure that the existing manor would have been a straightfonvard proposition for Wallace's forces. 
We cannot totally discount the possibility that Haddington was the only centre of royal government 
in Lothian that Wallace could attempt to seize with any great degree of confidence, but the political 
significance was very probably more important. The effect on English garrisons of seeing the enemy 
conduct operations on their own lines of communication would hardly be good for morale, but the 
arrival of a substantial Balliol force in the very heart of East Lothian must have been a cause for some 
concern to those who had aligned themselves with the Plantagenet administration. If Edward's 
government was not going to be able consistently to afford them peace and stability what incentive was 
there for supporting that government? Wallace presumably had no intention of making an immediate 
attempt to dislodge the Edwardian administration, but it would have been clear to anyone that as long as 
he could mount an operation to capture Haddington - however briefly - very few places were beyond 
his reach. 
It has been observed' that when Wallace offered battle to Edward I he chose to do so on the very 
borders of Lothian, at Falkirk, and this might be seen as an indication that the garrisons were not equal 
to the task of preventing Scottish military activity. The required scale of intervention would have been 
6 Documents Illustrative of Sir William Wallace, his L!fe and Times (Maitland Club, 1839). no. Xy, 
-; G,W,S. Barrow 'Lothian in the First War of Independence' S.H.R. LV (1976), pp. 151-71. 
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beyond both the remit and capacity of garrison forces as well as being outwith - if only just- the area 
for which they were responsible. When Wallace deployed at Falkirk he had command of a major field 
army, one concentrated for the specific purpose of fighting a large engagement with the main force of 
the enemy. Even if all the garrison troops of Lothian had been brought together they would hardly have 
been equal to the task of defeating Wallace's force, and such a concentration would have compromised 
the function for which the garrisons had been deployed in the first place. If the castles were denuded of 
troops how were they to be kept secure against the enemy and how was the business of government to 
be conducted? Providing a secure environment for Edwardian government was, after all, the chief 
function of the garrisons. Without them the practical elements of administration would have been 
impossible to carry out should the community of Lothian offer even minor resistance to Edwardian 
authority. Most communities at any time would be quite content to avoid rents and taxes of course, but 
failure to maintain law and order must inevitably have a negative impact on the credibility of the 
administration and therefore on the ability of that government to impose its will on the community. 
With the possible exception of 1296-78 the English administration of Edward I and Edward II does 
not seem to have imposed heavier burdens on the community than the due and accustomed practice 
under Alexander III or King John. Nor, generally, do they seem to have had any particular difficulty in 
collecting the issues of the county or maintaining civil order during the first few months of the 
occupation. The difficult circumstances of 1297-l304 and l306-14 meant that a far greater military 
presence was required than had been the case under Alexander III. The small numbers of ,vhat appear to 
be knights in receipt of cash allowances and the fees authorised to constables of castles9 during Edward 
1's administration in 1291-2 would hardly have been sufficient to provide a large force. The initial level 
of success may have been more apparent than real. Even in Berwickshire, where the local populace 
must have been all too aware of the extreme violence of Edward's sack of the town in March 1296.10 it 
8 Watson, Hammer, p.37. 
9 Stevenson Documents i, p.253-6. 
10 M.Prestwich. Edward I (London, 1998). 
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,vas proving impossible to collect the issues of the county by the summer of 1297.11 The level of 
military presence maintained by Alexander III and King John cannot be accurately assessed from the 
surviving documentary record, but that does not mean that there was no military presence at all. In 
1291-92 payments were made to the commanders of several Scottish royal castles from the Scottish 
exchequer under the authority of Edward I, to whom these castles had been entrusted pending the 
resolution of the succession dispute that arose on account of the death of Margaret, Maid of Norway, 
the heir of Alexander III. The castellan of Edinburgh castle, Sir Ralph Bisset received the considerable 
sum of one merk per day (13s 4d).12 Given that the 'field service' rate of pay for a senior knight with a 
leadership responsibility (a banneret) was 4s a day in English armies it would seem unreasonable to 
assume that Sir Ralph's 13s 4d a day was intended simply as salary, but rather more likely that he was 
obliged to supply a retinue, however small, to support him in his duties and provide security for the 
castle. It is of course possible that such an arrangement was a novelty in Scottish affairs and that it was 
an innovation of Edward I, but Edward does not seem to have been in the way of reorganising any 
aspect of government practice in Scotland. In fact he was committed, at least in theory, to the continuity 
of existing administrative practice under the terms of his agreement with the Scottish political 
. 13 
communlty. 
A small retinue was presumably considered an adequate complement in peacetime since a force of 
10 men-at-arms (plus 3 for his lands in Scotland) was considered sufficient for Sir John Kingeston's 
retinue in August 1302.14 If, in addition to that one merk per day, the commander of Edinburgh castle 
had the benefit of castleguard income from Edinburgh and Haddington (there was no royal castle at 
Haddington) there would probably have been adequate funding available to the commander for both his 
retinue and the normal upkeep of the castle itself, though significant improvements to the fabric of the 
11 CDS, v, p.175. 
12 Stevenson, Documents, i, pp. 240,260,274. 
13 Stevenson, Documents, i, p.162. Edward I was not alone in expressing support for continuity of practice. 
In July 1347 Sir John de Strive lin, former sheriff of Edinburgh, sought possession of the 'town' ofKellawe 
'according to the laws and customs of Scotland' C1nqu. Misc. ii, 2028. 
14 CDS, ii, 13 21. 
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castle would very probably require additional funding from the king. This was certainly the case under 
David II, whose exchequer supplied funds for various military stores for the castle. 15 
Strong garrisons might not prevent Scottish operations in Lothian, but they would certainly have 
seemed to have reduced such operations to a minimum. In the sense that keeping the war out of Lothian 
allowed the people to get on with their daily business in relative peace, the garrisons at Edinburgh and 
Linlithgow (and possibly at other locations such as Dirletonl6) may have helped to make the presence of 
Edwardian government more acceptable to the community and even if it did not do so, there was really 
very little the community could do to change the situation without taking the risks of forfeiture 
attendant on armed resistance. Even if such resistance was undertaken, there was no guarantee that it 
would be successful in the long term. Local military activity might reduce the ability of the garrison to 
carry out the functions of government, might even eject the garrisons from the towns and castles, but 
would be very unlikely indeed to repel the advance of a well-found field army intent on restoring the 
situation, which would undoubtedly be the response of King Edward to a 'revolt' that successfully 
dislodged his administration. Perhaps just as significantly, the ejection of the garrisons would not of 
itself be a source of stability, let alone bring about better government unless there was an alternative 
source of lordship ready to take the place of Edward's administration and, just as importantly, capable 
of preventing its return. 
The garrison establishment of thirteen men-at-arms under Sir John de Kingestone authorised in 
September 1302 seems to conflict with another ordinance of 1301-217 which had authorised a force of 
thirty men-at-arms plus officers. It is possible that this is a comparison of two different establishments: 
15 ER, i, p. 497. 
16 In 1300 there was a Plantagenet garrison of twenty men-at-arms at Dirleton, receivillg supplies illcludillg 
dried fish, oats, salt and beans (TNA,ElO1I531n) and William de Rue was described as the 'provider' for 
Edillburgh and Durleton castles ill October 1300, receivillg £40 to replenish them CDS, ii, no. 114l. 
However a record of garrisons from 1302 bearing the seal of Sir John de Kingston makes no mention of a 
garrison there TNA,EIOIIl0/5. It would seem that there was no (official) Plantagenet garrison at Dirleton 
under Edward II either, sillce it does not appear on the various reports, wage records or store requisitions of 
his reign, see for example TNA,E10l117/29. It seems reasonable to conclude that the castle was considered 
to be securely held ill the Plantagenet sympathy. A report relatillg to garrisons ill the southeast dated 1302 
does not refer to a garrison at Dirleton, possibly an indication that the admirristration felt it could rely on 
the resources of the baron to mailltaill the security of the castle, TNA, E 10111 0/5. 
17 CDS, ii, no. 1321. 
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the force of ten men-at-arms being a 'unit' dedicated to the security of Edinburgh castle and the force of 
thirty representing the requirements of the sheriffdom as a whole. Records of the garrisons in Scotland 
compiled in September 1302 indicate that there were 386 men-at-arms serving for wages and a further 
seventy-three serving for lands granted to them in Scotland. The report includes forty-one men-at-arms 
and a further forty infantrymen (half of them crossbowmen) in Sir John de Kingestone's garrison at 
Edinburgh. 18 The wording of tlle document is ambiguous but it seems to indicate that the garrisons were 
collectively about ninety men-at-arms short of the theoretical establishment: fifty who should have been 
serving for their lands and another forty who should have been in the retinue of Sir John de St. John. 
The indentures19 of the various garrison commanders give slightly different figures to the report, 
indicating that of 508 men 113 were serving for their lands in Scotland and 395 \vere receiving wages; 
very few had Scottish names .. :'.O Those men serving for lands are specifically described as having been 
granted lands in Scotland by the king, presumably lands that had been forfeited by others. The military 
obligations attendant on the land were in all probability identical to those due from the previous ovmer. 
Since these grants had been made in recent time - they can hardly have been made before the spring of 
1296 - it seems remarkable that as many as fifty men who had received grants of land in Scotland for 
military service should fail to discharge their obligations in 1302. 
The fact that the garrison of Edinburgh castle would appear to have been at three different sizes of 
complement authorised in a period of only two months may be a product of misdated documents or 
administrative confusion caused by the arrival or departure of contingents of men, equally it could be 
the product of a rapidly-changing military situation. The most likely explanation surely lies in the 
difference between what was considered adequate in the light of the practices of Scottish kings before 
1296 and the realities ofthe prevailing conditions of 1302. 
18. The crossbow was an important weapon in the medieval arsenal, though in British history it tends to be 
overshadowed by the longbow, see Keen, M., Medieval U--aifare, a History (Oxford, 2000), p. 204. 
19 Names are not a good guide to nationality, and nationality was not a good guide to allegiance and 
service. When Sir Robert Clifford undertook to serve at Lochmaben with 30 covered horses, he was not 
required to exclude Scots, only that the contract would be cancelled ifhis company should fall below thirty 
men-at-arms. TNA C47 /22/2/51. Stevenson, Documen ts, ii, pp. 407 -8. 
20 CDS ii, no. 1324. 
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This does not necessarily mean that the garrisons were intended simply as a means of retaining 
control of the sheriffdom or even of keeping the war out of the area, although these were surely 
important considerations. Strong 'depot' forces at Edinburgh and Linlithgow could provide temporary 
reinforcements for other establishments when required, but they could, in theory at least, also provide or 
contribute to mobile formations carrying the war to the Scots in other areas without compromising the 
security of local deployments and assets. Thus the complement of the Edinburgh garrison over and 
above the ten men-at-arms assigned to Sir John (plus the three from his own resources) may in fact have 
been accounted at Edinburgh for administrative reasons only, their task being the support of Edward's 
government in a rather wider sense than the defence of the castle and county. 
The eventual collapse of the Edwardian administration in Lothian is not proof-positive that the 
garrison policy itself was an outright failure. The field successes of the Bruce party were not a product 
of incapacity or incompetence on the part of the garrisons so much as the product of an inability on the 
part of central government consistently to obstruct the development of an alternative source of lordship 
powerful enough to contest the authority of English kingship. Superficially it might seem that the 
Lothian garrisons were in fact reasonably successful throughout the period from 1296 until the fall of 
Linlithgow peel in March 1314 with the exception of the apparent fall of Dirleton and two other castles 
to the Scots at some point between 1296 and 1298. The Bruce party may have been able to extort 
money and truces from Lothian in 1311-l2, but apparently could not extend their rule into the 
sheriffdom. On the other hand it would seem that the operational capacity of the Scots was identified as 
a real threat in 1304-5 when the Hospitallers were guaranteed entry to Linlithgow peel in the event of 
their preceptory at Torphichen being attacked.21 The possession of castles does not of itself necessarily 
imply the control of the surrounding countryside; although Edinburgh fell to the Scots in the spring of 
1314 through the efforts of a force from outwith the area under the Earl of Moray, the garrison was 
evidently not able to prevent the deployment of a Scottish force strong enough to institute a siege. Nor 
would it seem that the Edwardian administration was able to raise much in the way of issues from the 
21 CDS, ii, no, 1733 
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sheriffdom, or at least not enough to be able to forward a balance (after local expenses) to contribute to 
Edward 1's exchequer. Nonetheless the garrisons were strong enough to deny effective possession of 
Lothian to the Bruce party. 22 
Paid service in Lothian garrisons, and no doubt, throughout Scotland generally, seems to have been 
a 'career choice' rather than a function of the 'normal' military responsibility associated 'with land 
tenure. The majority of the men whose service is dated seem to have been in more or less continuous 
service the whole year round - the Edinburgh garrison account for 1312 is a particularly clear example 
- for fixed rates of pay. There are references to men-at-arms serving 'for their lands' (see above), but 
this provided only a small proportion of the manpower needed to staff the establislullents. 23 
Additionally, most of the men serving in that category were serving 'for their lands in Scotland granted 
by the king'. The implication is that these were lands granted by Edward lor Edward II in the hope that 
these grants would become permanent through eventual success in war against the Scots, and while 
some of the recipients of these grants were very possibly Scots, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
the majority were Englishmen trying to further their careers. This assumption is reinforced by the 
incidence of senior figures (such as Sir John de Kingestone, see above) in the English administration 
supplying men for their garrisons or retinues over and above the troops receiving the king's wages; the 
implication being that these men had received lands through subinfeudation in order that their superiors 
could fulfil the army service commitments attendant on their Scottish titles. Presumably those tenants 
who had remained in Edward's peace retained their property and continued to be liable for the 
appropriate military service. No doubt the officers of Edward's Scottish administration who were the 
main beneficiaries, Robert Hastangs, John de St. John, Robert Clifford and others, made a point of 
demanding the service of their new tenants in order to fulfil their own military obligations to the king.24 
22 Barbour, The En/ce. p.36:. 
23 CDS, ii, no. 1324. 
24 CDS, ii, no. 1324. Scottish lords in Ed\vard's peace could expect his support as well, Sir John de St. John 
was specifically ordered no to interfere with the Earl of Dunbar's treatment of any of his tenants adhering 
to the Scots. INA C47/22/3/24. 
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We can reasonably assume that that obligation was quite carefully defined. Although we can be sure 
that the autumn of 1302 was hardly 'peacetime', nor was it a period of deep crisis for the Edwardian 
administration, so it would be rash to assume that Edward's troop demands were either unrealistic or 
exceptionally heavy. It is perfectly possible that a force of 100 or more men-at-arms could be raised 
from landholder obligations in Lothian alone, a suggestion that is supported by the high incidence of 
man-at-arms service among those who appear in English records. Men serving 'for their lands' were 
not, it seems, generally recorded by name in central government documents relating to garrisons, 
though obviously their discharge of service was recorded in some way. If the men who owed that 
service were rotated on the basis of forty days of duty - or even perhaps fractions of forty days in the 
case of those owing fractional knight service - it would be an unnecessary inconvenience to maintain a 
nominal register of men serving for land at any given moment. The sheriff or constable would need to 
keep a register of who had or had not discharged their obligation - if only in order to identify and deal 
with defaulters- but the king's lieutenants would only need to know that the service was being 
performed. In a sense the modem observer is in the same position: we may not know the names of the 
individuals or the properties for which they served, but we can identify that service being performed. 
Making grants of land as a reward for service past or an incentive to serve in the future was 
obviously an attractive option to Edward since it encouraged serious commitment to the future of his 
administration in Scotland. It did, of course, depend on the availability of land to be granted. Although 
Scots could be, and were, forfeited for adherence to the Balliol cause (and of course the Bruce cause 
after 1306) forfeiture was something of a last resort, since it would discourage defections among the 
Scottish nobility. Further, should forfeited men join or return to Edward's peace, any of their lands that 
had already been granted to Edward's supporters might have to be restored to the defector, in which 
case the recipient of the grant would have to be compensated by a grant of land elsewhere or ,vith a 
cash allowance. Although a regular source of income would be attractive, there was more status 
attached to land than to a pension, and in. any case; a pension might be stopped in times of royal 
financial embaJrassment. 
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Documentary examples of grants ofland in Scotland to Edwardian soldiers are few and far between, 
no doubt because the military successes of the Scots eventually rendered them worthless, but since as 
many as seventy-three men were serving for land grants in September 1302,25 it is obvious that such 
grants were being made. It may be the case that grants were made for the service of archers or other 
troop-types - Kilsyth was granted for the service of archers,26 possibly an unusual but traditional 
arrangement since it was continued by Robert 1- but the primary concern seems to have been to increase 
the heavy cavalry element of Edward's forces. Certainly all of the seventy-three men referred to above 
were serving in that capacity. The men in question were obviously the recipients of lands forfeited by 
Balliol supporters or of crown property, but the significance is not so much who the men were or where 
their properties lay; this information does not seem to have been required in garrison reports. 
Regardless of who held the land the burdens that were attached to it still had to be discharged, and it 
\vould seem that in 1302 the administration was able to take advantage of at least some portion of the 
service due from Lothian lands. 
Men serving as heavy cavalry - as opposed to other fornls of mounted service (hobelars and 
mounted archers) - are described in a variety of terms. It may be the case that each of these terms bore 
a precise meaning to fourteenth-century administrators that is not clear to modern observers, but to all 
practical intents and purposes the military functions do not seem to have differed substantially if at all. 
Any heavy cavalry soldier would be covered by the term 'man-at-arms', whether banneret, knight, 
esquire, scutifer or 'socius', but the rates of pay differed substantially. A banneret would usually be 
entitled to 4s/day, a knight 2s/day and an 'ordinary' man-at-arms, whether described as such or as 
socius, esquire or scutifer Is/day, more usually recorded as I2d/day.27 The banneret would generally 
have had a command function as the leader of a portion of the cavalry force, not specifically limited to 
the members of his o\vn retinue. Knighthood may have implied a similar form of responsibility, but it 
would be rash to assume that these command functions were always the basis for his higher wages. To 
25 CDS, ii, no. 1324. 
26 Ibid .. no. 1457. 
27 Ayton, Knights, p.102. 
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some degree at least the better rate of pay is likely to be a reflection of social status. The knight's 
prestige demanded better conditions of service, a principle that was applied even to the maintenance 
allowances of prisoners of war. 28 
The overvvhehning majority of garrison men-at-arms were in the king's pay, receiving 12d a day as 
men-at-arms, esquires or scutifers or two shillings a day if they were knights. Whether or not those 
serving for lands got paid is not clear from the source material, however it is clear that service for land 
became less common than service for wages throughout the Scottish wars of the three Edwards, as it did 
in their other conflicts, since the incidence of men recorded as 'serving for their lands in Scotland' 
would seem to have disappeared entirely by the time Edward II came to the throne. This may, of course 
be a reflection of the inability of the administration to retain territory. The success of Robert I, and 
indeed the guardians in the period 1296-1303, in ousting the Edwardian administration would obviously 
have compromised the tenure of men who had been granted Scottish estates in locations no longer 
under English control and of course would reduce the vvillingness of men to serve for grants of lands 
which were still in that control but that might fall to the Scots at any time. Perceptions of security 
would naturally vary according to the wider political and military situation. Men granted land in 
Lothian by Edward I might have felt quite secure after the settlement of 1304; they had probably felt 
less so in the days after the fight at Roslin. Arguably men like Robert Hastang and John de Strivelin, 
respectively recipients of grants predominantly in Lothian from Edward I and Edward II before 1312 
and from Edward III before Culblean might have felt more secure in their acquisitions, but both men 
took the precaution of obtaining a guarantee of compensation if their properties fell to the Scots, surely 
an indication that their confidence in the ability of the Plantagenet govermnent permanently to secure 
Lothian, let alone Scotland as a whole, was less than complete. 
It would seem probable that the Edinburgh castle garrison included a number of retinues, all of 
them rather small, as well as a number of men enlisted individually, hence the differentiation between, 
for example, Thomas de Morham, recorded as serv'ing with two esquires and Pierre de Lubaud, 
28 CDS, iii, nos. 1394,1794. 
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recorded as an individually enlisted man-at-arms. This may indicate a distinction betw'een men provided 
by a lord as a feudal obligation and those enlisting for ,vages, but the distinction, if it existed, was not a 
permanent social condition. There were very real career opportunities for professional soldiers due to a 
seemingly endless demand for men-at-arms, so a man who served for a given period for his lands might 
\vell have the option of serving for longer periods in addition to that obligation for the sake of the wages 
available. Army service potentially offered more than just daily wages; a successful soldier like Pierre 
de Lubaud could rise in status from an enlisted soldier for 12d/da/9 to the rank of sergeant-at-arms30 
and eventually knighthood and appointment as a sherife l Once promoted, Lubaud provided a retinue 
of his own, either as a product of landholding or as a commercial supplier of troops. The latter would 
involve entering into a contractual arrangement - an indenture - whereby, for a given sum of money, he 
would provide a specified number of soldiers for a defined period. In 1312 Lubaud commanded 30 
men-at-arms in the Livingston garrison,32 six of whom he retained personally and at least thirteen of 
whom were Scots. Unusually, the muster roll for that garrison seems to differentiate between men-at-
arms and scutifers; the men retained by Lubaud are listed as men-at-arms, the others as scutifers. The 
significance of this, if any, is unclear. All of the men were paid at the usual man-at-arms rate of 1 s/day, 
an indication that they were not serving for their lands and, incidentally, of the quality of their 
equipment. The full12d a day wage for a man-at-arms was dependent, not only on having arms, armour 
and a suitable horse, but on having appropriate armour for the horse.33 Given the general trend of the 
war by 1312 thirty men-at-arms might seem to be a slender garrison, though it should be borne in mind 
that Livingston was within easy reach of the far larger establishment at Linlithgow and that although 
Robert I was unquestionably in the ascendant militarily he had yet to seriously challenge the Edwardian 
administration in Lothian or Stirling. It would seem possible that Lubaud was not able to maintain the 
strength of the garrison since the sum expended on \vages - £439 12s - fell considerably short of the 
29 CDS. ii, no. 1132. 
30 CDS, v, no. 305. 
31 CDS, ii, no. 159. 
32 CDS, iii, pp. 408-1l. 
33 Ayton, Knights, p. 89 n. 31. 
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£517 that would have been required to pay 30 men 12d each for the entire pay term of 346 days,34 
though of course to some extent the disparity is likely to have been a product of men going on leave. 
The indenture system had obvious administrative advantages for the king. The financial mechanism 
of making one payment to cover the wages of several men reduced book-keeping, but the transfer of 
recruiting responsibilities to the contractor ,vas perhaps just as significant. Although the system ,vas 
initially focused on men-at-arms the principle was eventually extended to hobelars and infantrymen, 
presumably because it was seen as a successful means of raising and retaining men for army service. 
Local recruitment was certainly taking place for archers, crossbowmen and hobelars before 1312; how 
successful it vms is difficult to gauge. There are many clear examples of Scots serving as infantry as 
well as cavalry, indeed we can sometimes see that the majority of a particular garrison might be Scots. 
In the case of Livingston peel we might even reasonably assume that the entire complement were Scots, 
but the high incidence of surnames common in both England and Scotland means that identification of 
nationality by surname alone would be of questionable validity. 
The few garrison infantry soldiers serving in Edinburgh garrison in 1312 who can be readily 
identified as Scots - six out of twenty-four crossbmvmen and ten out of twenty-seven archers who had 
served a full year, would seem to have been recruited from the immediate vicinity. Robert de Vallibus 
(de Vaux), Walter del Inche (presumably the 'Inch' area of Gilmerton), Johanis de Nodref (Niddry), 
William de Redehale (Redhall) and Walter de Pentland among the crossbovvmen, and Serlonis de 
Edenburghe (Edinburgh), Johannis de Lithcu (Linlithgow), Hugo de Blacknesse (Blackness), Thomas 
de Craumont (Cramond) and Adam de Prestone (Preston), all bore names with strong Lothian 
connections and other members of the group might very well have been local men. It would seem, then 
that some proportion of the troop requirements of the administration in Scotland could be raised in 
Scotland, a minimum of sixteen men out of a particular group of fifty-one members of the Edinburgh 
garrison in this instance and at least thirteen out of twenty archers in the Livingston peel garrison of the 
34 The discrepancy is equivalent to 1,552 paid days. 
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same year. On the other hand it would seem that only three out of the forty-five crossbowmen in the 
Linlithgow garrison were Scots and possibly as few as thirteen out of eighty-five men-at-arms. 
Local recruitment was certainly significant, but would hardly seem to have been dominant in the 
composition of the most important garrisons. However it is important to bear in mind that military 
service was not necessarily recorded. Men serving for land would not normally be paid, nor would they 
have their horses appraised for the 'restauro' roll. Such men might serve in large numbers without 
leaving any trace in surviving records. The muster rolls from 1312 are not after all descriptions of the 
full complement of the garrison, merely a record of those receiving pay for their services. If the 
Edwardian administration of Lothian was able to make landholders discharge their obligations the 
amount of unrecorded man-at-arms service might be very considerable. In addition it is quite possible 
that some landholders might have chosen to perform castleguard services instead of paying money to 
avoid them. Although the money saved would not be genuinely concomitant with the time committed, it 
,vould still be money saved and an additional man-at-arms would very likely be more w·elcome to the 
sheriff or constable than the insignificant amount of money lost. 
Assuming that Sir John de Kingestone's fee as constable of the castle excluded him from the garrison 
,vage bill, and that the remaining knights and men-at-arms and the archers and crossbowmen were in 
receipt of the usual pay rates of Edwardian garrison troops (2s/day for knights, 1 s/day for men-at-arms, 
4d/day for crossbowmen35 and 3d/day for archers) the daily total would come to £7 16s. The garrison 
also included a considerable number of non-combatants, amounting to 202 out of a total of 347,36 so the 
real daily expenditure on garrison wages was obviously a much larger sum. Some deductions about the 
function of the garrison may be made from a consideration of its membership. It is clear from a 
comparison w·ith wages of other garrisons and with field armies that the archers and crossbov,'lllen of 
the garrison of 1300 were not expected to maintain horses. Archers ,vould of course fight on foot, but 
35 Naturally this is a 'basic' rate of pay. In TNA,E10 1112/28 the crossbowmen of Linlithgow garrison 
appearto have consisted o[t\vo groups, one of twenty and one of nineteen. Two of the names are marked 
'officiarii', indicating an administrative or leadership role ",cithin each group and a better rate of pay 
accordingly. This is also clear evidence of a system of articulation. 
36 CDS, ii, p.289. 
154 
the mounted archer ,vould seem to have enjoyed the same rate of pay, 6d/day, as the hobelar, a light 
cavalry soldier. It should not be assumed that the archers and crossbo"'llen never took part in 
operations outwith the castle, but it is fair to assume that their primary role was defensive. The fact that 
the largest combatant group within the garrison was the men-at-arms and the careful detailing of the 
availability of suitable horses shows that mobility of force was seen as an important factor in the design 
of the garrison complement. Mobility was obviously of limited value for those manning the walls of the 
castle so we can conclude that the men-at-arms were stationed at Edinburgh with a vie,,, to conducting 
operations throughout the sheriffdom; otherwise they would be an unnecessarily expensive contribution 
to the complement. That expense was not simply a matter of higher wages. The non-combatant element 
of the garrison included large numbers of grooms and the logistical effort required to maintain horses 
for the men-at-arms, and one should bear in mind that the number of horses required to keep the man-
at-arms force would generally greatly exceed the number of men37 and would obviously call for a 
considerable expenditure on large quantities of hay and hard feed?8 In theory the garrison could forage 
for fodder,39 however, the animosity that the requisition of produce would encourage in the community 
would hardly be a means of endearing the administration to the populace. In any case the demand for 
fodder might well be greater than the capacity of the community to provide feedstuffs. The complaint 
made by Patrick, Earl of Dunbar and Sir Adam Gordon to Edward II (l3 l1x13 13)40 to the effect that the 
Berwick garrison was undermining their lordship by appropriating the goods of their tenants is a neat 
example of this sort of problem. 
Since Edward I was prepared to support an expensive force of men-at-arms in Edinburgh it seems 
reasonable to assume that he meant them to make a useful contribution to his policies, and since 
37 Ayton, Knights, p.102 
38 CDS, ii, no. 1446. 
39 Forage and fodder are terms frequently confused; to forage is to search for and requisition supplies which 
might or might not include feedstuffs for horses or oxen. Fodder is specifically animal feedstuffs, whether 
hay or hardfeed. The modern term 'forage merchant' is peculiar to the horse-racing and livery stable 
industries. 
40 CDS, iii, no. 337; TNA, C47/221l01l1. 
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Ed,Yard had a considerable experience of imposing his lordship in newly-conquered territories,.:!1 \ve 
might further assume that he was confident that that contribution ,yould bear results. The possession of 
castles ,vould not have been sufficient to enforce Edward's government if the sheriff of the county 
could not deploy sufficient force to discourage disorder, and while ten or thirty men-at-arms42 was 
hardly likely to constitute an adequate counter to incursions by a Scottish army, it would surely have 
been more than a match for any local opposition. This is not to say that the garrison men-at arms were 
deployed to perform 'policing' duties as a general rule. There seems no good reason to assume that the 
'peacetime' law and order systems in the form of 'local' courts that had existed under Scottish kings 
prior to 129643 were swept away by the occupying power after the battle of Dunbar. The fact that we 
have very limited information about the administration of justice through baronial courts or 
sergeanties 44 in early fourteenth-century Lothian does not mean that these aspects of govenUllent had 
disappeared or that they had become ineffective. We might more realistically see the garrison troops in 
the role of 'aid to the civil power' rather than as a substitute for the existing systems of government, in 
which case we might envisage the troops being deployed to deal with situations beyond the capacity of 
local officers rather than providing a defence against activity by the enemy. This might explain the 
different levels of force assigned to Edinburgh castle or to Linlithgmv peel in the late summer/autumn 
of 1302 (see above) i.e. that one 'unit' of ten men-at-arms was intended for aid to the civil power in the 
form of the sheriff's retinue and the other of thirty (plus 'officers') for more belligerent operational 
41 T. Herbert & G.E. Jones, Edward I and Wales (Cardiff, 1988) p 73-82. 
42 CDS, ii, no. 1324. 
43 Barrow, Neighbours, Chapter 11, 'Popular Courts' .p. 219. Professor Barrow has also pointed out the 
strong likelihood of 'a broad identity between English and Scottish law' The Anglo-Norman Era in Scottish 
Hist01Y (Oxford, 1980), p. 119. This does not imply an across-the-board adoption of English legal practice 
nor a rejection of existing processes and procedures. Professor MacQueen has drawn attention to a 
"blending of older customs with newer rules" thus avoiding the "cleavage of native and Anglo-French laws 
characteristic of later medieval Ireland and Wales". R. Oram (ed.) The Reign of Alexander II (Brill, 2005), 
p.228. 
44 Sergeanties seem to have been something of an anachronism by the close of the thirteenth century;. 
References are few and several ofthemre1ate to the same office, the sergeanty of Linlithgow. Of those 
references, two relate to the failure of the heir of the late sergeant to claim the position. Sergeanty stems 
from a military and la\v and order role in the community; a sergeant being a heavy cavalry man, though not 
a knight, in twelfth or thirteenth century Lothian and an officer of the Cro\VIl in thirteenth century 
Galloway, from whose depredations, particularly an exaction called 'surdit de sergeant', the locals sought 
relief from Alexander III; Duncan, Scotland, pp. 531-2. 
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pmposes, thus, for administrative purposes at least, giving Sir John de Kingestone a total of forty-one 
men-at-arms. 45 What exactly was the status or remit of the 'officers' of Linlithgow garrison is not clear, 
but their existence does indicate a formal command structure at levels of responsibility below' the 
garrison commander. Edmund de Caillou serving in the Edinburgh garrison of 1312 was described as 
the 'king's sergeant-at-arms', a rank or status he shared with two others, George Saunford and Arnaldo 
de Sancto Martino. Each of these men may have been the commander of a permanent sub-unit within 
the cavalry element of the garrison; the layout of the rolls suggests that this was so, but the title might 
indicate that the officer could be entrusted ,'lith a particular level of responsibility as and when required. 
The same holds true for other branches of service: English records, in particular the Plea Rolls of 1296, 
are littered \yith references to corporals, petty officers, centenars and millenars. The latter nyo seem to 
have been a function of large field armies and to have been the leaders of (or perhaps administrators of) 
bodies of one hundred and one thousand men respectively judging by the evidence from the plea rolls 
of 1296. Whether the role of the corporal or the petty officer w'as administrative - arranging payor 
working and ration parties for example - or tactical in the sense of providing leadership or executing 
commands is not knovm, but the men who structured Edward's army evidently felt that such men were 
necessary. Certainly they could be held responsible for the execution of duties. According to the Plea 
Rolls of the army of 1296 Richard Ie Taillur, a centenar of the millenarium of Henry Braillesford, paid a 
fme of one merk on behalf of himself and his 'hundred' for failing to perform guard duty.46 
Whatever the practical function of the garrisons, Edward plainly saw them as a necessary expense, 
and presumably saw the structure of those garrisons in the same light. Even if his judgment was faulty, 
and there is no reason to assume that it was, the fact remains that he was prepared to make the provision 
of men and materials a long-term commitment. Presumably he did not envisage maintaining such large 
or expensive deployments indefmitely, but \ve should be wary of assuming that a reduction or increase 
of garrison manpower or a change in the constitution of garrisons was simply a product of the 
45 CDS, ii,no. 1321. 
46 C.l Nevilles, 'A Plea Roll of Edward I's Army in Scotland' SHS Miscellany xi (Edinburgh, 1990), p.37. 
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requirements of the military situation. If the only perceived threat to the security of the castle was a 
siege by the enemy's field army, and not from any possibility of local disorder, the number of men-at-
arms might reasonably be reduced in favour of archers. Availability of men mayor may not have been 
an issue, but the strength of Edinburgh and Linlithgow garrisons did not remain static throughout the 
period 1300-1302. The muster roll of 1300 represents the actual service of individuals, but the two 
subsequent documents are more in the nature of statements of intent, i.e. that the garrisons of 
Linlithgow and Edinburgh should in the future comprise so many men-at-arms and so many archers as a 
matter of policy rather than being a reflection of the number of men actually available for service. 
The reductions of strength envisaged in these documents compared to the Edinburgh muster roll of 
13 00 may have had a financial basis, but there must also have been an operational justification of sorts. 
This does not mean that the Scots were perceived as less of a threat in 1302 than they had been in 1300, 
although that is certainly possible. The Scots may have been improving their position generally, but 
failing to threaten the English administration in Lothian. Changes in the structure of garrisons could be 
the result of a number of military factors. The men-at-arms in the Berwick garrison of 1300 were 
expected to take part in operations against the Scots, but not to confront large bodies of them in the field 
day on day. Twenty-five men-at-arms were evidently considered an adequate force for the maintenance 
of law and order; however the garrison also included 270 archers and sixty crossbo\vmen.47 A force of 
such magnitude \vould not have been assigned carelessly; a reasonable explanation would be that while 
the administration was not concerned that the sheriffdom of Benvick was at risk of being overrun by the 
Scots it was still necessary to maintain a strong force of archers to deter attempts by the Scots to take 
the to-WTI and castle by storm; it was hardly likely that the Scots would be able to mount a formal siege. 
The number of men-at-arms recorded as serving at a particular location is not an infallible guide to the 
level of perceived threat in that vicinity; we must consider the purpose of the deployment. The 
Linlithgo\v garrison of 1301-02 included eighty-five men-at-arms, ten of whom served as the retinue of 
47 CDS, ii, p.317 
158 
the sheriff, Sir Archibald Livingstone.4s The fact that ten men-at-arms ,vere considered adequate for the 
needs of the sheriff surely indicates that the other seventy-five men served a different function. In the 
absence of any other clear operational objective the conclusion must be that their purpose was to carry 
the war to the enemy and thus away from Lothian. We should, therefore, see Linlithgow, not as a 
frontier garrison w·hose primary function was to keep the Scots out of Lothian, but as a secure base 
from vvhich operations could be mounted in complete confidence that the peel would not be vulnerable 
to the Scots while substantial numbers of men-at-arms were in the field. Whether the striking arm 
element of the garrison was engaged in keeping the Scots out of Lothian or intercepting or pursuing 
them within Lothian, they would need to be confident that there would be a depot to which they could 
return at the completion of their operations. 
No doubt the huge sums of money required for wages had some effect on the numbers of men 
assigned to particular establishments, but it might be the case that experience had indicated that the 
lower numbers were adequate to the task and that men could be re-deployed to other establishments 
without compromising the security of Lothian or that the civil government functions of the sheriff no 
longer required the same level of military commitment or even that the Edwardian government believed 
that the size of the garrisons had a political dimension. If the government retained large forces in 
Lothian castles they would be tacitly admitting that there was a need to do so; that the Lothian 
constabularies were at risk from the operations of the Scots. Alternatively the government may have 
believed that the presence of a highly visible force might produce resentment in the community. It may 
be the case that Edward's officers simply could not recruit men in sufficient numbers to maintain the 
garrisons at the levels of manpower committed in 1300 and that troops had to be re-deployed to areas 
where the demand for men was more pressing than in Lothian. 
Despite the defeat of Wallace's army at Falkirk in 1298, the Scots enjoyed a remarkable degree 
and consistency of military success until 1303, and this may be reflected in the apparently small 
numbers of Scots serving in Lothian garrisons compared to either 1311-12 or 1335-7. The ability of the 
48 TNA, ElOl/68/l/20. Indenture for service of Sir Archibald Livingstone. 
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Balliol party to mount operations virtually anywhere in Scotland - even if only at a relatively trivial 
level - and to carry on the business of King John to the extent of being able to appoint officials and 
even hold a Parliament at Rutherglen 49 ,vas hardly an indication that the Edwardian government ,vas 
successfully 'settling' Scottish affairs. In l300 the position of the Edwardian government may have 
looked very insecure indeed in which case enlisting in the military service of that government would 
not have been a very attractive proposition for Scots even if their political sympathies lay with the 
Plantagenet cause. 
The garrison rolls for 1311-12 show an apparent rise in the proportion of Scots serving. It may be the 
case that there are simply more names recorded and/or that a greater proportion of the names are 
evidently Scottish. However there may be a political element present. ill February 1312 Edward II 
forfeited a number of Lothian landholders as 'enemies' .50 Some of these men had been in the Bruce 
camp for years by this point and quite why they should be forfeited at this juncture is unclear. Other 
than the fact that they had all defected and that they were all either Lothian men or at least men with 
extensive interests there, there is no obvious connection between the seven men concerned. Had their 
properties lain close to one another there might be an argument that these forfeitures were a direct 
product of the military situation, possibly that that particular area of Lothian was no longer in the 
control of Plantagenet government, but since those estates were widely scattered throughout Lothian 
that would suggest that very little of the Lothian sheriffdom actually remained in English hands in 
February 1312. Given the relatively large numbers of Scots serving in his garrisons Edward, or his 
advisors, may have felt that it was desirable to make an example of those who had left his peace, either 
as an incentive to those serving in his garrisons and Lothian landholders generally to continue in his 
allegiance or to demonstrate his appreciation of their continuing support. 
ill l312 the Bruce cause was certainly enjoying a considerable degree of success, but a 
considerable body of Scottish opinion was clearly aligned against it as we can see from the garrison 
49 CDS, v, no. 220; G.O. Sayles 'The Guardians of Scotland and a Parliament at Rutherglen in 1300' SHR, 
xxiv, pp. 245-5C 
50 CDS, ii, no. 245. 
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muster rolls of that year. At least twelve out of the thirty-five men-at-arms in the Stirling garrison and 
fourteen out of eighty-eight at Linlithgow were Scots, though only John de Maleville, Thomas de 
Ramsay, John, William and Nicholas de Lithcu (see Appendix) and Gilbert de Duddingston can be 
confidently associated with Lothian other than through military service. The Edinburgh garrison of the 
same year included eighty-one men-at-arms of whom twenty-three were Scots and thirteen of those 
were Lothian men. It must be stressed again that the number of Scots and the number of Lothian men 
should be regarded as absolute minimums; both categories are likely to have been rather larger, perhaps 
even of the order of Bothwell garrison where at least forty-three out of one hundred and thirteen men-
at-arms were Scots if not perhaps Livingston, where at least eight out of ten were Scots. 
The reasons for this were wide-ranging. Robert was a usurper and it is quite possible that men who 
had favoured the Balliol cause saw the Edwardian govermnent as the lesser of tvw evils. Sir William 
Oliphaunt had commanded the garrison of Stirling castle against Edward I in 1304 for the guardian 
administration of King John until the pacification of Perth, and even after the surrender of the Balliol 
party continued the defence of the castle, allegedly in the name of 'the lion', the heraldic symbol of 
Scotland, rather than surrender, but he was remarkably steadfast in his service to the Plantagenet cause 
thereafter, to the extent that he was the commander of the Perth garrison when it fell to the Bruce party 
in 131251 and Sir Ingram de Umfraville served as Guardian for the Balliol party, but fought against the 
Bruce party at Bannockburn. It is clear that not all Scots equated the Bruce party with the 'patriotic' 
cause. Bruce's attempt on the throne certainly drew men from Edward's allegiance, but it probably 
enabled him to recruit others who had previously opposed him, men like Sir John Graham who had 
fought Edward on behalf of the Balliols until 1304 but was serving Edward as a man-at-arms at Ayr in 
1307. Given the relatively large numbers of Lothian men who can be identified in Edwardian service 
between 1306 and 1314, and the relatively small number of their neighbours who can be confidently 
identified as fighting for Bruce, we might conclude, as Barron did,52 that Lothian men were unwilling to 
51 Barrow, BnJce p. 194. 
52 Barron, Scottish War, p.l27. 
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support what he sa\v as the 'patriotic' cause. However these men had to balance their conception of 
what was the 'right' course of action with the realities of the situation. 
A practical consideration might lie in the nature of the Bruce struggle. King John had undoubtedly 
been the legally constituted king prior to the invasion of Edward I. Since John had been deposed by 
force, his heir, Edward Balliol, would have a legitimate claim to Scottish kingship. King Robert had no 
legitimate male heir other than his brother Edward and both of them were active in the field. If they 
should both be killed in action or captured and subsequently executed the Bruce cause would cease to 
exist. In 1312 it may well have seemed to the majority of Lothian Scots that the chances of an eventual 
Bruce victory were still slim. The local garrison system seems to have been able to provide the 
administration with the stability and order necessary to conduct government. Resistance to that 
government was likely to provoke forfeiture at the very least, whereas service to it might help to 
preserve Lothian from the worst effects of a \var in which that government had clear advantages in 
terms of manpower and money. Admittedly Edward II had not been able to force battle on Robert, in 
fact it could be argued that before the summer of 1314 he had made little serious attempt to do so, but in 
general it was clear that the military capacity of English kings, should they choose to mobilize it in 
earnest, was unquestionably superior to that of Robert Bruce, and in all probability most contemporary 
observers would have expected that should a major confrontation occur, Ed\vard would be in a much 
stronger position. Also, although the Bruce party had enjoyed a considerable degree of military success 
prior to 1314, they had not been able to make permanent inroads into Lothian, or indeed the south-east 
of Scotland generally. Although they were able to force those communities to buy truces, they do not 
seem to have been in a position to retain territory. As long as that continued to be the case it would be 
rash for Lothian landholders to join the Bruce cause. While it is true that some Lothian men did join 
King Robert, even in the early part of his kingship,S3 the majority chose not to do so. According to 
Barbour,54 a considerable number served Edward II at the battle of Bmllockburn, an indication that 
53 G.W.S.Barrow, 'Lothian in the First War of Independence' SHR LV, 1976, pp. 151-71. 
54 Barbour, The Bruce, pp. 136-8. 
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despite the fall of Edinburgh castle, the English administration could still count on some degree of 
support from the political community of Lothian. Superficially this might suggest that the retention of 
castles was not a crucial factor in maintaining government; however it may not have been clear to 
Lothian landholders that the Edviardian government was suffering anything more than a temporary 
setback. Edinburgh castle had fallen to a coup de main operation rather than through a formal siege that 
Edward was powerless to raise, and while we might identifY King Robert's failure to garrison and retain 
the castle as part of a general policy of reducing the value of such installations, the Lothian community 
may have construed his slighting of the castle as an indication of weakness, that Robert did not feel that 
he would be able to keep the castle in the face of an English counter offensive. The fact that the war 
had gone in Robert's favour for some time was no guarantee that it would continue to do so. In 1303 the 
Scots had been in the ascendant militarily for some years, notwithstanding a signal English victory at 
Falkirk, but they capitulated in 1304.55 Lothian gentry would be positively rash to assume tllat a similar 
state of affairs could not come about as a result of Edward II's expedition of 1314. Edw'ard had initiated 
preparations for his attack before the close of 1313 and had wTitten to supporters in Scotland on 28 
November to assure them that he would be making an intervention in Scotland by midsummer of the 
next year.56 Men who deserted his cause before that intervention would face a bleak future if Edward 
were successfully to derail the Bruce party through a major victory in the field. The fall of a castle 
would not be sufficient of itself to convince the community as a whole that the relatively stable 
administration that had ruled Lothian for most of the preceding twenty years \vas moribund; a castle 
that had fallen to an enemy could be regained. 
The proportion of man-at-arms service performed by men identifiable as Scots in the Edinburgh 
and Linlithgow garrisons is not particularly high, assuming that the number apparently identifiable as 
Scots is a reasonably accurate expression of the numbers who actually were Scots, but it is hardly 
insignificant. As in Livingston, it is more than likely that some portion of the named members of the 
SS Watson,Hammer, p.186 
s6TNA,C47122110 111 
163 
garrisons were in fact Scots. John Ie Marechal and Roger de Merleye may well be the same men whose 
names appear on the Ragman Roll,57 but we cannot be absolutely certain that they \vere. Since this 
applies to a considerable proportion of the muster roll names it may be the case that Scottish men-at-
anns fonned a rather larger part of the \vhole than we might expect since only a relatively small 
number, such as Thomas de Wobourne and Nicholas de Paris, can be safely assumed to be not Scottish. 
It could be that as few as one in four of the Edinburgh men-at-anns were not in fact Scots, and since 
only one of them, Archibald de Livingstone, is described as a knight, this may have implications for our 
assessment of the numbers of men-at-arms that could be recruited from Scottish counties and therefore 
for the military capacity of Scottish annies in periods \vhen there was no serious competition from 
Edw'ardian administrations for recruiting those armies. In tenns of battlefield roles there was little if any 
real difference bet\veen men-at-arms and knights and there is no obvious correlation between the 
number of knights and the number of men-at-arms that might be enlisted from Scottish resources. 
The nationality of Linlithgow garrison members may have been rather different to either Edinburgh 
or Livingston. Only thirteen out of eighty-seven named members can be readily identified as Scots, and 
one of those is Sir Archibald de Livingstone, who, as we have already seen, was also on the roll of 
Edinburgh, an indication that he bore some responsibility in both installations. We cannot discount the 
possibility that two separate individuals are indicated, though this is less than likely. If there were two 
knights of that name the rolls would surely differentiate betvveen them, possibly as junioris and senioris 
if they were father and son or by including a geographical reference if they were not. There could be an 
operational significance should it be the case that the Edinburgh garrison consisted chiefly of Scots and 
the Linlithgow garrison did not. Given the lesser political and economic significance of Linlithgow it 
would seem safe to assume that the duties of the garrison extended to a greater range of activity than 
simply the immediate defence of the establishment, presumably raiding and interdiction operations. 
The administration might feel that it would be more effective to deploy men from outwith the area to 
the more aggressive role; men who could safely be considered to be less at risk of defecting to the Scots 
57 CDS, ii, p.194-211. 
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should they become prisoners or through the persuasion of their friends and relatives serving under 
Robert I. Arguably, the complement of Linlithgow might be more exposed to contact with the enemy 
and, if they were locally recruited men, might be more vulnerable to persuasion or blackmail than 
English regulars. 
The small garrison at Livingston, being mainly, perhaps exclusively, Scots would seem to militate 
against this, since they might choose to defect 'en masse'. However if that garrison was manned by men 
in the personal retinue of Sir Archibald Livingstone it \'iOuld not be unreasonable for the administration 
to assume that he was utterly convinced of their dependability, and in any case, the Livingston peel \vas 
not as significant an asset to the administration as Linlithgow, nor would it seem to have been regarded 
as a base from w·hich offensive operations were mounted. If they were to defect they would not be 
putting a major asset in jeopardy, nor would they be likely to compromise operations in hand. 
The rate of expenditure required to support the Lothian garrisons was obviously a heavy burden on 
the finances of Edwardian governments throughout the periods of occupation. Even when the garrisons 
were at their smallest it would seem to be the case that the cost of wages alone was more than could be 
collected from the issues of the county. Prior to the 1296 campaign the cost of garrisons was 
theoretically covered by the collection of castleguard money from the community and the fees paid to 
the commanders of castles,58 but it would seem unlikely that the payments were sufficient to cover the 
costs. In the period 1291-92, when Scottish royal castles were entrusted to Edward I pending the 
settlement of the succession dispute, the commander of Edinburgh castle received the considerable sum 
of 1 merk/day (13s 4d), a total of £243 6s 8d per annum/9 a figure greatly in excess of the recorded 
castleguard demands from the constabularies of Edinburgh and Haddington. Although it is quite 
possible that the fees paid in the period of Edward's government were greater than the customary costs 
under Alexander III there is no clear evidence that that is the case. The daily payment of 13s 4d was 
58 CDS. iii, p.329. 
'9 Stevenson, Documents, i, p.240. 
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designed to do more than pay the sheriff's wages: out of that sum he would be obliged to cover staff 
wages and at least some proportion of the general running costs of the castle and its garrison. 
The record of castleguard payments is not necessarily complete and even if it is complete there may 
have been customary demands of produce. This would seem to have been the case in other castles -
Paisley Abbey accepted the burden of fmding five chalders of oatmeal for the garrison of Dumbarton 
castle in exchange for being excused various exactions by Robert I; the abbey was presumably going to 
make a contribution to an existing system of supply.60 Evidently the Abbey had been making this 
contribution in the past, or there would have been little point in acquiring a charter to free it of the 
responsibility. The Edwardian administrations continued to collect castleguard, and King Robert did so 
as well, even though he had slighted Edinburgh castle in an effort to render it indefensible, so he did not 
maintain a garrison there. Although castleguard was theoretically what we might call a 'hypothecated' 
government income, that is one dedicated to a specific purpose, we should not assume that it was 
adequate to that purpose. No doubt when the payments were first levied in the twelfth century they 
constituted a serious proportion of the cost of garrison support. The customary castleguard payments 
uplifted by Edwardian administrations61 were hardly sufficient to make a noticeable contribution to the 
cost of manning the castles. However, although the continuation of government business in general was 
an important part of the function of the garrisons we must bear in mind their significance to the general 
war policy of the Plantagenets in Scotland, and indeed in France and Flanders, if we are to understand 
why three successive English kings were prepared to expend their resources so freely in an area that 
was unlikely to yield any material profit in the foreseeable future. 
The successful conquest of Scotland, or even the effective control of a portion of it, could be seen as a 
useful operation in a number of ways. In 1295 King John had demonstrated that he was prepared to 
combine with the king of France against the interests of Edward I, and though it has been remarked that 
medieval English kings were not always particularly interested in the well-being of their northern 
60 RRS, vi, p. 367. 
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counties, a recurring threat of Scottish incursion could not be ignored, particularly since that threat 
would be most likely to become a reality in periods when England was at war with France. 
A war on nvo fronts is always a dangerous situation, and although events of the fourteenth century 
would indicate that the defence of the border could generally be safely entrusted to the communities of 
the northern counties in terms of preventing Scottish annexations, this may not have been so clear at the 
close of the thirteenth century, particularly if the attentions of English kings were focused on their 
interests on the continent. The neutralisation of Scotland did not need to take the form of annexation 
and perhaps eventual integration of Scotland into England, though clearly that would be potentially the 
most attractive option. If, however, the Plantagenets could secure tracts of southern Scotland and retain 
them without making a major commitment of men and materials, any Scottish administration would be 
likely to have to concentrate their efforts on regaining those areas rather than on making anything more 
than rather transitory incursions into northern England, thus compromising the effectiveness of the 
Scots as allies of the French. Further, if the garrisons that would be needed to retain a foothold in 
Scotland could, to some extent at least, be paid for and manned from the resources of Scottish counties, 
the strain on English crovm resources would be reduced accordingly. If it was going to be necessary to 
fight the Scots due to their commitments to France, and if it was going to be necessary to establish 
strong garrisons to hold castles against them, then those deployments might as well be made in Scotland 
in the hope of containing conflict there rather than having to campaign on English soil. In any case it 
would do no harm for the prestige of his kingship if he were to extend his rule. 
PART 2. EDWARD BALLIOL TO DAVID II. 
Edward III was not opposed to the idea that he might incorporate Scotland into his realm. After the 
success of Edward Balliol at Dupplin Edward called a parliament to consider what course of action he 
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should take in relation to Scotland. Renewing his father and grandfather's claims to the Scottish throne 
was certainly one of the options he entertained.62 Balliol \vas ejected before the end of 1332 and 
Edward gave his overt support to the continuation of his war against the Bruce party at the battle of 
Halidon HilL The price of that support was the cession of a large proportion of southern and Eastern 
Scotland to the English crown in perpetuity, the balance to be held as a kingdom by Edward Balliol 
with Edward III as his feudal superior. 63 In a sense this reduced Edward's claims in Scotland, but it also 
made the apparent objective a more manageable proposition. If Edward Balliol could occupy the 
attentions of the opposition by campaigning in and for Scotland north of the Forth, Edward Plantagenet 
could concentrate his efforts on Scotland south of the Forth. Not only would that make occupation of 
the southern counties a more realisable ambition, but it would mean that should Edward Balliol fail in 
his endeavours there would be less damage to Plantagenet prestige than if the King of England tried 
again to gain all of Scotland and failed. Further, should the Bruce party succeed in ousting Edward 
Balliol, they might be prepared to accept an armistice with Edward III on the basis of his retention of 
southern Scotland, particularly if a large part of the political communities in those counties could be 
brought to the Plantagenet party. In the short term, the resources that would need to be deployed to 
garrison Lothian and the other ceded counties would obviously be much less than what would be 
required to provide garrisons for towns and castles throughout Scotland as a whole, even if continued 
support for the Balliol cause were to require the intervention of field armies from England. As things 
turned out Scotland did in fact become a drain on the financial and manpower resources of Edward III 
that 'vas much larger than any direct gain he could hope to make from the acquisition of the ceded 
counties, but it is safe to assume that it was not his intention to squander men or money. Edward I had 
apparently been close to achieving a favourable settlement of Scottish affairs in 1304 so why should 
Edward III not be able to bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion? 
62Nicholson, Edward III, p.lOO. 
63 Rot. Scot., i, p. 260. 
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In the brief period between his victory at Dupplin in August 1332 and his defeat at Annan in 
December that year Edward Balliol would seem to have made little headway in Lothian, possibly 
because Edinburgh castle and Linlithgow peel had been rendered indefensible by Robert I. The 
outcome of Halidon Hill initially provided a rather more secure basis for his kingship. In February 1334 
he was able to hold a parliament at HolYTood.64 Ho\vever his security may have rested on the fact that 
Edinburgh was included in the settlement he had made with Edward m65 and he could rely on the 
presence of English troops as much as on the inability of the Bruce party to act against him. 
Edward Ill's hold on his recent acquisitions was soon proved to be less than secure. On 8 September, 
less than two months after the appointment of officials in the Edwardian administration, two recent 
defectors, Sir William Keith and Sir Godfrey Ross forced a BaHiol party under Sir Richard Talbot to 
surrender after they had tried to defend themselves in a church near Linlithgow.66 Talbot's company 
seems to have included si"C knights, and though it probably included a number of men-at-arms, Ross's 
force may not have been very substantial. It soon became obvious that the incorporation of several 
southern sheriffdoms of Scotland into Edward Ill's domains was not going to be achieved by the 
transfer of lordship from the Scottish crown; a more positive military effort was required. To this end 
Edward III raised an army for service in Scotland and kept it in being throughout the winter of 1334-35, 
perhaps in the hope of forcing a settlement on the Scots in the way that his grandfather had in the winter 
of 1303-04. The army was based at Roxburgh, but undertook operations throughout lowland Scotland. 
The Bruce party did not oblige Edward by offering him battle and the result of the campaign would 
seem to have been no more than the rebuilding of Roxburgh castle and widespread looting and 
burning.67 Reconstruction at Roxburgh gave Edward a means of maintaining a secure military presence 
in that county and possession of a fairly significant town, but the actions of his army probably did more 
to push Scots to the Bruce party than to intimidate them. A second army was raised for a summer 
64 Rot Scot .. i, p.261. 
65TNAE39n. 
66 Chro~. FOI'dun, i, p. 357 
67 Nicholson, Edward III, p. 191. 
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campaign in 1335, this time entering Scotland in two divisions, one under Edward III and one under 
Edward Ballio1.68 The Scots were not strong enough to offer battle to such pO'werful forces, but equally, 
those forces were unable to prevent Scottish operations in their rear. On 30 July 1335, the day before 
the two Edwards united their armies at Glasgow69 and marched to Airth, a Scottish force under the Earl 
of Moray captured the Count of Namur after a fight in the ruins of Edinburgh castle while he ,vas on his 
way to join Edward III at Perth. 70 Namur would seem to have had a force comprising 100 men at arms 
and as many archers. 71 Since they had been pursued for some distance,72 we could reasonably assume 
that Moray's force, reinforced by the arrival of the Earl of Dunbar, Sir William Douglas and Sir 
Alexander Ramsay,73 was rather stronger than that and that the force available to Edward's 
administration in Lothian was insufficient to prevent Scottish operations in the sheriffdom even though 
Edward had a powerful army less than forty miles away. 
Moray had the misfortune to be captured himself while escorting his paroled prisoner to English 
held territory /4 but that was more a matter of Moray's misfortune than evidence of an adequate English 
military establishment in south-east Scotland. Obviously the retention of Lothian was going to require a 
greater investment of money and manpower and to this end Edward embarked on a programme of 
reconstruction at Edinburgh castle to provide a base for a more extensive garrison. On 14 September 
Edward concluded an indenture,75 with Sir Thomas Roscelyn for the wardenship of Edinburgh castle 
and the office of sheriff of Edinburgh, posts handed on to Sir John Strive lin on 2 November. The 
indenture relating to the transfer of the office 76 makes it clear that the castle was in a very poor state of 
repair. This can hardly have come as a surprise to Edward since he had been in Edinburgh himself in 
68Ibid, p. 205. 
69 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 99. 
70 Ibid, p. 100. 
71 Chron. Lanercost, p. 282. 
72Nicholson, Edward III, p.213. 
73 Scotichronicon, viii, p.1l3-5. 
74 Ibid. 
75 CDS, iii, no. 1186. 
76 Ibid. 
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September.77 On the positive side, Edward's administration was able to raise revenue from the 
sheriffdom in the years 1335-6 and 1336-7. However the revenues were much reduced 'on account of 
destruction through war' in 1335-6, amounting to £122 13s 4d halfpenny from Edinburgh constabulary, 
£73 2s 9d from Linlithgow and £81 17s 6 halfpenny from Haddington. 78 The income from Lothian may 
have been trivial throughout 1335-37, but the cost of supporting the garrisons there was enormous. 
Edward's administration, like that of his predecessors, did not install a garrison at Haddington, 
though we can be confident that existing baronial castles in the area such as Linlithgow and Luffness 
were integrated into the military establishment of Lothian, but the garrisons at Edinburgh and 
Linlithgo\v were considerable and therefore costly. In 1335-36, no doubt for a valid reason that is not 
kno\\m to us, the Edinburgh garrison was enrolled by nationality in some sense. The knights of the 
garrison are divided into 'Scots' and 'Germans' (apart from a solitary Englishman, Sir Edmund de 
Berkely), an indication that Edward was prepared, or obliged to deploy mercenaries from overseas to 
protect his Scottish lands. The assignation of nation to individuals would seem to have depended on a 
rationale unclear to the modem observer. 'Lord' Dedricus de Ahna)me and his two scutifers appear 
among the Milites Scoti rather than the Milites Ahnanni (Germans), as does Thomas Libaud. Thomas 
was presumably a descendant, if not the son, of Pierre Lubaud, formerly commander of Edinburgh 
castle for Edward II, who had defected to the Scots before Bannockburn, but had been forfeited and 
executed for treason sometime before March 1316 when his property at Cowden was regranted to Sir 
Robert Lauder. 79 A possible explanation for the appearaI1Ce of these men among the 'Scoti' could be 
that they had been granted lands in Scotland by Edward III and by serving in the Edinburgh garrison 
were discharging obligations due for those lands, though it would be unusual for men to appear by 
name in payrolls unless they were serving for wages. Interestingly, although six of the twelve knights of 
the garrison hailed from Germany, possibly only two of the seventy-five scutifers did, and even this 
may be an exaggeration; the hvo men in question are not named, they appear as the hvo scutifers of 
77 CDS, iii, no. 1176. 
7S Ibid .. p. 329. 
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Lord Dedricus de Almayne, who in turn is described as a Scottish knight. If Dedricus was discharging 
obligations due from lands in Scotland it is perfectly possible that his hvo scutifers were in fact his 
tenants, and therefore very likely to be Scots. The thirty-four men-at-arms in the 'Scoti' section of the 
roll did not represent the full complement of Scots in the garrison. Additionally there were six 
'Scottish' knights, including Thomas Lubaud and Dedricus de Almayne, each of whom served with two 
scutifers. Assuming that apart from Sir Thomas and Sir Dedricus they were all 'Scots', a total of forty-
seven Scottish men-at-arms (including the apparently misplaced Roger de Dalmahoy and Mungo de 
Buttergask) and four knights (including a total of eleven with Lothian names) served in the 1335-36 
garrison. 80 This accounts for well over half the entire force of eighty-eight men-at-arms and is probably 
as high a proportion, if not higher, than at any previous point during the Edwardian occupations. In the 
following year the proportion of Scots had become even greater, a minimum of fIfty-one out of eighty-
five men-at-arms. In 1335-36 the rest of the garrison comprised seventy-one hobelars and archers, 
apparently all Englishmen, little different from the next year when all but a handful of the sL-xty-four 
hobelars and archers were Englishmen. The high proportion of Scots men-at-arms would seem to 
suggest that the Edwardian administration in 1335-36 was reasonably acceptable to the community of 
Lothian - certainly several Lothian men were in service, However, by January 1339, although the ration 
strength of the garrison was much the same as it had been three years before, the proportion of Scots in 
service had dvvindled considerably to two of the Scottish knights, William Ramsey and Alexander Crag, 
and twelve men-at-arms; less than a quarter of the total. The 1336-37 garrison may not reflect 'normal' 
circumstances. Although the roll bears a large quota of Lothian men, probably at least twenty-nine, 
there are several Scots who do not normally appear in Lothian garrison documents such as William de 
Preshvick, William Syward, Gilbert de Lumsden and William Olifaunt. Their presence, and that of 
others, may be an indication of the contraction of areas under Plantagenet and Balliol control: as towns 
and castles fell to the Bruce party there would obviously be fewer places in which men in Balliol or 
Plantagenet allegiance could serve. 
80 CDS, iii, p.360. 
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It would seem, then, that less than two years after Edward's acquisition of Lothian, and despite the 
efforts of Edward Balliol against the Bruce party, the English administration in Lothian was already 
under sufficient pressure from the Scots that the communities of Lothian ",-ere unable to conduct their 
business in safety. In 1336-37 the situation deteriorated further. The rents of Edinburgh constabulary 
fell to £88 lOs 7 halfpenn:/l - a reduction of approximately one third. Although this "vas offset by 
escheats through forfeiture amounting to £46 8d,s2 Edward's grant of300 merks of Lothian land (which 
would otherwise have been in the hands of Edward III and contributing to the income of the 
sheriffdom), to Sir John Strivelin83 obviously more than accounted for any profit from that source. 
Superficially there would seem to have been some improvement in the situation at Haddington which 
generated £102 3s 4 halfpenny and £10 3s 4d from new escheats in that constabulary for the financial 
year 1336_37.84 Examination of the compotus shows that many of the properties in the section 
apparently relating to Haddington escheats were in fact in Edinburgh or Linlithgow constabularies. The 
significance of this, if any, is unclear, but there can be no mistaking the general trend of falling returns 
from issues throughout the sheriffdom. Overall income may not have been radically different, but the 
value of individual properties had fallen dramatically in the period 1335-37. Since it is perfectly clear 
that the reduction in income from these properties was due to war damage - the record tells us so 
repeatedly - it would seem equally clear that the Edwardian administration could not provide the stable 
and secure government, the 'good lordship' that would be necessary if Edward III \vas going to make 
his rule acceptable to the community of Lothian. 
The forfeiture of Lothianlandovmers in 1312 may conceivably have been a reflection of the tactical 
situation in the sense that Edward II's government forfeited Lothian lando'wners who had joined the 
Bruce party only \vhen the lands in question were no longer under Edwardian control and thus of no 
material significance. It would not seem to be the case that the Scots in 1335-7 were capturing and 
81 CDS. iii, pp. 327-9,379-82. 
S2 CDS, iii, pp. 379-82. 
83 TNA, E101/22/10/53. 
84 CDS, iii, pp. 383-9. 
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retaining territory in Lothian, but were chiefly occupied in gaining control of northern Scotland while at 
the same time conducting operations in Lothian (and Fife) with the sole objective of denying the 
produce - in the widest sense of the word - to the English. Sir Thomas Grey, author of Scalacronica 
claims that Edward III lost his possessions in Scotland for want of 'good lordship' ,85 but it is perhaps 
misleading to assume that Edward still believed in 1336-7 that he could make good his claims to the 
sheriffdoms that had been ceded to him by Edward BaIliol: rather that he saw his Scottish operation 
more as an exercise in preventing the Scots from recovering to the point where they could make a 
positive intenrention in his plans for France. Edward's efforts to restore his rule in southern Scotland 
after the fall of Edinburgh castle to the Scots in 1341 were hardly ambitious, let alone effective. Even 
after the signal victory of Neville's Cross in 1346 he seems to have made no serious attempt to install a 
new administration in Lothian. Edward Balliolled an arnlY as far north as Falkirk in May 1347,86 but 
retired to Galloway almost immediately having made no attempt to recover Edinburgh. Edward Ill's 
final campaign in Scotland, the 'Burnt Candlemas' saw him spend ten days at Haddington, during 
which time his troops caused extensive damage throughout Lothian, but he seems to have had no 
intention of forming any sort of government there, and, like Edward Balliol in 1347, he seems to have 
made no effort to capture Edinburgh castle. Edward's failure even to attempt to restore his rule in 
Lothian may have been the product of experience: a decision that the investment required to enforce his 
rule there was greater than any likely return or an acceptance that he simply could not recruit enough 
men willing to commit themselves to service in Scotland when there were better opportunities in 
France. Further, we should not discount the possibility that the capacity of the Scots to man and 
maintain garrisons had improved beyond the offensive capabilities of the forces that Edward could 
afford to commit in Scotland. ill 1338 a major siege of Dunbar castle had failed despite a brief visit 
from the king himself. Edward's lieutenant, the Earl of Salisbury withdrew from the siege, allegedly, in 
85 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 102. 
86 D. Rollason & M.Prestwich The Battle of Neville 's Cross (Stamford, 1998), p.34. 
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order to follow his king to the continent, but the operation had been an expensive and humiliating 
failure. 
Similarities in the approaches of three Edwards should not lead us to assume that their policies 
were identical. Edward I intended to secure the entirety of Scotland, w'hich, in the main, called for a 
persistent and expanding occupation policy which was successful inasmuch as it brought about the 
surrender of the Scots in 1304, but clearly the Scots still had a stomach for the fight in 1306. The 
position of Edward Ill's administration was rather different. Edward might hope that Edward Balliol 
would be successful in his bid for the Scottish throne, but if he was not, Lothian would always be 
vulnerable. Possibly Edward saw Lothian and the other ceded counties as no more than a buffer zone 
and perhaps, given the experience he gained between 1333 and the end of 1335, only a temporary one. 
In 1335-36 the Edwardian administration was unquestionably endeavouring to govern Lothian for the 
king of England, but by 1339-40 the duties of the garrison had been reduced to denying Lothian to the 
Scots. The ability to launch sudden attacks or ripostes was of greater significance than the ability to 
provide a secure environment for Plantagenet lordship in Lothian. The final muster roll of the 
Edinburgh garrison,S? detailing the complement at the time of the surrender, is broadly similar in form 
to that of 1339-40. Of forty-three men-at-arms (Bain puts the figure at forty-nine, SL,- more than the 
original documentSs) at least five, Adam de Berwick, John de Abernethy, Roger Dalmahoy, Thomas 
and Adam de Pontekin, and possibly a sixth, William Bachelor, were Scots, as were at least five of the 
SL,-ty mounted archers, namely Alexander Elphinstone, Robert Conyngham, Walter Dalmahoy, Adam 
Preston and another, unnamed, member of the Pontekin family. Curiously there \vould seem to have 
been no knights in the garrison at all, suggesting that the Scottish knights serving there before 1340 
(Sirs John Lockhart, William Ramsay, John de Crichton and both of the Alexander Craigies) had 
become casualties, defected to the Scots or had been redeployed to other posts. 
87 CDS. iii, no. l383. 
ss TNA, E101l32/1. 
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The possibility that Edinburgh had been reduced to an outpost in 1339-40 having been a centre of 
local government in 1335-36 does not mean that Edward III saw the castle as a disposable asset. 
Improvements to the fortifications there and at Stirling were still being made until at least January 1340, 
when the cost of building work and garrison wages for the two castles was computed at over £2000.89 
The normal issues of Lothian and Stirling, even if they could be collected, would hardly cover such 
expenditure, but Edward presumably sa,,, it as money well spent in keeping the Scots busy enough to 
reduce, if not prevent, their intervention in his war with France. 
THE LOGISTICS SITUATION 
In the strictest sense it would seem that, in general, the maintenance of a consistent provision of 
produce and ordnance did not pose a severe, or at least not an insuperable, problem for Plantagenet 
administrations in Lothian, either in 1296-1314 or in 1333-41. With the possible exception of the three 
unspecified Lothian castles which had fallen to Wallace in 1297, none of the castles in the sheriffdom 
seems to have been surrendered through failure of provisions. Even so, the maintenance of a supply 
system was obviously of critical importance to the administration. It would seem to have been easy 
enough to ship stores to Leith or Blackness,9o but once the goods were unloaded from the shipping it 
would be necessary to transfer them to Edinburgh or Linlithgo,\7 in the first instance, and then possibly 
to satellite installations such as Dirleton castle91 or Livingston peeL In some stages of the war this 
would not have been a great burden: so long as the Scots could be kept out of Lothian the security of a 
supply column travelling through the sheriffdom could probably be trusted to a handful of men to 
discourage banditry. Similarly, during the purchased truces of 1312-14 it is reasonable to assume that 
the Scots did not regularly interfere with the provisioning arrangements of the Plantagenet government, 
89 CDS. iii, no. 1323. 
90 Blackness ,vas still an important supply point in the period immediately following the Strathord 
armistice. Edward I called for food supplies to be sent there with all possible haste at the end of March 
1304. TNA, C49122/9/109. 
91 In 1300 the garrison of Dirleton was supplied with stockfish, salt, oats and beans, TNA, ElO1l531n. 
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or that if they did, the results ","ere not sufficiently significant to draw comment from Ed\",ardian 
officers. 
The apparent ease of maintenance must have been, in part, a product of the relationship behveen 
the community and the administration. The notion that Lothian people were particularly amenable to 
English rule and ","ere uninterested in or inimical to Scottish kingship cannot reasonably be sustained 
(Lothian had, after all, been part of the Scottish kingdom for some time before 1296), but it is clear that 
the majority of the community were not prepared to oppose Edwardian government actively before the 
Strathord agreement of 1304, and very few indeed between Robert 1's accession to the throne in 1306 
and his victory at Bannockburn in 1314. Acceptance into Edward's peace \\Tould undoubtedly entail 
being prepared to discharge various obligations to the Cro\Vll, including military service. The burden of 
military obligation fell most heavily, or at least most frequently, on the political community, since they 
were most likely to have an obligation to sen7e as men-at-arms. It could be argued, in fact, that the 
Lothian community not only accepted and supported the administration; but to a considerable extent 
they staffed the administration through their services as soldiers and jurors. Their service in Garrisons 
has certain implications for the logistical structures of the Lothian administration and for any 
assessment of the forces available based on analysis of recorded demands for, or receipts of, materials 
required for the army.92 The extent to which such men had to provide their own provisions is not clear 
from record sources, and though it is probably realistic to assume that men sen7ing for land 'messed' 
with men serving for wages and were considered part of the ration strength of the establishment, it is 
quite possible that they were obliged to deal with all of their O\\Tn supply needs, or at least some portion 
of them. A man giving service for land was not, for example, entitled to a restauro payment should he 
lose his horse in action, but it would be reasonable to assume that the fodder for his horse (and perhaps 
92 Ihe quantities of foodstuffs involved were staggering. See for example Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.347. 
INA C47/2/22/45. INA, C47/22/2/46. Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.346 shows an interesting assortment of 
the incidental stores that a garrison might require at a given point in addition to the grain, flour, malt, meat, 
beans, fish, wine and hay that were required every week of the year. Clearly, since this document is a 
receipt, not a requisition, it was possible to procure a wide variety of stores without too much difficulty. In 
addition the garrisons had to be provided with considerable quantities of arms and thousands of arrows and 
quarrels. INA, C4 7 /2/22/57. Stevenson, Documents, ii, p .438. 
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himself) could be supplied by the administration since individual provision would be ridiculously 
inefficient and of course it would lead to enormous storage difficulties if every man had to have his OvVll 
facilities. Bearing in mind that the administration would have had a vested interest in making military 
service acceptable to the local military tenants, making the burden less irksome by providing messing 
and fodder for those serving for their lands would surely be well worth the relatively trivial expenditure 
involved. 
The garrison complements initially authorised by Ed,vard I, in Lothian at least, would not seem to 
have been greatly in excess of the sort of forces available to the sheriff of Lothian and his constables at 
Haddington and Linlithgovl under John and Alexander III. Presumably these very tiny forces had been 
supported through the fees paid by the crovvn to the officers in question, castleguard payments from the 
community, the income accruing to the sheriff from judicial processes and perhaps through the produce 
of particular cwwn properties permanently allocated to the purpose. The extensive description of 
income due from crovm tenancies in the Cramond/Corstorphine area as listed by Edward Ill's 
administrators in 1335-6 and 1336_793 would seem to represent a pl31med structure of goods 311d 
money, including wheat, oats, barley and tiny sums of 'hen' and 'hearth' money from the minor tenants, 
presumably the cottars and others \vho provided the day labour for the properties. The proceeds from 
these properties may not have been traditionally applied to the support of the customary (and minute) 
peacetime garrisons of Scottish kings before 1296, but the men and horses would have to be fed 
somehow and the hypothecation of crown income from a local source would be a simple means of 
ensuring the delivery of rations. 
Since there was already a system of some sort in place to support the sheriff and his staff there is 
no reason to assume that Edward I did not intend to retain it as the means of supporting his own 
administration. Ifhe could make his lordship acceptable to the community there would be no great need 
to have larger complements than was customary. Indeed installing large forces might well be politically 
counterproductive, particularly if the garrisons were an economic drain on the community. Keeping the 
93 CDS, iii, p.327. 
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gamsons at traditional peacetime strengths and making only the customary demands for military 
service, castleguard and rents (,,-'hether in cash or produce) might even help to lend an air of 'business 
as usual' to the political situation. It would be very much in Edward's interests to promote the idea that 
the Dunbar campaign had brought about a change of kingship, but that that should not be a great 
concern to the political community. The practical advantage of being able to fund the administration 
from local resources would obviously have been very real to Edward; he did not invade Scotland with 
the intention of pouring money into the indefinite maintenance of his troops there - quite the reverse. It 
would have been infinitely preferable to him if the structures of government in Scotland did not make 
demands for military and fmancial resources that he could make use of elsewhere. 
It is abundantly clear that the administration in Lothian could not be secured on the basis of 
traditional levels of locally available force and revenue from the frequent demands made for provisions 
from English to\;vns and counties and the many receipts issued by garrison commanders. 94 Hovvever it 
is difficult to make firm observations from the very limited data available. The nature of the material 
demanded can, in some instances, be a very fme guide to the purpose of the demand. A purchase of 
sulphur and saltpetre can hardly indicate anything other than an intention to use a firearm or an 
explosive or combustive weapon. The provision of large quantities of food, however, is not clear 
evidence of the consumption of the garrison to which it was sent. Many English and Scottish men in 
Edwardian service received large quantities of provisions as 'prests' on their wages or as gifts. The 
incidence of these prests and gifts is impossible to estimate, but it is safe to assume that those recorded 
in Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland or Rotuli Scotiae are not the sum totaL95 Such supplies 
were generally to be collected from the stores of specific garrisons so clearly the stock issued to those 
garrisons was required to do rather more than simply feed the complement. It is quite possible, even 
94 See for example TNA, E10ln /9 and E10l1l1l7, mostly consisting of correspondence relating: to stores 
for the garrison of Edinburgh under Sir John de Kingston. Not all of the requisitions are entirely clear - two 
documents refer simply to 'frumentum' (grain). 
95 TNA, SC35/3. The requirements of garrisons were not always adequately fulfilled. When, in 1315, the 
logistic demand was less heavy due to the fall of Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Jedburgh, Selkirk and Roxburgh, 
Sir John Weston's force at Berwick was still evidently very short of provisions. 
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likely, that the major garrisons were centres for the distribution of supply to castles held by Lothian 
barons and lords in Plantagenet peace, such as Luffness or Dirleton. The disparity between the amount 
of supply provided to Edinburgh or Linlithgow and the actual consumption of the garrison may have 
been very substantial. Additionally, the stocks of produce held at a particular garrison are not a good 
indicator of the consumption of supply. In June 1311 at least three baronial castles in Lothian, Luffness, 
Dirleton and Yester, were in the charge of constables in Plantagenet peace. The garrisons of these 
castles may have consisted entirely of local landholders discharging customary castleguard obligations, 
though it is clear that two men-at-arms resident at Yester ,vith Sir Adam Welle in late 1302 were liable 
to ride out with Sir Jolm de Kingestone, constable of Edinburgh castle, 'at his command' .96 Dirleton 
castle was certainly considered a logistic responsibility of the Plantagenet administration in 1300, given 
the estimates of the 'victuals required' for the maintenance of a garrison there from January to June of 
that year.97 This is not clear evidence that Dirleton was regularly replenished by the Plantagenet 
government at all, let alone through a particular supply head such as Edinburgh, but the possibility that 
it \vas cannot be discounted. There was certainly a Plantagenet garrison oftvventy men-at-arms there in 
1300, four of whom were serving for lands in Scotland,98 and it was under the command of Sir Robert 
Mauleye in October that year at the start of a truce with the ScotS.99 The additional cost of supporting a 
handful of very small garrisons in baronial castles would be trivial in the overall expenditure required to 
support the administration as a whole and would help to maintain confidence in the administration 
among those garrisons. 
If the major installations, Edinburgh and Linlithgow, acted as the supply depots for a number of 
outlying minor strongholds, it would have been sound practice to have retained adequate stocks against 
tvvo contingencies for both LinlithgO\:v itself and the satellite installations: the possibility of a siege that 
96 CDS, v. no. 305. 
97 Ibid. 
98 INA, ElOli531n. 
99 INA, E39/100/138. 
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would require larger stocks to be retained and the possibility of accidental damage (fIre, flood, decay) to 
existing stocks. 
The nature of the supply demanded is a clear indication of the perceived need of the garrison, but it 
is not necessarily a reliable guide to the local availability of produce or goods. Wine certainly could not 
be produced in Lothian and so had to be imported, but most of the produce purchased, purveyed or 
requisitioned was of a more basic nature: wheat, oats, barley, and bacon could all be produced locally. 
Since the transport of money was, in general, rather easier to achieve than the transport of high volume 
goods, grain for instance, it would surely seem to have been more efficient to provide funds for local 
purchase. Instances of demands for particular supplies are not, however, a clear indication of what was, 
or "vas not, generally available from local sources. lOG Demands for hay in late 1301,101 for example, are 
not evidence that hay was unavailable, but that there were practical reasons for importing it at a 
particular time. With a higher proportion of land devoted to arable than pastoral production, Lothian 
may well have been an expensive place for hay at the best of times so one unseasonably wet month in 
the summer of 130 I might have pushed up prices to a point where it was economically preferable to 
import hay, even though the cost of transport may \vell have been greater than the value of the product. 
Further, if there was a shortage of hay in the Lothian market, it would not go well with the community 
if the supply was bought up for the needs of the garrison. 
A garrison at a tovm would itself become part of the local fmancial structure in that people from the 
town served in it, and some portion of the wages paid to the garrison would feed into the economy of 
the tovvn through the purchase of goods and services. According to Bower,102 eighty garrison members 
(in keeping with his nationalistic and moral standpoint Bower states that they were all Englishmen) 
were killed in 1338 when they were caught in the brothels of Edinburgh. They were, no doubt, making 
a positive contribution to the fiscal state of the community. It is clear that Lothian markets and 
merchants could not be relied on to supply all the needs of the garrison, but local provision must 
100 TNA, C471221215, Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.79. 
101 CDS, v, no. 213. 
102 Scotichronicon, vii, p.135 
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inevitably have been of some significance since local merchants were clearly trading with the garrison 
on a regular basis throughout the periods of Plantagenet rule. 
The logistical support structure of the Plantagenet administration was a sophisticated and 
successful operation in that supply was self-evidently reliable enough to prevent the fall of strongholds 
through failure of provision. Most of the chief castles of eastern Scotland - Perth, Dunbar, Dundee, 
Berwick, Edinburgh as long as the garrison controlled Leith - could be easily replenished by sea, but 
Linlithgow, and perhaps other installations would have required the delivery of supply by road from 
depots where goods could be unloaded from shipping. To this end it would seem that Blackness was 
regularly used as a delivery point for as long as Linlithgow peel was held for Edward 11. 103 It is not clear 
whether there was a permanent installation there. The earliest extant parts of Blackness castle date to 
the early part of the fIfteenth century, but it would seem likely that there would have been an 
establishment of some kind, though not necessarily manned on a permanent basis. The business of 
unloading a ship and re-packing the stores into w'agons would take some time, particularly if the stores 
had to be transferred to lighters rather than directly onto a jetty. Since such transfers, the movement of 
supplies from Linlithgovl and perhaps the further distribution of supplies to minor strongholds, were 
evidently achieved reliably (or at least reliably enough to prevent, apparently, the fall of Plantagenet 
strongholds to the Scots), it is fair to assume that, in the main, the administration was strong enough to 
prevent regular Scottish operations against the logistic structure that maintained those strongholds. The 
Scots could certainly mount operations \vithin and around Lothian, even at times w'hen the Plantagenet 
government was quite firmly entrenched, as seen from the engagements at Roslin in 1303, the capture 
of Talbot and Strivelin near Falkirk in 1334 and the fights at Edinburgh castle, Blaksollings and the 
Crags of Craigie in the 1330s, but from 1296 to 1314 and, perhaps to a lesser extent in 1333-41, they 
could not achieve the consistent local dominance required to prevent the replenishment of Plantagenet 
garrisons. The two situations \vere not the same however. In the fIrst period of Plantagenet 
administration there were three major permanent installations, Edinburgh and Linlithgow with powerful 
103 CDS, iii, no. 210; CDS, iv, p.462; CDS, v, nos. 453,492. 
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gamsons, and Livingston peel with a very mmor force. In addition to these there were an 
undeterminable number of baronial castles such as Luffuess and Dirleton and, though not a castle, the 
Hospitaller Preceptory at Torphichen. To what extent these were supported in either period of 
Plantagenet administration is unclear, but they would seem to have been a more important part of the 
military structure in 1296-1314 than in 1333-4 L The evidence is very sparse indeed, but the little that 
exists suggests that in the earlier period at least, the owners or constables of private castles could look 
to the Ed\vardian government for some degree of logistic support.104 There may have been rather fewer 
functioning castles in the later period due to the slightings attributed to Robert I, but Edward may have 
adopted a policy of a smaller deployment in fewer locations for fear of being unable to prevent 
operations against his lines of communication. 
The ability of the Bruce party to field men-at-arms was probably greater in 1333-41 than it had 
been in 1306-1312 (at least) due to their improved level of support in parts of the country where man-
at-arms service was the customary form of noble military activity, particularly the eastern seaboard 
counties. During the early years of his kingship Robert I was heavily dependent on troops from the west 
of Scotland, where there was no great local operational demand for, and therefore no established 
custom of cavalry service. Without sufficient men-at-arms to achieve local superiority on a regular 
basis, Robert I simply could not intervene adequately in Lothian until the last year or so before 
Bannockburn, so the supply system of the Plantagenet garrisons could be maintained by relatively small 
numbers of men-at-arms. How the structure fared between the fall of Edinburgh castle in March 1314 
and Bannockburn three months later is open to question. It would hardly be surprising if castles in the 
sheriffdom had surrendered to King Robert immediately after either event However, given that some 
Lothian men-at-arms served against Robert l05 at Bannockburn, it is clear that Edvv-ard II was still able to 
exert (or attract) lordship after the fall of Edinburgh castle. It is possible that some privately-owned 
Lothian castles w'ere still being held in his cause throughout the intervening period, as Dunbar was. 
104 INA. ElO1I531!7. 
105 Or, in the case of Alexander Seton, planned to do so, but chose to defect to the Bruce party. 
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Shortage of supply was a much less critical factor in the security of the Plantagenet 
administration of Lothian than military and political failures. The military dominance of Edward 1's 
government was enough to keep Lothian in English hands, but after his death, the failure of Edward 
II to mount operations that would effectively stop Bruce expansion, and his inability to save his 
supporters from blackmail, eventually undermined confidence in the Plantagenet cause. The same 
applied in 1333-41. Edward III could not provide the 'good lordship' necessary to retain control 
over Lothian. To some extent this was a product of his operations elsewhere. His resources were 
drained by his French campaigns. The Balliol cause did not enjoy enough popularity across 
Scotland to win power without a large commitment of English troops and money. Scottish military 
success in 1335-41 can hardly have encouraged Englishmen to enlist for service in Scotland. 
Casualties, and defectors, among the disinherited would have been very hard to replace. The 
properties of men killed in action might, in theory, pass to their heir, assuming that they had one, or 
escheat to Edward III or Edward Balliol if they did not. In practice, as the Bruce party achieved 
dominance, there was little chance of securing effective possession. In tum, that dominance 
enhanced the attractions of defection. If the Bruce party could offer a reasonable accommodation 
and more secure lordship, there was little value in adhering to the Balliol cause. Even by 1337 or 
1338 it must have been increasingly clear that the Balliol cause had been lost and that the 
Plantagenet administration was failing. Under these circumstances it must surely have been a 
challenge to attract men who would give service for the unlikely possibility of becoming an 
established heritable landholder in Scotland. This does not indicate that Edward III was never 
confident that Scotland could be conquered. Like his father and his grandfather, he defmitely 
favoured the formation of one British kingdom under one English king. Unlike them, he was 
prepared to adjust his political aims to conform to prevailing tactical and strategic realities. 
CHAPTERS 
ALLEGIANCE AND SERVICE 
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Allegiance and service were virtually inseparable topics in the lives of medieval landholders, whether in 
Lothian or anywhere else. If a landholder wished to retain their property they simply had to accept the 
authority of whichever party was currently in a position to exert the power of government. In return for 
accepting the authority of the government the landholder would naturally look to that government to 
provide a stable and secure environment and the government would expect the landholder to discharge 
the various obligations attached to the property. From 1296 until the 13S0s the most significant of those 
burdens was military service, not simply because of the obvious value of armed men in time of war but 
because the discharge of military service was a clear indication of current allegiance. Naturally this cut 
both ways. Those who lost their inheritances under the Plantagenets would have an incentive to join the 
Bruce party on the understanding that a Bruce victory would lead to the recovery of their property and 
those who lost their estates under the Bruces would be likely to join or remain in Plantagenet peace in 
the hope of an eventual Plantagenet victory. Either way, if an individual wished to gain, retain or 
recover lands, they would almost inevitably be obliged to discharge military service for a superior, 
generally the person from whom they held the property. In Lothian the high incidence of 'in capite' 
landholding meant that for a large proportion of the political community military service was owed 
directly to the crown rather than to an intermediate level of authority. This chapter is concerned with the 
operational and material realities of that service: operational in the sense that it examines the extent of 
military obligation and the actual activity of those called upon to discharge service, and material in the 
sense of examining the nature and cost of the equipment required for an individual to fulfil their 
contractual and/or customary military obligations. 
ARMY SERVICE. 
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The duty of every man to perform 'Common Army' service was unquestionably in place long before 
the Wars of Independence, 1 but so little is understood of the terms of service and the organisation of the 
troops raised that we can say virtually nothing about any aspect of the army it produced. We cannot 
even say that the system of enlistment, the equipment or the tactical application of the force raised was 
good bad or indifferent. The army that was raised to oppose Edward I in 1296 did not come to blows 
with the enemy, but simply disintegrated in the wake of the defeat of the heavy cavalry element of King 
John's army near Dunbar. It would seem that the Scottish cavalry had been making an attempt to raise 
the siege of the castle but were intercepted by a formation of English men-at-arms and quickly beaten. 
The defeat led to the surrender of the castle and the end of effective resistance to Edward I until the 
risings of William Wallace, Andrew Murray and the magnate-led revolt that fizzled out at Irvine in 
1297. 
If we hope to gain any insight into military affairs in Lothian c.1300, we must look to English 
records, simply because there are so few Scottish ones. Naturally, this tells us much more about the 
forces of the Edwardian administration than it does about their opponents, but Edward's garrisons 
contained many identifiable Scots and probably many more that cannot be identified. These men, not all 
from Lothian admittedly, would not seem to have been any different from their peers among the petty 
nobility, free tenants and burgesses who comprised the local political community. Military service 
obligations were part of their lives regardless of which king was in power. The contention that the fear 
of losing property in England was always sufficient to keep Lothian landholders loyal to Edward I does 
not bear examination given the number of people who were forfeited of English estates. Hugh and 
Margaret de Penicuik for example (see Appendix). What we can learn about the Lothian men in English 
service is likely often to hold true for their neighbours in the BaHiol or Bruce camps. There seems to be 
no evidence of forfeitures of pro-Plantagenet Scots by the Balliol party between 1297 and 1304, an 
indication perhaps that they did not feel confident about using forfeiture as a weapon, either because the 
1, G.W.S. Barrow 'The Army of Alexander Ill's Scotland', Reid, Alexander III, p.133; Duncan, Scotland. 
pp.380-81. 
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absence of a king deprived them of sufficient authority to do so, because they did not feel that they 
could enforce such forfeitures or because they felt that forfeiture might alienate potential supporters 
among the uncommitted. 
The lack of a document listing forfeitures of Plantagenet supporters in similar vein to the forfeiture 
of Bruce supporters in 1306 and 1312 is not proof that forfeitures did not take place. Several of the 
properties granted by Robert I to his supporters had been at one time the property of Plantagenet 
supporters or of men implicated in the de Soulis conspiracy. Not all of the grants made by King Robert 
would necessarily have been the product of politically inspired forfeitures (estates could, for example, 
fall to the crown through failure to produce an heir), but several were. Sir James Douglas2 and Sir 
Robert Lauder3 benefited from the forfeiture for treason of Sir Peter Lubaud sometime before 1316, Sir 
Laurence de Abernethy benefited from the forfeiture of Ingelram de Guines,4 Hugh de Vickers profited 
from the forfeiture of Adam de Mindrum and William de Dalton5 and Melrose abbey from the death in 
exile of Sir John de Soulis,6 all of whom had been active in the Plantagenet or Balliol causes. 
It is distinctly possible that for the campaign that led to the battle of Dupplin Muir the disinherited 
party were able to enlist significant numbers of men (out of an army of only 1500 to 2000 admittedly) 
from minor landholders who had left Scotland, or been driven out, in the period after Bannockburn and 
had not made their peace with King Robert. In order to attract men to his service, Balliol was obviously 
under some pressure to restore those men to their property, or, at the very least, provide them with 
comparable alternative prospects. The drawback to restoration was that it required either the acceptance 
of the current landholders or their removal. The former might be a viable matter for negotiation, but 
Edward can hardly have expected to be able to remove men from property granted them by Robert I in 
order to restore his own supporters but still attract them to his allegiance. Bruce grants of forfeited 
property were of course calculated to promote loyalty and exclude opposition. The best prospect for the 
2 RMS. i, no. 3 . 
.3 RRS, v, p. 367. 
4 RivfS, i, no, 6. 
5 MIS, i, no. 14. 
6 RMS, i, app. i, no. 14; RRS, v, pp. 465-6. 
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permanent retention of such properties therefore lay in the success of the Bruce cause since the 
ambitions of the Balliol party were so dependant on restoration of the disinherited and thus on the 
forfeiture of those who had gained land from King Robert. The whole process of granting land was 
both a means of encouraging support, and, just as importantly, of discouraging defection. A man who 
had profited by his service and allegiance to the Bruce cause might be dissuaded from defection by the 
prospect of having to surrender land to a member of the disinherited who (or whose forbear) had lost 
that land during the previous conflict. We might consider that the sources of lordship, Bruce, 
Plantagenet and Balliol had an interest in raising the stakes for landholders who wavered in their 
allegiance. From the Bruce standpoint the large numbers of Scots who served in the Plantagenet 
administration between 1296 and l314 must have been an incentive to bind the political community as 
closely to the Bruce party as could be arranged and hopefully prevent them from joining any future 
Plantagenet or Balliol campaign. 
Edward I had been able to recruit men for his garrisons and collect the military dues of some 
proportion of the Lothian landholders within a matter of months of Dunbar. Presumably he would not 
otherwise have been restoring men to their forfeited property.7 It would, however, be surprising if 
absolutely no Scots served quite voluntarily in English armies in other theatres in search of adventure or 
a military career. Some served to procure release: eleven knights and fifty-three scutifers, prisoners of 
war after Dunbar, were released to serve in Flanders in the autumn of 1296,8 and others, including 
Patrick, son of the Earl of Dunbar, were intending to join Edward there in May 1297.9 
Although the imposition of service in Edward's armies in France and Flanders seems to have been a 
concern of the Scots in the period of insurrection before the pacification of l304 there seems to have 
been little if any pressure on the populace as a whole to perform that service. 10 The fears of conscription 
that were alleged by the leaders of the 'noble' rising of 1297 (the Bishop of Glasgow, Robert Bruce and 
7 CDS. ii, no. 832. 
8 Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.l40. 
9 Ibid., p, 166. 
10 There is no record of an attempt to demand common army service in Lothian. 
188 
John the Stewart) to have fuelled resistance seem to have been without foundation, though several Scots 
who had become prisoners of war after the fight at Dunbar and the fall of Dunbar castle chose to serve 
Edward in Flanders as a means of achieving release from prison and of earning the restoration of their 
lands. 11 There is no evidence to suggest that bodies of troops were raised in Scotland as discrete parts of 
Edwardian armies in the way that they were in Ireland or Wales. 12 This is perhaps surprising given the 
perennial manpower shortages that curtailed Edward's military policies. 13 The principle of recruiting 
defeated enemies for service elsewhere was hardly a revolutionary concept, but in practice Scots were 
chiefly enlisted for service 'within Scotland. This might conceivably be a product of Edward's 
experience in the use of such forces. Large contingents were raised several times from Wales for 
service in Scotland, but their reliability was open to question. The failure of Edward's logistical effort 
in 1298 caused rioting and near mutiny among the Welsh troops on the eve of the battle of F alkirk. 14 
Once the Edwardian administration was in place any Lothian landholder who wanted to retain his 
position in society would have to discharge the various burdens attendant on that position, and that 
would inevitably include some degree of military obligation. Army service obligations took a number 
of forms; indeed all male members of the society from age sixteen to sixty were theoretically liable for 
army service twice over. The obligation on all men to serve the king for up to forty days at their own 
expense was not the whole extent of anyone's burden because they could be called out any number of 
tinleS in addition to those forty days in the event of a military emergency. IS 
CASTLEGUARD. 
The more prominent members of the community had to be prepared to carry a good deal more of a 
burden than that. The majority of landholders were obliged to perform military service for the person 
from whom they held their estate. This service took two forms, knight service in the field, or at least in 
the retinue of the superior, and castleguard. The latter term is superficially self-evident, but should not 
II Rot Scot., i, p.44; CDS, ii, nos. 889,892,940,942. 
12 Stevenson, Documents, i, p. 470. 
13 Rot Scot., i, p.292. 
14 Watson, Hammer, pp. 65-66. 
15 G.W.S.Barrow 'The Army of Alexander III's Scotland' in Reid, Alexander III, p.135. 
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perhaps be taken too literally. Performing forty days castleguard, which would seem to have been the 
normal requirement, would have been an irritating obligation for most, if not all, tenants, but it was 
probably less than totally practical for the superiors to \vhom it was due. Certainly it would have been 
very difficult indeed to rely on castleguard obligations to provide the entirety of a garrison even if the 
total of service due would have been theoretically sufficient to provide the manpower. In practice it 
would be enormously difficult to maintain good security if the membership of the garrison changed 
every forty days, and what would the service of forty days performed personally really be worth if the 
vassal owing the service were a child or too aged to serve? Obviously there must have been a system 
for substitution or for payment in lieu. That castleguard payments were collected is not in doubt. 
Castleguard had been collected by Alexander III16 and, presumably, by his predecessor, since it is from 
his reign that Bernard de Hadden's (or Hauden) confirmation of castleguard (and other) obligations 
dates.17 The chamberlain's accounts from June 1328 to September 132918 show an income of £40 from 
this source and this is remarkably close to the £34 2s 8d collected by Sir John de Strivelin for the 
administration of Edward III in the period 1335-36. Sir John collected a further £30 from Haddington 
and £7 5s 6d from Linlithgow. 19 Castleguard was not an innovation of the Edwardian government 
adopted by King Robert. There are examples of castleguard payments in the exchequer rolls from the 
administration of the guardians. 20 Castleguard payments do not figure regularly in the chamberlain's 
accounts generally, and it is perhaps possible that they were normally the responsibility of another part 
of the administration of Scottish kings. Given that in 1328 the chamberlain, Robert de Peebles, took 
Castleguard payments from the bishopric of St Andrews21 and in 1329 from the sheriffdom of 
Edinburgh,22 and that in 1359 the sheriff of Lanark collected £13 for castleguard and declared it to the 
16 Duncan, Scotland, p. 383. 
17 RMS, i, app. i, no. 55. 
18 ER, i,p.1l2. 
19 CDS, iii, p.329. 
20 ER, i, p. 45. The Castleguard due from Berwickshire amounted to £75 6s 8d for 1288. 
21 Ibid., p. 112. 
22 Ibid., i, p.205. 
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chamberlain23 we can see that the chamberlain could account for such money, but it is hardly 
established that he generally, or even normally, did so. The sum collected in 1359 came from ten 
Lanarkshire baronies at a rate of 20s each and one at 40S,24 however not all of the Lanarkshire baronies 
paid castleguard. One of the baronies, Hartshead, in Lanarkshire, paid nothing because it was in ward 
and two were in the hands of Thomas de Moray, who appears to have been excused castleguard through 
an arrangement with the late King (Robert I). It would seem unlikely that Lanarkshire barons were 
alone among the Scottish nobility in having to make castleguard payments and the extent of David II's 
administration in 1359 surely precludes any possibility that Lothian landholders avoided those 
payments because they were outwith his rule. If Lanarkshire landholders were paying castleguard we 
can safely assume that their counterparts in Lothian had to do the same. Certainly castleguard had been 
deemed collectable in Lothian as recently as May 1329 when Robert I had granted an annual of 20 
merks to the Grey Friars of Dundee from castleguard income due from Edinburgh,25 and it would be 
unreasonable to assume that his successor, David, did not continue to collect that income. There are 
instances of castleguard from other communities during Robert 1's reign, but none as heavy as that 
demanded from the Lothian constabularies. The chamberlain's accounts for 132926 include £4 lOs from 
Stirling, £7 5s from Dumfries, £14 13s 4d from Berwick and £20 2d from Roxburgh. In 1330 the 
Castleguard of Edinburgh amounted to only £l6?7 It would seem unlikely that these payments were 
unique, rather they were either not recorded at all, which seems improbable, or they were recorded 
elsewhere, or the relevant record simply has not survived. Assuming, as Professor Duncan does,28 that 
castleguard was normally administered by the sheriff, this would hardly be surprising given the scarcity 
of shrieval records generally, although one must wonder why there are isolated examples of castleguard 
being accounted to the chamberlain. On the other hand the sheriff presumably had to account for his 
23 Ibid., i. p.582 
24 Ibid. 
25 RRS, v, p.627. 
26 ER, i, p. 205. 
27 Ibid., p.283. 
21)uncan, Scotland, p.383-6. 
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collection, and presumably his disbursement, of these funds to a responsible officer in the king's 
government. 
A relationship between tenure by knight service and castleguard responsibilities and its continuity 
from one generation to another is supported by a charter29 of Alexander II to the laird of Hadden, 
Roxburghshire which required the recipient to pay 20s annually for his castleguard due to Roxburgh 
castle 'for what pertains to a knight's fief'. The evidence for the existence of this charter derives from 
its confirmation by Robert I in favour of Bernard de Hadden confirming the commutation for a cash 
settlement of his castleguard duties. This charter clearly states that Bernard was obliged to pay 20s 
annually for castleguard at Roxburgh, or, if required, to serve there for forty days in lieu of that 
payment as the service that pertains to the 'service of one knight'. It would be rash to assume that 
castleguard service was only required from knights (Bernard is not described as 'miles' in the charter) 
or that the stipulated forty days or 20s. payment was the sum total of responsibility. Bernard's charter 
makes it quite clear that further garrison duty at Roxburgh ""ould be required in an emergency; 
however, if Bernard served in the king's army either north of the Forth or south of the border he would 
be excused service or payment for that year.30 Evidently the provision that Bernard should serve at 
Roxburgh in the event of an emergency still held regardless of his army service elsewhere; what is not 
so clear is whether the type of service performed had a bearing on castleguard exemption. Like anyone 
else, Bernard owed service in the king's army as a general obligation to the state, but if his knight 
service for landholding was a separate obligation it is surely possible that he might have to discharge 
that service without affecting his castleguard duties. 
The fact that castleguard obligation on Bernard and his heirs was specifically apportioned to 
Roxburgh perhaps suggests a system designed to provide garrisons for the king' s castles in a manner 
that ,vould allow for a rotation of troops from the vicinity, men who would be likely to know one 
29 RMS. i, app. i, no. 55. 
30 Ibid,' ... .if war or emergency should arise through which they have to do their ward in our said castle, 
and they remain there for forty days, they are to be quit for that year of the said 20s ..... [if] an emergency 
occurs, they are to enter our said castle to defend it or pass to the army should need arise.'. Translation 
from Donaldson, Documents, p. 54. 
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another or at least share common regional interests. This does not mean that the entirety of a garrison 
was necessarily provided by castleguard obligations, and we may be on safer ground if we assume that 
the intention was to supplement a permanent complement. In l36631 Simon Reid, custodian of 
Edinburgh castle, received £26 l3s 4d, or 40 merks, for sentries and expenses and similar arrangements 
can be found for other castles. Forty merks was a considerable sum, but the 'roundness' of the sum 
rather suggests a customary payment or agreed fee as opposed to an exact accounting of actual costs, a 
possibility supported by the £20 paid to Malcohn Fleming for his role at Dumbarton castle recorded in 
the same document. It might be reasonable to assume that these payments were intended to cover, or at 
least contribute toward, the running costs ofthe garrison additional to the castleguard income. 
Even a very tiny permanent garrison structure has implications for army service more generally, 
particularly with regard to training and articulation. The evolutions and drill standards required of 
medieval soldiers might not have been terribly sophisticated, but some degree of practice among even a 
very small cadre would be essential if Scottish troops were to be made effective in the rather short 
periods for which large forces were raised. The controlled deployment and engagement of bodies of 
men - in scores, let alone hundreds or thousands - requires a degree of articulation that cannot be easily 
achieved without an element of structured training.32 The organisation of the army for most 
administrative purposes might be adequately carried out by local or customary leadership in the sense 
of personal followings, but in the event of such a leader becoming a casualty or simply not being 
present at a given place and moment - a leader might for example be absent from the infantry element 
of his following due to being involved in an operation involving only the cavalry - there would need to 
be another means of exerting control if the commanders' orders were to be carried out. A rotation of 
men serving in garrisons would have been a good opportunity to provide a cadre of at least partially 
trained men without calling upon "Scottish" or "common army" service which would have -potentially-
31 The Chamberlain Rolls, i, p.459 
32 Beyond noting the prohibition of football, golf and other games in favour of archery, training has 
received little attention from historians. C.T. Allmand Society at War. The Experience of France and 
England During the Hundred Years Tflarpp. 97-100, notes only two pieces of evidence relating to training, 
both of which allude to the desirability of military training rather than the practice. 
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a very positive effect on the competence of a large force when one was required. If the men of the army 
were reasonably competent personally very little would be required in the way of subordinate 
leadership, but it would be almost impossible to achieve any sort of continuity of command ,vithout 
some means of ensuring that orders were executed in the absence of specific individuals. This is 
conjecture of course, but there must have been some means of achieving and maintaining operational 
and administrative control over the army over and above aristocratic leadership liabilities. Since we are 
aware that particular individuals could have leadership responsibilities in particular arms of service 
(tvvo men killed in action at Perth are described as 'commanders of the Scottish archers,3~ we must 
accept that the articulation of medieval Scottish forces allowed for division by arm of service within the 
army. If the rank and file of Scottish archers served under what historians34 have agreed to be the 
normal conditions of military service to the Scottish crown, they could expect to be in the field for forty 
days (at their own expense) before being 'rotated' with other men. The fiscal advantage to the crown of 
such a system is obvious, but the practical difficulties are equally so. Without a well-established and 
clearly-understood hierarchy and tactical and administrative practices the forces raised would be 
extremely inefficient since each new draft of 'forty day' men would have to be brought to a state of 
combat readiness from a very low base indeed. 
The theoretical means of providing castles with garrisons, castleguard, also required a sophisticated 
approach to accounting if the service and/or money owed were to be collected effectively. The sums 
demanded for castleguard were not large. The rate of commuted payment works out a 6d per diem, but 
we should not necessarily assume that 6d a day was in any sense the "going rate" for army service 
generally. Presumably men performing castleguard served "all found", i.e. the administration of the 
castle provided the men of the garrison with rations rather than the men having to arrange their own 
33 Scotichronicon, vii, p. 142-3. Alan Boyd and John Stirling: are described as 'rectores architenencium'. 
The term 'architenencium' may indicate crossbow archers. One of the advantages of the crossbow, 
particularly in siege situations, was that it could be held in a 'loaded' condition and was therefore 
particuiarly useful against fleeting targets of opportunity and more practical for a 'sniping' role than a 
longbow. 
34 G.W.S. Barrow, 'The Army of Alexander III's Scotland' Reid,Alexander III, p.l3S; Nicholson, Aliddle 
Ages, p.49. 
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food supply. The onus on Paisley abbey to find five chalders of oatmeal for Dumbarton castle35 in 
exchange for exemption from various royal obligations surely supports this - but in any case the 
castleguard commutation rate had been set as much as one hundred years before Bernard de Hadden 
received his charter and was probably no longer genuinely economic due to the increasingly monetised 
Scottish economy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.36 Certainly it would not compare favourably 
with the rates of pay offered by Edwardian administrations between 1296 and the middle of the 
fourteenth century. However those rates were of recent origin and perhaps reflect the necessity to attract 
men to military service and we cannot be sure that we are comparing like with like. The 2s. per day 
offered for knightly men-at-arms serving the Edwardian government in Scottish garrisons in the 
fourteenth century37 is a reflection of a potentially rather more "active", and therefore dangerous, form 
of service and also the requirement for men undertaking that service to provide themselves with an 
expensive charger as well as an inducement for those men to serve away from home, or, in the case of 
Scots in Edwardian garrisons, perhaps to induce men to serve in a less than popular cause. Edwardian 
government may have been stable at different times, but that does not mean that it was welcome. 
More significantly, paid garrison service under the Plantagenets was a contractual arrangement of a 
"stand alone" nature, independent of landholding, whereas castleguard was part of a more complex 
structure, traditionally assumed to be connected to knight service and land tenure. The two forms of 
service were not mutually exclusive in the sense that they were performed by different personnel. There 
is no reason to assume that men who were granted Scottish estates by the Plantagenets or by Edward 
Balliol as a reward for service were excused the existing castleguard obligations attached to those 
estates, though there is the possibility that men who were in service all the year round might be excused 
their obligation or pay a fee in lieu of their service - they were, after all, receiving wages from the 
crown. 
35 RRS. v, p.679. 
36 Duncan, Scotland. pp. 395-6. 
37 CDS, ii, no. 1321. 
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When we read of men in Edwardian garrisons serving "for their lands in Scotland,,38 they might, 
theoretically, just as easily be men fulfilling their obligations as Scottish landholders in the "peace" of 
English kings or men who had gained Scottish properties through service to those kings and they might 
be discharging castleguard or "normal" military service commitments. In each case their unpaid service 
may be additional to salaried professional soldiering but since they are not named we have no way of 
identifying either the nature of their commitment or their nationality. It would seem likely that most of 
them were men in the following of English lords who had received extensive property in Scotland from 
Edward 1. Given that Sir John de St. John's retinue alone was short of forty men-at-arms in the summer 
of 1302 when the planned strength of the Scottish garrisons was only 507 this would seem to have been 
a policy of limited value. 39 
Army service for Scots seems to have been divided into two separate forms of responsibility- a duty 
to serve north of the Forth or south of the Forth. Bernard's service -if required- north of the Forth or 
south of the border is clearly defmed, but no mention is made of service between the Forth and the 
border. It may therefore be reasonable to assume that such service was covered by the universal 
obligation to serve for forty days at his own expense and that such service did not need to be defined 
since it was an obligation on all of the king's subjects. On the basis of the early thirteenth-century 
charter (or rather King Robert's confirmation of that charter) to the lairds of Hadden, Professor Duncan 
has suggested that castleguard 'represents that army service that did not cross the bounds of Lothian; it 
is the defence of the province which is found in both Northumbria and Scotia as forinsec service or its 
equivalent' .40 This may be a valid interpretation, but the case is not securely made. Since all men had an 
obligation to perform military service we must accept the possibility - at least - that since castleguard 
was a defmed duty it was an additional burden. 
3SIbid .. no. 1324. 
39 CDS, ii, no. 1324. The shortfall form this retinue alone represents nearly 111 Oth of the required 
complement. 
4cnuncan, Scotland, p.385. 
196 
Income designed to support the king's castles was not necessarily either fmancial or physical. As 
we have seen, an undated act of Robert 141 freed Paisley Abbey from an annual burden of five chalders 
of oatmeal for the garrison of Dumbartoll castle and in l33942 Robert the Steward relieved the priory of 
St. Andrews from the responsibility for payments toward the support of the Loch Leven garrison that 
the priory had undertaken on behalf of the "community" of Fife. Whether this was a normal burden on 
that community or an extraordinary demand occasioned by the demands of the war is unclear, but there 
can be no doubt that communities could be responsible for such support at least in times of crisis. 
The precise theoretical nature of castleguard as a burden is not absolutely clear and the operational 
nature of that service is no more so, inasmuch as we cannot be sure that documents that define 
castleguard responsibilities of an individual are typical of such arrangements or if the fact that the duties 
are clearly defined actually infers that the stated obligations were in fact atypical, hence the need to 
make a formal statement of those duties. Furthermore it is unclear whether it was related only to the 
needs of the king or whether it extended to the relationship between nobles and their tenants. Nobles 
had to garrison their castles somehow and in the absence of references to hired soldiers it would seem 
fair to assume that the tenants of barons contributed in some way to the manpower requirements of their 
superiors. In l335-36 Dunbar castle was receiving castleguard payments - mostly of lOs - from 
properties in the vicinity, but it is not clear that these payments were a normal part of the Earl's income 
or if they were extraordinary payments allowed to him as an adherent of Edward III for the upgrading 
of the castle. However since similar sums were still being collected43 more than 100 years later (when 
the value of currency had d"windled considerably) we might be entitled to assume that they were normal 
practice for the Earls of Dunbar. Earl Patrick in tum owed £3044 per aIiliUm castleguard to Berwick 
castle while it was in the hands of Edward III, but it is not clear whether this was the normal practice 
under the kings of Scots; the evidence ,ve have for this payment in the accounts of the Edwardian 
41 RRS, v, p.679. 
J2 RRS, vi,p. 63. 
4nuncan, Scotland, p.384. 
44 CDS. iii, p.368. 
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sheriff of Berwick 1336-37 refers to the period after the Earl's defection to the Scots and may not be a 
valid reflection of normal practice but an innovation of Edward Ill's government of the territories. 
What we might call- for want of a better term- national, or perhaps kingly, war was a much more 
regular event in the first half of the fourteenth century than it had been in the thirteenth, but what 
landholder was going to be able to defy a king's army at the gate? The landholder might have the men 
to defend his walls, but only for a certain number of days, and the men on whom the landholder 
depended had their own concerns. While they were undoubtedly due service to their lord they were also 
due both service and obedience to the king. As long as there was competition between rivals for the 
crown the position of minor landholders \vas very vulnerable to changes in higher authority. If they 
chose to support their immediate superior they might find themselves on the wrong side of whichever 
crown claimant was currently in control of the area; if they chose not to support their immediate 
landlord they might well fmd themselves dispossessed should the changing fortunes of war start to 
favour the other side. In 1296 Patrick, Earl of Dunbar was granted45 by Edward I the forfeitures of those 
of his tenants who had not yet come to the king's peace, complete with the services of all relevant 
subtenants. Patrick was not the only recipient of this bounty. Writs were issued to several sheriffs in 
favour of ten other magnates at the same time. Edward III was not so generous (or trusting?). In March 
1334 he gave instructions to sheriffs to allow Patrick to occupy the property of forfeited tenants, but 
only for a fixed period46 and also allowed him to retain the £30 per annum of castleguard due to 
Berwick from his properties until a total of 100 merks had been retained for upgrading Dunbar castle: a 
privilege no doubt much resented when the castle was under siege by the English in 1338 assuming that 
the funds had actually been spent on re-fortification. 47 
Castleguard evidence is thin and scattered and the threads of information are quite varied. The 
obligation on Paisley abbey to supply oatmeal for Dumbarton, the undertaking of St. Andrews priory of 
~5 CDS. ii, no. 853. 
J6 CDS, iii, no. 1115. 
47Jbid., no. 1121. Patrick also received some direct financial support. In 13 34 he issued a receipt for £ 1 00 
of £600 granted by Edward III. TNA, E421269 
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responsibility for payment to the Loch Leven garrison on behalf of the community, the sums collected 
by Edwardian and Bruce administrations all suggest a structured system of financial, produce and 
personal service contributions to a network of royal garrisons supported by a wider segment of the 
society than just landholders with knight service obligations. 
INCENTIVES, COERCION, LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND. 
Traditionally it has been assumed that only English kings and their lieutenants could mobilise the 
resources to pay soldier's wages, but this is making an assumption based on a lack of evidence rather 
than a deduction based on knowledge. There are no Scottish magnate financial accounts showing wage 
rates for employed troops, but there is very little in the way of Scottish fmancial records for the 
transactions of the crown let alone of the aristocracy. David II, when faced with the prospect of a major 
aristocratic revolt, drew £60048 from his treasury to pay soldiers. It has been generally assumed that this 
money would have been expended on men-at-arms. 49 At a rate of a shilling a da/o he could have 
procured the services of 1200 men-at arms for ten days, but such a force ",,·ould have been of very 
limited value without the archers and spearmen necessary to conduct a combined arms battle, and in 
any case, those of sufficient standing to equip themselves as men-at-arms were exactly the people with 
most to lose from changes in the government - whether through conquest or revolution. If they did not 
turn out to support the king they might well find themselves disinherited by a new regime which would 
inevitably have supporters who would need to be rewarded- and the same people were also most at risk 
from retribution should the crown survive an attempted revolution without their help- they did after all 
inevitably owe army service to the king even if they did not hold land from him directly. In any case, 
1200 men-at-arms was a substantial, but not huge force even by the standards of the mid-fourteenth 
century, and the quality of Scottish men-at-arms (and their horses) was not necessarily of the highest 
calibre. A combination of two or three powerful magnates might well aspire to raise such a force. 
48 Nicholson,1VJiddle Ages, p.168. 
~9 M. Penman 'The Kingship of David II' PhD. thesis CSt. Andre"vs, 1988) p.140. 
50 Ayton, Knights, pp. 108-120. 
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According to Fordun, in the winter of 1335, when much of southern Scotland was in Plantagenet 
control, Sir William Douglas of Liddesdale, the Earl of Dunbar and Sir Andrew Murray were able to 
raise a considerable force, from the counties below the Forth and lead it to Culblean.51 If on the other 
hand David was paying wages to more humble types of soldier his money could go a long way to 
procuring an army beyond the capacities of any group of nobles. At a rate of threepence a day - which 
would be reasonable wages by the standards of the mid-fourteenth century - he would be able to 
maintain 4800 infantry for the same ten-day period. An infantry army was of course very vulnerable to 
sudden attack, particularly on the march, but David was due knight service and perhaps the earlier, less 
prestigious "riding service"s2 from landholders in sufficient quantity that he should have had no great 
difficulty in raising an appropriate cavalry arm whose loyalty was dependent not on daily wages but on 
their continuing ownership of land. 
The composition of David's army in 1363 is not the issue however. The point is that this is a clear 
example of a Scottish army in receipt of 'vages. The fact that this is the earliest example of waged 
Scottish soldiers (other than knights in household service) does not mean that Scottish soldiers had not 
been paid on previous occasions. Robert I was able to keep his armies in England from despoiling those 
areas that paid their ransoms; the army besieging Stirling in 1299 was in action for several months; the 
troops besieging Perth in 133953 were maintained by a cash subsidy from the Abbey of Arbroath 
(although it should be noted that the Steward, acting as guardian was clear that this was not to be 
regarded as a precedent). The garrison of Loch Leven castle in the same year54 was supported by a 
financial levy on the community of Fife, administered by the prior of St. Andrews, and presumably had 
been supported in previous years through the same or similar arrangements. It would seem 
unreasonable to assume that the men who performed military service, particularly in situations where 
51 Scotichronicon, vii, p.117. Bower's term is 'electi' - picked men. 
52 G.W.S. Barrow 'Northern English Society' in Barrow, Neighbours. 
53 RRS, vi, p. 63. 
54 Ibid., pp. 63-4. 
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little or nothing could be expected in the way of ransoms55 or plunder, were rewarded with nothing 
more than their keep for their efforts. Naturally men who had been forfeited by one side would likely 
appear on the other in the hope of regaining their heritages. Such men could be relied upon to fIght for 
the sake of their keep, but there would not have been a great many of them. Whilst accepting that 
numerical strength is only one factor among many, and that although it is always signifIcant it is very 
seldom the most significant factor in achieving victory, it is clear that the eventual successes of the 
Bruce party were dependent on their ability to draw men away from Plantagenet lordship in greater 
quantity than the Plantagenets could induce acceptance of their rule. 
In any conflict, examining the relationship of the size of the force to the extent of the area of 
operational responsibility is a crucial part of gaining an understanding of the progress and outcome of 
the operations that comprise that conflict. Neither looking at the map nor counting heads on wage rolls 
will actually make much impression on that understanding unless it is done with an eye to the nature of 
terrain applied rather more closely than maps will allow and with a thought to both the objectives of 
operations conducted and the demands and conditions- economic, military and political- that the force 
in place must also address. We may be aware that the garrison of a particular castle consisted of a 
specifIed number of men, and even the distribution of those men between men-at-arms, archers 
(perhaps divided between longbowmen and crossbowmen) and other infantry, but that does not give us 
any information about how many men the garrison commander could afford to commit to a field 
operation. The men of the garrison would have a number of duties to fulfil- enforcing generallaw-and-
order, collecting rents and taxes, protecting convoys, gathering intelligence, disrupting the operations of 
the enemy, maintaining a visible military (and therefore political) presence in front of the local 
populace and of course the defence of the castle or burgh where the garrison was based. 
55 There was always the possibility of being taken prisoner oneself. Sir Andrew Harcla struggled to raise 
the money needed for his ransom in the autumn of 1316, rnA, C4 712211 0/27. A hostage need not be a 
prisoner of war in the sense of having been captured on the battlefield. Hostages were given as security for 
the ransoms of communities. Robert Goldwyn served as a hostage for Bamburgh in 1316. CIPM, viii, no. 
141. 
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The forfeiture of Lothian landowners in the years before Bannockbum56 clearly shows that the Bruce 
party was not without support in the Lothian area. Some of this support was undoubtedly because the 
lando\vners concerned had extensive property elsewhere in Scotland, which they feared losing if King 
Robert \vas successful, and which they did not think they w·ould regain through the actions of King 
Edward. Some of these Lothian landholders may have been motivated by a strong sense of what, as 
Professor Barrow says, 'older historians were content to call the national cause',57 but we should not 
ignore the possibility that increasing desertion of the Edwardian cause in the period 1307-early 1314, 
demonstrated by a handful of forfeitures in 131258 was a product of the operational situation, brought on 
by the inability of the administration to keep the Bruce party out of Lothian or by the general military 
success of King Robert's forces. 
The extensive restorations that can be identified after the battle of Dunbar are a strong indication 
that some form of 'blanket' forfeiture may have been enacted against all those who served King John in 
the 1296 campaign. It is not impossible that such an act may even have preceded hostilities in the hope, 
perhaps successful, that some people might be deterred from serving at alL The forfeiture of minor 
landholders seems to have been a sentence that could be rescinded on acceptance into the Plantagenet 
peace at the discretion of the sheriff or by a wTit from the king to the sheriff. In the summer and 
autumn of 1296 restorations were ordered for at least thirty-five mesne tenants and forty-three tenants 
in chief in twenty-eight different counties in ScotlaIld59 aIld a further flfty-eight, mostly free tenants 
from Lothian, Berwick, Roxburgh, Lanark and Stirling were restored on the third September 1296,60 
perhaps as a result of formally giving their allegiance to Edward since virtually all of them were 
Ragman Roll homagers on or before 28 August 1296. 
Forfeiture was the "last resort" sanction against rebellious landholders because although it could be 
reversed, and in the period after the battle of Dunbar there are many examples of this, repeated 
56 CDS. iii, no. 245. 
57.Barrow Neighbours, p.156. 
58 CDS, ii, no. 245. 
59 Ibid .. no. 853. 
60 Ibii no. 832. 
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restoration and forfeiture undermined the value of it as a threat to the recalcitrant and thereby damaged 
the prestige of the king. Although forfeiture was self-evidently not a successful policy, insofar as it was 
not effective in deterring defection to the Balliol or Bruce causes, it would be ~Tong to assume that it 
was a failed policy kept in place through inertia. The application of forfeiture was by no means the 
same in 1312 for example as it was in 1335.61 In any event, we should not assume that the lands 
forfeited were necessarily in the control of the Edwardian administration, though some certainly were 
since revenue was being raised from them. In one case the return was actually greater than the normal 
peacetime valuation,62 an indication perhaps of the difference between the rental of the property and the 
actual return to the landholder. The landholder could be declared forfeit even though the administration 
was not in a position to enforce its will. Nor should we assume that an area outwith the control of 
English administration was inevitably under the control of the Scots. The inability of local garrisons to 
collect rents and ta ..... es, even the development of 'no-go' areas, is not a sufficient indicator that the 
opposition have actually gained that territory for themselves. Whether or not that denial of territory is 
the product of the actions of the enemy is of course of secondary importance to the overall situation to 
the 'occupying' power - the fact is they have lost control of that area and inevitably the public 
perception of the ability of that power to maintain law and order would be damaged. Even \vith a very 
powerful and mobile force, maintaining effective civil order in the face of armed opposition vvould be a 
considerable challenge due to the nature of the terrain if nothing else. 
Although Lothian has, by Scottish standards, a good deal of high-quality arable land there is also a 
great deal of broken country. An English ~Titer complained in the winter of 129963 that as little as eight 
miles from Edinburgh an enemy force - in this case Hugh de Penicuik and his followers- could operate 
from a range of hills (the Pentlands) not easily penetrated by a large force. The arable areas of Lothian 
are hardly great rolling plains. The landscape is riven with deep river gorges separating low hill 
formations affording an unusually high incidence of covered approaches and withdrawals to the 
61 See chapter 2, Rights and Responsibilities. 
6: CDS, iii, p.327. 
63 Stevenson, Documents, ii, p. 538. 
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insurgent and an exceptionally difficult terrain for reconnaissance by garrisons. There are of course 
many hilltops throughout Lothian from ""hich one can see a great swathe of territory, but such 'vistas' 
are very misleading in almost any terrain; regardless of the nature of the terrain it is very seldom that 
anything less than 60% of the area bounded by our horizon is 'dead ground,.64 Given the fact that even 
the largest medieval armies were little more than a mere speck on the landscape it should be clear that 
small raiding forces would have been exceedingly difficult to detect and therefore almost impossible to 
intercept. Even if the insurgents could be identified as a target in time to deploy a force to pursue them, 
the nature of the countryside favours escape through concealment, and if the insurgents found it 
impossible to 'shake' their pursuers in daylight, they would almost inevitably do so with ease at 
nightfall. Line-of-sight considerations may seem a little laboured when applied to medieval conflict, but 
in fact topography is the defining non-human factor in any tactical problem. Even with the active 
intelligence-gathering support of a large part of the population, counter-insurgency operations are 
legendarily difficult, without that support they are virtually impossible. The imposition of authority by 
military means, or the disruption of that authority are more dependent on a regular and convincing 
appearance of strength than on combat; both sides seek to further their interests essentially by 
intimidation of the population (and of course one another) rather than fighting. This is a two-edged 
weapon however, particularly for an administration that is seen as an imposition. If the visible presence 
of the garrison forces is not extensive, the local populace may feel increasingly vulnerable to the 
insurgents, equally if it is too intrusive it might become a focus for resentment. 
Forcing battle would in itself have been a tactically challenging proposition for the garrison forces. 
In addition to the terrain problems, the garrisons \vere not generally strong enough in sum to be able to 
afford to put a large force into the field to chase the Scots. Even if the Scots were heavily outnumbered 
at any point in terms of men on active service throughout the theatre generally, the Edwardian 
administrations had far greater commitments. Achieving local superiority in numbers was probably not 
too much of a problem for the Scots, therefore Edwardian forces could not afford to precipitately pursue 
64 'Dead ground' - areas obscured from view by the nature of the terrain. 
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and attack Scottish forces. It is, after all, difficult to tell \vhen you are pursuing a fleeing enemy and 
when you are entering an ambush. The challenge of responding to such a situation can be seen in the 
structure of the battle of Roslin. Although the numbers involved were probably quite small - a few 
hundred Scots rather than the tens of thousands described by Bower and Fordun - the English forces 
were unable to concentrate in time to apply their superior numbers, partly, perhaps, due to their inability 
to find billets for the troops within easy supporting distance of one another. 
Naturally, it is the objective of any rebel organisation - and Edward certainly described his Scottish 
opponents as rebels - to replace the existing administration, which in the fourteenth century meant the 
eventual acquisition of the various centres of military and economic significance throughout the region, 
just as it would in any comparable insurgent conflict. Some modern thinkers65 have believed that 
'urban' (in the very loosest sense of the word) areas must inevitably fall to insurgents that have secured 
the rural hinterlands on which those centres depend. This is not necessarily valid in a medieval context. 
The great castles of Lothian like Edinburgh or Dirleton could be securely held by remarkably small 
garrisons66 so long as they were not called upon to conduct too much in the way of field operations, nor 
do they seem to have been under threat from the burgh community at Edinburgh other than those 
occasions when a force from outside Lothian (in 1338 and 1341) could intervene. As long as 
Edwardian governments were prepared to bear the expense of supporting their Lothian garrisons - if 
necessary from resources beyond the income that could be raised locally - those garrisons could 
severely compromise the establishment of a Bruce administration. 
At some point in a conflict, if the insurgents enjoy enough success, the roles of insurgent and 
administration start to become reversed; in a sense, the garrisons become insurgents. The 'favourable 
terrain' to which they \vould withdraw after operations v>'Quld be castles rather than camps in the hills, 
but their tactical and strategic condition would be based on the disruption of the Scots rather than the 
65 ~ost famously Mao Zedong, The Art oJ War (El Paso Norte, 2005) and Che Guevara. Guerrilla Waifare 
(University of Nebraska, 1998).This is also the general thrust of General Wesley Clark's W'inning Modem 
Wars (New York, 2003), Chapter 2, 'Decisive Operations'. 
6~icholson, Edward III, pp. 245-52. 
205 
domination of the territory. Even if the Scots were to hold a to\,\TI but not the castle within it (as might 
have been the case at Stirling before the fall of the castle in 1299 or Edinburgh in 1314 and 1341), they 
,vould not necessarily be able adequately or consistently to contain the garrison militarily and its 
relatively visible presence (compared to a band offighters in the woods) would undermine the authority 
and prestige of King Robert's government. If the castle was a symbol of regal authority as well as a 
centre of government, the fact that it was in the possession of the enemy would not be beneficial to the 
public perception of the king, which may offer a political explanation for King Robert's destruction of 
castles to complement the accepted military rationale - that he was not in a position to garrison castles 
securely and that their recovery by the Edwardian administration v>'ould threaten the security of his rule. 
As the general political situation developed, people adjusted their individual positions; someone 
who had been steadfast in support of King John was not necessarily going to transfer their loyalty to 
King Robert, who was really no less an usurper than Edward I and a sacrilegious murderer to boot, and 
the vast majority of those landholders had already given their allegiance to Edward in 1296.67 Even if an 
individual was strongly motivated in favour of King Robert or by a 'national consciousness' or other 
motive, they might find themselves in the 'peace' or even service of the Edwards for simple practical 
reasons like stability and cash wages. The subject of Scots in Plantagenet service has already been 
addressed, but the presence of Edwardian garrisons would hardly be an incentive for Lothian men to 
turn out for the other side and the attractions of (supposedly) regular payor the belief that the Bruce 
party were not going to win - and in 1307-1308 at the very least that would not have been an unrealistic 
assumption - would surely discourage defection. 
Those strongly opposed to the Bruces obviously had an incentive to support the Ed'wardian 
government. However, they too were affected by the wider situation. Immediately after Bannockburn 
any Edwardian administration as had survived the fall of Edinburgh castle seems to have disappeared 
overnight. Those who had been in Edward's peace but wished to retain their Lothian properties would 
67 Chiefly by appending their seals to the Ragman Roll, CDS, ii, no. 823, but a considerable number had 
already committed themselves to Edward I throughout the spring and summer of 1296. 
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obviously have had to seek an accommodation with King Robert. Some, but by no means alL of these 
people would make their peace with Edward III after Halidon Hill for the same reasons. It would seem 
that constancy was not a highly developed part of the psyche of Lothian landowners in the fIrst half of 
the fourteenth century, and many historians have been at pains to point this OUt.68 Even so, we should 
avoid being judgmental about complex social situations where there are so many obvious factors to be 
considered and surely some significant factors of which we have no knowledge at all, or where our 
understanding is particularly limited. Leadership, both local and national, must surely have had some 
bearing on military and political affairs. No clear pattern of long-term leadership groups has emerged in 
this study at either regional or local level. That should not be taken as evidence that such leadership did 
not exist, merely that it cannot be incontrovertibly demonstrated by example. If it were possible to chart 
all of the familial, social, economic, legal and geographic relationships of all the members of the 
political community of Lothian through the period from 1296 to the 1350s it might well be possible to 
identify groups with the same, or similar membership entering or leaving the peace of contending 
authorities, but that would not automatically make clear to us the basis of membership in that group nor 
that the people concerned really constitute a 'group' at all. Their offIcial admission to Ed ward's peace 
on the same day is not evidence that they were necessarily acting in concert, merely that they were 
included in the same instrument such as the 'writ of 3 September 1296 instructing the sheriff of 
Edinburgh to restore the property of Walter de Drylawe and John Ie Blund among others. 69 
On the occasions that we can genuinely identify a group changing sides 70 we might assume that 
there is a 'common interest' factor involved, but the nature of that relationship is not immediately 
apparent. Several individuals might come to the peace of Edward I, in the company of this or that 
prominent person,71 but the nature of the relationship is elusive. The members of the group might be 
connected by familial relationships, tradition or geographical proximity, but that relationship may not 
68 Barrow Neighbours, p.155-6. 
69 CDS, ii, no. 832. 
70 Ibid., no. 853. 
71 Such as Malise earl of Strathearn or Patrick, earl of Dunbar. 
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be clear to us. Family connections might be too tenuous to be identified at a distance of 700 years, but 
sufficiently well-known in the fourteenth century to require no comment. Traditions of political 
alignment between family groups might have no real currency, just the product of a friendship/mutual 
interest in a previous generation; geographical relationships could be obscured by the titles used by 
specific individuals. Equally, an identified group may represent a political structure of sorts. A great 
Lord might derive the preponderance of his wealth and power from one region, but he would be very 
likely to have property in other areas and it is not impossible that the men admitted to the peace of a 
king in the company of an earl represent the senior tenants of the lordships comprising the property of 
that earl throughout the country. 
Additionally, where \'ve do fmd a group of people coming to the peace of a king in the company of 
a great lord it may be the case that they are not particularly aligned with that person in a long-term 
sense, merely that they have found a means of taking advantage of that lord's prestige to effect 
changing sides in a relatively painless manner. The lord in question - as long as he was not going to be 
held responsible for the future conduct of the members of the group - would have his o\vn prestige 
enhanced by the fact that people were seeking his lordship, perhaps particularly so if those people were 
not long-term adherents or dependants. When the Earl of Fife came to the peace of Edward Balliol after 
the battle of Dupplin Muir he brought with him men who were, if not his tenants certainly his 
neighbours 72 and it is fair to assume that his local prominence was a major factor in their submission. 
The relationship behveen the Earl of Strathearn and the five men who had their lands restored in 
September 129673 having come to the peace of Edward I in his company is not so clear - William Byset 
(see AppendL"C), a "county" Ragman Roll homager may have been a dependant of the Earl -through 
familial relationship, family tradition or on the strength of land tenure. The Earl's interests were not 
limited to Stratheam, he granted land in the Barony of Balnacreiff in the constabulary of Linlithgow 
72 Nicholson. Edward III, p. 93n. 
-3 CDS, iii, no. 853. 
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(easily confused ,,,,ith Balencrefe in Haddington constabulary) to John Murray of Drumsergard74 but 
the relationship is not readily apparent now, though it may have been abundantly so at the time. 
William's commitment to the Edwardian cause was sufficient to take him into action at the battle of 
Falkirk where he had a horse- a hackney valued at eight merks 75 - killed in the fighting. William's 
service to King Edv>'ard may have been the product of the Earl's lordship or leadership, but the extent of 
lordly control can in any case be exaggerated. In 1304 King Edward found it necessary to order the Earl 
to prevent his men from supplying the Scottish garrison at Stirling.76 This was hardly a point where the 
patriotic star was in the ascendant and the Earl was most certainly in Edward's peace at the time. 
While the entire scope of an individual's motivation to fight for either side, or for that matter to 
avoid as far as possible being involved at all, can hardly be ascertained at a distance of seven centuries, 
we should have no doubt that personal considerations of a non-political nature could be a significant, 
even paramount factor in deciding alignment, at least for some people, some of the time. A love match 
might be enough to carry a person away from the traditional loyalties of their family or region and into 
the affinity of the other side. 77 Personal career interests might do the same, a factor demonstrated by the 
inheritance dispute that arose between the supporters of Edward Balliol in 1334. John Moubray had 
been killed in action at Annan in 1332 when the Bruce party had surprised Balliol's rather meagre 
following. Unlike other prominent members of the disinherited, the Moubrays had lost their estates in 
Scotland, not through war, despite their adherence to the Plantagenet cause before 1314, but through 
their involvement in the de Soulis conspiracy of 1320, an attempt to place Edward Balliol on the tluone. 
Evidently the Balliol party was happy to accept defectors from the Bruce party and the Moubrays were 
prepared to support Edv,!ard Balliol but not to the extent of surrendering their individual ambitions for 
territorial expansion. The Moubrays sought shelter in England and were forfeited by Robert I of a wide 
range of property, much of which was granted to the Stewart. In August 1334, under the kingship of 
74 NAS. GD 24/5 
-sTNA,E lOlt7!5. 
76 CDS, ii, no. 1489. 
77 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 14. 
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Edward Balliol, Sir Alexander Moubray claimed John Moubrays estates as the nearest male relative but 
this was contested by Richard Talbot, Henry Beaumont and David de Strathbogie. According to Bower, 
these three sought the exclusion of Alexander in favour of the daughters of his late brother, John. Those 
members of the disinherited who had been pursuing their lost heritages for rather longer than the 
Moubrays may have resented Balliol's decision to support their claims, ho\vever since the Moubrays 
had lost their lands in the 1320 attempt to restore the Balliol monarchy (no other credible candidate 
existed) Edward could hardly avoid offering whatever help he could if he was to be seen as a source of 
'good lordship'. 
These three men that he offended were prominent Balliol supporters. Edward would almost 
certainly have been unable to mount his invasion of Scotland in the summer of 1332 without their 
manpower, money and influence. 78 Maintaining even the semblance of Scottish kingship without their 
active military participation would have been quite impossible since they represented such a large 
portion of his powerbase. Despite this - and with the obvious aim of keeping the Moubrays on his side-
Edward decided in favour of Sir Alexander. The dissent sown among the three counter-claimants was 
short-lived because Sir Alexander soon made his o\vn accommodation with the Scots, but the damage to 
Edward's prestige among his 0\\?J.1 supporters was probably complemented by damage to his 
relationship \vith Edw'ard III. If Edward Balliol could not exert his kingship among his closest 
associates how successful was he going to be at attracting, and, more importantly, retaining support 
from the Bruce cause? Edward III may have envisaged a client king, but a client king who could not 
deliver a stable Scottish administration, or at least contaimnent of the Bruce party, was of very limited 
value. The defection of Sir Alexander was an indication that the Bruce party was far from being 
contained. On the contrary, Moubray had joined them despite the fact that Edward Balliol had taken his 
part against three men, Beaumont, Strathbogie and Talbot whose support was crucial to the fortunes of 
78 Nicholson, Edward III, pp. 77-8. Hemy Beaumont, David de Strathbogie and Gilbert d' Umfraville all 
raised money in the summer of 1332 by granting or leasing their English estates. Sir Thomas Wake granted 
a Norfolk property to Sir Thomas Roscelyn in liferent. Roscelyn took an active part in Edward III's 
Scottish campaign, serving as sheriff of Edinburgh in the autumn of 1335. CDS, iii .. no. 1186. 
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the Balliol cause. Edward Balliol's authority was severely undermined because Moubray's defection 
demonstrated a lack of faith in Edward's ability to form a permanent administration. 
Defections were not always the product of land disputes: an important motivational factor in 
several instances was self-evidently the most personal career ambition of all - namely keeping one's 
head attached to one's neck. David de Strathbogie was - generally - a stalwart supporter of the Balliol 
cause, but when confronted with the prospect of capture and very possibly death in September 1334 he 
too defected to the Bruce party and was entrusted with the administration of the north by the Earl of 
Moray, King David's lieutenant. 79 This begs the question as to why Moray should have been so 
accommodating. Did he feel that Strathbogie could be trusted to adhere to his new allegiance? Did he 
feel that confident that he could afford to take a gamble on that allegiance or was he simply not strong 
enough to execute Strathbogie out of hand for fear of alienating support in the north? Strathbogie did 
return to the Balliol party in August 1335. His defection, however temporary, must have been 
detrimental to the authority of the Plantagenet party, but the reality of his situation must have been clear 
to Edward Balliol and to Edward III, neither of whom hesitated to accept Strathbogie into their peace. 
Naturally, not all defections were by such exalted persons, nor is the documentary evidence sufficiently 
intact to date all such changes of heart. However the restorations and forfeitures that do survive can 
give us some picture of the regularity with which they occurred. Geoffrey de Fressingleye, a "county" 
Ragman Roll homager, would seem to have remained in the peace of the Plantagenets until 1308 but 
was not forfeited of his property of half the "vill" of Wester Duddingston until February 1312, when he 
was declared to have been an enemy "for four years".80 His heir - presumably his son- William, having 
apparently been in the peace of Edward III was forfeited of the entire "vill" of Duddingston before July 
1336.81 Not only is this an indication of defection, it suggests - at least in the reign of Edward II - a 
certain reluctance to forfeit people for rebellion. The titles by which people are known to us may well 
obscure important aspects of their life because our attention is not drawn to those factors. Sir Thomas 
79 Nicholson, Edward III, p.I72; Scotichronicon, vii, p.l 07. 
80 CDS, ii. no. 258. 
81 CDS, iii, pp. 341,346. 
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Randolph can serve as an example of this. As the Earl of Moray it is no surprise to us that he had 
extensive interests in the north, but his properties elsewhere were hardly insignificant. 82 Each of these 
landholdings involved Randolph or his representative in the political life of that particular vicinity. 
These involvements were not discrete; the value of being able to draw resources from one area to 
provide armed strength in another can be seen in the force of southern Scots led to Culblean by Sir 
Andrew Moray. The action was obviously a function of war and politics in the north,83 but the men on 
either side \V·ere largely 'recruited' from other areas -southern Scots on one side and the retinues of 
English Lords on the other. This is, in a sense, the direct contradiction of Barron's proposition that the 
Wars of Independence \vere conducted by the men of what he saw as 'Celtic' Scotland; he went so far 
as to state that the 'men of Lothian had neither lot nor part' in the 'nationalist' cause, presumably 
unaware that Culblean was won by a Scottish army which contained a large body recruited from south 
of the river Forth.84 
If political leadership groups are, to say the least, shado,vy, what can we say about local military 
leadership, and can it really be separated from political leadership? Again, although it would seem that 
such leadership was crucial to the Scottish recoveries after major reverses on the battlefield, the nature 
of that leadership is just as elusive as political leadership. Certainly there were more and less 
po\V-erful/influential people in any region we care to examine, but how \vas that leadership obtained and 
retained? 
The basis for local po\yer might spring from the crovm in the form of grants of land or positions of 
authority in a particular vicinity, but the preservation, development and application of that power would 
depend, at least in part, on the ability of the lord in question to maintain his prestige and credibility 
through what would in due course be termed 'good lordship'. In the volatile arena of fourteenth-century 
political life this would almost inevitably involve military activity from time to time and there is no 
question but that success in the field could enhance the prestige of great lords and kings, and this was 
82 His property of Stichill, Roxburgh for example. 
8"Nicholson, Edward 111, pp. 229-30. 
84 Chron. FOI"dun i, p.360. 
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surely reflected at a regional level in the actions of local magnates. Within the Lothian community it is 
clear that men who would not normally have been of any great consequence on the national political 
scene could acquire a fo llowing, initially through their local network of relatives, friends and 
neighbours and develop that through their own leadership abilities. In the 1330s William Douglas of 
Lothian, a minor baron, rose to prominence through successful leadership in war, amply reported by 
Fordun85 and Bower,86 not because of his status in the national political community. A magnate pattern 
of leadership in Lothian at the same period may not be discernible, but that does not mean it did not 
exist. Inevitably the political choices of a local potentate must have had some impact, not only on the 
tenants of those magnates but also on their neighbours. We might reasonably assume, for instance, that 
the defection of Patrick Earl of Dunbar to the peace of Edward III after Halidon Hill resulted in a 
similar change of allegiance among his tenants and neighbours, but the fact that Patrick was specifically 
granted87 the properties of any of his tenants that were forfeited by Edward III surely indicates that local 
leadership \vas not universally effective in enforcing lordship, or at least that local potentates could be 
defied. The reversion of Earl Patrick to the Bruce cause might, for all we know, have given him a 
second opportunity to dispose of tenants, this time those who were unwilling to return to the allegiance 
of David II. The right to the removal and the forfeitures of free tenants might be construed as no more 
than an opportunity for the lord concerned to dispose of difficult tenants and reward faithful service or 
to provide an income for less fortunate dependants through re-granting the forfeited properties. 
However it may indicate a need to make some examples to ensure the future loyalty of the surviving 
tenants. Whether the Earl of Dunbar was able to benefit from his grant of the forfeitures of his tenants is 
unclear; his o\vn defection to the Bruce party must surely have effectively prevented him from 
prosecuting any of his tenants who had joined the Bruces at an earlier date. 
85 Chron. Fordun, i, pp. 351-3, 355, 357. 
86 Scotichronicon, vii, 107, 109, 113,115,125,135,139. 
87 CDS, iii, no. 1121. This grant was clearly a mark of favour, and a lever to bind Patrick to Edward III. 
Edward might have granted these properties to another person, but that would have undermined Patrick's 
authority within the earldom. 
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Local leadership did not have to be limited to tenants however. Neighbouring landowners, 
regardless of from whom they held their estate would be likely to be influenced by the actions of the 
most powerful person in their vicinity, particularly in periods of cmwn weakness. By the 1330s and 
1340s the concentration of local authority in the hands of a small number oftmsted lieutenants that had 
taken place under Robert I had engendered a small class of \varlord magnates with enormous power in 
those localities if only they could effectively exert lordship. That lordship was, in many cases, 
threatened by the claims of the' disinherited' lords who had lost their lands through their opposition to 
Robert I and who hoped to regain their lands through their support of Edward Balliol.88 The competition 
for authority between the members of these groups was certainly expressed in armed conflict, but it 
would be short-sighted to assume that they did not actively seek the support of the local political 
community by less belligerent means, like remissions of rents and casualties, grants of land, office or 
privilege. In short, they had to offer 'good lordship' if they were to make themselves secure in their 
possession of territory. Sir Thomas Grey \vas of the opinion that Edward III lost his conquest lands in 
Scotland primarily through a lack of 'good 10rdship,89; Sir Thomas did not give any specific examples 
of this failure, nor did he offer an explanation for its occurrence, but since he was actively involved in 
both the civil and military aspects of Edward's government vve should perhaps accept his opinion. 
Several prominent lords \vere forfeited by the Edwardian administration. If these lords were to 
recover their inheritances they would have to fight, and if they were to fight successfully they must 
inevitably mobilise troops. These troops might not be raised from the contested areas, but it is difficult 
to see how a lord could recover his position without a degree of local support, or how they would retain 
that position without making their authority acceptable to the local community. In the short term that 
might be effected through force of arms, but to do so indefmitely would be an unacceptable burden on 
tenants drav,'ll from other regions and, in the long term, might well alienate the very people that the lord 
was endeavouring to bring under his control. Again, Patrick Earl of Dunbar can provide an example of 
88Nicho1son, Edward III, pp. 126-7 
89 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.102 
214 
practice. When he decided to join the Bruce party, one of the factors that induced his defection was the 
tendency of troops in Edwardian garrisons, and Berwick in particular,90 to conduct foraging operations 
against the local population regardless of ,vhich side they were on. Patrick ,vas quite prepared to take 
this issue to Edward III, but Edward ,vas unable, or perhaps umvilling, to do anything very positive 
about the problem. Edward's failure to support Earl Patrick undermined his position as a local magnate 
insofar as he could not deliver the physical protection of his clients that was part of the responsibility of 
lordship. The strength of Edward II's garrisons was not great enough to enforce his lordship or protect 
his clients, but it was sufficient to undermine his only really important ally in the south-east. 
As the war increasingly favoured the Scots, Earl Patrick's tenants would have been subjected to 
their demands as well as those of the garrison. If Patrick could not protect his tenants and dependants 
from the operations of either side he would eventually lose those tenants to a lord who would give them 
that protection. Patrick's reversion to the Bruce party was not simply a renouncing of allegiance to 
Edward III (who, since the ceding to him of 2000 librates of southern Scotland by Edward Ballioe1 had 
been Patrick's liege lord) but an effort to prevent encroachment on his lordship by Scottish lords in the 
Bruce camp hopeful of extending their influence in the south-east. One could perhaps argue that Patrick 
had come to the conclusion that he was being damaged more by his absence from the Scottish political 
community than he was being protected by his presence in the Edwardian political community, which, 
in a rather grand sense admittedly, is not far removed from the position of the political community of 
Lothian throughout the period of competition for regal authority. As long as the Edwardian 
administration could wield enough strength to prevent extensive Scottish operations in Lothian, most of 
the community was prepared to accept it, though what choice they had in the absence of effective 
Scottish military intervention is hard to say. When the Edwardian administrations were too weak to 
prevent that intervention most of the community accepted the Bruce administration, with what degree 
of enthusiasm is impossible to say, though Professor Barrow has expressed strong views on the 
90 Ibidpp. 190-91. 
91 Rot Scot i, pp. 261-3. 
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subject.92 The presence of Lothian men in the ranks of Bruce armies certainly demonstrates that not 
everyone in Lothian was at ease 'with the Edwardian government, but is hardly proof of widespread 
opposition to it in the communities between the A von and Cockbumspath. 
KNIGHTS AND MEN-AT-ARMS. 
The most prestigious form of military obligation was knight service.93 How exactly knight service was 
accounted as a fmancial burden cannot be precisely evaluated. The cost of equipping a first-rate man-at-
arms rose dramatically in the latter part of the thirteenth century94 and must have become an almost 
intolerable burden for smaller landholders whose estates would hardly be sufficient to support the man-
at-arms and his horse let alone discharge the debt incurred if the man were captured and had to find a 
ransom. The cost of knight service was not, however, a fixed universal sum. A suitable mount might 
easily cost as much as £30,95 but even a cursory glance at the horse valuation rolls in CDS indicates that 
for the vast majority of men-at-arms a beast with a value of £5-10 was the norm. 96 The same applies to 
the equipment. Suits of chainmail referred to in contemporary documents are valued at anything from 
20 shillings to 100 shillings.97 Obviously this is a reflection of the value of the individual hauberk. At 
the lower end of the price spectrum the hauberk would consist of relatively large links, perhaps a 
centimetre or more in diameter and the gauge of the metal itself only one millimetre thick. The 
protective value of such a hauberk would have been very limited compared to one with links of only 
92 Barrow, Neighbours, pp. 155-6. 
93 Several authors have pointed out similarities in the role of the armoured cavalryman and the Main Battle 
Tank, however the differences substantially outweigh those similarities . .lTC. Fuller's observations on 
this topic are compromised by his concentration on general engagements to the exclusion of a wider 
operational view of medieval campaigning. Annaments and History (London, 1946) p.23. The changing 
application of the tank since WW2 has made the analogy even less appropriate. 
94 G.W.S.Barrow 'The Army of Alexander Ill's Scotland' in Reid, Alexander III p.136. 
95 CDS, iii, p.413. -
96 Ibid.,pp. 413-22. 
97 SHS Miscellany, xi, C.l Neville 'A Plea Roll of Edward 1's Army in Scotland' p.ll!. 
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five or si.x millimetres diameter. 98 The cost of a hauberk 'was not simply dependent on the size and 
density of the links, but was also, obviously, a reflection of the extent of the protection. A coat of mail 
that extended to the knee and with long sleeves terminating in chainmail mittens would inevitably be a 
more costly item than one of similar quality that only reached to the waist and elbows. Self evidently, 
assuming a similar quality of link, the latter would comprise many more links than the former; possibly 
the difference between 15-20,000 links and 30-40,000 links.99 The single most important cost factor 
was whether the mail links were butted or riveted. In butted mail the individual links are passed through 
one another and the ends of each link simply meet or slightly overlap rather like a modem ",-asher. The 
more expensive variety- riveted mail- was a much more labour intensive product. Each link is firmly 
closed by one or sometimes two tiny rivets. 100 Chainmail is still being hand-made in India to-day for the 
film and re-enactment market, and the price relationship between the two forms (for the same size of 
hauberk) is approximately 2.5:1 in favour of riveted mail. Given that the method of assembly has not 
changed in the intervening seven hundred years it ",-ould seem unreasonable, failing specific evidence 
to the contrary, to assume that that relationship was radically different in the fourteenth century, 
although the 'real price' in relation to incomes was far greater than it is today due to the lower price of 
the metal itself and the availability of suitable wire to cut into links. 
The protective power of chainmail by itself was quite limited. As a guard against an edged weapon 
mail was quite effective, indeed mail gloves are still sometimes used by butchers, but mail offered little 
protection against the impact of a blow, thus, to protect the wearer from broken bones the mail hauberk 
was worn with a thickly padded garment (jack, gambeson) to diffuse impact. Non-metal protection had 
the advantage of being relatively cheap; it could be made locally by men and women without 
developing a high level of skills and from materials that were to be found easily in any community-
linen, wool and leather. 
98 The smaller the links, the better the protection afforded to the wearer, see G.C.Stone Glossmy of the 
Construction and Decoration ofAmls and AmlOur in all Countries and in all Times (New York, 1961) pp. 
424-9. 
99 Ibid. 
lOa Ibid. 
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Some proportion of the munitions used in Scotland \'iaS imported from the Lo,v Countries, 101 
possibly the majority of it, but this cannot be adequately demonstrated. Certainly some came either 
directly from England or indirectly as re-exported goods from England via Ireland if \ve are to accept 
the repeated demands of English kings 102 that their subjects refrain from trading arms to the Scots as 
evidence that such legislation was necessary. Whether these imports constituted the mainstay of 
Scottish armies is a different matter. Any type of medieval weaponry could be manufactured locally. 
As early as William the Lion's reign a man held property in Perth in exchange for two iron helmets and 
one Perth tradesman (possibly the same man) was specifically described as a galeator: a helmet 
maker. 103 If helmet making could be a full-tinIe, or at least primary, occupation, it would seem 
reasonable to aSSUllle that Perth tradesmen could provide any personal military equipment that the local 
community might require, and that the same would apply in Edinburgh, Stirling or any other sizeable 
burgh. Since a helmet is as hard, or harder, to produce than any other piece of armour it follows that all 
the necessary appurtenances of knightly combat were available in a town like Perth. 104 Whether the 
local producers could meet the demands of entire armies is another matter. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the Scots imported arms, not because they could not be produced locally, but because 
they could not be produced in sufficient quantity, or, after a particularly heavy defeat such as Falkirk, 
because lost equipment could not be replaced quickly. 
Before the close of the thirteenth century the sword had ceased to be the primary weapon of battle 
even for dismounted men-at-arms. A body of men equipped with spears could face cavalry with some 
degree of confidence compared to a similar body bearing only swords. The sword of course was much 
more practical for individual combat than the spear, but the development of better quality armour, and 
101 Numerous Flemish and French ships were seized by the English leading to diplomatic interventions to 
procure their release, INA, SC33/37, SC33/l84. 
102 Edward did not limit such pleas to his o\vn subjects; on the n:venty-seventh October 1309 he asked 
Robert count of Artois to prevent Scottish and 'Estland' merchants from being received in his territories. 
Edward III faced the same difficulties. CIPAf, ii, nos. 397,940,1577. 
103Duncan, Scotland, p.489. 
]()4 A sword purchased at Perth was the subject of a court case in 1296. SHS miscellany, xi, C. Neville 'A 
Plea Roll of Edward 1's Army in Scotland' p.87. 
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in particular the growing practice of adding protective plates on top of and eventually in place of mail 
reduced its effectiveness in fighting between men at arms. The net result was the increasing popularity 
of pole-arms and mace, hammer and axe type weapons which could reasonably be expected to break or 
penetrate even the strongest plates if the wielder could achieve a clean blow on his enemy, or at least to 
cause internal injuries- including broken bones- with a less than perfect strike. The sword was retained 
because of its convenience as a side arm for personal defence ounvith operational conditions- criminal 
assaults and disorder- and because of its social significance as the weapon of gentlemen. 
THE HORSE. 
No man-at-arms could serve properly without a suitable horse; so much so that records of garrison 
complements mention not only the lack of horses but sometimes that a particular animal was 
'insufficient' .105 Dr. Ayton has demonstrated that most mounts in Scotland were valued at substantially 
more than the lOOs (£5)106 which was generally the minimum value of horse acceptable for restauro 
assessment. It is ahnost axiomatic that Scottish medieval armies were almost devoid of cavalry due to 
the difficulty of maintaining suitable mounts through the winter. However the very extensive level of 
man-at-arms sen'ice performed by Lothian men for Plantagenet governments v>'Quld indicate that such 
animals were reasonably readily available and that there were men competent to serve on horseback 
suggests that the availability of horses vms not a product of the campaign of 1296. The evolutions of 
medieval armies were extremely basic, but the quality of horsemanship necessary for the individual to 
function competently on the battlefield would have been very high indeed, a level of skill that would be 
impossible to achieve without the appropriate mount. 
The limited amount of archaeoiogical107 evidence relating to the horse in Scotland- skeletal remains 
and horse furniture- would seem to indicate that short, thickset animals of 12 to 14 hands \;vere the 
norm. However virtually all of the data comes from urban excavations. Since only a very small portion 
105 CDS, ii, no. 132l. 
106 AytonKnights, p.229. 
107 C .Smith 'Cats, Dogs and Horses' inProc. Soc. Antiq. Scot 128 (1998), p.870-72. 
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(perhaps 10% at most) of medieval Scots lived in urban areas we should be very careful in our 
application of the material gathered. There should be no doubt that the majority of animals across the 
country were short enough that today they would be described as ponies rather than horses, but the 
number of Scottish men ",·ho performed mounted military service in Edwardian garrisons surely 
suggests that there was a high enough incidence of ovmership of horses fit for such duties for the 
society to be able to furnish competent cavalry soldiers in sufficient numbers to justify the effort of 
administering the necessary records of service. A number of these men108 were given the use of one of 
the king's horses to carry out their duties, but that is not a particularly good indicator that such horses 
were not readily available to ScotS.109 It could just as easily be the case that these individuals could not 
afford to buy- or just as importantly maintain- a horse of that calibre, or simply that they had already 
lost their own horse and had the use of one from the king as a temporary measure pending the 
Wardrobe paying out for a replacement or that they have been provided with a horse 'by gift of the 
king' .110 This might be on account of good service in the past or perhaps for personal reasons with no 
particular relevance to historians, but no doubt it was chiefly to ensure that the king's army was not 
deprived of the serv'ice of an adequate man-at-arms. 
The height of a horse did not determine its usefulness for war. Recent research III suggests that 
the great war horses of the early fourteenth century - when body armour for the battlefield was at its 
heaviest - were rather shorter than traditionally believed, perhaps closer to fifteen hands than seventeen, 
and that the advantage of these horses over other breeds lay more in their greater endurance than in 
superior speed or stature. Mounted combat in great engagements- although still the preferred arena for 
deeds of chivalry- was extremely rare. 112 In the more mundane forms of activity that were more typical 
IOSE10117/5. 
109 Matthew Paris noted that in 1244 the men-at-arms (armed men) of Alexander Irs army were mounted 
'upon horses sufficiently good, although not Spanish or Italian'. Anderson, A. Scottish Annals from English 
Chronicles (Stamford, 1991), p.354. 
110 Sir Richard Siward, CDS, ii, no. 1011. 
III AytonKnights, pp. 23-24. 
112 See A. King 'A Helm with a Crest of Gold' in (ed.), N. Saul, Fourteenth CentlllY England. 
(Woodbridge, 2000) also A. MacDonald 'Profit, Politics and Personality: War and the Later Medieval 
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of campaigning - reconnaissance, raiding, counter-raiding, convoy, and what we might call operations 
in support of the civil power- the chief function of the horse was to move troops from A to B and back 
again. For both sides this v>'Quld often mean traversing difficult terrain. Scots operating an insurgent 
strategy from inaccessible strongholds would have to cross such terrain in order to reach objectives, and 
the Edwardian garrison troops would have to negotiate it if they were to attack the Scots in their camps 
or pursue them after incursions. To conduct these operations both sides would have had to make use of 
cheap, sturdy horses that would not be a huge loss if they were lost- they needed animals that could be 
replaced readily and locally; more mounted infantry nags rather than knightly chargers. Nonetheless, 
there was still a place for the great horse. There are a number of instances of what we might think of as 
'classic' h."llightly fighting; actions like Dunbar, Roslin and Methven where the schwelpunktll3 of the 
engagement was the meeting of mounted men-at-arms. These fights, and the tournaments that took 
place in the later phases of the wars, were the arena in which the 'destrier' horses were a necessary part 
of a gentleman's equipment. The Scots enjoyed a number of successes in mounted combat and in 
tournaments, and it is therefore hard to accept the traditional view that the Scots did not have access to 
heavy cavalry horses. 114 Certainly it is true that the Scots could not raise such large forces of men-at-
arms as the English or the French, but then, Scotland was a rather smaller country, and the maintenance 
of a heavy war horse would be likely to have been a rather greater burden simply because of the relative 
poverty of the Scottish nobility and gentry. There are enough instances of mounted Scottish men-at-
arms in action throughout the entire period of the Wars of Independence to demonstrate that they were a 
crucial part of the Scottish approach to war generally, and since it would seem that at least one in three 
of the men in the sample (see Appendix) served as men-at-arms, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion 
that heavy cavalry service was a normal practice for Lothian gentlemen. 
Scottish Nobility' in (edd) D. Ditchburn T. Brotherstone Freedom and Authority (East Linton, 2000) pp. 
121,127. 
113 Schwerpunk.'t; not necessarily the largest or most intense sector of the battlefield, but the most crucial 
location, the focus of the engagement. 
114 Scots were certainly prepared to spend money on armour specifically designed for the lists rather than 
the battlefield. See The Bannat).ne Miscellany ii, p.l 06. The will of William Douglas stipUlated the 
recipient of his 'bacinet, hauberk, gauntlets and other armours for tournaments' (hastiludio). 
The extent to which Scottish chargers were armoured is open to question. However there is no 
evidence to suggest that Scottish men-at-arms were equipped to a lower standard than their English 
counterparts. In 1299 the Balliol party, under the leadership of John Comyn and Robert Bruce, stationed 
a force under Sir Robert Keith and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, in Ettrick Forest to harass the English. In 
addition to the local men the force consisted of 1500 infantry and one hundred men-at-arms w·ith 
covered (barbed, barded or armoured) horses. lls It would be very unlikely that the Scots would commit 
a very substantial part of their armoured cavalry to operations in a forest, or that they would select that 
force primarily from the men with covered horses or indeed to commit them to operations that did not 
involve the higher commanders. As we have already seen (Chapter 4), receipt of full man-at-arms 
wages in English armies and garrisons was dependant on possession of adequate horse armour. If it was 
normal for Scots on unarmoured horses to fight garrison members on armoured ones it would be likely 
that patriotic Scottish chroniclers would have made the point repeatedly to underline the military 
achievements of their countrymen. 
A comparison of the valuations of the horses of Scottish men-at-arms in Edwardian garrisons with 
those of their English counterparts would seem to suggest that they might, in the main, have owned 
somewhat cheaper animals, but this is hardly conclusive since so large a proportion of the men named 
in valuations cannot be adequately identified as Scots or English. Even if we could demonstrate that a 
'typical' Scottish man-at-arms (and how would we decide what was typical?) serving in a particular 
garrison was less expensively mounted than an English man-at-arms, we would not have proven that 
this ,vas a universal, or even commonplace condition. The valuations are not in themselves a good 
guide to the quality of horseflesh available to Scottish men-at-arms; only a record of the animals they 
took on active service. Superficially it might seem that a man-at-arms would inevitably choose to take a 
powerful, perhaps prestigious animal on campaign. Englishmen coming to serve in Scotland would 
presumably take their expensive charger in the expectation of taking part in a conventional chivalrous 
fight - and that is obviously going to be the animal they have valued, lest it be lost in action. Scotsmen, 
115 Scotichronicon, vii p.293-7. 
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with a clearer picture of local conditions (and perhaps able to send home for a different mount should 
they need it) may have elected not to expose their more valuable animals to the hazards of daily military 
service or to risk the animal's health by keeping it in a crowded stable. 
OPERATIONAL PRACTICE 
Although tactical analysis with such limited data is of questionable validity at the best of times it is 
worth giving some consideration to the composition of the armies from what we know of combat. The 
dependence on men-at-arms as the striking force of Edwardian garrisons is evident from the muster 
rolls - generally half or more of the entire combatant strength. Where the balance of the garrison 
includes archers, particularly crossbovvmen, it is reasonable to assume that their usual function would 
be to maintain the security of the establishment, not to march across the country. Equally, it is 
reasonable to assume that the main function of retaining a large force of men-at-arms at Linlithgov,' or 
Edinburgh was to carry the war to the enemy. The strategic value of cavalry lay primarily in their 
ability to conduct operations at a greater distance from their base and return without too much risk of 
interception by a more balanced force and the strong likelihood of being able to escape from such an 
interception should it occur. The tactical advantage lay in the ability to deploy directly to combat from 
line-of-march. At its simplest, the Scots needed to be able to achieve local superiority in men-at-arms 
over the parties that could be committed by the garrison forces. The key phrase is of course local 
superiority. It would not be necessary for the Scots to maintain a larger force of men-at-arms than the 
total English deployment. They would require only as many as would be needed to deter the English 
force in a particular vicinity at a particular time and to do so on enough occasions to achieve local 
tactical dominance, at \vhich point the garrison would no longer be able to fulfil its administrative 
functions for the government and probably start to be seriously at risk of capture by the Scots due to the 
difficulties of maintaining a fortress in enemy territory. 
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The majority of the infantry in garrison service \vere archers or crossbowmen usually receiving 3d 
or 4d 116 per day and presumably not engaged in offensive operations to any great degree. This may not 
have been the case in the Edinburgh garrison of 1340 when half of the complement consisted of men-at-
arms and the remainder mounted archers. It is possible that these particular "mounted archers" were in 
fact foot archers receiving a preferential rate of pay for service in a very exposed stronghold or that the 
garrison establishment had been changed to conform to developments in English military thinking in 
the 1330s.]]7 The trend toward forces consisting mostly, if not entirely, of men-at-arms and mounted 
archers has been thoroughly examined by Dr. Ayton and Col. Rogers l18 and a lengthy discussion of that 
trend here is neither necessary nor desirable, suffice to say that it is widely recognised. There is no 
reason to assume that Scotland was a military backwater in the 1330s; the rationale that lay behind the 
adoption of a force that was completely mounted but retaining some of the advantages of dismounted 
troops - primarily the 'firepower' aspect - was as viable in Scotland as it was in France. One muster 
roll document is a very slender basis for analysis of a garrison that existed for some years. It may have 
been the case that archers in previous years had been provided with horses, but that the documents 
recording those animals, assuming that they were documented at all, have failed to survive. It is also 
possible that the weak position of the Plantagenet cause in Lothian in 1340 had prompted the 
government to pay for or even provide a horse for every man in the event of the garrison having to 
make a hasty withdrawal. 
Dr. Po\vicke was fIrmly convinced that there was no articulated system of knight serVIce m 
Scotland,119 Professor Barrow is equally convinced that there was,120 though neither has been 
particularly clear about what exactly they mean by an 'articulated system '. Certainly the incidence of 
116 CDS. ii. no. 1978. 
:7 M. Prestwich A,mies and Waifare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience. (New Haven, 1996) p. 
126. 
118 AytonKnights, pp. 15-17. 
119 M. Powicke England in the Thirteenth CentUlY (Oxford 1953), p. 576. 
120 Barro,,-', Bntce, First Edition (London, 1965), p.23. This statement does not appear in the Third Edition 
(Edinburgh, 1988), though the rationale that supports the statement does - 'most of the more fertile land 
was held by knight service and organised into baronies and knights' fees.' Barrow, Bntce, p. 16. 
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knight service obligations for land under Robert I would hardly have produced a cavalry force of more 
than a fe\v hundred from the who Ie of Scotland, but we should bear in mind that the majority of records 
which tell us anything at all about combat in the fourteenth century refer repeatedly to the service of 
Scottish men-at-arms; we read of them in English garrisons, \ve read of them fighting at Dunbar, 
Roslin, Edinburgh Castle, Culblean and Crichtondene. 
At Dunbar it is clear that only heavy cavalry elements were engaged on either side. It is often 
assumed that the entirety of the Scottish cavalry were present; however there is no evidence to suggest 
that this is the case, but there is evidence that a considerable party of Scottish men-at-arms were in the 
garrison of Dunbar castle. Whilst recognising that the Scottish leadership \vas inexperienced in war, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the whole of the Scottish cavalry, the striking arm of the army, 
would be constituted as a single formation for any purpose other than as part of a general engagement 
let alone detached from the army as a raiding force. Even if we assume that men might choose to join 
an operation without the sanction, or even against the direct orders of their superiors, we can hardly 
assume that all of the men-at-arms in the anny were either disobedient or so very keen to come to 
blows with the enemy. All the same, it is clear that defeat at Dunbar and the subsequent surrender of 
the castle was a blow sufficient to deter the Scots from any earnest resistance for the rest of the summer 
and the balance of King lohn's anny disintegrated. By 1300 the Scottish military effort had recovered 
itself sufficiently that Edward I thought it worthwhile fortifying Berwick and the man-at-arms element 
had recovered to the extent that Sir Thomas Grey could \vrite of 'great passages of arms between the 
marches and notably in Teviotdale, before Roxburgh castle ... ,l2l The fight at Roslin was unquestionably 
an encounter between men-at-anns. The Scots approached from Biggar, surprised the main body of tlle 
enemy in a night attack and regrouped in time to attack and defeat another part of the force. Grey tells 
us that the English expedition was made in 'great strength', but fails to make clear what he means by 
that. There are two distinct possibilities. Grey may mean that the English force comprised a large body 
of men-at-arms; the numbers involved would be unlikely to be very large; hundreds perhaps rather than 
121 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.23. 
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thousands, but the significance of their defeat would be considerable since they would be regarded as an 
elite formation as well as the more direct military significance of a demonstration that the English could 
not rely on Lothian as a secure area nor on the ability of their men-at-arms to dominate their Scottish 
equivalents in battle. Alternatively, if Segrave led a more conventional force of horse and foot, it would 
suggest that in the absence of the man-at-arms element, already defeated by the Scots, the balance of 
the army would not be safe in open country and should be obliged to withdraw for fear of further defeat. 
Sir Thomas describes two other fights of men-at-arms during the same period at Cupar, when his father 
was the constable of the castle there, an indication that such activity was not limited to Lothian, but a 
normal practice of war in Scotland. The English expedition of 1322, which penetrated as far as 
Edinburgh, was seriously hampered by the activity of the Scottish cavalry. Although Grey does not 
describe any actions in Lothian he makes it clear that the hobelars of the English army were prevented 
from foraging. The implication is that the Scots could counter English cavalry forces adequately and 
that the English therefore had lost the reconnaissance battle to a degree that prevented any worthwhile 
degree of operational activity. Grey tells us that the English army was consistently harassed by the 
Scots during the retreat to Newcastle, a further indication that the Scots could deploy fast and powerful 
columns which could disengage easily if threatened by a concentration of the enemy. It is difficult to 
imagine what kind of force could have fulfilled such a role other than one with a high proportion of 
men-at-arms. Incidental comments from Grey give us further pointers to the existence of a chivalrous or 
armigerous class. The participation of Scottish magnates in jousts is unremarkable but the description of 
a Scottish lord as a 'banneret'122 is a strong indication that the structures of the Scottish armigerous 
classes were at least broadly similar to those in England. 
The social niceties of fourteenth-century war were practised in Lothian as they might be 
anyvvhere else, which is to say intermittently, and no doubt with due regard to political realities. The 
122 Scalacronica (Maxwell), p.82. It is of course possible that the term 'banneret' was not used in Scotland 
at this period and that Grey simply used the appropriate English term, nonetheless, it is clear that the 
function and status 0 f the senior knight was similar enough in both countries for Grey to use the word to 
describe Scots. 
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Earl of Moray pursued a force under the Count of Naruur from Burghmuir (at least) to the ruins of 
Edinburgh castle, a distance of at least two miles, in 1335. Contemporary accounts123 indicate a fight 
primarily, if not exclusively, between men-at-arms. Bower particularly dra,vs attention to a combat 
which resulted in the two combatants (one of them female) simultaneously spearing one another. While 
this is further evidence of the importance of men-at-arms generally, the outcome of the fight 
demonstrates a ,villingness to make the sort of grand chivalrous gesture that could enhance a man's 
reputation as a noble warrior. Moray elected to release the Count ofNaruur free of ransom on condition 
that he would never bear arms against David II. Escorting his prisoner to English-held territory, Moray 
had the misfortune to be captured himself and spent some years as a prisoner of war. 124 Moray could 
afford to make a generous gesture and release Namur because Naruur was not really a militarily or 
politically significant figure, though he was probably famous enough that his capture and release would 
be noted. Moray on the other hand was a military leader of some talent and a major figure in the Bruce 
party. The presence or otherwise of the count of Naruur and his hundred men-at-arms in the English 
army would have made very little difference to Scots militarily. Their release would have helped to 
establish or maintain the status of the Scots as members of a pan-European chivalrous class, whereas 
the removal of Moray ,vas a severe material blow. However chivalrous Moray's gesture may have been, 
it was also a political device, though one that backfired. 
The literature of the day is not, of course, a secure guide to the general nature of the war, only to 
the parts of the conflict in which the 'writers were interested. This is particularly true of Grey and 
Barbour. Each was predominantly concerned with the actions of men-at-arms. Even where Barbour 
refers to courageous acts by common men like Thorn Dicson or William Bunnock, we might consider 
the possibility that Barbour uses their stories as a device to encourage the chivalric confidence of his 
audience by implying that the Scottish commons were braver and more independent than most, and 
therefore needed particularly fme lords and knights to lead them. These 'middling men' seem to seldom, 
123 Scotichronicon, vii, pp. 113,115; Chron. Fordun, i, pp. 350-51;Scalacronica (Maxwell), p. 100. 
124 Nicholson, Edward III, p.13l. 
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if ever, act on their ovm initiative, but they could be motivated by their leaders, not only to join the 
action themselves, but to encourage others, thus Thomas Dicson in book 5 of The Bruce -
'Sa vvTocht he throu sutelte 
That all the lele men of that land 
That with his fadyr were dwelland 
This gud man gert cum ane and ane 
And mak him manrent everilkane,lJ5 
If Barbour and Grey concentrate on the men-at-arms, it is quite probable that they do so, not only 
because of their own social status, but because the bulk of the operational activity was in fact conducted 
by rather modest formations consisting primarily or even exclusively of heavy cavalry. This cannot be 
assumed for the action at Crichtondene as described by John of Fordun. 126 A force was raised in the 
north of England to raise the Scots siege of Edinburgh castle. The operation was successful in intent in 
that the siege was raised, but the Scots elected to confront the relief column, meeting them between 
Clerkington and Crichton. The relief column may not have included a strong contingent of men-at-
arms, but it would have been a very unusual structure for an English raiding party if it did not. Equally 
the Scottish force may not have had a force of men-at-arms, but it would be very unlikely for a force 
without a strong cavalry element to attempt to intercept and out manoeUVTe an enemy that they would at 
least expect to have a plentiful supply of men-at-arms in keeping with the normal usage of the day. The 
Scots won the day and then threatened to move on into England, obliging the English force to remain 
under arms south of the Tweed for two days until the Scots moved away. Again, though we are not told 
of the nature of the force, it would be very unusual for any raiding party not to include a significant 
proportion of men-at-arms. 
125 Barbour, The Bruce, pp. 204-6. 
126 Chron. Fordun i, p.362 
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In addition to the literary and administrative records relating to the service of men-at-arms there 
are many examples of men receiving prisoner of war allowances appropriate for that status or of being 
forfeited for their service to the Bruce cause. In the sample of less than 300 Lothian men (see 
Appendix) an absolute minimum of over 100 can be unquestionably identified as giving man-at-arms 
service. Given the scarcity of documents we can surely be confident that the real figure would be 
somewhat greater. Whether this is proof of an articulated system of knight service is not the issue, the 
question is whether or not the Scots ",-ere able to field and maintain a force of heavy cavalry adequate to 
their needs. Undoubtedly on the few occasions that large field armies met the English cavalry force was 
superior in quantity and perhaps quality, hardly surprising given the disparity in size and economic 
conditions betvveen the two countries.127 Large actions certainly could determine the immediate 
progress of the war and tend to receive a disproportionate amount of attention, but they were very few 
and far between. Stirling, Falkirk, Bannockburn, Myton, Dupplin Muir, Halidon Hill and Neville's 
Cross were all very significant events, but the several recoveries of the Bruce cause were to a 
considerable extent achieved in lengthy campaigns of small actions and it would be difficult to argue 
that the brunt of the fighting was not borne by men-at-arms. 
Before leaving this topic some observations must be made about general military service as envisaged 
by Robert I's legislation of 1318.128 The obligations on the individual are quite clearly defined: men 
whose possessions were equal in value to a cow were obliged to [md themselves a spear or a bovv 'with 
arrows, men with goods to the value of £10 a rather more comprehensive list of equipment. Professor 
Duncan has made the point that simply to value the cow - about lOs - hides the fact that poorer men sa\\? 
127 The strength of medieval armies is a thorny issue, either in terms of sheer numbers or of relative 
strengths. Estimates of the Scottish and English armies at Bannockburn stem, largely, from questionable 
interpretations of numbers offered in contemporary accounts - essentially dividing Barbour's figure of 
100,000 English by four to achieve a 'credible' figure of 25,000 and his estimate of 30,000 Scots by the 
same factor to achieve a 'credible' figure of7,500. Barbour's figures were not intended to be taken 
literally in the first place, therefore an extrapolation based on his estimates is of questionable value. 
Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the Scottish force engaged at Dupplin Muir comprised 20,000 men-
see. Rogers, Wars, p.270 - and even more so bearing in mind that another Scottish force was in the 
vicinity. In the 17ili century the Scottish government endeavoured to raise an army of about 20,000 for 
service in England, but could not keep it up to strength. E. Furgol Regimental HistOlY of the Cm-enanting 
Armies (Edinburgh, 1990) pp. 5-6. 
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money so rarely that they would have assessed their goods in terms of cattle-values. 129 One has to 
question the validity of this, certainly in relation to Lothian, which was already a highly monetarised 
society by the close of the thirteenth century. Ho\vever the relative scarcity of specie in other parts of 
the country may have made cattle-values an effective 'common denominator' of wealth. Obviously this 
part of the legislation was not aimed at providing the king with a force of trained, competent men that 
he could lead in an offensive campaign, but at raising large forces when required to meet invaders. The 
threshold of goods to the value of half a cow was very low indeed, and while vve should recognise that 
there \vas undoubtedly a class of people too poor to own even that much, we should also recognise that 
the bulk of the adult male population probably did have goods to that value. However conscripting large 
numbers of these men for any length of time would have economic implications - who would tend the 
fields if these men \vere on campaign? 
The position of the man with goods to the value of £10 is, if anything, less clear than that of his 
poorer neighbour. His £10 of goods obliged him to acquire a bacinet, an aketon, armoured gloves, 
sword and lance. 130 Failing the aketon, he was to have a haubergel with a 'good iron for his body'. The 
legislation does not make clear what is meant by the terms aketon and haubergel; obviously there was 
an intention to differentiate between two different forms of protection. Haubergel is a diminutive form 
of the word 'hauberk' (a chainmail shirt), generally perceived as leather or cloth armour, a perception 
supported by the phrase 'with a good iron'. The 'good iron' may refer to a small round cap but it may be 
a description of an early form of what would later be called a brigandine; the practice of inserting or 
attaching iron plates to cloth and leather armour was hardly a novelty in 1318. Unfortunately the term 
aketon is very often used to describe much the same thing. There are two distinct possibilities here. 
Either aketon was used to denote an alternative type of armour - which could hardly be anything other 
129 Ibid p.54 
130 The lance was the primary offensive arm of cavalry, as the spear or polearm was for infantry. S. 
Morillo's suggestion that the sword was 'the real killing weapon' in 'The age of Cavalry Revisited' in The 
Circle afWar in the Middle Ages' (Woodbridge, 1999) p.55 is not supported by contemporary descriptions 
of battles. By the early fourteentll century armour had reached a stage of development that made it very 
difficult to penetrate with a s\vord. Most of the individual combats recorded in contemporary accounts 
concern the lance or spear. 
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than chainmail - or that aketon and haubergel were generally understood as tenu for different fonus of 
essentially the same sort of product. Though there is no obvious reason why medieval legislators should 
have thought the distinction desirable or necessary, they evidently did think it necessary, and 
presumably with good cause, so perhaps we should assume that the aketon and bacinet was seen as the 
more desirable choice, but that a haubergel with 'a good iron' vvas considered an adequate substitute. 
With the addition of his 'cyrotecas de guerra' (gloves of war), the £1 0 man was equipped to the sort of 
standard to be expected of line of battle infantry in France or England, but the legislation is unclear 
about \vhat exactly constituted a £1 0 man, nor do we know if King Robert's law was in the nature of a 
defmition of customary practice or an attempt to broaden the range of men liable to provide service at a 
certain standard. 
Are \ve to assume that those who owned less than £10 of goods had no more obligation than those 
with one cow's worth? This would seem to be unusually lenient to men with £9 a year and it surely 
cannot mean that men with £100 a year were no more heavily burdened than those with a tenth of that 
income. The division into two groups for military purposes might suggest that the only equipment 
scales of medieval Scots were those of the impoverished peasant archer/spearmen or of the heavy 
infantry with aketon and bacinet, yet we can easily identify large amounts of man-at-anus service being 
discharged in and around Lothian or by Lothian men in virtually every year from 1296 at Dunbar to 
Neville's Cross in 1346. Should we therefore assume that knight and man-at-arms service was not 
affected by the 1318 law? Certainly anyone perfonuing man-at-arms service would have to have rather 
better equipment than that envisaged in the legislation, though if the 'aketon' of the act implies a 
chainmail shirt the additional equipment required for man-at-anus service might not have been a very 
heavy investment. The legislation makes no reference to a shield or to leg protection or to a horse, but 
most men of property would already own an adequate horse and a perfectly adequate shield could be 
manufactured by any half way competent carpenter. Given that a chainmail shirt could be had for any 
thing from twenty to one hundred shillings it would be reasonable to estimate leggings at two to twenty-
five shillings a pair depending on size, quality and degree of 'tailoring'. A significant sum to a man with 
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goods worth £10 perhaps, but not a very heavy one. If, as seems reasonable to assume, the category 
extended up to £10, rather than from £10 upward, the cost of 'upgrading' equipment and the upkeep or 
acquisition of a suitable horse would of course represent a very significant investment for men at the 
lower end of the wealth scale. For men at the top of that scale acquiring the extra equipment (and skills) 
might actually have been a means of potentially improving one's status in the community. If a man were 
equipped to serve with the men-at-arms he would undoubtedly be welcome to do so both in Scottish 
armies where men-at-arms must have been at a premium and in English garrisons where there were 
frequently recruiting problems and where there must surely have been a desire to have as many 
members of the local community as possible and encourage commitment to Plantagenet lordship. 
Serving with the men-at-arms would bring a man into more contact with men who could offer him 
patronage and advancement than serving 'with the infantry. 
The act must surely have been concerned with the provision of a large army to conduct or resist 
invasion, a relatively rare event generally, and particularly so in Lothian. Given that year on year the 
bulk of the fighting would seem to have been done by men-at-arms, the significance of the legislation 
may have been rather limited. To the best of our knowledge Scottish men-at-arms served for land tenure 
obligations. The precise extent of their armament was not defmed, but they, and their superior, were 
aware of what was required of them. The equipment required would not have been cheap, but it need 
not have been terribly expensive either. An aketon or haubergel could be made domestically, a spear 
might cost 3d to 6d, and Edward II (in 1302-3, when he was still Prince of Wales) spent 20s on three 
bacinets and lOs on a pair of plate gloves. l3i Presumably the bacinets ,vere for members of his retinue, 
and therefore probably were of a good quality and high price. Edward would hardly be likely to buy the 
cheapest items available, so it is a safe assumption that these things could be purchased for rather less 
than the sums he paid. It is likely that in the early fourteenth century the Scottish '£10 man' could equip 
himself for less than £2, and possibly even less tllan £1 bearing in mind that Edward's plate gloves 
would have been very much more costly than a pair of leather mittens with chainmail, or even just very 
131 CDS, ii, no. 1413 
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thick, rigid leather attached to the backs. If £ 1 0 represented the upper limit of income scale relative to 
equipment scale we would have to ask why that figure should be selected and what are the implications 
for our perception of military service among men of greater fmancial standing? It may be more realistic 
to regard the requirements of the 1318 legislation as a means of setting a standard for all the men whose 
goods had a value that lay between 'a cow' and £10. In that case the cost of equipment would have been 
a real burden on the man whose goods were valued at one or two pounds, but not an impossible one; it 
\vas not, after all, a man's income that was the qualifying factor, but his goods. 
Landholder status was apparently not a factor and there is no way of knowing what sort of income 
could be expected from any particular property on the basis of the rental paid. However the military 
obligations implicit in William the Lion's grant to his sister - one hundred librates of land in the 
baronies of Ratho and Bathgate infeft with tW'enty knights - \vould suggest that man-at-arms service 
could be expected from men with tenure of land worth £5 per annum in the early thirteenth century.132 
Obligations may have changed, of course, but the rather conservative nature of medieval societies 
generally would militate against this. The fmancial obligations of heritable tenants remained static, 
there is no reason to think that military ones altered in principle, though the regularity with which due 
services were demanded was presumably much greater in the fourteenth century. Of the properties 
forfeited by Bruce partisans in Lothian in l335-36, over seventy were valued at £5 or more, \vith a high 
incidence of rentals at £5 (more usually described as 100s) in the Bathgate and Ratho area; possibly 
revealing the structure of the estates granted by William the Lion to his sister Ada. We might 
reasonably suppose that the majority of these forfeitures, at least of the men, were the result of 
performing army service for the Bruce cause. 
Most of the men with more than £1 0 of goods would have had defmed military obligations attached 
to land tenure, but by the close of the thirteenth century there was already a well-established mercantile 
class in Scottish towns and they were - vicissitudes of war excepted - increasingly wealthy. Although 
no knovvn Edinburgh burgess can be positively identified performing man-at-arms service before John 
132 Duncan, Scotland, p. 377. 
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Wyggemore (see Appendix) we should not assume that wealthy burgh residents, only a small 
proportion of whom were actually burgesses, did not perform that service by long standing tradition. If 
foreign merchants could be obliged to acquire arms and armour and give service at Berwick,133 it is hard 
to see ho\v local men of similar standing could avoid doing the same. Burgh men were of course 
ob liged to serve in the defence of their town should the need arise. Hovvever the defence of a to\vn with 
no \valls \vas hardly worth attempting in the face of a field army. Since neither Edinburgh, Haddington 
nor Linlithgow had to\Vn walls the actual discharge of that obligation must have been rare to say the 
least, but burgh men were called out to serve in the field like anyone else. 
To what extent army service could be dra\Vn from Lothian obviously depended to a great degree on 
who was demanding the service and who held the reins of government and how fmnly. Professor 
Barro\v has demonstrated clearly that a sizeable proportion of the tenants of Coldinghamshire \vere 
forfeited by Ed,vard I for fighting for the Balliol cause at F alkirk, 134 and we should not doubt that 
Lothian men also served there, though whether Wallace was able to raise the level of manpower 
actually due from Lothian is very doubtful. The garrison at Edinburgh and the alignment of the Earl of 
Dunbar with Edward I must have discouraged some and many must have doubted both the potential of 
Wallace to defeat the English and the validity of his cause. John's abdication may have been forced, but 
it was not necessarily invalid from a legal perspective since he had svvorn allegiance to Edward I in 
1291-92. Additionally, a number of Lothian barons and free tenants were either in Edward's peace or 
his prisons. In the absence of several men who \vould normally have had recruitment and/or leadership 
responsibilities it would surely have proved difficult to call upon the 'service that every man owes for 
his headol35 very effectively; there would inevitably be doubts about who was responsible for ensuring 
enlistment from their baronies and properties and about the validity of their authority. 
It is of course quite impossible to make any detailed assessment of the size of the army of Lothian 
had it been available to Wallace in its entirety. Professor Duncan has drawn attention to a sLxteenth-
133 Duncan, Scotland, p. 515. 
134 Barrow, Neighbours. p.19: 
135 AIelrose Libel', no. 351. 
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century wappinschaw at which the 'army of Annandale' numbered rather more than 1,000 men and 
makes the case that the fourteenth-century equivalent would have been of much the same size,J36 and 
indeed Edward I would seem to have expected that 1,000 men could be raised by the earl of Carrick in 
1297.137 We can hardly think that the 'army of Lothian' would be any smaller, in fact almost certainly 
rather larger given the presence of one of the largest towns on the country, Edinburgh, and several 
smaller towns and nucleated villages large enough to support markets; not a notable feature of medieval 
Carrick. Men with Lothian connections were certainly recruited for the campaign that resulted in 
Neville's Cross,138 but probably not in the numbers we might e)..'Pect for a general obligation like a 
wappinschaw. In the event of a general call-out the labouring men of the community - those with goods 
,,,orth a cow or more anyway - were required to serve, but an expeditionary force would be more likely 
to include a larger proportion of men selected for service, men who had, or at least ,,,ere expected to 
have, adequate arms and armour. 
Formulary E, no. 59, contains an instruction for raising troops from the burgh of 'A' - possibly 
Ayr. The order requires one hundred and twenty men 'armed for fighting' and six men 'sufficiently 
armed' (perhaps 'appropriately' or 'properly' armed) to be their leaders.139 The document is from a 
formulary and cannot be assumed to be typical of the reality of enlistments, also it refers to Ayrshire not 
Lothian, all the same it is probably fair to assume that an enlistment of the order of 120 ,,,ith arms men 
and SLX men ,,,ith 'sufficient' armour would not have been an unrealistic expectation for the town. The 
fact that there is a provision for leadership, like the archers from Bowden and their 'armed man' or the 
two men said by Bower140 to be 'leaders of the archers', is a further indication that there was some 
understanding of the need for people who could fill ~iunior leader' roles to aid the articulation141 of the 
136 Duncan, Scotland. p. 391. 
137 INA, C4712212118; Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.178. 
138 The earl of Dunbar and Sir William Douglas of Lothian among others. 
139 RRS, v, p.261. 
140 Scotichronicon vii, p.141 
141 Appoilltment to such positions was not necessarily popular. In November 1336 Humphrey de Bohun 
requested that a 'bachelor ofhis company' who had been selected as an illfantry officer should be excused 
duty so that he could contirlUe to serve ill de Bohun's retillue. TNA, SC1/39119. 
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anny. It is also clear from two documents that the crovvll identified hvo different levels of obligation on 
men of the same community. Those who had, or could be provided with, weapons and those required to 
provide themselves with 'sufficient' annour in Fonnulary 'E' and the men with goods to the value of a 
covv and men vv·ith goods to the value of £10 in the 1318 legislation. Neither document defines the 
service of men with military tenure presumably because each of those tenures was a specific contract 
behveen tenant and superior. Men holding land for defmed military service still had the universal 
burden of army service for the state, but would be expected to present themselves for service in the 
same role as that envisaged in their land grant, which, for most of them at least, would be that of a man-
at-arms. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In a broad sense, the political community of Lothian would seem to have carried much the same 
range of responsibilities and privileges as their counterparts in England, with similar obligations of 
court and military service. The local political community formed part of the administrative fabric of the 
country as jurors, as military leaders, as specialist combatants and, in some cases, as barons with 
judicial responsibilities additional to their duties to the sheriff court. i To retain the family property, and 
the privileges attendant on landholding, each member of the political community had to achieve and 
maintain a positive relationship with whichever party was in a position to exert lordship in the 
sheriffdom. During most of the period between 1296 and l314 it is very clear that the Plantagenet 
administration was effective in Lothian, and the very small number of Lothian landholders forfeited in 
13062 and 13123 suggests that the overwhelming majority of the Lothian political community were 
prepared to accept Plantagenet lordship. 
Traditionally that acceptance has been seen by both English and Scottish historians as evidence that 
the nobility were, by and large anyway, less than enthusiastic about Scottish independence and Scottish 
kingship and far more interested in retaining their family properties, including, of course, lands in 
England.4 Since the maintenance (or improvement) of the status of one's family and the protection of 
1 RRS, v, pp. 41-44 
:: Barrow, Bntce pp. 325-8, including the tenants of He my Pinkney at Ballencreiff, Michael Wemyss, 
William Somerville, Alexander Fraser, Alexander Lindsay, James Lindsay, John Fenton and probably 
William, his father, who had been a Ragman Roll homager in 1296 CDS, ii, pp. 194-211, but whose 
property is not listed. It is more than likely that other men forfeited at the same time also had interests in 
Lothian, as well as the areas with which they are associated in this document since the instrument in 
question is essentially a list of properties sought by Edward 1's follow·ers rather that a catalogue of the 
properties held by the forfeited men. 
3 CDS, iii, no. 245, comprising Sir Robert Keith, Sir Thomas de Hay, Peter de Pontekin, Edmund de 
Ramsay, Godfrey Broun, Edward de Fressingleye and Aymer de Hauden. See Appendi'i: for Keith, Ramsay, 
and Fressingleye. 
4 In 1296 several Lothian landholders held property in England and no doubt some people eventually gave 
up on their Scottish inheritances and emigrated to England; however, the majority seem to have held no 
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their rights was the primary duty of any landholder it is hardly surprising that they should have accepted 
Plantagenet lordship when the alternative would have been going to war in support of a kingship that 
had failed to maintain the independence of the kingdom (the Balliol cause in 1296-1304) or of one that 
had yet to establish itself as a credible source of authority (the Bruce cause in 1306-1314). Service was 
inevitable, but not wholly undesirable. The military service performed by Lothian men, both as 
garrison men-at-arms and for landholding, contributed to the security of the administration, providing 
some degree of social, political and economic stability through the sheriffdom. This was not simply a 
matter of combat strength or effectiveness in the field. Even after Robert I had gained the military 
ascendancy and control of most of Scotland he ,vas unable to penetrate Lothian to any great extent, 
though he was able to draw blackmail in exchange for truces. 5 Had the Lothian administration not had 
the military power to resist him, Robert would have had no need to offer truces, and it is extremely 
unlikely that the administration could have fielded an adequate force of men at arms6 to offer any 
realistic level ofresistance to the Bruce party if it had not been able to call upon the service of Lothian 
landholders. 
The discharge of military obligation to the government was inevitable if landholders were going to 
retain their positions, but is not really a good guide to their political inclinations. Certainly it is a good 
indicator of the current and overt allegiance of an individual, but that should not be construed as 
evidence of political belief any more than paying income tax today is an indicator of support for the 
party in government. So long as the Plantagenets could offer good lordship Lothian men had good 
cause to fulfil their obligations and keep on the right side of the government of the day, thus helping to 
keep the war out of Lothian. That level of acceptance was not universal in Lothian. A number of 
Lothian men gave their allegiance to Robert in 1306 and were duly forfeited, as were a handful more in 
property whatsoever in England, and the properties of those who did were not extensive enough to make 
the men in question significant members of the political community in England. None of the Lothian men 
in the Appendix - and virtually no other Scots - appear in Moor's Knights of Edward J (London, 1900). 
5 C. MacNamee, The Wars of the Brnces (East Linton, 1997), p.130; CDS, iii, no. 337. 
6 There is no evidence to indicate that the Plantagenet administrations made any effort whatsoever to call 
on the common army service of Lothian men, either in 1296-1314 or 1333-41. 
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1312. The majority of the political community surely continued to gIve their serVice to the 
administrations of Edward I and Edward II, or the lists of forfeitures would have been much longer, as 
would be the case in 1335-7. 
By 1314 the Plantagenet administration had held power in Lothian for the better part of twenty 
years and would seem to have been quite "fIrmly established; sufficiently so that despite the fall of 
Linlithgow and Edinburgh to the Scots, a number of Lothian men served Edward II at Bannockburn. 
This indicates some level of confidence in the Plantagenet cause, though of what nature and to ,vhat 
extent is open to question. The men concerned may have believed the Bruce cause to be unreasonable in 
itself or just unrealisable in the face of concerted English opposition. They may have considered it 
inevitable that the English would win a major battle and restore their power in Scotland and that they 
should therefore continue in Plantagenet peace as the better prospect in the long run. 
Any strong popular support for the Plantagenets would not seem to have endured after 
Bannockburn, and Robert I seems to have had no difficulty in exerting lordship in Lothian thereafter. 
This does not mean that he was in any sense king through popular acclaim there, rather that, like the 
Plantagenets before him, his power was sufficiently evident to discourage opposition. The Bruce party 
had become the government of the day, and, like the Plantagenets, so long as they could afford good 
lordship to the community, particularly in regard to keeping war out of Lothian, they could reasonably 
expect to retain power. 
It might be argued that the Bruce party, like the Plantagenets, were acceptable to the community as 
they provided good government, and that the political community of Lothian were content to accept 
their lordship until after Halidon Hill (Edward Ballio!' s brief reign in 1332 does not seem to have had 
any real significance in Lothian) at ,vhich point they were content to accept Plantagenet lordship as they 
or their predecessors had a generation before. The situations were not the same however. The high 
incidence of forfeiture that occurred by 1335-67 has no counterpart in the reigns of Edward II, and 
7 CDS, iii, pp. 327-41. 
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though the large number of restorations made by Edward I in 1296-78 might suggest that there had been 
a spate of wholesale forfeitures in the period immediately after the battle of Dunbar in 1296 it is 
perhaps more likely that those restorations .vere the product of 'blanket' forfeitures of men who 
supported King John and/or men who failed to give service due for lands held in England. 
It would seem that Edward III was not able to procure as much service from the Lothian community 
as his father and grandfather had done. The Bruce party was able to call on the services of 'electi' 
soldiers (literally 'chosen' men, the numbers involved, the conduct of the engagement and the fact that 
they ,vere clearly not 'common army' conscripts suggests very strongly that they were men-at-arms) 
from below the F orth9 to fight at Culblean in November 1335. It is fair to assume that a portion of those 
men came from Lothian and that they were not giving army service to the Plantagenet administration. 
In 1335-6 over one hundred Lothian men and women were recorded as having been forfeited, some at 
least would surely have been men who had fought at Culblean, but whether they were or not; they were 
obviously not serving Edward III. The names of men giving service for land (as opposed to men 
serving for wages) were not recorded for posterity (though sheriffs and other responsible parties must 
have kept a register of service due and service discharged) so it is impossible to be clear hov'i much 
service was available, let alone how much of it was performed. Equally, is clear from the accounts of 
the sheriff of Edinburgh in 1335-6 and 1336-710 that a very large proportion of each constabulary was, 
if not actually under the control of the Scots, destroyed or denied to the administration which must have 
adversely affected the ability of the administration to dra,,, army service from the community. 
Under Edward I and Edward II many Scots served in English garrisons for wages, and this 
continued to be the case under Edward III, but the pattem of that service was not the same. A large 
proportion of the identifiable Scots in garrison service in the 1330s would seem to have been drawn 
S CDS, ii, nos. 832.853. 
5; Chron. Fordun i, p.360. Bower refers to this force as 'picked men from Lothian and the borders.· 
Scotichronicon,vii, p.117. 
10 CDS, iii, pp. 347-59. 
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from the ranks of the disinherited. 11 As men whose prospects were dependent on the successful 
establishment of a BallioIIPlantagenet government it is unsurprising that several of them should have 
joined garrisons, however many of them may have found that garrison service was their only means of 
livelihood. They might have been theoretically restored to their properties by the Plantagenet 
administration, but it is open to question how many were ever able to realise their lordship. Those 
,yhose property lay outside the areas of PlantagenetlBalliol lordship would still have been unable to 
collect their rents and casualties. The appearance of men from the west of Scotland in the garrison 
records of Edinburgh and Berwick perhaps points in that direction. 
If Edward III were to pursue his Scottish ambitions successfully (eyen if those ambitions were 
essentially limited to an outpost strategy aimed at preventing serious Scottish intervention in a future 
war with France) he would have needed to support these men in some way, as he did Edward BanioL 
They, in tum, could reasonably expect to further their own ambitions more easily if they were resident 
in Scotland, and, as active supporters of the PlantagenetlBalliol cause could expect to be rew'arded in 
the event of the Bruce party being defeated. For some at least, garrison service was the only valid 
option other than defection to the Bruce party, a choice which was less than likely to lead to restoration 
since that would often require the displacement of a Bruce supporter. 
Although it is important to be wary of the tendency, encouraged by pro-Bruce chroniclers and 
historians, to conflate the Bruce cause and support for Scottish independence, it is equally important to 
recognise that to some extent at least, there was an association of the two from at least the spring of 
1307 in the minds of a segment of the population. In May of that year an English officer or sympathiser 
stationed in Forfar wrote to a senior official that Robert Bruce 'never had the good will of his o\"n 
follo\vers or of the people at large or even half of them as now' and that if he could escape to Ross he 
would 'fmd them all ready at his will more entirely than ever'. 12 The 'writer may have felt moved to 
exaggerate the strength of Bruce support in order to encourage Edward II's government to provide more 
11 Sir Alexander Cragy, Roger Dalmahoy, John Duncan and Richard Naper all served in Edinburgh 
garnsons. 
12 CDS, iii, no. 1926 
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men-at-arms, but he surely perceived the Bruce party as a serious threat. The statement that Bruce 
would gain the support of the people 'more than ever' would seem curious in an area where the Bruces 
did not have a particularly well established tradition of lordship. If Robert could enjoy popular support 
in Angus there is no reason to suppose that there was no sympathy at all in Lothian for the Bruce cause, 
only that it was not strong enough to have any great effect on the political stability of the community. 
Even in the spring Isummer of 1306 there was sufficient disturbance in the south and east of Scotland 
for Edward II's govenunent to spend 60s on the hire of shipping to carry 200 men-at-arms from 
Bernick to Perth 'on account of enemies between Bervvick and the king's army,.l3 Evidently 
Plantagenet lines of communication through eastern Scotland were not at all secure if a strong company 
of men-at-arms could not pass along them with impunity. The same document refers to pay for a man 
who had spent eighteen days ascertaining 'the will and state of the common men of those parts' (the 
vicinity of Perthshire). If the opinion of the common people was of no significance, or if there was no 
expectation that they might side with the Bruce party there would have been no point in making such a 
reconnaIssance. 
The Bruce cause and independent kingship presumably did become firmly connected in popular 
consciousness as the mainsprings of Scottish political identity. A growing tradition of anti-English 
feeling would inevitably have led to support for the most effective opposition to the English, and such a 
tradition would almost certainly have developed in the two generations of children that grew up in war 
zones between the close of the thirteenth century and the middle of the fourteenth. No doubt the 
exploits of Scottish heroes helped to inspire confidence in times of crisis, though it is questionable 
whether these crises were necessarily quite as dire as chronicle accounts might lead us to believe. The 
Bruce party may have been reduced to a handful of castles in 1333 -414 but hovv significant is that 
observation, even assuming its accuracy? The extent of damage inflicted by King Robert's policy of 
slighting castles may not have been enough to raze them to the ground, but it must have been enough to 
13 CDS, v. no. 492. 
14 Chron. Lanercost p. 276 lists these as Dumbarton, Kildrummy, Urquhart, Loch Leven and Loch Doon. 
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compromise their security. We might question how many viable fortresses would have been available 
for the Scots to hold even if the manpower had been available. Fordun and Bower had demands on their 
work beyond the simple relation of events. The more bleak the fortunes of the Scots in 1333-5, the more 
spectacular their recovery after 1335. Perhaps more significantly, two years after Halidon Hill, 
Edward's Scottish administration was already under severe pressure, if not actually failing. The Earl of 
Dunbar, Edward's most important adherent in the south-east, had returned to Bruce allegiance 
sometime before February 1335 15 and led troops from below the Forth to fight at Culblean. The 
forfeiture of over one hundred Lothian free tenants by Michaelmas 133616 would hardly suggest that the 
Plantagenet administration there \vas attracting the support of the local political community at a time 
when the Bruce party was gaining the military initiative throughout the country as a whole, indeed there 
was a 'steady trickle' of defections to the Bruce party from early 1335 onward. 17 
The defection of the Earl must be regarded as particularly significant. As an experienced and 
cautious politician he would surely not have embraced the Bruce cause in 1335 had he not been 
extremely confident of their eventual victory. Earl Patrick had more to lose than most and the bulk of 
his property was very vulnerable to English operations; however he was in an excellent position to 
gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the English administration since he was a part of its command 
structure. His example may have been instrumental in persuading other members of the political 
community to follow suit, or even possibly the other way round; Patrick was granted the lands of any of 
his tenants forfeited for treason, but he might find it difficult, even impossible to enforce those 
forfeitures if a large enough proportion of his tenants were active Bruce supporters. Any such failure 
would undermine his prestige and authority and his credibility as a senior political figure. Any of his 
tenants could also be confident of restoration in the event of Bruce success, which was hardly the case 
for the earl. It is always possible that Patrick underwent an ideological conversion, that he was 
15 Chron. Lanercost, p. 278. 
16 CDS, iii, pp. 327-4l. 
17 B. Webster 'Scotland without a King' in A. Grant and K. Stringer (edd),A1edieval Scotland. Crown, 
Lordship and Community (Edinburgh, 1993), p. 233. 
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persuaded of the justice of the Bruce cause and defected as a matter of political principle: however it is 
more probable that his decision was based very strongly on a sober appreciation of the situation and the 
desire to back a winner. Had the Plantagenet administration been in good condition in 1335 it is very 
unlikely that the Earl would have defected. 
The significance of the defection of Patrick, or of Sir Alexander Seton, may lie more in leadership 
by example than fonnal power in a command structure. If prominent men with (probably) better sources 
of intelligence and "vith greater estates at risk decided that the time had come to join the Bruce party, 
then others, beyond their tenants and other dependents, might be moved to join them. If the Bruce party 
was successful it would do no hann to have followed the lead of local men who were likely to be 
influential in the community once the war was over. Moreover, these same men might well be of some 
importance on the national political stage in the future and be helpful in procuring preferment for local 
men who had proved themselves as supportive neighbours. Seton had in fact been granted particular 
military leadership privileges in Lothian by Robert I, including the 'superiority' of various properties 
and the 'leadership' of all his men. 18 
The implication must be that the leadership of the men of these properties had previously lain 
elsewhere, perhaps with the sheriff. Presumably there was a military command significance to these 
grants, perhaps giving the baron in question the power to raise a retinue of man-at-anns for the general 
conduct of war and/or a formation of infantry for the (rather rare) mustering of a large field army. Even 
very small armies require some form of articulation if they are to function adequately. A provision to 
enable men of proven military experience to raise discrete formations from men to whom they were 
already familiar as local figures of authority would be a simple means of achieving some degree of 
articulation. The 'men' of Alexander Seton or Robert Lauder or James Douglas would become 'units' 
'within the army alongside, or perhaps as sub-units of, the 'annies' of sheriffdoms and earldoms. The 
usual practice of the war did not, however, depend on the deployment of large armies of manoeuvre, but 
of small mobile parties, and grants of 'superiority' or 'leadership' may have been more significant in 
18 RRS, V, p. 459. 
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that setting. Whatever the precise implications of leadership and superiority in a military context, it 
would seem most likely that the intention of such grants was to provide authority and convey 
responsibility for a structured system of 'units' or retinues that could be deployed individually or in 
concert to specific tasks or operations without recourse to indentures - and fmancial rewards - for the 
supply of troops in general, and perhaps men-at-arms in particular. 19 
Although it is apparent that the majority of operational service was conducted by men-at-arms 
drawn from the political community, it would be rash to assume that these men, even in the most 
intense periods of conflict, were continually, even regularly, committed to engagements. In campaigns 
conducted by small parties of relatively specialised soldiers individual casualties make more impression 
on the strength, and more significantly the morale, of the forces involved. In a war of small mobile 
parties a successful contact with the enemy ", .. ould comprise engaging, achieving an objective and 
disengaging without serious loss, preferably driving tlle enemy off without incurring any casualties at 
all. Operations would be a matter of achieving local dominance through demonstration, rather than 
actual combat. Even when combat did occur the number of fatalities need not have been high. The 
mobility and armour of the man-at-arms afforded him some degree of protection in combat and some 
hope of escaping from an unsuccessful encounter. If defeated and unable to escape, there was every 
chance that a ransom - or defection - could be negotiated. This may in fact have been the practical 
battlefield significance of heraldry. The likelihood of being able accurately to recognise several 
thousand devices and know whether the bearer ,vas in the Bruce or Plantagenet party would be very 
slim beyond, perhaps, the devices of neighbours and great lords?O The fact tllat a man bore a device at 
all would indicate that he would probably have sufficient resources to be worth holding for ransom. 
Not unnaturally, the wars encouraged tlle development of a tradition of anti-English sentiment in 
19 See the indenture between Sir Aymer de Valence and Sir Thomas de Berkely, July 1298, for an example 
of the sort of terms and conditions which were applied to military service indentures. TNA ElO 1/68/1/l. 
20 Duplication of armorial devices was an inevitable consequence of the lack of a universal register which 
could prevent disputes. See A. A yton 'Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the 
Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry' , A. A yion & 1. Price (edd), The MedievallVfilitmy Revolution 
(London, 1995), pp. 84-6. 
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Scotland. Generations that grew up in time of endemic war with what was fast becoming 'the auld 
enemy' would be inclined toward the most effective opposition to the Plantagenets. From 1296 to l304 
this was the cause of King John. From 1306 omvard it was the Bruce party. Between l333 and 1341 the 
war may generally have been conducted by small-scale forces, but it brought men to prominence on the 
basis of their martial conduct. Men like Sir William Douglas of Lothian or Sir Alexander Ramsay of 
Dalhousie provided examples of heroic and successful leadership and formed the basis of a Scottish 
military tradition vvhich, all things considered, was remarkably successful throughout the fourteenth 
century. 
Military activity itself was obviously a factor in the extension or contraction of lordship; however, 
the product of that activity has to be considered. In the period between 1296 and the fall of Edinburgh 
castle in March 1314 the Plantagenet administration in Lothian was reasonably secure. Wallace 
marched on Haddington and vvithdrew without noticeable opposition, possibly gaining temporary 
occupation of some non-royal castles in the process and in 1303 the Scots won a fight at Roslin, but 
neither event seems to have seriously threatened the existence of the administration. Of course it was 
not the function of the garrisons to engage a large field army, but to prevent a competing source of 
authority from exerting lordship in the area. King Robert was able to draw blackmail from the 
community of Lothian before 1314, but while his ability to do so demonstrates his power, it also 
demonstrates his inability to exert lordship in the face of the Plantagenet government. 
If the Lothian community accepted Plantagenet rule in 1296-1314 with apparent equanimity and 
Bruce rule in l314-33 without resistance, is it adequate to say that the Lothian political community was 
simply willing to accept the authority of the de facto government of the day regardless of its political 
colour? This may have been the case, but that vyould demand an explanation of the extent of overt 
Bruce support in Lothian by l335-6. If a Bruce victory was not perceived as the likely outcome in the 
long term it would be incomprehensible that so many of tlle political community would have been 
willing to risk life and limb for a political ambition that was unlikely to materialise. Some of the 
hundred or so Lothian freeholders forfeited in l335-6 may have been motivated by simple nationalism, 
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but surely the majority made a sober assessment of the situation and decided that the Bruce cause was 
the more attractive for rather more prosaic reasons. Some of these forfeited persons would of course 
have lost their property to members of the disinherited and vvould have an obvious incentive to join the 
Bruce party. Equally, the desire of Edward III and Edward Balliol to build a 'constituency' of support 
in the political community, and the perelmial shortage of men-at-arms that hampered them both,21 could 
have led to negotiated settlements that would have kept such men in the Balliol or Plantagenet peace. 
The forfeiture of one hundred free tenants, surely many more than had benefited from Bruce grants, 
would have cut a swathe through the political community, and demonstrates a degree of public 
confidence in the Bruce cause, but, bearing in mind the severity of the defeats at Dupplin and Halidon 
Hill and the presence of a powerful garrison at Edinburgh after 1335, may not be representative of 
Bruce/nationalist sympathy in the Lothian political community as a whole. The absence of resistance to 
Bruce kingship after 1314 and after 1341, in contrast to the very clear evidence of Bruce support (or at 
least antipathy to the Plantagenets) in Lothian in 1335-6, suggests that the political community of 
Lothian came to adhere to the Bruce party over the course of the Wars of Independence. 
That adherence need not have been born out of the good lordship of Robert I so much as a 
confidence that a Bruce government would be more effective at excluding war from Lothian than a 
Plantagenet one. Edward II's administration failed in 1314 and Edward Ill's by the spring of 1341 but 
it had obviously been struggling for some years before that. Indeed, Edward Ill's authority, like that of 
his father's, was undermined by his inability to control the behaviour of his garrisons, let alone prevent 
the encroachment of the Scots. Edward did not attempt to restore his administration in Lothian after 
Neville's Cross in 1346. Admittedly there were no forces available for the purpose, but it would have 
been very difficult for any new Plantagenet government in Lothian to establish its' credibility at the 
third attempt. Further, \vhile it is clear that Scottish nationalism was a vehicle for the Bruce party, we 
should not ignore the possibility that the Bruce party was a vehicle for nationalists. Men and women 
21 Dr. Ayton has drawn attention to the difficulties of recruiting men-at-arms for service on the continent in 
1338-40. Not only was it necessary to employ large numbers of foreign mercenaries, but English men-al-
arms were offered double wages. 'English Armies in the Fourteenth Century' in Rogers, Wars, p. 310. 
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might well support the Bruces simply because they were the only credible source of authority with a 
genuinely Scottish agenda. 
The Plantagenets adopted a policy of granting extensive estates m Lothian to the men they 
appointed to office there, particularly Sir Robert Hastang under Edward rf2 and Sir John Strivelin23 
under Edward III. This was presumably intended as a means of giving these men local leadership rights 
over their tenants, and perhaps neighbours, as a means of bolstering their resources and giving them 
status in the political community. That policy may have been counter-productive to some extent. The 
political community of Lothian were not accustomed to the leadership of magnates, and though Robert r 
may have adopted a similar policy in effect by extending the lands and rights of Sir Alexander Seton24 
and Sir Robert Lauder,25 he was promoting the interests of Lothian men rather than imposing new men 
in positions of authority. 
In the absence of an established magnate the Lothian political community would look to the crovvn 
for preferment. Other figures would of course have wielded some degree of influence. The Earls of 
March and Fife were both extensive landholders in Lothian, though not sufficiently so for them to 
dominate the political community. The Bishop of St. Andrews was also a significant landholder in the 
county, as the presence of several 'bishop's tenants' on the Ragman Roll demonstrates.26 His tenants 
were obviously considered important enough to be ranked in among the free tenants and burgesses, and 
no doubt the bishop's tenants were briefed on a general policy position, but it would have been very 
difficult for the Bishop himself to take a very active part in the deliberations of the community given his 
duties and responsibilities elsewhere. 
22 CDS, iii, nos. 71, 230. 
23Ibid., no. 1209; INA, E 101/22/10/53. Interestingly both Sir Robert Hastang and Sir John de Strivelin 
were both granted lands in Bathgate and Ratho. William the Lion granted lands in Bathgate and Ratho to 
the extent of one hundred librates infeft with twenty knights and Alexander III granted lands there to his 
Queen, Margaret; Duncan, Scotland, pp. 377,592. 
24 RRS, V, pp. 424,425,450,451,453,459,515 and 680 are all grants oflandor rights in Lothian to Sir 
Alexander. He also received two royal confIrmations of grants from other nobles - Jolm de Vaus and 
Patrick earl of Dunbar (RRS, v, p. 670)- and a grantofland in the burgh of Aberdeen (RRS v, p.519) 
25 Ibid., p. 367; RMS, i, nos. 55,62,68,89, all ofwmch refer to lands in Lothian except no. 89 which refers to 
a property at Larbert. 
26 CDS, ii, no. 823. 
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It might be a reasonable conclusion that the political community in Lothian was less trammelled 
by layers of authority and influence than that of other counties. Essentially the Lothian landholder had 
to keep on the right side of the party in pov,'er, but did not have to worry too much about other sources 
of authority, such as an earl or other great lord whose priorities might clash with those of the 
government and/or the local community. Roxburghshire and Berwickshire lairds, and not just those 
who were his tenants, would surely have felt some pressure to support the Earl of Dunbar at each of his 
defections though they might personally have felt more inclined to stay either in Bruce allegiance in 
1333 or in Plantagenet allegiance in 1335. Superficially it would seem that Lothian landholders w'ere 
spared the complications of an intermediate level of authority bet\veen themselves and the crown, but 
local leadership structures will have existed, however transient or informal?7 It is possible that 
leadership groups are reflected in a number of records relating to forfeiture and restoration. A group of 
men are described as 'coming to the king's peace (Edward I) with the Earl of Stratheam,.28 Another 
group were forfeited along with Sir Alexander de Moubray29 when he defected to the Bruce camp in 
1334 over an inheritance dispute. All of the latter group were accepted into Edward Ill's peace and 
restored shortly thereafter. What is not clear is the nature of the grouping in either instance. The men 
who joined Edward l' s peace with the Earl of Strathearn may have been his tenants, his relatives, his 
friends and acquaintances or simply a body of men who took the opportunity to defect in the company 
of a powerful and influential man who could secure good terms from Edward's government. It is not 
impossible that they were not in any sense a conscious grouping, merely a body of men whose defection 
occurred at a given point and that the Earl was no more than the most prominent figure in that group. It 
is quite conceivable, that the document in question groups these men together as nothing more than an 
administrative convenience and that the inclusion of some or all of them was not the outcome of a 
27 Dr. A yton has drawn attention to the fluctuating membership of the following.s of individual leaders in 
English armies, suggesting that the close adherents of the leader provided 'a nucleus around which the less 
stable, more transitory elements in a magnate's war comitiva could be assembled.' 'English Armies in the 
Fourteenth Century' in Rogers, Wars, p. 312. 
28 CDS, ii, no. 853. 
29 CDS, iii, no. 1137. 
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conscious decision by, or on behalf of, a group of men with shared political vievols, merely a record of 
men who had defected. 
The defection of Moubray, Alexander Craigie and others in 133430 could be seen in a slightly 
different light. Superficially it would seem that they chose to abandon the PlantagenetiBalliol peace at a 
time when the fortunes of the Bruce party were at a very low- ebb. There is some cause to suspect that 
the position of David II's government was not perhaps quite so precarious as it appears to have been, 
but it was certainly in a very weak condition. Craigie31 submitted to Edward III in August 1335,32 but 
both his defection from, and return to, Plantagenet peace were the product of dissent and reconciliation 
within the PlantagenetlBalliol camp rather than of political ideology. 
Neither instance is solid evidence for the existence of long-tenn leadership groups 'within Lothian, 
though Lothian men were involved on both occasions. That does not mean that such groups did not 
exist. It is quite possible that if all the material concerning relationships - familial, social, local, 
commercial, judicial, political and military - relating to Lothian people could be collated, instances of 
concerted political activity by apparently distinct groups within the political community could be 
identified. Even so, whether the patterns emerging represented actual instances of local political 
leadership or chance agglomerations of people who happened to be connected with one another would 
still be open to question. Of course, since 'we cannot be aware of all of the connections between all of 
the members of the political community or of all their actions, any group that comes together in record 
might conceivably represent a leadership group of some sort. The jurors on the De Pinkney Post 
Mortem Inquisition in 129633 might, for all ,ve know, be a group of men ,vith a specific, recognisable 
identity that ,vas readily familiar to fourteenth-century Scots. They might have been the jurors of a 
particular sub-division of the constabulary of Haddington, men of a particular status with a judicial 
relationship to a specific barony, men who owed their position to the nepotism of a particular family or 
30 CDS. ii, no. 1184. 
31 Sir Alexander remained in Edward III's service after the fall of Edinburgh castle in 1341, receiving an 
annuity of £40 as compensation for his lost lands from May 1342 CDS, iii, no. 1388. 
32 Rot Scot ip.381. 
33 CDS, ii, no. 857; INA, C47/22/10/45. 
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group of families. Alternatively, and this is obviously the most likely proposition, they might simply be 
men chosen at random from those members of the political community with suit of court 
responsibilities. No doubt several of them were related to one another or were neighbours, but their 
presence on the Inquisition does not imply membership of a stable leadership group other than that of 
the Lothian political community as a whole. 
Is it reasonable to consider the Lothian political community as a leadership group in itself? The 
apparent ease with which Lothian accepted Plantagenet rule in 1296-1314 and Bruce rule in 1314-33 
might suggest that the community could, to some degree, act in concert in the search for good lordship; 
Lothian did not accept Robert l' s kingship until he had achieved a major battlefield success. It is clear 
that Edward Ill's government met much more opposition in the 1330s. Whereas Lothian would not 
accept the authority of King Robert until some months after the fall of Edinburgh castle in 1314, the 
community was prepared to accept the authority of Laurence Preston34 as sheriff in 1338 when the 
castle was under siege. This may indicate a loss of confidence in the Plantagenet administration and/or 
a fear of tlle Bruce party. It surely indicates both to some extent. However there is a possibility that the 
political community was quite prepared to accept Bruce authority on the condition that the Bruce party 
intervened physically against the Plantagenet party. Should such intervention be successful, the Lothian 
political community v·iQuld be on the 'right' (winning) side. Should it fail, the political community 
could claim that they had been obliged to submit tlrrough force. 
The willingness of the community to accept changes in the source of authority could be seen as the 
operation of one significant leadership group within the community, focused on the crown as the source 
of preferment and protection. This might e:\:plain the apparently uncontested transfer of power from 
John to Edward I and from Edward II to Robert I in the wake of 'decisive' battles, but would not sit 
comfortably with the inability of Edvvard III consistently to impose his rule in Lothian in 1335-6 despite 
a position of considerable military superiority, or the acceptance of Bruce authority in 1338 or 1341. 
Perhaps the most significant factor in determining the allegiance of Lothian men in the years after 
34 Scotichronicon, vii, p.l17. 
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Halidon Hill was the activity of two barons, William Douglas of Lothian and Alexander Ramsay of 
Dalhousie. The families of the two men whose influence in Lothian had been most enhanced by Robert 
I - Sir Alexander Seton and Sir Robert Lauder- failed to provide the Bruce party with effective 
leadership in Lothian after Halidon Hill and were eclipsed by Douglas and Ramsay. Their rise to 
prominence in the 1330s lay in their abilities as soldiers, providing effective war leadership to Bruce 
sympathisers in Lothian. The extent of that sympathy by late 1334/early 1335 is impossible to judge, 
but it must have been substantial enough to help persuade him (and another astute politician, the Earl of 
Dunbar) that commitment to the Bruce party was in his best long-term interests. To the extent that both 
Douglas and Ramsay were fighting the same enemy under the same flag they were allies, but each was 
ambitious to retain in peacetime the lands, offices and leadership status that they had attained in the 
defeat of Edward Ill's administration. 
On his return from France David IT could not afford to alienate Douglas and was obliged to accept the 
extension of his lordship, but endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to curtail Douglas' ambitions by appointing 
Ramsay sheriff of Teviotdale and constable of Roxburgh in 1342. Douglas promptly murdered 
Ramsay/5 confident that he would be able survive the inevitable fury of the king. The price of Douglas 
support for the Bruces was effective Douglas dominance in the southeast, but Douglas still sought the 
king's endorsement of his gains. If Edv,'ard I, II and III and Robert I all tried to manufacture Lothian 
magnates in the shape of Hastangs, Seton and Strivelin, it would seem that Douglas succeeded where 
they failed. According to Bower there were three magnates in Scotland in September 1335: Andrew 
Moray, the Earl of Dunbar and Sir William Douglas of Lothian?6 
Naturally, the allegiance of Lothian landholders did not rest entirely with domestic considerations, 
be they social, military or political. The difficulties and distractions of Edward I, II and III were 
important contributory factors to the progress of the wars, and thus in the political lives of Lothian 
landholders. For a variety of reasons, none of the three was able consistently to concentrate their 
35 Scotichronicon, vii, p. 153. 
36Ibid., p. 139. 
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resources on the conquest of Scotland. They were intennittently hampered by war in Flanders and 
France, dissent at home, diplomatic constraints and a perennial shortage of money and troops, 
particularly men-at-anns, for whom service in France was a more attractive proposition financially. 
Effective government requires credibility, and by the later 1330s that may have been a 
consideration for all parties. Edward Ill's failure to mount a relief of Edinburgh castle in 1341, or an 
operation to bring about its recovery, would surely be a strong indication to the Lothian community that 
he had lost confidence in the ability of his administration to establish itself. Since Edward had already 
failed to take Dunbar castle or to relieve Bothwell castle it would be surprising if the political 
community had not lost credibility in Edward's capacity to provide good lordship. 
Edward's commitment to war with France is often seen as the key to Scottish success in the late 
1330s; but it is worth bearing in mind that by the time Edward w'ent to war with France the Bruce party 
had already staged a remarkable recovery, despite considerable internal divisions and signal defeats on 
the battlefield. Edward was unable to afford sufficient support to Edward Balliol, to prevent the 
recovery of the Scots north of the Forth through the mid to late 1330s despite the deployment of a 
number of substantial armies. Further, due to the acquisition of better equipment, the Scots no longer 
had to rely on the failure of supply to force the surrender of a garrison. S1. Andrews castle and Bothwell 
castle were each battered into submission in a matter of a few weeks.37 In the period from the 1290s to 
fall of Berwick to King Robert, the length of time it took for the Scots to force a surrender had meant 
that there was a reasonable chance that a relief could be mounted and a siege raised. By 1337 the 
'window of opportunity for such operations had evidently become much smaller. More significantly, the 
value of such operations had been severely compromised. If the Scots could not be brought to battle and 
if castles and towns captured by major English invasions could be recovered swiftly, what was the point 
in mounting expensive expeditions? Obviously the Scots won their war of independence, but at what 
juncture was it clear that they had done so? Further, at what point did the war cease to be a question of 
Scottish independence? From an operational vie\vpoint the issue of independence had been settled 
37 Nicholson, Middle Ages, p.130. 
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before the return of David II from exile in France. Edw'ard III continued to refuse recognition of 
David's kingship, but was unable to prevent the Bruce party from achieving independence as a political 
reality. David's operations in the north of England ,vere aimed at forcing recognition of his rule, not at 
freeing his country from the spectre of conquest and subjugation. Even his capture at Neville's Cross in 
1346 did not put Scottish independence at serious risk. The diplomatic and political issues remained at 
the heart of the relationship between England and Scotland, but the military issue had been effectively 
resolved by the fall of Edinburgh castle in 1341. The fact that the Scots chose to garrison the castle, 
rather than destroy it, is a clear indication of their confidence as much as the failure of Edward III to 
attempt its recovery is an indication of his acceptance that the war could not be won by military means. 
Diplomatic initiatives might sweeten the pill of military failure, but the pill still had to be swallowed, 
however reluctantly. 
The precise point at which the tide of the conflict turned in favour of the Scots is open to question, 
as the point at which it changed from being a war of independence to a war between sovereign 
kingdoms is open to question, but clearly the course and nature of the conflict did change. In the end of 
the day, the Scots most certainly won their war. What of the fortunes of the political community of 
Lothian? Regardless of the processes that induced resistance or defection, it is clear that the majority of 
Lothian landholding families managed to survive each change of government from the appearance of 
individuals and their heirs under successive governments and the survival of family names into the later 
fourteenth century. 
Of the thirty-six Lothian-based families (the Siwards, Lubauds, and Sir John Strivelin became figures 
in the Lothian political community through the fortunes of war) examined in the Appendix, only two, 
the Lardners and the Linlithgows disappeared from Lothian entirely. The disappearance of family 
groups may be more apparent than reaL Merely because a family disappears from a particular location 
during a war is not evidence that their departure was either directly or indirectly a consequence of the 
conflict, or even that the family had departed at all. The practice of children bearing the name of their 
father rather than their mother could lead to the disappearance of the family name even though the 
254 
descent of the property had never been affected by the ,var.38 An estate ,vithout a legitimate heir at all 
would escheat to the cro,vn or a fmancially incompetent landholder could be forced to sell up, again, 
without the influence of the war. Further, people might have chosen to relocate in an effort to avoid 
war in the future, or to remove themselves from the scene of a traumatic past or been offered an 
attractive opportunity elsewhere. For most, hov,rever, the overriding priority was the retention of the 
family property no matter which party was in power. This ,vas partly a matter of tradition and partly a 
matter of where they were to go and what they ,'v ere to do for an income if they were forfeited. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the extent of the conflict, relocation does not seem to have been a 
priority. The retention of the family property does. At least one member of every family profiled for 
this thesis was, at some point, in the peace of Edward I, Edward II or Edward III, several families were 
in the peace of all three, but members of at least twenty eight of those thirty-six families ,vere able to 
reach an accommodation with the Scottish crown after the defeat of Edward III's Lothian 
administration in 1341. Even the Craigie family, who had been, with the exception of a short period, 
steadfast in the Plantagenet peace and staunch supporters of the Balliol cause, had a member of the 
family knighted by David II in 1342/9 despite the fact that Sir Alexander de Craigie, along with his son 
and his cousin, both named Alexander, were still in the peace of Edward III in 1343.40 Clearly the 
majority of Lothian families managed to retain some, if not all, of their heritage, which strongly 
suggests that the political community of Lothian survived the Wars of Independence remarkably well 
despite the political and military stresses of nearly half a century of war. 
38 The Moubray family, forfeited in the wake of the De Soulis conspiracy, is a case in point. The male 
members of the Moubray family, and therefore the name, disappeared from Lothian, but Philippa, daughter 
of John, was granted - with her husband, Bartholomew de Loen - the barony of Barnbougle in May 1342. 
RRS, vi, pp. 136-7. 
39 Scotichronicon, vii, p.151. 
40 CDS, iii, nos. 1404,1412. 
APPENDIX 
LOTHIAN FAMILY PROFILES 
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To avoid the insertion of over 1,000 footnotes, references have been included 'within the body of the text, e.g. 
(CDS, ii, p. 414). Inevitably several people from outwith the family groups are mentioned in the profiles; family 
member's names are underlined thus- Alexander - to ease identification. The legend RR has been used to denote 
that the individual concerned ,vas a Ragman Roll homager. The incidence of forfeiture or restoration is obviously 
an important indication of shifting allegiance on the part of individuals and evidence of such events has been 
highlighted in the Appendix by underlining and italicising, thus: /9rteited. 
BACHELOR 
William RR homager, burgess of Haddington, swore fealty on 28/0811296 to Edward I (CDS, ii, no. 815). 
William Bachelor was typical of RR homagers in that he would seem not to appear in any other record. The 
reasons for this 'normal' incidence might be quite varied: death, decline into economic obscurity or forfeiture 
could all bring about this absence from documentary material, but the most likely explanation is that the 
individual (or family group tor that matter) simply never did anything much that needed to be recorded. 
The removal of landholders through forfeiture was largely seen as a last resort, at least until the mid l330s, 
when, perhaps despairing of winning Scottish landholders to his support, Edward III would seem to have tried to 
assert his lordship by the wholesale removal of those landholders, presumably with the intention of repopulating 
the political community of his Scottish lands (ceded to him by Edward Balliol in exchange for his support in 
Balliol's pursuit of the cro,vn) with men of his own choosing. 
William, possibly a descendant of William, above, served in the Edinburgh garrison of 1312 (CDS iii, no. 1321, 
a list of named men-at-arms serving in the garrison exists at TNA, ElOl/23/1. I am indebted to Dr. Michael 
Brown for this reference. 
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BllrnRTONffiYKERTOUN 
John, RR homager, county of Linlithgow, presumably the same man as the John Bickerton who held land at 
Luffnoc and Bynyn, Linlithgow from Robert de Pinkney (CDS, ii, no. 857). Robert died before October 1296 and 
an inquisition was held by twelve Lothian landholders, most of them Ragman Roll homagers, to ascertain the 
extent and value of his lands. The total of the issues of the properties came to £112 lOs, a considerable sum for the 
late thli1:eenth century, and Robert held the properties 'in capite' from the king for the service of one knight for 
Ballencreiff and % of a knight for Bynyn. The properties were not contiguous: Bynyn lay in the constabulary of 
Linlithgow and the castle of Luffuess in that of Haddington. It is not clear whether the 12 jurors were chosen from 
the immediate neighbourhood of either of these properties, but certainly the majority, and probably all of them, 
were Lothian men. Even if it could be demonstrated that none of these men had their chief property in the vicinity 
of either Luffuess or Bynyn it would be premature to assume that they did not also hold property, or perhaps 
office, in that area, so though they might not be 'neighbours' in the modern sense they would be appropriate 
choices as jurors for the inquisition as men ",ith a local interest. The fact that they were entrusted with the task at 
all suggests a willingness on the part of Edward I and his administrators to rely on the normal practices of the 
Scottish legal system as it had operated under King Jolm and Alexander III as well as a willingness on the part of 
the jurors to discharge traditional legal responsibilities on behalf of the new administration in the interests of 
maintaining the normal practices of inheritance of land in particular, but probably of maintaining law and order in 
a more general sense, doubtless for obvious practical reasons, but presumably because they might fmd themselves 
deprived of their estates for 'defect of service'; in this case a failure to fulfil their suit of court obligations. 
Robert's heir, acknowledged by the jurors was Sir Henry de Pinkney and it would seem that the Bickertons 
continued to be his tenants; however full title to the property would seem to have passed to the Bickertons, 
possibly as a result of Robert 1's victory at Bannockburn because twenty years later a Sir John Bickerton was 
forfeited of land formerly worth £5 6s 8d (8 merks) in Balnacreiff, by Edward III, presumably because he was in 
the Bruce party (CDS, iii, pp. 337, 383); and was also forfeited of Luffnoc - Luffness - in 1335-6 (CDS, iii, p. 
337). The property made a nil return in that year and in 1337 although it ,vas valued at £26 13s 4d (40 merks) it 
made a return of only 6s 8d (1/2 Mark) from Elizabeth, widow of Sir John, after the payment of a longstanding 
annual of 10 merks to the friars of Luffness. (CDS, ii, p. 386). \Vhether Sir John had entered Edward Ill's peace 
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before his death and had had his properties restored is not clear, but it would seem that his widow was able to 
retain her terce though its value had been reduced drastically through war damage. 
Elizabeth Bickerton, widow of Walter, was farfejted of property held in terce in Balnacreiff by 1335-36 (CDS, 
iii, p. 338) and was also forteited of a third of Luffuess -held in dower- worth 10 marks in peacetime, but reduced 
to nil before 1337 (CDS, ii, no. 87). Elizabeth may have been the widow of Walter (RR homager, county of Fife). 
Although it might seem odd that Walter does not appear on the Ragman Roll tor Lothian he may have been the 
heir of Sir John, since Elizabeth's property was held in dower. 
Eustace, RR homager, county of Fife was presumably related in some degree to Sir John, Elizabeth and Walter, 
but does not seem to appear in documentary record other than the Ragman Roll and is thus typical of a very large 
proportion, probably even the majority, of Ragman Roll homagers. 
John, portioner of the barony of Fytkyll, took action against the monks of Dunfermline tor the recovery of his 
lands in 'Gatemylch' and 'Caskybarian' (RRS, v, p. 681) and may be the same person as John/Sir John (above). 
Walter, granted a charter by Robert I for the thanage of Downie, Angus in barony for the service of 1 knight, 
(RRS, v, p. 295) may have been the husband of Elizabeth (above). The fact that Walter held land for the service of 
one knight does not mean that he actually was a knight himself. Knighthood \vas not a common estate, and in a 
society that was very conscious of status we might reasonably assume that Walter would want to have his rank 
clearly stated on his charter, particularly if we bear in mind that a charter was more usually sought by the recipient 
than ot1'ered by the donor. 
The Bickerton family - and it is surely reasonable to assume that all the bearers of such an unusual name were 
related in reasonably close degree - seem to have avoided difficulties with the Edwardian administrations until the 
1330s, but were able to maintain, even improve their position under the rule of Robert I. They do not appear in the 
surviving muster rolls or horse valuations of Edwardian garrisons acting against King Robert. That is not proof 
that they did not serve, only that they did not serve for wages. Men serving tor their lands seem not to have 
enjoyed horse valuation as part of their terms of service and perhaps for that reason are not named in muster rolls. 
The absence of Bickertons from muster-rolls does not indicate that they did no military service, only that such 
service is not recorded. That they were a family from whom knight service could be required is hardly in doubt 
since there are two documents that clearly demand it, an inquisition of Edward I and a charter of Robert I. 
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BYSET 
Antecedents, Sir Robert "king of Scotland's knight", (CDS, i, no. 220) John (deceased before October 1278), 
his daughters Cecilia, Elizabeth and Muriella were given permission to appoint their husbands to receive their 
portions of their father's English and Irish properties in King Edward's court, (CDS, ii, no. 129). Sir Robert held 
property in Cambridge and Huntingdon - a messuage and thirty acres worth £6 6s. 5d saving the service of two 
fees held of William Malherbe for 2s. p.a. (CDS, ii, no. 1075; INA, C47, 22/6/14). 
Thomas, Esq. A prisoner of war on 16105/1296, taken at Dunbar castle and lodged in Conway castle, (CDS, ii, 
no. 742) 
Walter, RR homager for the county of Edinburgh, perhaps the same man who appears twice tor the county of 
Aberdeen. 
Sir William, RR homager, son of Sir Robert (above), presu711ablv forfeited since he was restored (CDS, ii, no. 
832) on 03/09/96 along with several other men from Lothian and elsewhere, a similar writ was issued two days 
later (CDS, ii, no. 853). He swore on 1010611297 to serve Edward I overseas with arms and horse, i.e. as a man-at-
arms (CDS, ii, no. 892). In 1298 he was serving in the household division of the English army, his fawn hackney, 
valued at 8 Marks (CDS, ii, no. 1011), 'was killed at the battle of F alkirk which suggests that he was serving for 
wages rather than for his lands since 'restauro' was generally confined to those men serving tor pay. He received 
£40 from the Earl of Fife in 1295-6 in lieu of the wardship of Calder-Comitis, presumably an economically 
realistic settlement (CDS, ii, no. 865). He was one of a number of men ordered on 24/05/1296 to obey and support 
Hugh de Cressingham and Osbert de Spaldington, Edward 1's executive officers in Scotland (CDS, ii, no, 884). 
Described as William son of Robert, he was granted seisin on 08/09/97 of his father's lands (Calendar oj Close 
Rolls, i, no. 160). He was presumably the same as person as -
William, complaining (early 1298) to King Edward that his manor ofUpsettlinton was raided by various named 
persons from the 'vill' of Norham while he (William) was in the king's service in France, (CDS, ii, no. 979). On 
3010411312 he received a protection for his lands and crops against requisition by the officers of Edward II, (CDS, 
iii, no. 272) and is presumably the same as-
William, described as his' own valet' by Edward I, and appointed sheriff of Clackrnannan, before 17/04/1304. 
Edward I ordered Sir Henry Percy not to allow his men to try and eject William from his office as that would be to 
the king's detriment, (CDS, ii, no. 1514). William informed Edward, by a letter by hand of his brother John Byset, 
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to \vhich Edward replied on 17/0411304, that he had captured the boats of the Scottish garrison in Stirling castle, 
an action which would reduce the ability of the garrison to bring in supplies. Presumably his complaint re the men 
of Henry Percy was contained in that letter, Edward's reply stating that he had written to Henry Percy (CDS, ii, 
no. 1515). William next appears receiving stores on 25/07/1304 as sheriff of Stirling, no doubt a promotion from 
sheriff of Clackmannan and he does not appear again until ordered, with several others on 14/12/1307 to keep the 
peace (CDS, iii, no. 29). In July 1308 he petitioned Edward II tor lands promised him by Edward I tor his good 
service and also for the lands of his late brother John to be delivered to his widow, (CDS, iii, no. 49). His 
continuing status within the ranks of English supporters is indicated by the fact that he was witness to a charter on 
28/0711310 of Antony Bek Bishop of Durham that was the subject of an inspeximus of Edward III (CDS, iii, no. 
1147) in February 1335. William evidently remained in the English camp after Bannockburn, being granted £20 
p.a. on 24/05/1315 by Edward II for the loss of his lands in Scotland (CDS, iii, no. 434). William was not the only 
member of his family to serve in Edwardian armies and garrisons; he led a small retinue including -
Richard, "socius of William", serving as a man-at-arms in the summer of 1298 with a horse valued at 6 merks, 
(CDS, ii, no. 1011) and-
John, "socius of William", also serving that summer as a man-at-arms with a horse valued at 7 merks, (CDS, ii, 
no. 1011) and it would appear that all three served in the household division. Richard disappears from record 
thereafter, John at least was in service before the Falkirk campaign, since he was the subject of an instruction 
dated 26/04/98 that he was not to be defaulted for non-appearance, possibly in connection with suit of court or 
other civil obligations, since he was serving in the army of Edward I at that time (Calendar of Close Rolls, i, no. 
160). John received 20s tor bringing news from Scotland to Edward II in NovemberlDecember 1306 (CDS, v, no. 
472). Unlike Willianl, John and his wife Cristiane evidently chose, or were allowed, to enter the peace of Robert I 
after Bannockburn, and in April 1315 they were granted leave (RRS, v, p. 665) to divide the lands of the late 
David Ovioth with Hugh, John's brother and His wife Margaret, Cristiane and Margaret being the daughters of 
David Ovioth. Sir William may not have remained in English allegiance for very long after the Bannockburn, or if 
he did King Robert chose not to confiscate his lands permanently. In June 1317 Sir Henry Sinclair was granted the 
wardship of the lands of William, son and heir of William Byset of Mertoun (RRS, v, p.389). William junior was 
later sued by William de Sinclair of Herdmanston for tlle debts of his fatller, amounting to £60 (RRS, v, p.674). 
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Walter, surely a relation of Sir William, perhaps the son of William junior, either remained in Scottish 
allegiance or, ifhe did not, was able to maintain his position. He resigned his lands at Clerkington, Edinburgh and 
Kilbreckmont, Fife to King David which were then granted on 06/0411362 to his son John complete with the 
homage and services of free tenants for 'usual services' (RRS, vi. p. 301). 
Sir Thomas evidently supported John BaHiol andlor Edward III and was presumablv forteited of his Scottish 
property since arrangements were made on 16/09/1341 for him to receive 'suitable sustenance' (CDS, iii, no. 
1369), and later, on 28/0511343, he was granted an annuity of 100 merks pending the recovery of his lands in 
Scotland (CDS, iii, no. 413). It would seem that he was not in danger from the supporters of David II however, 
since he was able plan a pilgrimage to St. Andrews, for which he obtained a safe conduct and protection on 
15/07/1343 from Edward III (CDS, iii, no. 1417]. Sir Thomas must have detected to the Scots at some point 
during the next 14 years, because he was involved in appointing a commission in July 1357 to arrange the ransom 
of David II after the battle of Neville's Cross (CDS, iii, no. 1651) and was later named as an_alternate hostage for 
the ransom of David II as specified in the inspexirnus of the indenture of the treaty of 03/10/57, repeated in 'full 
council' at Scone 06/10/57. He received a charter- content unspecified- from David II on 08/06/65 and had his 
charter-content also unspecified- to Isabella of Fife inspected on 17/04/66 (RRS, vi. p. 384); and another charter 
to William Cargill inspected on 02/0SnO (RRS, vi, p. 491), making a final appearance in documentary record as a 
witness on 11/02158 to a royal charter of Mertoun and Upper Merchiston, eRRS, vi. p. 209), properties that had 
been surrendered on 11/02/58 by William Byset to the King, who immediately granted them to William Sinclair 
for 'usual services' but without free tenant services eRRS, vi. p. 209), perhaps to discharge a debt to the Sinclair 
family. 
Christiana made one mortification and two gifts of land to Holyrood Abbey in 1338, NAS, GD401l/46, 
GD40/1/47 and GD40/1/48. 
CRAGY/CRAGGY 
John. RR county of Lanarkshire, presumably the same as, or perhaps son/father of 
John, RR homager, county of Edinburgh (x2); presumably the same as-
John de, who swore fealty to Edward I separately from the Ragman Roll proper on 28/08/1296 (CDS, ii, no. 
809). 
Annevs. RR homager, county of Edinburgh; 
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Robert, son of Cristiana owner of lands in Daliel (CDS, ii, p. 428) from which 55 shillings were accounted for 
in the compotus of Lanark shire in 1303-4. Cristiana, apparently does not appear in documentary record other than 
as the mother of Robert (above), but presumably held the land referred to above in her own right since property 
held in terce would not have descended to her son, but returned to the family of her husband as 'heritage' land. 
Alexander, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in l312 (CDS, iii, p.409) his horse was 
valued at £6 at Bothwell; 
Brice, (d.) his daughter Mariota claimed land in Aberdeen on 28/07/1317 worth 6s 8d from her sister Emma 
(RRS, v. p. 394) 
Sir Alexander. "Ie Pere", probably tlle same as Alexander (above), he presumably was forfeited at some point, 
probably due to defecting to the Bruce party in the company of Alexander Moubray because he was pardoned by 
Edward III on 10110/1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1184) in the company of several others who were pardoned alongside 
Alexander. He served as a Knight/man-at-arms in 1335 in the Edinburgh garrison (CDS, iii, no. 1186) and in the 
following year (CDS, iii, pp. 60, 362). He received some arrears of pay two years later (CDS, iii, no. 1280) and 
had apparently been in service continuously since he had been seeking his - and his retinues'- pay (55 merks) for 
serving under John de Strivelin at Edinburgh castle garrison for tlle period August l337 - March l338 (CDS, iii, 
no. 1293). During this period he was given 3 tuns of wine to alleviate his fmancial hardships, (CDS, iii, no. 1296); 
He ,vas still in the Edinburgh Castle garrison between July l339 and January 1340 (CDS, iii, no. 1323) and for 
that service he received a gift and arrears of pay from Edward III in March 1341. He would appear to have left 
Scotland after the fall of Edinburgh castle and was granted an annuity of £40 pending the recovery of his lands in 
May l342 (CDS, iii, no. 1388); On 16/09/1341 he was still in the peace of Edward III who ordered his 'suitable 
sustenance' to be arranged (CDS, iii, no. l369;). Edward authorised instruction for payment of that sustenance in 
February 1343 (CDS, iii, no. 1404) with a provision that if the current truce ,'lith the Scots should end in peace 
without Sir Alexander recovering his lands in Scotland Edward III would pay him 4s/day for himself and 2 
esquires, since the esquires would probably expect to receive 12d/day each, Sir Alexander would be left with 
2s/day, no more than any other knight serving in Edward's army. His career path would seem to have been 
mirrored by that of his son, who no doubt served in his father's retinue since one 
Alexander, son of Sir Alexander, was pardoned \vith his father on 10110/l335 by Ed\vard III of all offences 
since the 'beginning of the world' (CDS, iii, no. 1184) Alexander junior was serving as a man-at-arms in Lothian 
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garrison in September-November 1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1186) and thereafter in Edinburgh castle garrison (CDS, iii, 
pp. 361,363). He might reasonably be expected have been one of the two esquires for whom Sir Alexander 
received l2d1day after the English garrisons were ejected from Lothian (see above). 
Three other members of the family also served in the army of Edward III; Gilbert serving as a man-at-arms in 
Edinburgh Castle garrison (CDS, iii, p.369) in 1335-36, and-
William, also serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison (CDS, iii, pp. 409, 422). and-
Alexander. cousin of Sir Alexander, who was granted an allowance of l2d1day in May 1343; pending recovery 
ofthe lands in Scotland that he had lost through his adherence to the Plantagenet cause (CDS, iii, no. 1412). 
The family would seem to have been divided in its allegiance, for at least some of them had been in the peace of 
Robert I in 1329 and of David II thereafter since one of them, John, 'the son', had his charter from Edward de 
Cockburn of all his land in the Barony of Kir1..llrd, Peeblesshire inspected by Robert I on 31105/1329 (RRS, v, p. 
628). Another John, or quite possibly the same, appears as a witness to a charter of David II (RRS, vi, pp. 409-13) 
and again as a witness to a charter of Agnes de Monttode, confirmed on 08/08/1367 by David II, (RRS, vi, pp. 
408-10). 
DALMAHOY 
Alexander, Named twice as a Ragman Roll homager for the county of Edinburgh; he had already sworn fealty 
to Edward I on 28/05/1296 (CDS, ii, no. 809);and was ordered to support Cressingham and Spaldington on 
24/0511297 (CDS, ii, no. 884), suggesting that he had remained loyal to Edward through the intervening period. 
On the grounds of age alone it would seem that he was not the same man as the 
Alexander, to whom Edward III gave, on 01/02/1343 a quantity of wool in lieu of cash payment) for 
outstanding arrears of pay (CDS, ii~ no. 1404). The pay scale of l2d1day indicates that Alexander had been 
serving as a man-at-arms and tlle date of the authorisation shows that he had not only been in service for some 
time but that he had either chosen to remain in Plantagenet service or that he had not been accepted into the peace 
of David II's government. 
Henrv, Ragman Roll homager for the county of Linlitllg0W and who does not seem to appear in any other 
record. 
William, who was pardoned of all offences since the 'beginning of the world' by Edward II on 10110/1335 
(CDS, iii, no. 1184) an indication that he had been aligned with the Bruce party, however fue fact that he came to 
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the peace oCEdward III_and had lands of Ormiston, Roxburgh restored sometime before 23/02/1339 (CDS, iii, 
no. 1304) surely indicates that he had previously detected to the Bruce party and then returned to the Plantagenet 
cause in the intervening period. The timing of his last change ofheart is curious since the Scots were undoubtedly 
in the ascendant militarily which may mean that the cause of his change of heart was not necessarily a product of 
the \var situation in the most direct sense. One possibility would be he defected because he had been taken 
prisoner, though we might expect that Edward Ill's officers would hesitate to accept a man who had already 
changed sides more than once, however it is possible that he had more to offer than his own presence to the 
English administration since one -
Roger Dalmahoy was serving in the Edinburgh garrison between July 1339-January 1340 (CDS, iii, no. 1323) 
and he may have joined the English with Alexander or, if already in English service, have vouched for Alexander 
as a suitable and dependable recruit, Roger was still serving in Edinburgh castle garrison when it surrendered in 
1341 (CDS, iii, no. 1383) 
Walter Serving as a mounted archer in the Edinburgh garrison that surrendered on 16th April, 1341 (CDS, iii, no. 
1383) 
DOUGLAS OF LOTHIAN 
William, described as 'the late William Douglas of Lothian' (RRS, v, p. 341), the father of 
James who was the recipient of a charter of Robert I dated 02/0411315 of the barony of Kingscavill and Calder-
Clere in the Constabularies of Linlithgow and Edinburgh for an annual payment of £ 12 5s 10d and the service of 
half a knight.; The rather odd sum of money involved perhaps indicates that the barony as it existed in 1315 was 
the product of tlle amalgamation of more than one property, each of which had a traditional valuation. A month 
later the Barony was the subject of another charter (RRS, v, p.352) granting an annualrent of 10 merks from the 
money due from James to Reginald Crawford for the service of one archer in the king's army. 
William, son of (the late) James, was the recipient of a charter of Robert I dated 30/04/1323 remitting the 
balance of the annual due for Kingscavil and Calder-Clere after the annual paid to Reginald Crawford eRRS, v, 
p.493) William's charter from John Logan for the land of Linton Roderick, Peeblesshire .vas the subject of an 
inspeximus dated 08/05/1340 during the minority of David IT eRRS, vi, p. 64), an indication, particularly in the 
light of several charters from King Robert and from King David to other members oftlle family (see below) and 
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their apparent complete absence from English records, that the Douglases of Lothian ,vere one of the relatively 
small number of Lothian families that remained in the Bruce camp continuously after 1306. 
William's son James was the recipient of a charter dated 17/0411320 - content unspecified - of Robert I eRRS, v, 
p. 440). His agreement with John de Kirkintilloch relating to a wadset of land in Peeblesshire was confirmed on 
23/09/1323 by the King eRRS, v, p. 513) and he was the beneficiary of a charter dated 10105/1329 for the lands of 
Eshiels, Peebles shire for an annual of 10 merks, (RRS, v, pp. 624-5) and of another from David II- during his 
minority, it was issued on 01/03/1331 - of Lochurd, Peeblesshire (RRS, vi, p.57) and of a charter from Robert the 
Steward oflands in the Barony of Bathgate, West Lothian, confirmed which was by confrrmed by King David on 
2811111358 (RRS, vi, p.439).A prisoner at Carlisle in March 1333 (CDS, iii, 1074) he was released and was 
immediately engaged in the war. He wasfoifeited of Whitlawe (CDS, iii, p.333) and Blackness (CDS, iii, p. 341) 
in 1335-6, commanded the Scots at the fall of Edinburgh castle in 1341, was appointed to maintain a truce, 
probably in late 1343 (CDS, v, no. 798) and was captured at Neville's Cross. Although a successful commander 
for the Bruce cause, he was not prepared to allow an alternative source of leadership in the south-east and in 
March 1342 (Scotichronicon vii, pp. 152-7) murdered David II's appointee as sheriff of Teviotdale, Sir Alexander 
Ramsay, even so he was careful to acquire royal sanction for his acquisitions, indicating the importance of the 
crown as the ultimate source of authority. 
FENTON 
Waltiam, (Walter?) gave fealty on 23/07/1291 to Edward I at Lundors, (CDS, ii, no. 508). 
John, Doctor of Law, witness to a document of Robert I (RRS, v, pp. 601-2). 
William, appointed by his wife Cecilia to take possession of her late father's lands in Ireland (October 1278) in 
Ed,vard 1's court, (CDS, ii, no. 129); he and Cecilia show that they had come to Edward 1's peace 'after the first 
Scottish war' - an indication that not everyone identified the BaHiol campaign of 1296 with the renewed fighting 
since 1297 and an indication that the surviving declarations of fealty to Edward I do not constitute a complete 
record of those Scots who accepted Edward 1's lordship in 1296 since neither William or Cecilia appear in the 
Ragman Roll or other, less extensive, fealty exercises. They were successful in their appeal and were given their 
lands, some of which were still being retained as escheats (CDS, ii, no. 1728). He received £78 15s for serving 
with five men-at-arms, probably at Perth, between 18th February and 30th September 1306. 
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William, his charter to Coupar Abbey of Auchindory, Angus was confIrmed on 0711 0/1316 by Robert I eRRS, v, 
p,380), 
William, his agreement with Alexander Chisolm and Margaret his wife was confirmed on 04/0911366 by David 
II. The agreement aimed to resolve a dispute over Margaret's marriage, which William had been granted by King 
David, As part of this complex arrangement the 'whole land' of Wester Fenton and an annualrent of 20 merks 
from Drem were settled on Alexander and Margaret with properties in the Clyde valley and elsewhere, in return 
for which they committed themselves to paying £200 to William eRRS, vi, pp. 390-92). 
Cristiana, her rights were possibly protected under the terms of the above, however the document is incomplete 
and the meaning obscure, (RRS, vi, p. 391). 
Ingram, as per Cristiana, above (RRS, vi, p. 391) 
FRESSINGLEYEI'FRESSELY 
Henrv, RR homager, county of Fife, inquisition juror in 1296 (CDS, ii, no. 1689). 
William, RR homager, county of Fife 
Geoffrey, RR homager, county ofF ife, lands restored (CDS, ii p. 172), he was received to the peace of Edward I 
(CDS, ii, no. 1481), had his lands in Yorkshire returned (CDS, ii, no. 1594). His allegiance did not long outlast the 
death of Edward I however, since he was described as "an enemy tor tour years" on 20102/1312, so he was 
presumably an early supporter of Robert I. At the time of his fOrfeiture by Edward II he held half the '\rill" of 
Wester Duddingston, worth 100s, in peacetime, reduced to 5 marks after paying the annual farm to the Abbey of 
Kelso (CDS, ii, no. 254). 
William, presumably son and heir of Geoffrey, forfeited -presumably having_been in the peace of Edward III-_of 
tlle '\rill" of Dud dings ton, worth 22 marks in peacetime, reduced to nil by 12/0711336 (CDS, iii, p.388). 
William, Lord of Fairgie, his grant of the mill of Arngask to Cambuskenneth Abbey was confumed on 
19/0611324 by Robert I (RRS, v, p, 519) 
GRAHAM 
Henn', RR homager, county of Dumfries; 
Sir David, gave fealty to Edward I (JunelAugust 1291) at Berwick (CDS, ii, no. 508), described as having been 
killed in the Flanders campaign in the company of Roger de Feltone, who sought redress in 1306-7 for the 
266 
marriage of Patrick, heir of Sir David, who married without Roger's consent, the marriage having been granted to 
Roger by Edward I (CDS, ii, no. 1967) 
David, husband of Muriella Byset who appointed him to receive her share of her late father's lands in Ireland 
(CDS, ii, no. 129), perhaps the same person as David brother of Patrick, guaranteed by the Earl of Athole, 
Alexander de Meyners and John de Inchemartin in August 1297, to serve in King Edward's army in France or 
elsewhere, (CDS, ii, no. 940). In September l305 David attested that Michael de Miggel had served William 
Wallace only under duress, (CDS, ii, no. 1689). He received a prest of £3 on his wages in early 1307 (CDS, v, no. 
492) and was ordered (14112/1307) with several others, to keep the peace (CDS, iii, no. 29). In January 1311 he 
delivered 40 merks to his 'valet' John Ie Taillour, presumably army wages, (CDS, iii, no. 193). On 12/02/1312 he 
received a grant of £80 p.a. from the issues of Templar property in England, (CDS, iii, no. 306) presumably as a 
reviard tor service or as compensation tor property in Scotland no longer in the control of Edward II's 
administration. 
John, ordered, on 14112/1307, with several others, to keep the peace, (CDS, iii, no. 29) 
Sir John, recorded as being a member of Sir John Comyn's party at the capitulation of the Scots at Strathord in 
1305 (CDS, i, no. 1741) and was serving as a knightlman-at-arms with Edward I at Ayr in the summer of l307 
(CDS, ii, no. 1961) 
Sir David, "the father" received a grant on 01/03/1326 of Old Montrose for the service of half a Davoch the 
thanage of Kimber, Angus tor the service of an archer and a charter of old Montrose in exchange for Cardross, site 
of Robert 1's manor house eRRS, v, p.522). 
David, his son, \\;jtness to several acta of Robert I (RRS, v, various). 
Patrick, Apparently a household knight, Patrick received a fee of £20 during the 1291-2 administration of 
Edward I (INA, E 391100114711), he was witness on 16/0111293 to an indenture concerning the fealty of John 
Balliol to Edward I, (CDS, ii, no. 660); presumably he was the same Sir Patrick, who in 1293-94 ejected King 
Edward's officers from the lands of Cartcany and Lentebolt by force of arms, (CDS, ii, no. 708). He joined 
Edward 1's peace at some point before 0811111306 and was immediately committed to the Tower of London, 
possibly having to accept a term of imprisonment as part of the price of being received into Edward's peace -
presumably Patrick had been under arms \\;jth Robert I (CDS, ii, no. 1811). His confmernent there \vas eased by 
order of Edward II on 04112/1308 at the request of Henry de Sinclair so that he might take exercise but he was still 
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to be close-guarded, (CDS, iii, no. 62). A petition to Edward II from John of Argyle in late l308 asked that his son 
in law, Sir Patrick Graham be released so that he might serve with John against the king's enemies (CDS, iii, no. 
65). 
Sir David son of Patrick, taken prisoner at Dunbar castle and lodged in the Tower of London (CDS, ii, no. 742). 
David, brother of Robert, Patrick and Sir David, son of Patrick (above) were all to be released from custody in 
the summer of 1297 to go overseas in the service of Edward I, presumably to Flanders (Calendar oj Close Rolls, 
i, no. 126) 
Nicholas, was ordered on 24/05/1297 to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland (CDS, ii, no. 884). As 
husband of Maria, sister and heir of Muriella, Countess of Mar (deceased before January 1292) he gave homage 
and took seisin of her heritage (CDS, ii, no. 558), declared a rebel, in 1299 (Calendar of Close Rolls, i, no. 507) 
he was restored to his and his wife's lands which the Bishop of Durham had retained although Sir Nicholas had 
been in King Edward's peace for some time, (CDS, ii, no. l359) however, he is described (December 1302 x 
October 1303) as a 'Scottish rebel " and was forfeited of Wooler, Northumberland, (CDS, ii, no. 1399). 
Maria. widow of Nicholas, above, had her Barony of Mus camp, 'County of Newcastle' restored by Edward I ' 
as he has taken her homage' (CDS, ii, no. 1733) she was the subject of a letter, to or from whom unknown, stating 
that Maria had pertormed homage to Edward I as of 14/06/1306 (CDS, ii, no. 1734). These two documents would 
suggest that the widely held belief that women could not give homage is unfounded. On 12/06/1311 she attested 
that she had discharged the service of two knights in Edward II's Scottish army (CDS, iii, no. 214), a firm 
indication that Edwardian governments were able to call on the knight service due from Scottish landholders. To 
what extent they could do so successfully was obviously dependant on the prevalent political, strategic and 
tactical conditions of the moment. This is significant in that there is very little documentary evidence relating to 
such service obligations, the majority of references to service for Scottish lands appear to be burdens attached to 
lands granted by the (English) king to his supporters. This is a rare example of a Scottish woman being held 
directly responsible for providing men-at-arms. 
Robert, presumably the same as Robert above, forfeited of various lands in Northumberland by 2611111301 
(Calendar of Close Rolls, i, no. 210). 
Patrick, - presumably not the same man as Patrick* (above) on the grounds of age - was fOrfeited oflands worth 
f12_at Kynpond, Ratho, (CDS, iii, pp. 341,390) 
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John. Earl of Menteith, sentenced to death on 22/02/1347 as a traitor to Edward III, (CDS, iii, no. 1486; TNA 
C4 7 /22/21) John would not seem to have been declared forfeit, however the value of such a forfeiture would have 
been very limited, given that despite the defeat of the Scots at Neville's Cross Edward III could not, or perhaps 
would not, restore his administration in Scotland. 
David, lord of Dundas, one of the magnates appointing commissioners for the ransom of David II (CDS, iii, no. 
1651) 
HAY/DE LA HAYE 
Hugh de la, gave fealty to Edward Ion 22/07/1291 at St, Andrews, (CDS, ii, no. 508). 
John de la, gave fealty to Edvvard I 22/0711291 at St. Andrews, (CDS, ii, no. 508) and received fees as a 
household knight TN~ E39/84/8(5) in 1291-2, presumably the same as Sir John who performed homage to 
Edward I on 14/03/1296 (CDS, ii, no. 730) 
Sir Nicholas de la, gave fealty on 10/0711296 to Edward I on 10/0711296 at Montrose (CDS, ii, no. 767). 
Nicol de l~ personne ofCrol, RR homager, county of Perth; 
Sir William de la, RR homager, prisoner of war taken at Dunbar Castle and lodged in the Tower of London 
(16/05/1296) CDS, ii, no. 742; presumably the same as-
William de la, ordered (24/05/1297) to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland- Hugh de Cressingham and 
Osbert de Spaldington- CDS, ii, no. 884, He was the subject of a guarantee dated August 1297 from John Earl of 
Athole, Alexander de Meyners and John de Inchemartin that William would serve in King Edward's army in 
France or elsewhere (Calendar of Close Rolls, i no. 162). 
Sir Gilbert, RR homager, possibly the same as ... 
Gilbert de la, RR homager, county of Perth, king's tenant; and/or perhaps 
Sir Gilbert who_attested, on 01109/1305, that Michael de Miggel served under William Wallace under duress, 
(CDS, ii, no. 1689), possibly the same man as-
Sir Gilbert who was the recipient of a letter patent of 08/1 1113 19 of Robert I giving him permission to leave the 
relief of his lands to an heir of his own free choice. The precise meaning of this document is not immediately 
clear; presumably Sir Gilbert was a tenant in chief and casualties would normally be due to the king. If, however 
the relief of his properties had been granted to him previously, presumably he would need the consent of the 
crown to transmit that privilege to his heir. Why he should wish to have the power to choose an heir for this 
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purpose seemingly outwith the normal practices of inheritance (if it were normal practice no specific permission 
from the king would be required) is not explained in the document (RRS, v, p. 428). 
Sir Thomas, fiJr{eited oflands in Heriot, Rasawe, Lediset and Garvock worth £10 in peacetime but reduced to 
40s by 20/0311312 through war damage (CDS, iii, no. 258), undoubtedly the same person as-
Sir Thomas Hay, witness on 28114/1315 to a charter of Robert I to Adam Marshall of half the Barony of Manor, 
Peeblesshire (RRS, v, p. 345) and to another dated 08/0611316 for Alan de Liddel for half the land of Sir Gilbert 
de Lindsay in Skirling, Peeblesshire eRRS, v, p. 373) 
Sir Hugh de la, RR hornager, county of Dumfries. 
John de la, RR homager, county of Fife. 
Sir David, Confirms a gift to Newbattle Abbey by Gerard de Lindsay, 04/09/1327, GD40/li39, recipient of 
letters patent of David II affirming that the use of a 'palace' in Aberdeen granted to Sir John Simrell would not 
prejudice the rights of Sir David in the future, eRRS, vi. p. 90). 
Elena, was jointly restored with her husband John de Menteith (15/03/1359) by David II, to the Barony of 
Strathgartney, Stirlingshire, displacing John de Logy, to whom it had previously been granted (RRS, vi, pp. 241-
2). 
Sir Gilbert, Constable of Scotland, had his charter of the patronage and the lands of Errol Kirk and the chapel of 
Inchemartin confirmed (16/03/58) by David II eRRS, vi, p. 211). 
John. was the recipient of a charter 16/0111363 - subject unspecified- of David II, (RRS, vi, p. 317) and was 
instructed by David II at an unknown date to protect the Priory of Urquhart against demands for a pension by the 
treasurer of Moray. His tack to the vicar of Fordyce \vas confirmed on 14/10/1363 by David II, (RRS, vi, p. 337). 
Thomas, his charter to Janet Monypenny confirmed by David II c.13 59 
(RRS, vi. p.514) 
Thomas, son and heir of William of Loghorward, designated a hostage for the ransom of David I (RRS, vi, pp. 
175, 186). 
With the exception of Sir William, \vho was one of a number of men who received instructions to support 
Edward's officers and who served or at least arranged to serve in Edward's army in 1297, the Hays seem to have 
been relatively consistent in their support tor the 'patriotic' cause. Presumably they had remained in Edward's 
peace after the peace of Strathord until the Robert 1's attempt to gain the throne. Sir Thomas was not actually 
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declared forfeit of his inheritance in Lothian until 1312, but he had left the peace of Edward II three years earlier, 
at the same time as Sir Robert Keith who was declared forfeit in the same document (CDS, iii, no. 245) This may 
be another example of the rather elusive element of local leadership groups that one might have expected to 
emerge clearly from the compilation of these protiles, equally it may be that the two men simply happened to 
defect to the Bruce party at much the same time. 
HAUDEN 
Robert, RR homager, county of Berwick. 
Rauf, RR homager, county of Bervvick, persomle del eglise de Whitsum. 
Avmer (Adomar), RR homager, county of Edinburgh. He was received to the peace of Edward and his wife 
Isabel's lands in England restored on 24/03/1304 (CDS, ii, no. 1481), Edvvard I sought advice on an issue between 
Aymer and Maria, widow of Wilham de Maleville (see below) on the one part and the Bishop pf Durham's 
franchise of Norham on the other (CDS, ii, no. 1579), described as "an enemy since martinmas 1310", he was 
fOrfeited in l312 (CDS, ii~ no. 245). He had held land in Uckeston (Oxton) worth 1 OOs in peacetime, but currently 
reduced to 5 marks. On the grounds of age it is surely fair to assume that he was not the same man as-
Avmer. who was a juror for an inquisition relating to the lands of William de Ramsay on 22/0411343 (CDS, iii, 
no. 1409) 
Simon, served as a man-at-arms in Roxburgh Castle garrison in the summer of 1298, during which time he lost 
his horse, valued at 6 merks, on operations against the Scots, (CDS, ii, no. 1007). Considering his likely age he 
was not, presumably, the same man as 
Simon, who served as a man-at-arms in the Edinburgh garrison of 1335/36, (CDS, iii, p.361) - one of 30 "Scoti 
ad arma" or "Scottish (men-) at- arms" serving in the garrison. This is the only reference to a division among 
Edwardian men-at-arms on the basis of nationality. A possible explanation would be that the "Scoti" were 
discharging customary military service for which they were not entitled to wages, though that would be an 
unusual practice and of limited value since the body of men serving for lands would be continually changing as 
contingents discharged their obligations. Their presence in the garrison complement would still need to be 
recorded since the garrison commander would need to know the number of men at his disposal, but normal 
practice would suggest that the 'Scoti ad arms' were waged men-at-arms and that the distinction is administrative 
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indicates that the men-a-t arms were divided into two sub units for administrative and/or tactical purposes; to 
provide 'articulation' at a low level of command. 
William, serving in the Perth garrison as a man-at-arms in 1312, his horse was valued at £16 (CDS, iii, p.42S) 
Bernard, ofHauden or Howdean, was witness to a charter of Roger Aulton granting land at Wester Softlaw tor 
a chantry in Roxburgh, confIrmed on 0 1/04/13S4 by David II (RRS, vi, pp. ISS-7) 
KARLETON/CARLTON 
Muriella, was torfeited ofland in Niddry (CDS, iii p.338) in 133S-36. 
John, had his charter from the late Edward Bruce of a grant of land in Ayrshire inspected on 26/07/1323 by 
Robert 1. eRRS, v, p.SOS) 
KEITH 
Sir Bernard, juror on an inquisition into the properties of Elena la Zouche in August 1296 (CDS, ii, no. 824), an 
example of the continuity of normal administrative practice under Edward I after the deposition of John and of 
the willingness of Scottish landholders to fulfil their civil obligations. Sir Bernard lent money - 73 merks- to 
Aymer de Valence in July 1307 for the 'sustenance' of Hugh, Earl of Ross and his 'pitaille' searching for Robert 
I, (CDS, ii, no. 1942) an illustration of the logistical and financial difficulties of Edward 1's officers serving in 
Scotland. 
Sir Roben, subject of a warrant dated 04/1011300 for payment of his allowance as a prisoner of war in 
Kenilworth castle (CDS, ii, no. IIS9); Sir Robert came to Edward's peace sometime before Martinmas 1302 
when he asked for support concerning the marriages of the daughters of Andrew Crawford which had been 
allowed him at that time (CDS, ii, no. 1406). He later asked Edward I for the land of Covington which had been 
granted him when he entered the king's peace, (CDS, ii, no. 1409). His expenses for escorting carpenters from 
Newcastle to Linlithgow were paid on 19/10/1304 (CDS, ii, no. 1602) and he gave mainprise, with others. on 
22/06/1306 for the conduct of the Bishop of st. Andrews, (CDS, ii, no. 1788) On 30/09/1307 he was ordered by 
Edward II to cooperate witll several others against Robert I (CDS, iii, no. IS) and was instructed on 14/12/1307, to 
keep the peace (CDS, iii, no. 29). He was thanked (20/0S/1308) for his good service and on 23/05/1308 
guaranteed, with several others, the good behaviour in future of William, Bishop of S1. Andrews (CDS, iii, no. 
44). He must have opted to join the Bruce party quite shortly thereafter, since he wasfOr(eited on 20/0211312, on 
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the grounds that he had left the peace of Edward II "at Christmas three years past" (CDS, iii, no. 245). Prior to his 
forfeiture he had held the Barony of Keith; worth 100 marks p.a. in peacetime, but reduced to 40 marks on 
account of the war. On 26/12/1324 he was granted a charter oftailzie by Robert I to his grandsons and his brother 
Edward (below) (RRS, v, p. 525); and on the same day received a charter for various lands in East Lothian, 
Aberdeenshire, Lanarkshire and Strathbogie with the office of Marischal (RRS, v, p. 524) 
Alexander, Donee of a charter of Robert I dated 08/05/1315 of a share in lands and mill at Longforgan, 
Perthshire (RRS, v, p. 353), and another charter of Robert I dated 06/02/1325 of the Barony of Longforgan, (RRS, 
v, p. 527). 
Edward, described by Edward I sometime between 1297-l303 as his 'dear valet', he was granted whatever he 
could make from the goods and chattels of Sir William Wallace (CDS, ii, no. 1433); possibly the same person as-
Edward, brother and co-heir of Robert, subject of a tailzie for the Barony of Keith (RRS, v, p.525) who was 
granted a charter of Robert 1(18/03/1328) of various lands in Aberdeenshire to be held in Barony later confirmed 
by David II (RRS, v, p. 604, RRS, vi, p. 508). 
William, recipient of a letter patent of David II issued 04.11/1353, ordering him to desist from helping his 
brother John in a conflict over Culbak, Mearns, property of Arbroath Abbey, (RRS, vi. p. 151). 
John, brother of William, (RRS, vi. p. 151), 
Margaret, wife of William, Earl Marshal, (RRS, vi. pp. 162,362). 
Robert the Marshal, A regular witness, at least 14 times, to charters of David II. 
LANYNILENY 
Johan, RR homager, county of Edinburgh 
Thomas of, serving as a hobelar, Edinburgh garrison 1312 (CDS, iii, p.408). 
Thomas of, Junior, hobelar serving in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii, p. 409). 
John, appointed as constable of Tarbert Castle (RRS, v, p. 686), undated. 
LARDINERfLARDER 
Michael, RR homager; king's tenant (x2) in Linlithgow constabulary, he was presumably forfeited after the 
battle of Dunbar; his properties were restored by Edward L CDS, ii, no. 832. 
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Michael's heir; unnamed; failed to pursue his right to inherit the sergeanty of Linlithgow forfeited by his father. 
Very little is recorded relating to the duties and responsibilities of sergeants, but the office - or at least the land 
attached to the office was obviously of some significance. 
Henry de Lardere, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. 
William, RR homager, Burgess, Edinburgh. 
Walter his allowance as a POW to be paid up to his release on 07/12/07 (CDS, iii, no. 188). 
The release date of Walter seems curious; if he had been made a POW in first campaign of Robert I we might 
expect him to have been executed out of hand, equally the Bruce party can hardly have been in a position to force 
a prisoner exchange in the winter of 1307. Walter may have been able to come into Edward's peace through his 
own efforts or he may have been seen as one of the "middling people" who could be admitted to the king's peace 
on the authority of local sheriffs. 
LASTALRYEJRESTALRIG 
John, RR homager, county of Edinburgh 
SimO!l, his father, apparently incapable of giving homage and fealty in 1296 due to his 'idiocy'. 
LIBERT ON 
Alan, RR homager (x2), juror on the inquisition onto the lands of forfeited Bruce supporters in Lothian of 
2010211312 (CDS, iii, no. 245) 
David, RR homager, juror on the inquisition into the lands of forfeited Bruce supporters in Lothian on 
2010211312 (CDS, iii, no. 245) 
John, serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison 1336-37 (CDS, iii p, 363). 
David, received letters patent from David II (RRS, vi, p. 514), date and purpose unknovm, but probably 1359-60 
by its context. 
LINDSEY 
Alicia, married to Henry de Pinkney, an Englishman, inheritor of Luffness castle and other property in Scotland, 
subject of post-mortem inquisition, (CDS, ii, no. 1836; CDS, i, Nos. 1753, 1758). 
Sir Phillip RR homager; Sir John de Langeton, chancellor of England, asked (c. June 1297) Edward I for a 
protection for Sir Phillip who was intending to serve with Langton in the king's war in Scotland, (CDS, ii, no. 
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898,) returning to Scotland with Ed,vard I, Sir Henry Percy asks (17/11/1301) John de Langeton, chancellor, to 
have Sir Philip's 'protection' amended accordingly, (CDS, ii, no. 1258). He gave security on 28/03/1310 for the 
behaviour of Alexander, son of Alexander Balliol of Cavers, (CDS, iii, no. 129). He joined the Scots at some point 
before 05/08/1316 since he wasfOrteited on that date (CDS, iii, no. 498). 
John RR homager, county ofRoxburgh 
Walter, RR homager, king's tenant, Edinburgh, perhaps the same as Sir Walter, at whose manor of Thurstanton 
(unlocated) King Edward stayed on 05/07/1291 (CDS, ii, no. 508). 
Sir Alexander ordered to remain outside Scotland for SL~ months as part of the surrender settlement of 1304 
(CDS, ii, no. 1691), presumably the same as-
AlexandeL Witness to a charter of Robert I (1308-9) to Melrose Abbey of land in Dumfriesshire, which the 
Abbey had formerly held of Nicholas de Graham (see above), and viitness to another charter of Robert I c.1312 of 
land in Moffat to Adam de la Chambre, (RRS, v, pp. 631-2). 
Reginald, son of Alexander (presumably Sir Alexander, above), subject of a warrant dated 08/05/1309 for his 
allowance as a POW in Carlisle castle, of 2d1day (CDS, iii, no. 87);he was evidently still a POW in the spring of 
1309 when a warrant was issued for payment of his allowance (CDS, iii, no. 82). A third warrant to the same 
effect was issued on 11111/1312 (CDS, iii, no. 290). 
Alexander (brother of Reginald, above, also in Carlisle castle) Subject of a warrant dated 08/0511309 
authorising his POW allowance of2d1day, (CDS, iii, no. 87). He was still in prison in the spring of 1309 when a 
warrant was issued for payment of his allowance (CDS, iii, no. 82) and on 11/1111312 when another POW 
allowance warrant was issued (CDS, iii, no. 290). 
Sir James, Witness to a charter of Robert I dated between 1309 and 1314 to William de Vipont ('the son') of 
fees and forfeitures from the barony of Carriden, West Lothian (RRS, v, p. 631). 
Sir Simon, Made an indenture on 10111/1300 with Edward I to keep Hermitage castle and the motte of Lydel 
and to maintain tlle peace (CDS, ii, no. 1173). 
Phillip, Holder at one time of the Barony of Staplegordon, Dumfriesshire, which was inherited by his son John, 
Canon of Glasgow, (RRS, v, pp. 441-2). 
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John, Canon of Glasgow Resigned the Barony of Staplegordon, Dumfriesshire to Robert L The date is 
unknown, but the resignation took place at Newbattle Abbey sometime before May 1320 when it was granted to 
Sir James Douglas (RRS, v, pp. 441-2). 
William, Son of Alexander, above, chamberlain of Robert I and witness to several acta, always as 'chamberlain' 
(MS, v. various) 
William, Justiciar of Lothian, witness to four acta of Robert I, twice incorrectly named Walter, (RRS, v, 
various). 
Sir Gerard, Deceased before 1327(RRS, v, pp. 641-2) father of-
Sir David, Lord of Crawford, his charter confIrming his father's gift of land in the barony of Crawford to 
Newbattle Abbey was confIrmed by Robert I between late 1327 and mid -1328 (RRS, v, pp. 641-2). Sir David 
was a witness to roughly 20 other acta of King Robert (RRS, v, various). 
Christine, Her legacy to her heir William de Coucy, who in tum granted her properties to his son and heir, also 
William, confmned by Edward III on 05/06/1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1159). The properties included Philipstoilo Petid 
Fenton and 1 carucate called 'Petide Scravelin' in Edinburgh sheriffdom and Scraeve1yn (Skirling) in 
Peeblesshire, perhaps the same property referred to in RRS, v, pp. 373-4, see 'Gilbert' below. 
Gilbert, Half of his land in Skirling granted to Alan de Lidde1 and confmned by Robert I on 08/06/1315 (RRS, 
v, pp. 373-4). 
Sir James, Witness to a charter dated 12/0211315 of Robert I oflands in Angus andPerthshire (RRS, v, pp. 334-
5). 
Sir John, Received a charter from Robert I of Wauchopedale, Dumfriesshire and other lands forfeited by his 
father, Simon (see below). 
Sir Simon, Forfeited -date unknown but before 08/09/1321- by Robert I ofWauchopedale and other lands (RRS, 
v, pp. 463-4). 
Isabella, Wife of Simon, owner of various properties held and forfeited by her husband, (RRS, v, pp. 463-4) 
Sir David, Subject of a warrant for payment of his allovvance as a POW c.1307 -1308 (CDS, iii, no. 188) and of 
another for 'defraying' his expenses on 23/08/1311 (CDS, iii, no. 225). 
Sir John of Walghope, an inspeximus dated 23/04/1333 of a charter of his lands was granted by Edward III on 
20110/1332 to Sir John de Orreton (CDS, iii, no. 1354);presumably the same as '" 
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JQhn,. 'who forfeited lands in Thoreston worth £17 in 1335-36, (CDS, ii~ pp. 338, 336), presumably the_same 
as ... 
JQhn,. whojOrteited Ketilston, Linlithgow in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, pp. 341,389). 
James, His charter to his brother Alexander of the Barony of Byres, Edinburgh, was conflfIIled by David II on 
01110/58 (RRS, vi, p.226). 
Alexander, His agreements ''lith Alexander Cockburn were confIrmed by David II on 32/02/58, eRRS, vi, p. 
452) and his charter to his daughter Janet was conflfIIled on the same date; his charter from Earl of Mar confirmed 
on 04/07/63 (RRS, vi, p. 330) and he received a charter- content unspecifIed- from David II on 05/08/67 (RRS, vi, 
p. 333) and another- content unspecifIed- on 10/05/66 eRRS, vi, p. 384). His lands of Byres were surrendered to 
King David and entailed to William Lindsay on 17/01/67 eRRS, vi, pp. 399-400). He gave an oath on behalf of 
King David to maintain a truce of fourteen years with England on 20/07/69 (RRS, vi, pp. 468-70). He received a 
charter-content unspecifIed- from David II on 15/01170 (RRS, vi, p. 485) and another -content unspecified- on 
03/05/70 (RRS, vi, p. 491). 
John, Received a charter-content unspecifIed - on 21107/60 (RRS, vi, pp. 463-4) 
James Named as an alternate hostage for David II as part of the ransom negotiations (RRS, vi, pp. 175, 186). He 
was a frequent witness to royal charters (RRS, vi, various), he received a charter,-content unspecifIed- on 
03/04/70 and received conflfIIlation at the same date of his charter - content unspecified- to William Telfer (RRS, 
vi, p. 489). 
Janet. Received conflfIIlation by David II of a charter in her favour from her father James on 23/02/69 (RRS, v~ 
p.452). 
Patrick, Witness to a charter of Donald Earl of Lennox, subject of an inspexirnus of 15/01158 (RRS, vi, p.200). 
William, Bishop of Saint Andrews, witness to three acta of David II, (RRS, vi, pp. 274,276,299) 
Hemy, Received a safe conduct to go overseas 'with us' from Edward III in September 1338 (CDS, iii, no. 
1286). 
LINLITHGOWILITHGOILITHCU 
John, RR homager, king's tenant, County of Linlithgow- presumably forfeited after Dunbar, he was restored 
(CDS, ii, no. 832) on 03/0911296, possibly the same man as -
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John, Serving as an archer in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii, p.1I0), who might be the same man 
as -
John, esq., Serving as a man-at-arms in Linlithgow Peel garrison in 1313 (CDS, iii p.412) his horse was valued 
at £1 0 (CDS, iii, p.423). 
Nicholas, esq. Serving as man-at-arms in Linlithgow Peel garrison in 1313 (CDS, iii p.412); his horse was 
valued at 10 merks or £6 13s 4d (CDS, iii, p.423t 
William, esq. Serving in the garrison of Linlithgow Peel in 1313 (CDS, iii, p.412) with a 10 merk horse (CDS, 
iii, p. 423). 
Assuming that these men were in fact related to one another - and it would surely be unreasonable to assume 
that they were not - they may be illustrative of the military capacity of a not very prominent, but well established 
- family in the local gentry of Linlithgow. The most notable member of the family, at least in terms of identifiable 
landholding would seem to be John, prominent enough to be a Ragman Roll homager, but not sufficiently so for 
his heritage landholding to justify his inclusion there, since he appears in his capacity as a King" Tenant. Despite 
their apparent lack of lands the family would seem to have been able to provide the wherewithal for at least three 
men to serve as men-at-arms simultaneously in the local garrison furnished with horses which, though not perhaps 
of the best quality were, if anything slightly better than the average mount for that garrison. 
LIVINGSTONE 
Andrew, esq. Serving as a knightlman-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison, (CDS, iii, pp. 408, 409t 
Sir Andrew, RR homager, county of Lanarkshire, presumably the same as -
Andrew, who was instructed by Edward I on 24/0511297 to support his chief officers in Scotland, Hugh de 
Cressingham and Osbert Spaldington (CDS, ii, no. 884), 
Sir Archibald, ordered on 24/05.1297 to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland, Hugh de Cressingham 
and Osbert Spaldington (CDS, ii, no. 884). He made an indenture with Edward Ion 12/02/1302, as sheriff of 
Linhthgow, to keep the town and sheriffdom with 10 men-at-arms for 20 merks until Pentecost (CDS, ii no. 
1286). It seems remarkable that Edward I should have considered 10 men-at-arms an adequate force for the 
'sheriff of Linhthgow - more usually described as a constabulary than a sheriffdom - however this force may 
278 
have been regarded as being designated as 'aid to the civil power' and an escort for the sheriff !constable rather 
than a unit for active and aggressive operations against the enemy. Having lost his supplies at sea, Sir Archibald 
was authorised by Edward I on December 1301 to draw stores, chiefly wine and wheat, from the depot at 
Berwick, (CDS, ii, no. 1268). Continuing as sheriff of Linlithgow with 10 men-at-arms, he undertook the 
supervision of building work at the castle there (CDS, ii, no. 1321). He was still keeping Linlithgow sheriffdom 
vvith 10 men-at-arms in late 1302 (CDS, ii, no. 337) and accounted on 2510811304 for fodder consumed at 
Linlithgow by Edward 1's army during the summer. (CDS, ii, no. 1586). 
Archibald. Serving as a hobelar in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii, pA31) possibly the same man as 
Sir Archibald, Serving in Linlithgow Peel with his retinue, (CDS, iii pAll) in 1335-36, perhaps an indication of 
a successful soldiering career. As a member of a prominent family - in local terms at least - he might more 
reasonably be expected to be serving as a man-at-arms rather than a hobelar. If the Linlithgow family, apparently 
rather less prominent, could support three men-at-arms in Edwardian service (see above) the Livingstone family 
would not have their status enhanced by one of their members serving as a hobelar. In 1335-36 his horse was 
valued at £20, one of the two most valuable mounts from a garrison of nearly 90 men-at-arms (CDS, iii, p. 423). 
Bartholomew. esq. Serving as a man-at-arms in Dundee garrison in 1311 (CDS, iii, pA31). 
Gilbert, esq. Serving as a man-at-arms in Linlithgow Peel in 1312 (CDS, iii, p. 411) his horse was valued at £6 
(CDS, iii, p. 423t 
Hugh,juror on an inquisition concerning Arthuret church 1328-29 at Carlisle, (CDS, ii~ no. 974). 
Walter, esq., Serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1184). 
William, Forfeited of £10 of land in Gorgie in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, p. 335) and £10 of land in Craigmylor 
(Craigrnillar) (CDS, iii, p. 382) presumably the same as-
Sir William, who escorted the Earl of Moray to prison in July 1341 after the fighting in the ruins of Edinburgh 
Castle (CDS, iii no. 1364). 
William. son of Sir William, named as a hostage for David II in July 1354 (CDS, ii~ no. 1576), appointed to 
negotiate peace and the King's ransom (also July 1354 (CDS, iii, no. 1600) and again in May 1356 (CDS, iii, no. 
1610, TNA,C47122/6/27) and again in September 1357 (CDS, iii, no. 1649) Plenipotentiary for Robert the 
Steward and other magnates (CDS, iii no. 1651). 
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Patrick, son and heir of William, delivered to Benvick burgesses on 08/10/57 (CDS, iii, p, 435) as a hostage for 
the King. 
William. juror on an inquisition relating to the estate of William de Carlisle on l3/0711347 Lochmaben (CDS, 
iii, no. 1499);possibly the same as 
William serving as a man-at-arms in the Edinburgh garrison in l335-6 (CDS, iii, p.361). 
Patrick, son of William, named as a hostage for the ransom of David II, (RRS, vi, pp. 175,186). 
Sir William, received, with his wife Cristiana Callendar, a charter -content unspecified- from David II on 
l3/02/62 and witnesses more than 20 acta of David II. 
Traditionally Scottish, and other, historians have tended to associate service by Scottish lords to English kings 
as a product of a fear of being deprived of property held in England. The Livingstone family would seem to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of that association as a means of explaining the frequent defections to and from the 
peace of English kings by members of the Scottish gentry and aristocracy. It would appear that if the Livingstone 
family held property in England it was not sufficient to make them members of the political or military 
community, or at least that their lands were not extensive enough to carry army service obligations; they do not 
for instance, appear in C. Moor's 'Knights of Edward l' nor in the various calendars of English documents other 
than in relation to Scottish matters, but they remain constant in Edwardian service until - it would appear - the 
recovery of the Bruce cause in the mid 1330s when William (see above) was declared forfeit, presumably on the 
grounds of rebellion. William had found his way back into the peace of Edward III betore the sunIDler of 1341, 
since he escorted the Earl of Moray into captivity, but the Livingstone family as a whole would seem to have been 
firmly in the Bruce party by the time of King David's ransom. 
LUBAUDILIBAUD 
Peter, serving as a man-at-arms in Edward 1's household retinue in the campaign of 1296 with a 'rough liard' 
hackney worth 20 merks, (CDS, ii, no. 1007),he was thanked on 2010511308 (CDS, iii, no. 43) for his service to 
Edward II. By September l309 he had become Sir Peter, Constable of LinlithgO\,v Peel (CDS, iii, no. 121). 
Appointed sheriff of Edinburgh in 1310, he was instructed on 14/0811310 to pay for Linlithgow garrison supplies 
out of Linlithgow church teinds (CDS, iii, no. 159). He was apparently granted 'inadvertently' the liferent of the 
barony of Bathgate and Ratho, despite the fact that the properties had already been granted to Robert Hastang by 
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of a charter of Edward I, and repeated by Edward II on 1911211311 (CDS, iii, no. 230).he received a Charter for 
Bathgate and Ratho in December 1311, (CDS, iii, no. 245). Promoted to the posts of Constable of Linlithgow Peel 
and Edinburgh Castle and sheriff of Edinburgh and Linlithgow before March 1312, his fee and costs for the 
garrisons under his command were £1416 13s 1d in arrears, for which payment was ordered on 20/08/1313 and 
he was instructed to receive stores form Berwick (CDS, iii, no. 330). He paid out £56 13s 4d arrears to David de 
Strathbogie, Earl of Atholl tor his past service in the Dundee garrison (CDS, iii, p, 404). In 1311-1312 he made 
returns of £19 2s 1 Od from Edinburgh, £1 02 19s 6d from Haddington and £40 19s 3d from Linlithgow to the King 
(Edward II) from the issues of Lothian. His retinue and the rest of the garrisons of Edinburgh and Linlithgow 
senring under him appear at CDS, iii, pp. 408-411; possibly because there were suspicions about his loyalty, he 
was ordered to surrender his charge to Ebulo de Montibus on 22 February 1314 and was later granted various 
properties in the Lothian area by Robert 1. He was forfeited of his lands at Cowden in the Barony of Dalkeith 
(RRS, v, p. 367) possibly at a parliament in Edinburgh on 08/0311316 and possibly for betraying an attempt to re-
capture Berwick from the English (RRS, v, p. 137). 
Ladv Nicola, his wife, received the gift of a saddle from Edward II, (CDS, iii, no. 1320t 
Sibilla (of Scotland), and her son Thomas (of tender age) to be received by order of Edward III dated 
0111211339 into Shaftesbury Abbey (CDS, iii, no. 1320) .. She was authorised to receive an annuity of 60s. from 
07112/1348, pending recovery of her lands in Scotland. Arrears of the annuity ordered to be paid (CDS, ii, no. 
1533). 
Thomas, her son, "of tender age" (CDS, iii, no. 1533). 
Sir Thomas, serving as a knighted man-at-arms in Edinburgh garrison, dead before September 1339. (CDS, iii, 
p.360) 
His heir (unnamed) was declared forfeit of Gar1eton-Dumynge on 29/09/36 (CDS, iii, p.388) and of the barony 
of Livingston on 30/09/39 (CDS, iii, no. 390). 
The Lubaud family fIrst made their appearance in Scotland, so far as is kno\VIl, through the service of Peter, 
later Sir Peter, who rose from serving as a man-at-arms in Edward of Caemarvon's household retinue to be the 
chief offIcer of the Edwardian administration in Lothian. When the Plantagenet government came to an end in 
1314 he ,vas able to transfer his allegiance to Robert I, from whom he received considerable property grants. The 
281 
Lubaud family could be excluded from the sample on the grounds that they were not an established Lothian 
family, however most if not all of the other family groups in the sample had interests in areas outwith Lothian. 
Unlike the other family groups the Lubauds actively chose to have a Lothian connection and Sir Peter in particular 
was an extensive landowner there under both English and Scottish kings, having apparently decided that his future 
lay in Lothian regardless of who was king he can hardly be regarded as not being a member of the Lothian 
political community. 
MAISTERTON 
WilliaIll- RR homager, county of Fife, perhaps the same as, or father of-
William,fOrteited of7 acres of Milne flat, Haddington, worth 17 s. in 1335-6 (CDS, iii, p 330) 
The Maistertons are perhaps 'typical' of local gentry in that they do not appear in record other than as above. 
MALEVILLE~ELVILLE 
Sir Jolm, swore fealty on 21/07/1296 to Edward I, (CDS, ii, no. 787). 
Patrick, ordered on 24/05/1297 to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland, Hugh de Cressingham and 
Osbert de Spaldington (CDS, ii, no. 884). 
William, deceased before 04/06/1304, an inquisition into his lands was held (CDS, ii, no. 1436). 
Maria, widow of William (above); her lands were restored on 27/05/1304, having presumably been forfeited at 
some point, though whether on account of her own actions or those of her late husband is unclear (CDS, ii, no. 
1554). 
James. RR homager, county of Aberdeen, possibly the same as ... 
James, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Dundee garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii, pAll). 
Robert, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Dundee garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii pAll) his horse was recorded but 
not valued in 1312 (CDS, iii, pA29). 
John, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Linlithgow Peel in l3l2 (CDS, iii, pAll) his horse was valued at 10 
merks in 1312 (CDS, iii, pA23). 
Thomas, serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh garrison in 1335-36 (CDS, iii p.363). 
Richard, RR homager, county of Fife; possibly the same as ... 
Richard, esq., Serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii pA08). 
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William, valet, Serving as a man-at-arms in Stirling Castle Garrison, his horse was valued at £10, (CDS, iii, 
p.424 ). 
Adam, Forfeited of) parts of "Orchardland" CDS, iii, pp. 335,382. 
Agneta, Forteited of2 oxgangs in Bynns in 1335-36, (CDS, iii, pp. 342, 390). 
Elizabeth, Issued a letter by Robert I c.1319-20 allowing her to appoint an attorney - Ma1co 1m de Haddington -
to arrange the resignation and re-granting ofburghal tenements (RRS, v, p. 667). 
Cristiana, Her charter - content unspecified- to John Melville confirmed by David II on 06/04/66 (RRS, vi. 
p.382). 
John, Recipient of charter from Cristiana, see above; 
Jolm Melville of Carnbee, possibly the same as John, above, witness to inspeximi of charters by David II (RRS, 
vi, 236,322). 
Robert, Witness to a charter, subject of an inspeximus of David II, of William Keith, Marshal of Scotland, of 
lands in Kincardineshire to Alexander Barclay and his wife Katherine (RRS, vi, p. 162). 
Walter, and his wife-
Margaret; were recipients of a charter of Robert I (which does not appear in the RRS, v), which was the subject 
of an inspeximus of David II (RRS, vi, p.385). 
The combined assets of the Maleville family must have been quite extensive given that SL,{ members of the 
family were serving as men-at-arms in the service of Edward II in 1312. A tradition of service in Plantagenet 
garrisons does not seem to survived beyond 1314 however; two members of the family were forfeited in 1335-36 
and no other members would seem to appear other than as Bruce partisans thereafter. 
MAXWELL 
John, Ordered on 24/05/1296 to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland, (CDS, ii, no. 884) presumably the 
san1e man as-
Sir John, who was present at the capitulation of the Scots at Strathord in February 1305 (CDS, ii no. 1741). 
Godfrey, was forteited oflands in Wester Pencaitland worth £19 in peacetime, but returning only £4 6s 8d - 6 
and a half merks - in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, p.385). 
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Sir Herbert, Swore fealty on 10/07/1296 to Edward I (CDS, ii, no. 764). His manor of Maxwell wasforkited 
and granted to Robert de Hastang on 20/0311312 (CDS, iii, no. 258). Sir Herbert was only one of a number of 
Bruce supporters forfeited at this date. 
Sir Eustace, Retained for life by Edward III and promised a manor worth £40 p.a. according to a ""Tit issued on 
01/02/1335 to the Bishop of Durham (CDS, iii, no. 1143). On 21/02/1335 Sir Eustace was granted £40 p.a. for his 
losses incurred through his support of Edward III and his predecessors, (CDS, iii, no. 1149). 
Elena. Widow of Sir Eustace, her charter to John Strang of 4 merks annualrent from lands in the barony of 
Kellie, Fife was the subject of an inspeximus of David II on 16/12/58 (RRS, vi, p.235). 
Herbert, Apparently surrendered Caerlaverock Castle some time before 01/09/1347 to Henry Percy and sought a 
safe conduct and protection for himself and his garrison to the effect that none in the English March trouble him in 
any way, but instead treat him as an Englishman (CDS, iii, no. 1507, INA, C47/22/6/25). Forkited and dead by 
23/03/52, his lands were given to Alan Steward ofPettinain for the service of 4 armed men and 4 archers (RRS, vi, 
p.527). 
John, His charter to Roger Aulton of the lands of Wester Softlaw, Roxburgh was confIrmed by David II on 
01/04/54 (RRS, vi. p.155) His charter (as 'Lord' ofPencaitland) of the patronage of the Kirk ofPencaitland to 
Dryburgh Abbey was confIrmed by the King on 14/04/45 (RRS, vi, p. 126) and his charter to Kilwinning Abbey 
was confIrmed c.1366 (RRS, vi, p.5 16). He was presumably the same man as-
Sir John, One of the magnates appointing a commission concerning the ransom of David II on 26/09/l357 
(CDS, iii, no. 1651) 
MORE 
Thomas de la, appointed attorney by November 1291 for the lands of John Balliol in England, (CDS, ii, no. 
681). 
John de la, esq. A prisoner of war on 16105/1296, he was taken at Dunbar castle and lodged in Bristol castle, 
(CDS, ii, no. 742). 
Reginald, Farmer and Customar of Berwick and probably a member of Robert 1's council, he was a witness to 
Robert 1's charter dated 031/03/1320 to the Burgh of Berwick (RRS, v. pp. 437-40). 
Adanl. Steward of Robert 1's household and sheriff of Ayr and witness to several of tlle king's acta, (RRS, v, 
various) he was granted a safe conduct by Edward III on 29/10/1333 to visit England (CDS, iii, no. 1099). 
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Adam, recipient of a note of a confirmation by David II of a charter of exchange of the lands of Erthbey and 
Kyncumber between Adam and Alexander Elphinstone of 0910 1163 (RRS, vi, p. 316) 
Joanna, Daughter of Adam, subject of a note c.1320-2 of a writ of mortancestor in her favour from Robert I 
(RRS, v, p. 669) 
William, Forfeited or otherwise disinherited oflands in Dairy, Ayrshire. The lands in question being granted on 
03/05/1315 by a charter of Robert I to Sir Robert Boyd (RRS, v, p. 351). 
Sir William, Lord of Abercom and one of the magnates appointing a commission to deal with the ransom of 
David II on 26/09/1357 (CDS, iii, no. 1651) described as Lord of Abercom (CDS, iv, no. 63) and as the knight of 
Abercom on 01/0811363 (RRS, vi, p.331). His charter of Ray 1st on a (perhaps Ravelston, Edinburgh) to the parish 
kirk of Edinburgh was confmned by David II on 18/0911363 (RRS, vi, p.335). His 20 merklands in Drem, East 
Lothian, surrendered to the king and then granted to Alexander Haliburton for damages on 13111157 (RRS, vi, 
p.l93). There may have been some doubt or dispute concerning the warrandice of the property; the new owner, 
Alexander Haliburton, could perhaps be more confident of title if the title were granted by the king than by the 
lord of Abercom. Sir William surrendered his lands in Upper Merchiston before 15112/58 when they were 
granted to the chaplain of St, Katherine of the parish Kirk of Edinburgh (RRS, vi, p.233) and his charter of 
Craig forth, Stirling, to Robert Erskine was confmned on 06/03/1369 by David II eRRS, vi, p.452). He was a 
witness to an examination on 16/07/1363 of letters of Robert the Steward to HolyTood Abbey (RRS, vi, p.3 31) 
and his charter to David Meldrum - content unspecified- was confmned on 2811011363 (fiRS, vi, p.342). 
Reginald, Son of William, was named as a hostage for the ransom of King David (RRS, vi, pp. 175, 186) His 
wadset (secured loan) of 26/07/1363 of the lands of Dean, Edinburgh to Adam Thore was confmned by David II 
on 01/08/63 (RRS, vi,p.33lt 
Dony, All royal suits against him (and 17 others) were remitted by David II on 01/11164 (RRS vi, p.331). 
Alexander 'Chevaler' (knight) a payment of £30 from him and others at Lochmaben was acknowledged on 
03/0211351 byEdwardIII(CDS,iii,no. 1551). 
MORHAM 
Sir Thomas Sm Taken prisoner at Dunbar castle (CDS, ii, no. 742)and entitled to 4d per day as of 0611111297 
as a prisoner of war in the Tower of London, (CDS, ii, no. 960). Presumably he was restored and released because 
he served Edward at the battle of Falkirk where his horse, valued at 24 merks in the summer of 1298, was killed 
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(CDS, ii, no. 1011) He was serving as a knightlman-at-arms with a retinue of2 esquires and with 3 chargers and 7 
grooms in Edinburgh castle garrison on 28/0211300 (CDS, ii, no. 1132). He evidently made his peace with the 
Bruce party at some point since he resigned the Barony of Kimmergharne, Berwickshire, to Robert I (date 
unknown) who re-granted it to Alexander Stewart for the service of one knight (RRS, v, pp. 376-7). He was the 
recipient of a charter of Robert I dated 18/05/1322 of lands in various Baronies to be held in liferent including 
Duncanlaw and Morham in East Lothian, the remainder of the properties to be held by Sir John and his 'wife 
Euphemia but with reversion to the heirs of Sir Thomas, who was specifically barred from permanently alienating 
any part of the property. The properties had previously been surrendered to the king by Sir Thomas Randolph, 
Earl of Moray (RRS, v, p.47l). 
Herbert, Serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh castle garrison on 28/0211300 with a retinue of 2 esquires with 
3 chargers,4 hackneys and 7 grooms, (CDS, ii, no. 1132). 
Sir Thomas, Received an allowance of 4d1day in 1311-12 as a prisoner of war in the Tower of London (CDS, 
iii, no. 322). 
MOUBRAYIMOWBRAY 
John, Selected on 07/0411299 for a prisoner of war exchange with the Scots for Sir Marmaduke Tweng (CDS, ii, 
no. 1062), but to be kept in prison pending a decision by King Edward 16/07/99 (Calendar of Close Rolls, i, no. 
258). Presumably pardoned and restored he was one of the Scots appointed to a commission, with 22 Englishmen, 
to negotiate a constitutional/administrative settlement for Scotland after the peace agreement of 1304, (CDS, ii, 
no. 1691). He received £20 in 1305 for his expenses in attending parliament in London (CDS, ii, no. 1722) and in 
the same year asked Edward I to appoint someone to protect Edward's subjects in Scotland from 'their rulers', 
also to give various lands of the king's enemies to Geoffrey de Moubray in settlement of arrears of wages and 
expenses amounting to £20 and to confirm John's commission from Sir John de Britanny of 'the ward beyond the 
Scottish mountains' (CDS, ii, no. 1726) possibly - though the dates would seem to make it very unlikely -the 
same man as_-
Sir .Tolm, Serving Edward I atAyr as a man-at-arms in the summer of 1307 (CDS, ii, no. 1961). He ,vas bound, 
with others, on 2110811307, to pay 5000 merks to Ralph de Monthermer, (CDS, iii, no. 5). He was thanked by 
Edward II on 20/0511308 for his good service (CDS, iii, no. 43) and on 23/0511308 he stood guarantor for the 
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future good behaviour of William, Bishop of S1. Andrews (CDS, iii, no. 44). In June 1308 he was appointed 
warden of Annandale with 40 men-at-arms, (CDS, iii, no. 47). He may have been the same man as -
John, Son and heir of Sir Roger, granted on 01/06/1306 by the king's special favour his father's lands despite 
being a minor (CDS, ii no. 1779). 
Alexander. valet, Serving as a man-at-arms in the Dundee garrison in 1312 (CDS, iii, p.429). His horse was 
recorded in the same year, but not valued (CDS, iii, p.429). At some point in the same year he served as a man-at-
anns in Stirling Castle garrison, where his horse was valued at £30 (CDS, iii, p.424). He received a grant of the 
lands of Boulton, Lothian, forfeited by William de Vipond (see AppendL'{). In April 1312 (CDS, iii, no. 263). He 
was pardoned on 18/0211321 by Edward II all his transgressions in the late war (CDS, iii, no. 723). Sir Alexander 
and his people were received into the peace of Edward II on 27/02/1321 (CDS, iii, no. 729). Pleading poverty, he 
received money from Edward II on March 1322 (CDS, iii, p.435). Alexander and his wife were granted an 
allowance of 3s. per day from August 1322 (CDS, iii, no. 760). On 08/09/1322 he received a grant of Boulton in 
Allerdale, previously forfeited by Roger de Moubray. On 11/02/1334 he was appointed a commissioner of 
Edward Balliol for putting the 'perpetual peace' agreed with Edward III into effect, (CDS, iii, no. 1111). His lands 
were fOrfeited on 27/10/1334 because of his defection to the Scots (CDS, iii, no. 1137), a consequence of an 
inheritance dispute among the 'disinherited'. In October 1335 several people were accepted into Edward's peace 
under an agreement reached with Sir Alexander. The group included William, Roger and Geoffrey de Moubray, 
Sir Alexander de Cragy and his son Alexander and William Dalmahoy, (all subjects of this series of profiles) and 
described as 'Scottish gentlemen'. Several others in the list also have Lothian connections and this may be a rare 
example local leadership (CDS, iii, no. 1184). In March 1336 Sir Alexander was granted the Barony of 
Dalswinton for 20 marks p.a. (CDS, iii, p.318). 
Geoffrev. Nephew and heir of Robert, above, witness on 16/01/1293 to the indenture concerning the fealty of 
John to Edward I (CDS, ii, no. 645). His manor of Bolton (presumably in Cumberland) was taken into the hands 
oftl1e sheriff of Cumberland on behalf of King Edward and made a return of75s 9 l/2d from the farms and 4s 6d 
for pannage (CDS, ii, no. 841). 1000 merks ofland in Scotland belonging to Geoffrey (but excluding the manor of 
Eckford, Roxburghshire), John de Strivelyn (a ragman Roll homager from Carstairs, not to be confused with Sir 
John Strivelin of East Sv.ynnebume, sheriff of Edinburgh forty years later) and Andrew de Chartres granted 
(25/09/1298) to Guy, Earl of Warwick (CDS, ii, no. 1009). He complained to Edward I November 1292 that his 
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property in England was being 'asset stripped' by Robert Bruce, Sm. and his wife Cristiana (CDS, ii, no. 645). He 
had evidently been declared [or(eit by Edward I and returned to his peace, since his properties had been granted to 
Sir Robert Hastangs and then taken back into the king's hand in order that they could be restored (CDS, iii, no. 
258). He sought the release of Walter Comyn in March 1310 (CDS, iii, 131) and requested payment of arrears of 
his pay in 1311 (CDS, iii, no. 193), perhaps the same man as -. 
Sir Geoffrey Issued a safe-conduct on 25/10/1334 for himself and his retinue from Edward III to visit the King 
(CDS, iii, no. 1136). Pardoned by Edward III on 10110/35 on the terms agreed with Sir Alexander, (CDS, iii, no. 
1184) he \vas the subject of a mainprise by Sir Richard Talbot and others that Geoffrey would join Edward III 
overseas as quickly as possible, serve him loyally and them return to prison unless 'by favour' of the king (CDS, 
iii, no. 1315). He received custody of the Baronies of Pentland, Couston and Roslin on 28/01/36 (CDS, iii, p.332) 
less the dower of Alicia S1. Clair (CDS, iii, p.382). Possibly the same man as -
Geoffrey, Witness to a charter (undated) of Gilbert Ruthven \vhich was the subject of an inspeximus of David 
IL dated 20101/69 (RRS, vi, p. 449). 
Sir Philip Granted custody on 08/02/1312 of Maria de Bruce to exchange for this brother Richard, with 
instructions that if he cannot secure the exchange he is to ransom her for whatever he can get and apply the sum to 
his ovm outstanding fees (CDS, iii, no. 244) Appointed sheriff of Stirling, 1311-1312, (CDS, iii, p.433) he was 
made commander of Stirling Castle for Edward II until June 1314, when he defected to the Scots. Witness to 
several acta of Robert I, he was granted a charter oflmlds in north Tyneda1e, Northumberland in late 1317. 
Richard, prisoner of war of the Scots, brother of Sir Phillip, was permitted to be exchanged for Maria de Bruce 
(CDS, iii, no. 244). 
John. Son of Phillip, killed in action against King David, his lands were granted to William Douglas on 
19/01142 (RRS, vi, p.89). 
Sir John, prisoner of war as of 06111/1297 in the Tower of London, entitled to 4d per diem (CDS, ii, no. 960). 
Perhaps the same as-
Sir John. Thanked for his loyalty by Edward II, (CDS, iii, no. 4), he stood surety for the Bishop of S1. Andrews 
(CDS, iii, no. 44) and was joint warden of the West March by June 1308 (CDS, iii, no. 47) He was issued a safe 
conduct for himself, an unnamed associate and forty horse to go to Scotland on 26/02/1322 (CDS, iii, no. 746) and 
was perhaps the same person as-
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John, Sought a protection from the Bishop of Durham (Chancellor) for John Schirwode, his valet, serving 
Edward III in December l336 with John (CDS, iii, no. 1222). In July l340 he petitioned the Duke of Cornwall for 
arrears of his fees and wages for his garrison. This came to a total of £485 19s for himself and 'his own' retinue 
and a further £679 for the rest of the complement. He further asked that a paymaster be appointed to \vho would 
treat the townspeople fittingly and that safe provision be made for the payment of troops and that the Duke make 
provision tor the repair of the to\\'11 walls, 30 perches of which were in danger of falling down. 100 merks would 
suffice for immediate repair, but more than £300 would be required if the walls should actually collapse (CDS, iii, 
no. 1338). This item gives some insight into the massive expense involved in Edward Ill's Scottish war. 
Sir Roger, ordered on 11111/1310 to join the Perth garrison with 20 men-at-arms of his own retinue, a 
considerable force when one considers the very small contingents of men-at-arms required by the crown for even 
very major lordships - ten knights from the whole of Annandale for example - suggesting that the military 
potential of Scottish lordships was rather more extensive than we might expect. Sir Roger's retinue was to serve 
until Easter, for which he was to be paid 300 merks. The fee would seem to include compensation for killed 
horses, (CDS, iii, no. 173). In November-January 1311 he was ordered to account for his fee of 300 merks from 
the time of his service in Perth (CDS, iii, no. 192) defected to the Scots and forfeited Boulton in Allerdale and a 
further 20 marks from templar lands in 1313 (CDS, iii, no. 383). Around l318-19 he was appointed special 
justiciar to inquire into lands of Lessangie, F orfarshire by Robert I (RRS, v, p. 667). His Barony of Kirkmichael 
was granted to William de Lindsay, canon of Glasgow after it was forfeited by Robert I due to the involvement of 
Sir Roger in the De Soubs conspiracy of l320 (RRS, v, p. 684). He was witness to an inspeximus dated 
20102/1335 of Edward III ofa charter of27 108/1310 from Antony Bek, Bishop of Durham to Sir William Dacre of 
the manor ofCrayling in Scotland (CDS, iii, no. 1147). On 1011011335 he was pardoned by_Edward III and joined 
him under the terms agreed with Sir Alexander (CDS, iii, no. 1184). Sir Roger was the subject of a mainprise of 
21107/1339 by Sir Richard Talbot and others that he (Sir Roger) would serve King Edward overseas as soon as 
possible, would serve him loyally and would return to prison 'at favour' (CDS, iii, no. 1315). He was a witness on 
29111152 to an exemplification of charters to William de Aldeburgh by Edward Balliol (CDS, iii, no. 1578). 
Phillipi!, Wife of Bartholomew de Loen, received, with her husband, a grant of the Barony of Barnbougle, 
Edinburgh, resigned by John Graham, Earl of Menteith and his wife Maria on 03/05/47, to discharge their debt of 
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2000 merks for their marriage and relief, the Barony was re-granted for the service of one archer on 28/05/46 
eRRS, vi, pp. 299-300). 
PENCAITLANDIPENKA TLAND 
Davici Swore fealty to Edward I on 28/0811296 (CDS, ii, no. 815) and served as a juror to an inquisition into the 
lands of the late Elena de Zouche in Tranent in August 1296 (CDS, ii, No, 824). 
Sir Thomas, Authorised on 22/11 11312 to receive £91 5s 8d as wages for himself- described as 'esquire at 
arms"- and the 5 esquires and 10 hobelars serving in his retinue and for the loss of his black horse, (CDS, iii, no. 
288). He was accused c. OctoberlNovember 1313 of raiding the lands of Patrick, Earl of Dunbar and Sir Adam de 
Gordon, and of seizing locals, taking them to Berwick, ransoming the ones with money and murdering the rest 
(CDS, iii, no. 337). He served in the Berwick garrison at least up to 0311111314 with two 'socii'; unusually the list 
is divided into knights, esquires, sergeants-at-arms and esquires of the household (CDS, iii, no. 400) though the 
significance of these definitions, if any, is not made clear. Sir Thomas was granted an annuity on 04/10/1327 of 
100 merks by Edward III (CDS, iii, no. 937) and a warrant to receive his £90 fee outstanding for his service to 
Edward II so that he might equip himself properly for service to Edward III (CDS, iii, no. 938). On 25/0911334 
Edward III gave an instruction to issue Thomas with cloth and fur for a robe suitable to his station, Issues of robes 
(or cloth to make them) are not uncommon; apparently the king's knights had a particular pattern or colour of 
cloth since at least one request for such an issue clearly asks that the cloth desired should be of a similar quality 
to, but distinct in appearance from, the robes issued to the knights (CDS, iii, no. 1134). Thomas gave a receipt at 
York on 2511011334 for 3 ells of green 'Lovaine' cloth 3 V. ells of 'rayed' cloth and a 'fur of lambskins', 
presumably a 'fur' refers to a garment, i.e. a cloak, stole or similar wrap (CDS, iii, no. 1134). Appointed Warden 
of Edinburgh, sheriff of Lothian, he was responsible for compotus of September-November l335. He made an 
indenture with Edward III to keep Edinburgh Castle 14/09/36 (CDS, iii, no. 1186) and was dead before 
06/07/1336 (CDS, iii,Nos. 1208,1240). 
John, gave mainprise on 24/08/1296 that Rauf Ie Engleys would answer for all suits against hi.m (CDS, ii, no. 
805). He was acquitted of rebellion witl1 the rest of the pro-Balliol garrison of Jedburgh on account of his 
delivery of the castle (Calendar of Close Rolls, i., p. 208). 
PRESTON 
David, RR homager, county of Edinburgh 
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Nicol, RR homager, county of Edinburgh, presumably the same person as-
Nicholas, juror to an inquisition into the lands of the late Elena de Zouche in August 1296 in Tranent (CDS, ii, 
no. 824). 
John, Inquisition juror tor Edward 1's administration on 2811111300 before the sheriff of Berwick, (CDS, ii, no. 
1178) 
Jo1m, Received a charter of the Barony of Gorton (Gouerton), Edinburgh, as resigned by Margaret and 
Constance, the heirs of Edward Whitewell and Joan Lysours, on 06/0111342, to be held for 'usual services' (RRS, 
vi, p.87) and a grant of all the lands of Joachim de Kinbuck on 04/0111368. Described by David II as 'our 
bachelor', so presumably he had been made a knight before 03/02/58 when, disregarding the provisions of the 
1341 revocation act he was granted a charter for two burgages and an annualrent in Edinburgh which were in the 
hands of King David due to torfeiture and escheat (RRS, vi, p. 207). He was the subject ofletters under the Privy 
Seal requiring the sheriff and bailies of Edinburgh to give him the escheated property of William son of Roger, 
(RRS, vi, p. 281). He received charter - content unspecitled- c.1341 (RRS, ·vi, p.505) and was granted, by Andrew 
Murray, king's Lieutenant, the lands of Andrew Murray of Tullibardine on 04/12/35. 
Laurence. Appointed sheriff of Edinburgh during the siege of Edinburgh castle in 1338 (Scotichronicon, vii, 
book xiii, p. 129). He was killed in action, presumably at Crichtondene, in September that year (Scotichronicon, 
vii, p.127). 
Simon Preston of Gorton, Witness to a charter of Jolm of Allincrum (an Edinburgh burgess) of lands in 
Craigcrook, Edinburgh to the parish Kirk of Edinburgh, which was the subject of an inspeximus of David II (RRS, 
vi, pp. 306-8). 
PENICUIKIPENICOKE 
Margaret, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. Although she was in Edward's peace in 1298 her son, Hugh, was 
not, and she was said, in a letter from Sir John de Kingestone, sheriff of Edinburgh, to have received him, and 
others, at Penicuik (Stevenson, Documents, ii, p.527). The sheriffs response was to make a foray to Penicuik, 
\vhich he calls a town, and remove all the cattle and take them to Edinburgh, \vhere he returned some to "poor 
people who say they are at peace with us". This episode neatly shows a number of the problems facing garrison 
commanders in Lothian and elsewhere. The contlscation of cattle was undoubtedly a blow to the landholder, but it 
was economic disaster for their tenants. Whether or not the tenants genuinely were, as they claimed, "at peace" 
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would be very difficult indeed to assess. If they were loya~ then to bring them to ruin by confiscating their 
livestock would hardly be an incentive for them to continue to support the new administration; if they were not 
loyal, restoring their livestock might seem like weakness. 
Hugh, RR homager, county 0 f Edinburgh (x2), his English lands restored, described as a Scottish rebel who 
had come to Edward 1 's peace, his lands in Northumberland were to be restored to him by the sheriff under a writ 
dated 14/04/1304 (CDS, ii, no. 1481) repeated beiore September that year (CDS, ii, no. 1594). Hugh was 
conducting operations in the vicinity of Edinburgh in the summer of 1298 (Stevenson, Documents, ii, p .527). 
Nigel, Serving as a man-at-arms in the Dundee garrison in 1312 with an unpriced horse (CDS, iii, p.428). 
John, esq., Serving as a man-at-arms in the Dundee garrison in 1312 with an unpriced horse, (CDS, iii, pA28). 
There is no guarantee that either Nigel or John was related in any way to Margaret and Hugh, though the rarity 
of the name Penicuik must make it more than likely that they were. 
PONTEKIN 
Peter, Left the allegiance of Edward II before Martinmas 1312 presumably to support Robert I, and fOrfeited the 
land of Pontekyn in the Barony of Musselburgl\ worth £9 in peacetime and returning the full farm as of 
20102/1312. (CDS, iii, no. 245). 
Adam, esq., Son of Thomas, belo\v, serving as a man-at arms in Edinburgh castle garrison in 1339-40 (CDS, iii, 
no. 1323). He was granted an allowance for the loss of his lands in May 1342 (CDS, iii, no. 1390) and was 
authorised to receive wool in part payment of his arrears in February 1343 (CDS, iii, no. 1406). In the summer of 
1338 he received a prest of 50s of his arrears (CDS, iii, no. 1534). 
Thomas, esq., Serving as a man-at-arms in Lothian garrison in 1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1186) and again in 1337 
(CDS, iii, p.363) and again in 1339-40 (CDS, iii, no. 1323) and again at the surrender of the castle to the Scots in 
April 1341 (CDS, iii, no. 1383) He was granted an allowance tor loss oflands in May 1342 (CDS, iii, no. 1390) to 
receive wool in part payment of arrears in February 1343 (CDS, iii, no. 1406) and to receive 50s part payment of 
arrears in the summer of 1348 (CDS, iii, no. 1534). 
RAMSAY 
John, RR homager, county of Fife; he, or John son of Nece, below, inquisition juror for the lands of the late 
Elena de Zouche in August 1296 (CDS, ii, no. 824). 
John son ofNece, RR homager, county of Fife; 
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Sir Edmund, Performed homage to Edward I on 14/0311296 (CDS, ii, no. 730) he was the subject of a letter 
patent of John, Earl of Athole, Alexander de Meygners and John de Inchemartin guaranteeing that Edmund would 
serve King Edward in France or elsewhere (CDS, ii, no. 940). Sir Edmund joined Robert I before_1309/1 and was 
[orteited of lands in Cockpen, "Upper Lothian" worth 23 marks in peacetime but reduced to 10 marks by 
20102/1312 (CDS, iii, no. 245). His lands were given to Robert Hastang on 20103/1312 (CDS, iii, no. 258). Since 
Sir Edmund had made homage to Edward I in the middle of March 1296 it is possible that he is not the same as-
Sir Edmund, prisoner of war taken at Dunbar castle and lodged at Devizes castle, (CDS, ii no. 742) presumably 
pardoned and restored, he attested, with several others on 01/09/1305, that Michael de Miggel had been coerced to 
fight under William Wallace and should not be punished (CDS, ii, no. 1689) 
Elias, esq., A writ was issued on 28/0111302 to pay his allowance as a prisoner of war in Winchester castle 
(CDS, ii, no. 1283). 
William, RR homager, county of Angus; perhaps the same man as-
William (of Dalhousie), ordered on 24/0511296 to support Edward 1's chief officers in Scotland, (CDS, ii, no. 
884) possibly the same as-
Sir William, A prisoner of war in the summer of 1304, taken at Stirling castle, to be carefully guarded (CDS, ii, 
no. 1668) perhaps the same as-
William/valet', who received 100 merks in January 1311 from Sir Alexander Abernethy for service to Edward 
II (CDS, iii, no. 193). 
William, Possibly either of the above, a juror on the inquisition into the lands of Bruce supporters in Lothian on 
20102/1312 (CDS, iii, no. 245). 
Hugh, Brother of Sir William (above); a prisoner of war at Gloucester castle in the summer of 1304 with 
specific instructions that he be carefully guarded, (CDS, ii, no. 1668). 
Thomas, Man-at-arms serving in the garrison of Kirkintilloch castle on 01/09/1302 (CDS, ii, no. 1321). 
Margaret, RR homager, County of Linlithgow. 
Malise, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in the Dundee garrison in 1312, his horse was recorded but not valued 
(CDS, iii, p.429). 
Nes, 'Esquire of Scotland' paid arrears of wages, £7 6s. in 1337-38 (CDS, iii, no. 1280). The description 
'esquire' in this context, particularly in connection with a fairly substantial sum in arrears of pay, suggests that 
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Nes was serving in the Edwardian administration in some connection. Although there is no further record ofNes, 
most significantly the absence of his horse from valuation rolls the fact that his arrears are recorded in a document 
that relates to military expenditure would suggest that he was serving as a man-at-arms. 
Maria, Dowager in Crookston, forteited of lands worth £9 13s 4d reduced to 46s 8d (three and a half merks) in 
1335-6 (CDS, iii, p.380). 
Malcolm, Forteited of lands in Cockpen, "extending to" £12 reduced to 26s 8d (£1 and half a merk) and 
Gilbertstone worth £6 13s 8d (or 10 merks) reduced to 3s 4d (quarter of a merk) in 1336 (CDS, iii, p.334). His 
lands in Wester Pencaitland, normally worth 5 marks, were worthless in 1336 (CDS, iii, p.337) and to 20d (an 
eighth of a merk) in 1336-37 (CDS, iii, p. 385). 
William, Received arrears of wages in 1337-38, a sum of 66s 8d out of £33 12s outstanding (CDS, iii, no. 
1280). He was to be paid 330 5s 4d tor the service of himself and his retinue at Edinburgh under Sir John de 
Stirling between August 1337 and February 1338 (CDS, iii, no. 1294) and to receive another 100 merks on 
16/03/1340 from the receiver for the Scottish war (CDS, iii, no. 1351). He served as a man-at-arms in the garrison 
of Edinburgh castle which surrendered on 16m April1341 (CDS, iii, no. 1383). He was freed on 10/0811341 from 
a demand for £4 castleguard for his lands in Berwickshire, which had been destroyed by the Scots because he, 'a 
native Scot, adheres to the King' (CDS, iii, no. 1367) his 'suitable sustenance' was ordered to be arranged on 
16/09II341 (CDS, iii, no. 1369) He was declared an enemy and a traitor and was forteited of his lands of Foul den, 
Berwickshire, which were the subject of an inquisition on 22/04/43 'in full county' which found that the property 
was held of the king 'by ward and relief and suit of county' and 40s castleguard and that the issues were currently 
worth £6 9s 4d (CDS, iii, no. 1409). A warrant was issued on 3110111347 to pay the expenses of Bertin Beneyi, 
valet, for Sir William, a prisoner taken on the Marches of Scotland (CDS, iii, no. 1482). 
Alexander of Dalhousie, witness to Robert 1's inspeximus dated 0511211318 ofa charter of Alexander II (RRS, 
v, pp. 417-9). Forfeited by Edward III of 11 bovates of land at Wiston, Berwickshire, and the mills thereof, 
destroyed by war and returning nothing in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, p.326). A successful war leader in tlle tllirteen-
thirties a..'1d appointed sheriff of Roxburgh, he ,vas murdered by James Douglas of Lothian who saw Ramsay as a 
potential rival for prominence in the south-east. 
Ness. Witness to an inspeximus of Robert I of 05112/1318 (RRS, v, pp. 417-9). 
294 
Robert. A member of the Stirling castle garrison in 1304, he was still a prisoner of war at Rochester in May 
1305. CDS, ii, no. 1668. 
Robert, Received, with his wife Agnes, a charter of entail dated 20108/58 of one fuird of the Barony of 
Longtorgan, Perth (RRS, vi, p.222). 
William, Note of his charter to Alexander Ramsey ofland at Cambok, Fife 11111/41 eRRS, vi p.479) 
Alexander, Witness to a confIrmation by David II dated 08/0811367 of a charter of Agnes de Mountiode to 
Simon Schaklock of land near Slains, Montrose (RRS, vi, pp. 408-9). 
Alexander, Subject of charter of entail dated 15/0711367 of the Barony of Dalhousie, Edinburgh, as surrendered 
by Patrick Ramsey. eRRS, vi, p. 406) 
James, son of Patrick, His grant to John son of Matfuew confIrmed on 20108/69 by David II eRRS, vi, p. 472), 
Malcolm, Witness to a document -content unspecified- of David II, (RRS, vi, pp. 87 -8) 
Sir Patrick, One of the magnates entrusted with appointing commissioners for the ransom of David II on 
29/0911357 (CDS, iii, no. 1651), presumably the same man as-
Patrick of Dalhousie. knight, His charter of Dalhousie Kirk to Newbattle Abbey confIrmed by David II on 
14/07/57 (RRS, vi,p. 171). 
William, Designated an alternate hostage tor the ransom of David II, (RRS, vi, pp. 175, 186) on 03/10/57 and 
05110/57, he was witness to the surrender of Mertoun and Upper Merchiston to David II on 11/02/58 by Thomas 
Byset (RRS, vi, p.209). He received letters patent- purpose unspecitled- on 09/09/62 (RRS, vi, p.309) and a 
charter - content unspecified - on 2411 0/69 eRRS, vi, p.479) He was a witness to documents of King David 7 
times as Earl of Fife and was one of the 'Knights of Scotland' in the ransom treaty of October 1357 (RRS, vi, 
p.183). 
Henrv. valet, Authorised to receive, as of 12/10/1340, £20 p.a. for his good service and for the lands he had lost 
in Scotland, (CDS, iii, Nos. 1340, 1341). Presumably Henry had been in the peace of the Bruce party before 
Edward Balliors campaigns, since he had evidently had property to lose. 
SETON 
Sir John, went to the aid of the constable of Berwick castle on 3010811301 with 4 'va1ettes' - men-at-arms -
during a mutinous riot among the infantry of the garrison caused by a failure of wages (CDS, ii, no. 1223). The 
ability of an ordinary knight to call out 4 men-at-arms, presumably at short notice since the need of the constable 
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was urgent, is a further indication that we should not assume that the level of knight-service demanded by the king 
for lands was a reflection of the extent of availability of suitable manpower 
Christopher The son and heir of John (above), he was called upon to answer, c. September/October l301, for 
the relief of his father's lands (CDS, ii, no. 1232) He was serving Edward I as a man-at-arms at Lochmaben on 
03/03/l304. He gave homage to Edward I and received his lands in October the following year (CDS, ii, no. 
1697). Taken prisoner and executed, he was declared a rebel and his lands forfeited in l307 due to his support for 
Robert I (CDS, ii, no. 1775). 
William, Groom of Elizabeth de Siward, delivered a horse to Edward II in December 1312 (CDS, iii, no. 298) 
Sir Alexander, Received a gift ofwine for himself and his wife from Edward II in November 1309 (CDS, iii, no. 
12l). He served as a juror for land forfeitures of Bruce partisans in Lothian on 20/0211312 (CDS, iii, no. 245). He 
was issued a safe conduct by Edward II as an envoy of Robert I in September 1322 (CDS, iii, no. 767).) Recipient 
of a charter (10/04/1321) of Robert I for part of the Barony of Tranent and Falside, East Lothian and the 
superiority of Myles, East Lothian (RRS, v, p .450-51) and another of the same date granting him Barns, East 
Lothian for the service of two archers (fiRS, v, p.45l) and another three days later (which survives only in 
summary) and another dated l3/0411321 of the superiority of Dundas and Wester Craigie, West Lothian for what 
are described as 'usual services' (RRS, v. p. 453) and another of 16/04/1321 granting him Seton, East Lothian 
(RRS, v. p.453) He was the recipient of a grant dated 16/0111324 (surviving only in summary) of permission to 
have a weekly market in his 'free burgh' of Seton, East Lothian, (RRS, v. p. 515), a valuable privilege, since it 
would enable Sir Alexander to take a profit from sellers and buyers through market fees. He was the recipient of a 
charter ofunknov.n date or purpose from Sir John de Vallibus (de Vaux) which was confirmed by Robert I in a 
note of c.l321-22 (RRS, v. p.670) and of a charter dated 08/0411324 of a grant of 'una petia' ofland in Aberdeen 
(RRS, v. p. 519) and of a charter of Robert I recorded in a note of c.1314-18 for lands in Longniddry (RRS, v. p. 
680). Sir Alexander obviously enjoyed great favour from King Robert and no doubt King Robert was confident of 
the loyalty of Sir Alexander. The number, extent and location of the different properties and superiorities granted 
to Sir Alexander could be seen as an effort by the king to install a new magnate ,vhose primary commitment was 
to the Bruce cause. This would not be out of character; Sir James Douglas and Sir Thomas Randolph were both 
raised to great estate to provide the king with magnate allies, furthermore, it is not clear that any magnate really 
held great sway over the county and parish gentry of Lothian to the extent that the Earl of Dunbar did in 
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Roxburghshire or Berwickshire, in which case there existed not so much a power vacuum but an opportunity to 
alter the political traditions of Lothian by 'inventing' a magnate power. If that was the intention of King Robert 
the grants of superiority would be of some significance to Sir Alexander. In 1329 he accounted for the goods of 
the deceased Bishop of St Andrews, £15 and paid a £20 fine for entry into Barony of Lambniston (CDS, iii, p. 
316). In 1335 Robert de Byncestre claimed that Edward Ballio1 had granted him all the lands of Alexander Seton 
and that he was being denied his property by Sir William de Eynesford, to whom Edward III had made a similar 
grant (CDS, iii, no. 1223). By the time accounts for 1335-36 had been complied Sir Alexander had been torfeited 
oflands and superiorities throughout Lothian (CDS, iii, P 333). He was a witness to a charter of Robert I dated 
15/03126 which was the subject of an inspeximus of David II dated 1110111360 (RRS, vi, p.258) and was witness 
to charter of Robert I to Holyrood Abbey which was the subject of an inspeximus of David II dated 14112/42 
(RRS, vi, p.103) and again on 06/06/43 (RRS, vi, p.113) and was also witness to an inspeximus of a confirmation 
by Robert I of a charter by King Edgar to Holyrood Abbey Witness to charter of Simon of Peebles to Hemy 
Douglas ofland at Quilt which was subject of an inspeximus of David II dated 281l1l68 eRRS, vi, p.439). He was 
witness to a charter of David II to the burgesses of Inverbervie on 22/06/41 and his charter from Thomas Urquhart 
of one Carucate in Nidriffe (presumably Niddry), Edinburgh, was confumed by David II. In 1345-8 he served as 
Precentor of the lands of the Knights Hospitaller in Scotland and as the household Steward of David II (ER, i, p. 
149) 
Alexander, A friar of the Order of St, John of Jerusalem, he was the subject of a protection and safe conduct 
issued to the Wardens of the Scottish March by Edward III on 01/06/1345 (CDS, iii, no. 1446) to meet with his 
Prior in London. 
William, His charter - content unspecified - to Adam Forester was confirmed on 23/1 ono by David II (RRS, vi, 
p.497). 
John, Witness to a charter -content unspecified - dated 03/05/51 of William Keith, marshal of Scotland, which 
was the subject of an inspeximus of David II dated 18/03/55 (RRS, vi, p.16l). 
SIWARD 
Sir Richard Sm., Appointed custodian of 3 castles in Dumfriesshire on 24/03/92, during Edward 1's 
administration prior to the arbitration of the 'great cause' (CDS, ii, no. 582) he acknmvledged receipt of his fee of 
40 marks for 40 days on 26/04/1292 (CDS, ii, no. 589). A rate of 1 merklday was paid to a number of men in 
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similar appointments. It would be reasonable to assume that the 13 s 8d per day was intended as more than simply 
remuneration for the officer in question and that some part of the retinue required to support him in his tasks 
would have had to be paid out of the fee. Sir Richard witnessed the homage of John to Edward I on 16/01/92 
(CDS, ii, no. 660). It would seem that Sir Richard was not among the Scottish lords who adhered to Edward I in 
1296 since his lands in Northamptonshire were restored on 31/07/1297 'by the king's special favour' (CDS, ii, 
no. 930). His son, Richard Siward Jm. would seem to ha-ve served King John at Dunbar, was captured and 
remained in strict confinement until the good service of his father to Edward I was rewarded with an order that 
Richard Jm. Should have his fetters removed on 29/05/98 (CDS, ii, no. 986). Arrangements made for Sir Richard 
Sm. to raise troops with the Earl of Carrick for Edward's operations in Scotland in the summer of 1298 (CDS, ii, 
no. 1409). Sir Richard was must have proved his reliability since he was considered a suitable choice for warden 
ofNithsdale Castle by 28/04/99 (CDS, ii, no. 1057) On 17/08/1299 he was described as a 'knight of Annandale' 
who was to have due pay and living expenses (CDS, ii, no. 1088). King Edward issues an instruction on 16/11/99 
that 'liegemen' should assist Sir Richard in improving the palisade of the 'close' of Lochmaben castle (CDS, ii, 
no. 1112) and gave £50 on 12/06/02 toward the cost of improvements to Richard's new castle at Tibbers (CDS, ii, 
no. 1307). In November 1299 he received a prest of his wages, amount unknmNn (CDS, ii, no. 1115). On 
01/09/1302 he agreed -'with others - to keep Kirkintilloch castle with 28 men-at-arms and 60 foot (CDS, ii, no. 
1321). He wrote to Ralph de Mantone in the winter of 1302 thanking him for his good offices with King Edward 
and complaining that he had no more than 10 men-at-arms (including Sir Richard Siward, presumably his son, see 
below) to secure the area of Lochmaben (CDS, ii, no. 1334). He received a prest of £20 over and above his fees 
"so that the district is not left unprovided - an indication that local military obligations were not sufficient to 
provide adequate garrisons; He was serving as a knightlman-at-arms in tlle Lochmaben Castle garrison 
OctoberlNovember 1302 (CDS, ii, no. 1334) and was appointed as sheriff of Fife before 19/03/1304 when John 
Cambou was serving as his deputy (CDS, ii, no. 1350). King Edward instructed him to lead 300 "chosen" troops 
to Berwick in April 1303 (CDS, ii, no. 1356) and on 14/12/1303 instructions were given for wages to be paid for 
6 weeks senrice in Lochmaben Castle garrison for Richard, his bachelors and 8 esquires (CDS, ii, no. 1418) By 
1305 Edward had instructed Richard (04/05/1304) to restore the temporalities and castle of St. Andrews to the 
Bishop in his capacity as sheriff of Dumfries (CDS, ii, no. 1691).Dead by 1311, he was forfeited by Robert I and 
his lands re-granted (RRS, v, p. 256). 
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Sir Richard Jm. A writ for payment was issued on 02/07/1297 to Richard for his expenses as a prisoner ohvar 
(CDS, ii, no. 906). He was kept in close confmement, even in irons, until 29/05/ 1298 when his fetters were 
ordered to be removed on account of the loyal service of his father to Edward I (CDS, ii, no. 986). By 30/05/1297 
he had been ordered to be released on the mainprise of Antony Bek, Bishop of Durham, having surrendered his 
son Jolm as a hostage for his future loyalty, but would seem to have remained in captivity for another year, 
perhaps for failure to give his parole or observe the conditions of his release? (CDS, ii, no. 940). Sir Richard 
evidently made his peace with Edward I because in OctoberlNovember 1302 he was serving as a knightlman-at-
arms under his father at Lochrnaben (CDS, ii, no. 1334). Dead before 15/03/1307, his widow, Elizabeth, was 
authorised to receive 3d/day (CDS, ii, no. 1910) however presumably he or his heir was forfeited (date unknown) 
by Robert I of his Barony of Aberdour, Fife, sometime before 11101/1325 when the Barony was granted to Sir 
Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray, tor 'usual services' (RRS, v, p.526). 
Elizabeth, Widow of Sir Richard, Jm (above), to receive as of 15/03/1307 3d/day for her support (CDS, ii, no. 
910) and to receive as of July 1307 3d/day and one merk for her dress, and 1 04s 7 d in arrears, (CDS, ii, no. 1952). 
John Son and heir of sir Richard Jm., a writ was issued on 24/1111299 for his allowance as a prisoner of war or 
perhaps hostage in Chester castle (CDS, ii, no. 1114) and another to the same purpose was issued on 29/09/1300 
(CDS, i~ no. 1156), Sometime before 18112/1314 Edward II was notified that John had joined the Scots and 
fOrfeited him (CDS, iii, no. 407). His goods were sold bet ore 11/06/1315 tor £40 (CDS, iii, no. 416). On 
19/06/1334 Edward III examined the charter 'of his cousin the king of Scotland' - Edward Balliol - of Bonkhill 
and other lands in Scotland to Sir John Syward and ordered the Archbishop of Canterbury to issue confirmatory 
letters accordingly (CDS, iii, no. 1128). 
William Authorised on 01/02/1343 to receive wool in lieu of outstanding wages (CDS, iii, no. 1404). This is one 
of a number of examples of men who performed military service in Scotland and the North of England tor Edward 
III being paid with wool. There are a number of possibilities that could explain this practice. The shortage of hard 
cash in t~e exchequer and wardrobe, possibly coupled with the difficulty of transporting the cash to Scotland in 
the middle of winter may have obliged Edward to force acceptance of wool - that the recipients would have to 
market if they were to see their money - in lieu of money, however it is not impossible that payment in wool was 
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potentially very profitable if the rate of commutation (an unusual example of the commutation of cash to produce 
rather than vice versa) was favourable when compared to the actual market price of the product~ 
STRlVELIN OF EAST SWINNEBURNE 
Sir John, Made an indenture with Sir Thomas Rocelyn dated 02/1111335 concerning the handover of the 
wardenship of Edinburgh castle from Sir Thomas to Sir Jolm (CDS, iii, no. 1186). Sir Jolm had been made a 
banneret by Edward III at Perth (on the previous feast-day of S1. John the Baptist) but was not receiving the 
appropriate rise in salary, similarly for his fees as sheriff of Lothian, that although he paid his hobelars 6d1day he 
was only receiving 4d/day for them and 6d/day and 4d1day respectively for his night-watchmen at Edinburgh 
presumably) the castle and his transport costs for procuring supplies from the depot at Berwick (by water). He 
received a charter from Edward III dated 12/0711336 for lands worth £200 in the Baronies ofRatho and Bathgate, 
the lands and mills of Dene (Dean), Edinburgh, and the 'suit of the town of Edinburgh thereto'. The properties 
'extended' to £203 7 s 8d and were to be held as a knights fee, paying the 'excess' of £3 7 s 8d to the exchequer. If 
ejected by the Scots he was to have 200 merks of land in England or 200 merks p.a. from the exchequer. The 
provision of an alternative scheme of reward would suggest tllat either John or Edward or both were not entirely 
convinced of the viability of Edward Balliol's cession of lands to Edward III. He continued as warden of 
Edinburgh castle from November 1335 to October 1336, and was paid for his outlay on workers and material for 
repair of the castle (CDS, iii, no. 1215). He received a part-payment of 50s on 29/09/1337. (CDS, iii, no. 1247). 
His charter for Bathgate and Ratho was cancelled as per provisions of the charter due to the properties being 
overrun by the Scots, Sir John to receive 200 merks p.a. (CDS, iii, no. 1319). On 29/05/1343 he was granted £20 
p.a. of rents from Yorkshire in the king's ward until the majority of David de Strathbogie, cousin and one of the 
heirs of the late Aymer de Valence (CDS, iii, no. 1414). On 2011211343 Edward III granted him properties in 
Yorkshire, total value £106 5s 4d p.a. (CDS, iii, no. 1423). He was authorised to take evidence on 19110/1344 
concerning a destructive raid by the Scots in Northumberland during 1340 when 24 parishes in the county had 
been destroyed (CDS, iii, no. 1441) On 02/0411345 he asked for a protection for his friend George Salvayn, 'while 
with him in the garrison of Berwick' (CDS, iii, no. 1442) On 2111011346 he was granted the 'vill' of Hot on, 
forfeited by Andrew Moray and the lands of Peter de Helye (d.) in Paxton, Berwickshire (CDS, iii, no. 1466). Sir 
john, like Pierre de Lubaud, was not strictly a Lothian man, but had every intention of becoming one through a 
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combination of office and lands. Had Edward III conquered Lothian, Sir John would have been a prominent figure 
in the political community of the sheriffdom. 
STIRLING 
AdaJ11, Swore homage and fealty in June/August 1291) to Edward I as a burgess of Berwick, (CDS, ii, no. 508) 
John, Swore homage and fealty in June/August 1291 to Edward I as a burgess of Berwick (CDS, ii, no. 508) 
perhaps the same man as-
Sir John, who swore fealty to Edward I on 02/0711296 (CDS, ii, no. 753). He was restored to his property 
having come to King Edward's peace with the Earl of Strathearn on 08/09/1296 (CDS, ii, no. 853). Given the 
passage of forty years, it would seem unlikely, but not impossible that he should be the same as-
Alexander, restored to his property (08/0911296) CDS, ii, no. 853; having come to King Edward's peace with 
Malise, Earl of Strathearn (CDS, ii, no. 1518) 
Marie, widow of Alexander, who died before 2010411304, having done homage and fealty to Edward L she was 
to be restored to her lands (CDS, ii, no. 1518). 
Alexander, esq. Serving as a man-at-arms in Linlithgow Peel in 1312 with a horse valued at 10 merks (CDS, iii, 
pp. 411,423). 
Alexander, esq. serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1336. (CDS, iii, p.362) 
Gilbert, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1336 (CDS, iii, p.362) presumably the 
same man as Gilbert, who served as a mounted archer in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1339-40 (CDS, iii, no. 
1323) This is the only example from this sample of a man serving in a less prestigious capacity at a later date in 
his career. There are several possible eA"planations for this. The income of this individual may have fallen below 
the point at which an adequate charger and suitable equipment could be maintained. It would be rash to assume 
that the wages paid to men-at-arms were adequate to support them; alternatively there may have been vacancies 
for mounted archers in the garrison complement, but not for men-at-arms, [mally, these documents may refer to 
two men with the same name. 
Henrv, A prisoner of war at Scarborough on 1611211312, receiving 2d per day. (CDS, iii, nos. 35,297). 
Alexander, witness to the inspeximus by David II of a charter of Agnes of Crambeth to James Vallance on 
18/03/54 (RRS, vi, pp. 159-60) 
Mm, 'Domina' of Robert on, pardoned and granted her heritage lands on 01/07/46 (RRS, vi, p.509) 
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SWAYNESTON 
Thomas, held Frankisheland of the king. The property was worth 20 merks in peacetime, reduced to nil in 1335-
36.(CDS, iii, pp. 331-2).The tact that the property was in the hands of Edward III might suggest that Thomas had 
been forfeited, however escheats could occur for a number of reasons, including the lack of an heir. 
VIPOND 
Nicol, swore fealty to Edward I on 28/08/1296 (CDS, ii, no. 815). 
Sir William, A prisoner of war, possibly since 1296, he was to be paid wages of 3d/day as of 12/05/1302 
(Calendar of Close Rolls, i, p. 406). He was ordered to be removed from the castle of Blaye on 03/0111301 and 
taken to Portchester castle, Hampshire (CDS, ii, no. 1185) and tllen on 12/0511301 to be taken from Portchester to 
Winchester castle, (CDS, ii, no. 1203). A writ was issued on 28/0 111302 to pay his allowance as a prisoner of war 
at Winchester castle (CDS, ii, no. 1283) and another of the same was issued on 23/02/1302 (CDS, ii, no. 1294) He 
evidently came to Edward 1's peace before the coup of Robert I since he was serving as a knightlman-at-arms at 
Ayr in the summer of 1307 (CDS, ii, no. 1961). 
PeroneI, RR homager, county of Berwick shire 
Robert, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. 
Aline, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. 
Sir Alan, A prisoner of war in the summer of 1304, he was to be kept particularly secure (CDS, ii, no. 1668) 
presumably the same as-
Alan, recipient of a safe conduct to England from Edward III in November 1333 (CDS, iii, no. 1099) 
Sir Nicholas, lost his horse while serving as a knightlman-at-arms under Sir Robert Clifford in November 1311 
(CDS, iii, no. 278) son and heir of Robert, above 
William. received a grant from Robert I on 20/l01I309 of the Barony of Boulton East Lothian and Langton, 
Berwickshire eRRS, v, p. 298) His lands in Boulton were given to Alexander Moubray by Edward II in April 1312 
(CDS, iii; no. 263). He was forteited of his barony of Carden or Carriden (CDS, iii, p, 340) in 1335 and of the 
demesne lands ofCarriden worth flO on 15/12/36 (CDS, iii, p.290) 
Thomas, esq., serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1336 (CDS, iii, p.362) 
John, resigned (date unknown) the Barony of Bolton, East Lothian, which was re-granted by David II to Walter 
Haliburton on 091I2.1353 (fiRS, vi, p.153) 
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WIGGEMORE 
John, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. He swore homage to Edward I with the other burgesses of Edinburgh 
in 1291 (CDS, ii, no. 820). 
Henry, torfeited ofland worth 13s 4d in Edinburgh in 1335-36 (CDS, iii, p.346). 
John. Scottish merchant in prison at Scarborough before 07/09/1326 (CDS, iii, no. 887) Alderman of Edinburgh 
in 1335 (CDS, iii, no. 1186) he paid 53s 4d on 1511211336 and £4 l3s 3 112d on 25/01ll337 to the English 
exchequer (CDS, iii, no. 1247). He was collector of the great custom of Edinburgh and raised £13 3s Sd. on wool 
and hides. The issues of Haddington - £8 6s 8d - collected by the bailiffs of the town, were also delivered by John 
(CDS, iii, no. 1247) and he received (15/12/1337) £6 13s 4d (10 merks) for his expenses 'making extents and 
inquisitions' in Edinburgh county (CDS, iii, no. 1271) He was serving as a man-at-arms in Edinburgh Castle 
garrison in 1337 (CDS, iii, p.363). He was joint collector of customs for Edinburgh and Leith in 1337 (CDS, iii, 
Nos. 1247, 1251). Jo1m collected £12 2s 6d in customs for Edward III in 1337-8, TNA, E10l/331/32. He might 
be the same man as 
John recipient of a charter of David II on 24112/1368, purpose unknown, (RRS, vi, p.443). 
ZOUCHE, DE LA, 
Elena, RR homager, county of Edinburgh. An inquisition was held in August 1296 into her lands in Tranent, 
Fauside, Niddry and Ca1der-C1ere (CDS, ii, no. 824). Elena owned several other properties; in Lauder, 
Berwickshire, Girton, Dumfriesshire, Mauhinton, Wigtonshire and Dysart, Fife ibid. 
Alan, aged 24 in August 1296, heir of Elena, son of Sir Roger (d.) (CDS, ii p.452). His land at Dreghorn, 
Ayrshire, was taken into Edward 1's hands for failure to perform military service and returned 55s 4d. His 
tenements in the Burgh of Irvine, also in Edward's hands and presumably for the same reason, returned 17s 6d 
and his other lands at Dreghorn a further 33s 4d, each of these being co-owned with Sir William Ferrars (CDS, ii, 
no. 1608). Described as "the late" Alan in l314, his daughter Maud and her husband Sir Robert de Holand were 
recorded as having purparty of his lands (CDS, iii, no. 386). Land at Fauside formerly held by him was granted by 
Robert I to Sir Alexander Seton on 2110411321 (RRS, v, p.538) 
Sir William, Sir William was paid for his service as a knightlman-at-arrns in 1307 guarding the Burgh of Ayr 
against the Bruces and for serving in a raid on Bruce in FebruarylMarch of that year. (CDS, ii, no. 1923) 
303 
William (d.28/05/36), holding lands in Tranent and Niddry through the minority of the (unnamed) heir (CDS, 
iii, p.371), Sir William's lands were in the king's hands in July 1337 (CDS, iii, p.387) as an escheat rather than a 
forfeiture. 
William, king's clerk in 1336 (CDS, iii, no. 1207). 
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RHS,S6 E93/94IS(1) RH6,100 
RHS,66 E39/94IS(11) RH6,104 
RHS,86 E39/94/8(1) RH6,10S 
RHS,90 E39/84/8(S) RH6,106 
RHS,98 E39/94/8(l4) RH6,107 
RHS,114 E99/100/146(2) RH6,112 
RHS,l1S E39/100/147(1) RH6,118 
RHS,120 E39/1 001150(1) RH6,119 
RHS,20S E39/100/188(8) RH6,120 
RHS,220 E3 9 1100/189 IS GD 12, Swinton family. 
RHS,227 GD 18. Clerks ofPenicuik. 
RHS,230 GD 26. Leslie family. 
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CD 28. Hay/de la Haye family. 
GD.40. Lindsay and Byset families. 
GD 82. MacGill/Makgill family. 
GD 84. Lindsay family. 
GD 122. Preston and Gilmours of Libert on. 
GD 164. Sinclair family. 
GD 430. Napier family. 
RH5,54 
GD 86. Fraser and Gourley families. 
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